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ABSTRACT 
 
Decentralisation and the Management of Ethnic Conflict:  
A Case Study of the Republic of Macedonia 
Aisling Lyon 
 
This thesis considers the extent to which decentralisation in the Republic of 
Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has been effective in reducing ethnic 
inequalities that exacerbate social divisions and can lead to conflict. Guided by 
the concept of horizontal inequalities, it identifies the factors which influenced 
the decision to devolve responsibilities to the municipalities after 2001. It 
examines the particular institutional design that Macedonian decentralisation 
took, and demonstrates how its use of local power-sharing mechanisms was 
intended to address the concerns of the Albanian and Macedonian communities 
simultaneously. This thesis takes an integrative approach to studying the 
political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralisation’s 
implementation, and considers whether the reform has indeed contributed to the 
reduction of inequalities between Macedonia’s ethnic groups. Where 
decentralisation’s potential has not been reached, obstacles to its successful 
implementation are identified. 
 
While decentralisation alone may be unable to address all of the grievances 
raised by the Albanian community prior to 2001, this thesis argues that the 
reform has the potential to address many of the horizontal inequalities that were 
responsible for raising inter-ethnic tensions during the 1990s. However, 
decentralisation in Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has only been partial, 
  ii 
and advances in the administrative and political aspects of the reform have 
been undermined by limited progress in its fiscal dimension. Attempts to solve 
self-determination conflicts through decentralisation will fail if local self-
governance exists only in form but not in substance. 
 
 
Keywords: Municipal decentralisation, Macedonia, ethnic conflict,  
complex power-sharing, consociationalism, horizontal inequalities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the extent to which decentralisation in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has been effective in 
reducing ethnic inequalities that exacerbate social divisions and can lead to 
conflict.1 Macedonia experienced ethnic conflict during the spring and summer 
of 2001, when intense fighting broke out between ethnic Albanian insurgents 
(the Albanian National Liberation Army) and state security forces.2 Hostilities 
were concentrated in the north and west of the country, where significant 
Albanian communities reside, and the insurgents claimed to be fighting to 
improve the rights of fellow Albanians living in Macedonia. The conflict 
culminated in the signing of the internationally-sponsored Ohrid Framework 
Agreement in August 2001, within which decentralisation was a major 
component.3 Decentralisation is held to improve inter-ethnic relations in multi-
ethnic states by allowing territorially concentrated local communities the 
possibility of realising their aspirations for internal self-determination, whilst also 
maintaining the territorial integrity of the existing unitary state.  
 
Guided by the concept of horizontal inequalities, this thesis identifies the factors 
unique to Macedonia which influenced the decision to devolve responsibilities to 
the municipalities after 2001. It examines the particular institutional design that 
Macedonian decentralisation took, and demonstrates how its use of local 
power-sharing mechanisms was intended to address the concerns of the 
                                                          
1
 Hereafter referred to as ‘Macedonia’.  
2
 Hereafter, Macedonia’s ethnic communities (ethnic Albanian, ethnic Turkish, etc.) are referred to as 
‘Albanian’, ‘Turkish’, etc. Where the term ‘Macedonian community’ is used, it refers to the majority, Slavic 
ethnic group. 
3
 Hereafter referred to as the ‘Framework Agreement’. 
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Albanian and Macedonian communities simultaneously. The research takes an 
integrative approach to studying the political, administrative, and fiscal 
dimensions of decentralisation’s implementation, and considers whether the 
reform has indeed contributed to the reduction of inequalities between 
Macedonia’s ethnic groups. Where decentralisation’s potential has not been 
reached, obstacles to its successful implementation are identified. 
 
Research into how decentralisation to the local level may facilitate the peaceful 
management of ethnic conflict has generally been neglected by scholars. 
However, the emerging practice of complex power-sharing has given studies of 
local government decentralisation a new sense of urgency and significance. 
Studies on local government decentralisation are also needed given the 
international community’s reluctance to accept changes to international 
boundaries, to grant minorities group rights in general and autonomy in 
particular, and of the bad press given to multi-national federations.4 Importantly, 
not all ethnic conflicts are secessionist in nature, or that the geographical 
dispersal of a state’s ethnic populations lends itself to either federalism or 
regional autonomy. This thesis’s focus on the implementation, rather than just 
the design, of local government decentralisation in Macedonia will contribute to 
a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing different forms of 
decentralisation. 
 
While decentralisation alone may be unable to address all of the grievances 
raised by the Albanian community prior to 2001, this thesis argues that the 
                                                          
4
 According to Francesco Palermo (2012, 83, 90), between 1993 and 2012 no new autonomy regime was 
established (not only in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe but, with minor exceptions such as 
Greenland or Bolivia, in the whole world). In the work of international organisations, autonomy is usually 
considered from the perspective of maintaining the status quo: where existing, it has been (moderately) 
endorsed; where not granted, it has been (moderately) discouraged. 
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reform has the potential to address many of the horizontal inequalities that were 
responsible for raising inter-ethnic tensions during the 1990s. However, if 
academics and policymakers want decentralisation in Macedonia to work more 
effectively, greater attention should be paid to the political environment within 
which the reform is being implemented. As this research demonstrates, the 
success of decentralisation may depend as much on contextual factors as on 
the design of any particular reform model. This research also indicates that 
decentralisation in Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has only been partial, 
and advances in the administrative and political aspects of the reform have 
been undermined by limited progress in its fiscal dimension. Attempts to solve 
self-determination conflicts through decentralisation will fail if local self-
governance exists only in form but not in substance. 
 
 
Defining Decentralisation 
 
This thesis focuses on only one of a variety of territorial self-governance 
arrangements available for the management ethnopolitical conflict: 
decentralisation to the local government level. Other common forms of territorial 
self-governance not examined in this research are federalism, autonomy, and 
devolution.5 I define decentralisation as a process by which central-local relations 
are restructured in a unitary state, through the devolution of competences from 
the national to local levels of government (GTZ 2006, 5; Braathen et al. 2008, 3; 
Grasa and Camps 2009, 21). This process is understood as being a mechanism 
for sharing power vertically between central and local government in the 
                                                          
5
 In this context, the term ‘devolution’ denotes the decentralisation of specific competences to a selected 
territory or territories in an otherwise unitary state. Examples include the United Kingdom (Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales), and Spain (Catalonia, Basque Country, etc.) (Wolff 2010, 10). 
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following three dimensions: political, administrative, and fiscal. It is guided by 
the principle of subsidiarity, which entails the exercise of public responsibilities 
by those authorities that are closest to citizens (CoE 1985, Art. 4.3).  
 
Political decentralisation refers to the transfer of political authority to the local 
level through the establishment of elected local governments. It also 
encompasses procedures aimed at increasing the participation of citizens and 
civil society in local decision-making processes (Grasa and Camps 2009, 21). 
Administrative decentralisation involves the devolution of functional 
responsibilities to municipalities, such as the provision of basic public services, 
along with their bureaucratic structures. Importantly, it does so without removing 
their accountability to central government. It may also entail the devolution of 
decision-making authority over these competences, but this is not a necessary 
condition (Faletti 2009, 329). Finally, fiscal decentralisation entails the transfer 
of financial authority from the central to local level and is essential if institutions 
are to exercise public policy functions autonomously. It involves a set of policies 
designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of local governments and 
can assume the following forms: an increase of transfers from the central 
government, the creation of new sub-national taxes, and/or the delegation of tax 
collection authority that was previously national (ibid., 329). 
 
Decentralisation requires the devolution of competences from the national to 
local levels of government. It enables locally elected representatives to freely 
exercise their authority and carry out their functions, based on the confidence 
that the central government places in them (Siegle and O’Mahony 2007). In this 
respect it differs significantly from forms of deconcentrated or delegated 
  5 
governance. When responsibilities are merely deconcentrated, power is not 
transferred to locally elected representatives, but rather to centrally appointed 
officials operating at the local level. Consequently, central government 
maintains control over resources and local priorities (Grasa and Camps 2009, 
23). In contrast, the delegation of central government competences to elected 
local governments means that some local autonomy may be retained in their 
implementation. However, these competences remain the ultimate responsibility 
of central government and can therefore be retracted at any time. 
 
While decentralisation reforms may entail the extensive devolution of power to 
local governments, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that these self-
governing entities remain ultimately subordinate to the authority of central 
government.6 Unlike in federal systems of governance, sovereignty is not 
divided in decentralised unitary states. Unitary states may possess national and 
sub-national tiers of government, but in the event of conflict, the national 
government remains constitutionally sovereign. Executive decisions and 
legislation passed centrally cannot be overruled by lower government levels 
(Norris 2008, 168). Similarly, devolved responsibilities can, in principle, be 
withdrawn at any time and without the need for local consent. The 
decentralisation of power to local communities is therefore a “matter of grace, 
not [a] right” (Elazar 1976, 13). 
 
The absence of a constitutionally entrenched guarantee, which requires the 
consent of all government tiers to authorise amendments, is one of the key 
features of decentralisation that distinguishes it from other forms of territorial 
                                                          
6
 The degree of devolved authority may in fact be greater than in federal or autonomous units. 
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self-governance, principally federalism (Rothchild and Hartzell 2000, 261; 
Coakley 2001, 299; Wolff 2010a, 10). Irrespective of the degree of autonomy 
awarded to decentralised local units, their authority remains vulnerable to the 
encroachment of central governments. Other attributes of federalism that are 
missing in decentralised states are: bicameral legislatures, where the second 
chamber represents the sub-national level centrally and may compensate 
smaller units through over-representation; independent mechanisms of judicial 
review, with supreme arbitral authority to settle disputes over the constitution 
and inter-governmental relations; and exclusive legislative and judicial powers 
(Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 9). Decentralisation also differs from autonomy in 
that the reforms are not generally of an ethnic nature (Young 1998, 60).7 Ruth 
Lapidoth (1997, 174-5), a leading expert on autonomous arrangements, defines 
territorial autonomy as “an arrangement aimed at granting a certain degree of 
self- identification to a group that differs from the majority of the population in 
the state, and yet constitutes the majority in a specific region”. Finally, 
decentralisation differs from autonomy (as well as devolution) in that it requires 
territorial sub-divisions across the entire state territory (Wolff 2010a, 10). 
 
                                                          
7
 Autonomy can also be granted on a non-territorial or ‘personal’ basis. 
  7 
Figure 1.1: Centralisation / Decentralisation Continuum of Territorial  
Self-Governance Arrangements8 
 
 
 
 
Why Do Governments Decentralise? 
 
If the enhanced autonomy spatially concentrated groups acquire through 
decentralisation comes at the expense of central government control, why do 
states choose to decentralise? It is an accepted fact that most decentralising 
states, particularly those which are unitary rather than federal, have conceived 
and implemented decentralisation reforms on their own initiative (‘top-down 
decentralisation’), and have been relatively free of pressure from below (Manor 
1999, 43; Dickovick 2011, 35).9 Where then does the enthusiasm for 
decentralisation come from? The motives behind decentralisation, notes Paul 
Smoke (2010, 194), are “often much more complex and may be rather less 
benign”, but are crucial to understand since they have a direct bearing on the 
                                                          
8
 This illustration represents only an approximation of the degree to which different forms of territorial self-
governance are either centralised or decentralised. Levels of autonomy will differ depending on the extent 
to which responsibility is devolved. Wolff (2010, 9) defines a confederation as a relatively rare form of 
voluntary association of sovereign member states. Some competences are pooled by treaty, but executive 
power is not usually granted to the confederal level of government. An example of a confederation is 
Switzerland. 
9
 According to Manor (1999, 31), enthusiasm often develops after decentralisation has taken place, rather 
than beforehand. 
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ways in which reforms are designed and implemented, and on their long-term 
prospect of success. Decentralisation motivated only by short-term goals is 
more likely to be obstructed and/or reversed at a later date (Shah and 
Thompson 2004, 22). 
 
Putting aside the exogenous pressures that regional and international 
organisations may place on developing countries to decentralise, devolution to 
sub-national levels can bring many recognised benefits to central governments. 
When threatened with secessionist attempts, federalism, or even partition of the 
state, decentralisation can appear as an attractive way of preserving state 
integrity, of regaining control of remote areas, and of integrating separatist 
movements (Litvack et al. 1998, 108; Schou and Haug 2005, 18; Braathen and 
Bjerkreim Hellevik 2008, 15). Decentralisation to the local level, rather than to 
regional or federal institutions, may be employed to deliberately fragment the 
local power bases of secessionist groups into smaller, weaker, politically 
insignificant units (Horowitz 2000, 646; Crook 2002, 300; Ejobowah 2008). 
Decentralisation may also be used as a mechanism for rejuvenating imperilled 
governments and for gaining countrywide acceptance of state institutions 
(Boone 2003, 375; Lake and Rothchild 2005, 122). Finally, central governments 
may decentralise in times of economic crises in order to reduce government 
expenditure levels and budget deficits by offloading responsibility for providing 
expensive public services onto local bodies (Eaton 2004, 11; Manor 1999, 109; 
Scott 2009, 7). 
 
Some scholars have questioned the tendency of researchers to under-
emphasise and misperceive the political (rather than fiscal or administrative) 
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motives of national politicians when researching decentralisation initiatives 
(Manor 1999, 53). Since most politicians are generally pre-occupied with 
protecting and enhancing their own influence, political considerations often take 
precedence over other concerns. For example, political parties in central 
governments may recognise decentralisation as a strategy for mobilising and 
strengthening local power bases, and of extending their patronage networks 
(Manor 1999, 44; Boone 2003; Khemani 2010). Although scholars have found 
no connection between political party decisions to decentralise and their 
ideological convictions, Kathleen O’Neill’s research into decentralisation 
processes in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela does however 
suggest a link between the adoption of reforms and the electoral concerns of 
parties (O’Neill 2003; 2005).10 The premise of her argument is as follows:  
 
Viewed through the lens of electoral motivations, decentralising reform 
can be reconciled with the power-seeking motives of politicians: A party 
distributes political and fiscal power to the arenas in which their political 
allies seem most likely to gain control of it. When political parties predict 
that they will be unable to control central power in a centralised 
governing structure and also predict that they could win a substantial 
proportion of subnational offices were they contested democratically, 
decentralisation becomes more attractive. Its attractiveness lies in the 
party’s ability to hold real power at subnational levels even as it loses 
control of the centre. 
                                                                                    (ibid. 2003, 1087) 
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 J. Tyler Dickovick’s research on Brazil, South Africa, Peru, and Senegal finds no empirical evidence to 
suggest a link between decentralisation and economic liberalisers or with left-wing politicians, given the 
policy’s association with participation and local action (Dickovick 2011, 24-25). 
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Decentralisation may therefore require a “calculation of trade-offs”, whereby the 
parties in government balance relinquishing some of the power it holds in the 
present against the opportunity to compete for decentralised power in the future 
(Rodríguez 1997). 
 
 
Threats to Successful Decentralisation 
 
The prominent role political considerations potentially play in the decision of 
national politicians to decentralise may affect the long-term success of reforms 
in the following ways. First, hastily developed reforms, created in response to a 
political crisis or conflict, are more likely to lack broad-based political support 
and may result in the adoption of superficial frameworks or outright opposition 
during implementation (Smoke 2007, 135). Similarly, if decentralisation has 
been imposed on a country by external agencies, these reforms are also likely 
to lack legitimacy in the eyes of both majority and minority communities and 
may become vulnerable to centripetalist tendencies. Peace, observe David 
Lake and Donald Rothchild (2005, 110), consolidates majority power, and over 
time majority communities may use its political strength to recentralise state 
authority and resources.  
 
Second, if the decision to decentralise has been based on the short-term 
political calculations of governing parties (greater electoral strength at the local 
rather than national level), the fate of reforms may be sealed if the fortunes of 
these same parties are reversed at a later date (Eaton 2001, 103). Likewise, the 
sustainability of decentralisation may be undermined if an alternative party with 
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strong support at the national level is re-elected and believes it would benefit 
from recentralising power (Manor 1999, 60; O’Neill 2005, 23; Dickovick 2011, 
10). This is what David Lake and Donald Rothchild (2005, 128) refer to as the 
“transient majority problem”. They observe: “no present majority can bind a 
future majority. Territorial decentralisation offered today can be retracted 
tomorrow”. Finally, if the reforms are a result of negotiations between national 
representatives rather than grassroots pressure from below (as they are in most 
unitary states), the interests that benefit most from decentralisation are rarely 
sufficiently organised to defend against the reform’s reversal (Eaton 2001, 123). 
 
Genuine support for decentralisation at the national level can also vary within 
political parties and across government. Despite reforms being formally 
endorsed by their party, national politicians may resist devolving political and 
fiscal power to local counterparts since these individuals are likely to be their 
political rivals (ibid., 117).11 Similarly, ministries and their bureaucrats have few 
incentives to work cooperatively across government and with the sub-national 
level. Indeed, decentralisation undermines line ministry control over substantial 
resources and there may well be competition between ministries for control of 
the decentralisation agenda and resources (Boone 2003, 135). If the Ministry of 
Finance, for example, is on record as favouring decentralisation, explains Roy 
Bahl (1999, 27), it is likely to be a very controlled form of decentralisation with 
the local level experiencing limited freedom to set tax rates or borrow capital, as 
well as stringent expenditure mandates. Table 1.1 illustrates the possible 
competing interests in decentralisation across government. It is based on an 
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 In Macedonia, as elsewhere, a politician often begins their political career at the local level before 
choosing to compete in national elections once their reputation has been established. 
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analysis by Bahl, but has been adapted to better suit a decentralised, rather 
than federal context.  
 
Table 1.1: Champions of and Challengers to Decentralisation  
  
Potentially Strong 
Supporters 
Comment 
Citizens and locally elected 
representatives 
Demand for more participation in local governance 
Parliament 
MPs would like to identify with specific local projects which 
they can “bring home”; favour a less transparent, 
discretionary system 
Urban and wealthier 
municipalities 
Often concerned with how their autonomy is restricted and 
how access to their tax base is limited 
Potentially Weak 
Supporters 
 
Ministry of Finance 
Advocate strict limits to fiscal decentralisation in order to 
maintain control of the main fiscal tools for stabilisation 
policy purposes 
Ministry of Economy 
Wish to control the types of investments made, in addition 
to their regional distribution 
Line Ministries 
Would like to control public service delivery standards and 
maintain ultimate approval or sign-off power over initiatives 
Ambivalent Supporters  
Ministry of Local Self-
Government 
Favours a greater guaranteed fiscal share for 
municipalities, but would like to control the distribution of 
these resources 
Rural and less wealthy 
municipalities 
Are more interested in fiscal equalisation systems than 
local tax systems and would like a guaranteed transfer of 
resources from urban and wealthier municipalities to the 
rest 
   Source: Bahl 1999, 26. 
 
 
The pace of implementing decentralisation is therefore an important 
consideration which may undermine the reform’s long-term success. 
Recentralisation, observe Shah and Thompson for the World Bank (2004, 20), 
is more likely to occur if the process of decentralisation is implemented 
gradually. A steady, as opposed to a ‘Big Bang’ approach, such as the reform 
process implemented in Indonesia after 1998, may be justified by the fear of 
weak local capacity or low levels of civic participation. However, the slow pace 
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of reforms may give opponents of decentralisation an opportunity to regroup 
and build support to circumvent it. 
 
Regardless of the motives of political parties and central government 
bureaucracies concerning decentralisation, important pre-conditions for 
successful reforms also include a general commitment to popular participation 
and support for bottom-up decision-making (Kälin 1999, 59; Blunt and Turner 
2005, 77). Central government must be genuinely prepared to share power with 
sub-national units, and both the central and local levels must regard each other 
as equal partners in an on-going process. Sufficient local capacity to implement 
the devolved competences effectively is also crucial, and concern about under-
performing local governments is the case most frequently invoked against 
decentralisation (Litvack et al. 1998, 122; Illner 1998). Impatience, observes 
Manor (1999, 72), very often destroys the considerable promise of 
decentralisation. Finally, democracy and the presence of a vibrant, inclusive 
civil society within which participatory local governance may flourish are other 
important pre-conditions for successful decentralisation (Manor 1999, 55; 
Tranchant 2007, 3; Barter 2008, 3). 
 
This introductory chapter will now demonstrate how this thesis addresses 
important gaps in the literature, and will explain the methodological approach 
adopted during this research project. The chapter will end by providing an 
overview of the thesis and its key arguments. 
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Literature Review 
 
This research fits within the existing bodies of literature on institutional design in 
ethnically divided societies, and on territorial self-governance as a mechanism 
for managing ethnic conflict. The thesis makes an original contribution to these 
fields through a study of decentralisation in Macedonia. Four trends are 
apparent from a survey of the current literature. First, the substantial literature 
on state-building and institutional design in divided societies has been 
dominated by studies of power-sharing at the state level and, more precisely, 
consociationalism. However, developments in the liberal consociational 
literature, along with the emerging practice of complex power-sharing, have 
made this body of literature more relevant to studies of territorial self-
governance, and in particular decentralisation. By its very nature, the 
institutional design literature is preoccupied with debates concerning the merits 
of particular design features and normative arguments, rather than exploring the 
many obstacles that may arise in the implementation phase. Second, the 
literature on territorial self-governance and conflict management is dominated 
by studies of federalism and regional autonomy, rather than of the devolution of 
power to the local level. Where empirical evidence does exists, scholars have 
generally been preoccupied with assessing whether ‘decentralisation’ (in its 
broadest sense) either exacerbates or inhibits ethnic conflict and secessionist 
tendencies, rather than examining under what conditions decentralisation is 
most likely to work. Third, the literature on local government decentralisation is 
dominated by studies of political, administrative, or fiscal decentralisation, rather 
than research which takes an integrated approach to all three aspects. 
Empirical studies also focus mainly on countries in Latin America and in Africa, 
rather than on Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the literature on local 
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government decentralisation does not generally focus on post-conflict 
environments. Empirical evidence to support policy assumptions, particularly 
with regard to fiscal decentralisation, is therefore limited.   
 
 
State-building and Institutional Design in Divided Societies 
 
There is general agreement among scholars about the importance of 
institutional design as a means of promoting sustainable peace in deeply 
divided societies (Wolff 2010b, 129). Stefan Wolff and Christalla Yakinthou 
(2012, 4) have identified three principal areas where institutions may have an 
impact on managing conflict in ethnically divided societies. The first is the 
state’s overall construction, which relates to the territorial organisation of the 
state and whether it should adopt a unitary, federal, or hybrid form. The second 
area is the institutions of government, the composition and powers of its 
executive, legislative and judicial branches, and the relationship between them. 
Finally, questions of institutional design are also concerned with the rights and 
identities of individual citizens and groups, and the extent to which they should 
be privileged. The normative debate concerning these three aspects of 
institutional design has dominated the literature for many decades and has 
involved advocates of consociationalism and their opponents; namely 
centripetalists and supporters of power-dividing techniques. The debate is 
relevant to this thesis since an examination of Macedonia’s particular 
decentralisation design in Chapter 2 demonstrates how these different 
approaches to power-sharing have been combined in order to address the 
opposing concerns of the Albanian and Macedonian communities 
simultaneously. 
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“[I]n the guise of ‘power-sharing’”, observed Brendan O’Leary (2005, 10), 
consociationalism has become the prescribed method of conflict regulation of 
the international community. It is associated with the work of Arend Lijphart 
(1977, 1999, 2002, 2008), and more recently with John McGarry and Brendan 
O’Leary (2004; 2011; O’Leary 2005; McGarry 2008). Its approach is to explicitly 
recognise segmental cleavages between different ethnic groups and to turn 
them into constructive elements of stable democracy (Lijphart 1977, 42). 
Lijphart’s initial consociational framework included the following features: grand 
coalition of political parties representing all major segments in a divided society; 
proportionality in legislative and executive bodies, and within the public 
administration and allocation of public funds; minority veto rights on all essential 
decisions; arbitration mechanisms; and segmental autonomy (ibid.).12 Most of 
these techniques have been incorporated into Macedonia’s decentralisation 
design, as well as the wider Framework Agreement of 2001. According to this 
approach, federalism also offers an excellent opportunity for group autonomy; 
particularly if groups are geographically concentrated and if state boundaries 
coincide as much as possible with ethnic boundaries (Lijphart 2002, 51).13 
 
In contrast, centripetalism, which is associated with Donald Horowitz (1991; 
2000; 2002), Timothy Sisk (1996), and Benjamin Reilly (2001; 2012), adopts a 
more integrative approach to power-sharing. Rather than replicate existing 
ethnic divisions in the legislature and executive, this theory suggests that the 
best way to manage democracy in divided societies is to design institutional 
                                                          
12
 Lijphart has since simplified this model. The two primary elements are executive power-sharing and 
group autonomy, especially in the areas of education and culture. Secondary characteristics are 
proportionality and mutual veto (Lijphart 2002, 38-39). 
13
 Non-territorial or personal autonomy is also “distinctly consociational” (O’Leary 2008, 55). According to 
Ephraim Nimni (2007, 357), Lijphart showed “considerable sympathy” for this approach, since it 
emphasises the individual’s right to elect the community she/he wishes to belong to. 
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incentives for cross-ethnic behaviour that will encourage accommodation 
between rival groups (Reilly 2012, 57).14 Examples include majoritarian 
electoral systems based on vote-pooling rather than proportional 
representation, such as the alternative vote or the single transferable vote, and 
heterogeneous territorial units where no one ethnic group represents an overall 
majority, and which “proliferate points of power” (Horowitz 2000, 598; 2007, 
964). As the discussion in Chapter 2 illustrates, some elements of integrative 
power-sharing also feature in Macedonia’s decentralisation design. 
 
Finally, advocates of power-dividing, namely Philip Roeder and Donald 
Rothchild (2005; Roeder, 2012), recognise that while power-sharing 
(consociational or integrative) may be an attractive short-term mechanism to 
facilitate an end to conflict, the very same institutions are unlikely to consolidate 
peace and democracy over the longer term. Instead, they propose the division 
of state powers between government and civil society, and the distribution of 
those responsibilities left to government among separate, independent organs 
which represent crosscutting “multiple-majorities” (Roeder 2005, 61; 2012, 66). 
Such divisions, they propose, ‘lower the stakes in politics’ and protect against a 
monopoly of power by the majority. The approach is in direct opposition to both 
consociational and integrative forms of power-sharing, since it is concerned with 
limiting the influence of ethnic groups in policy-making and encouraging civil 
society and private interests to meet the diverse needs of citizens (Wolff and 
Yakinthou 2012, 5). Attempts to enhance the direct participation of citizens in 
local decision-making processes (examined in Chapter 2), along with the role of 
school boards (discussed in Chapter 3), are both examples of how power-
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 Proponents believe approaches which institutionalise ethnic differences, such as consociationalism, 
generate centrifugal or fissiparous politics (McGarry 2008, 53). 
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dividing strategies have been incorporated into Macedonian decentralisation 
process. 
 
Efforts have been made to fill important gaps in traditional consociational 
literature, such as its narrow focus on political institutions at the expense of 
other crucial sectors, for example the police and security forces; the positive 
involvement of outside forces in the facilitation and implementation of political 
settlements; and, importantly, its neglect of self-determination conflicts 
(McGarry and O’Leary 2005; 2008, 383; 2011, 260; McGarry 2008, 694-701).15  
Liberal consociationalists such as John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary have 
increasingly emphasised the complementarity of consociational power-sharing 
and territorial forms of self-governance, as well as the possibility of combining it 
with power-dividing strategies  such as human rights legislation (Wolff 2010b, 
135; 2012, 23). The emerging practice of ‘complex power-sharing’, researched 
extensively by Stefan Wolff (2007; 2008; 2009; 2012) and Marc Weller (Weller 
et al. 2008), reflects a growing realisation among scholars and practitioners that 
neither central power-sharing or territorial self-government alone is likely to be 
sufficient to secure sustainable peace in areas where minorities are territorially 
concentrated (Horowitz 1993, 36; Rothchild and Hartzell 2000, 269; Hoodie and 
Hartzell 2005). An increasing number of peace agreements have combined 
territorial self-governance with various models of power-sharing at both the 
central and local levels. Examples include, but are not limited to, Bosnia and 
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 Developments in the liberal consociational literature have also attempted to address its centripetalist and 
power-dividing critics. For example, in response to claims that consociations further entrench pre-existing 
ethnic identities, O’Leary and McGarry have clarified the distinction between corporate and liberal 
consociational practice (O’Leary 2005; McGarry 2008). Further, regarding the claim that consociationalism 
is inherently undemocratic because it precludes opposition, O’Leary and McGarry have distinguished 
between complete, concurrent, and weak consociations (O’Leary 2005, 13; McGarry 2008, 708; McGarry, 
O’Leary, and Simeon 2008, 58). 
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Herzegovina (1995), Northern Ireland (1998), Macedonia (2001), and Kosovo 
(2007).  
 
Complex power-sharing remains under-theorised and, as with developments in 
traditional consociational literature, lacks empirical evidence of the difficulties 
that may arise during its implementation. Studies that examine which types of 
power-sharing institutions work best and under what conditions have to date 
only considered specific design features in isolation, rather than their combined 
use with other approaches to sharing power (see, for example Norris 2008).16 
This thesis is therefore both timely and essential since it focuses on the 
implementation of an important aspect of Macedonia’s Framework Agreement; 
an example of complex power-sharing. By researching in detail the 
implementation of decentralisation, including its local power-sharing 
mechanisms, and by identifying the obstacles that have arisen during this 
phase, this thesis addresses a significant gap in the current literature. 
 
 
Territorial Self-governance as a Mechanism of Conflict Management 
 
The challenge of addressing internal self-determination disputes through 
various territorial solutions has produced a sizable literature. Wolff defines the 
term ‘territorial self-governance’ as encompassing five distinct governance 
arrangements: confederation, federation, autonomy, devolution, and 
decentralisation (Wolff 2010a, 9). However, the literature on territorial self-
governance as a mechanism of conflict management has and continues to be 
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 Pippa Norris’ research (2008) examines the impact of different electoral systems, presidential and 
parliamentary executives, federalism and decentralisation, and the role of the free press on democracy in 
separate statistical analyses. 
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dominated by studies of federalism (in its various forms) and autonomy. 
Developments in the liberal consociational literature, along with the emerging 
practice of complex power-sharing, have created some interest in 
decentralisation to the local level. Nevertheless, the relationship between local 
government decentralisation and ethnic conflict management remains under-
researched. This thesis addresses these issues in depth. 
 
Of the extensive literature available on federalism and conflict management, a 
substantial proportion considers whether federalism either exacerbates or 
inhibits ethnic conflict and secessionist tendencies, rather than examining under 
what conditions decentralisation is most likely to work. Two further prominent 
debates in the literature on federalism, relevant to Chapter 6 which examines 
Macedonia’s experience with territorial reorganisation and of fiscal equalisation, 
concern the design of state boundaries and whether competences should be 
assigned symmetrically or asymmetrically. The former discussion involves those 
who favour multi-national or ‘pluri-national’ federations, where state boundaries 
coincide as much as possible with ethnic or group boundaries (see, for 
example, Lijphart 2002; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; Burgess and Pinder 2011); 
and those who advocate they should cut across ethnic boundaries, “proliferate 
points of power”, and foster inter-ethnic collaboration (see Horowitz 1985, 2002; 
Elazar 1994; Lake and Rothchild 2005, 130). The latter debate on symmetry 
considers whether states should ‘offer the best deal’ to regions most at risk of 
seceding (McGarry 2007; Hechter 2007; and Weller and Hobbs (2010) for 
examples of asymmetric autonomy settlements).  
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Scholars who argue that carefully designed federal structures reduce the 
likelihood of ethnic mobilisation by allowing territorially concentrated groups a 
meaningful degree of self-government include Lijphart (1977, 2002), Gurr 
(2000), and McGarry and O’Leary (2005). Successful cases commonly cited in 
support of this claim include Switzerland, Canada, Belgium and South Africa. In 
contrast, others, such as Nordlinger (1972), Bunce (2004), Hale (2004), Roeder 
and Rothchild (2005), and Brancati (2006, 2008), argue that federalism is 
subject to strong centripetal and centrifugal pulls and is therefore likely to fail in 
the long run.17 Cases commonly cited to validate this claim are Yugoslavia, the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.18 While most of its opponents emphasise 
how federalism builds “microstates and regimes in-the-making”, David Lake and 
Donald Rothchild are almost alone in pointing out what they regard as the 
“transient majorities problem”; a theme particularly pertinent to this review of 
Macedonian decentralisation (Bunce 2004, 156; Lake and Rothchild 2005, 128). 
The thesis contributes to the literature on territorial self-governance and conflict 
management by researching a case where political, administrative and fiscal 
responsibilities have been devolved to the local government level, rather than to 
a federal unit or autonomous region(s). Until now, the relationship between local 
government decentralisation and ethnic conflict management has been 
neglected in the literature. 
 
The literature on federalism and autonomy has evolved over the years and has 
begun to consider the conditions under which both approaches are most likely 
to succeed or fail. For example, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary  
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 Interestingly, Brancati argues that political decentralisation directly reduces the probability of anti-regime 
mobilisation and inter-communal conflict, but may also indirectly exacerbate secessionism by encouraging 
the growth of (ethno-) regional political parties. 
18
 McGarry and O’Leary (2005, 275) have argued that the major Communist federal failures were in fact 
sham or pseudo-federations and therefore not genuinely representative of their constituent parts. 
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(2005, 281-287; 2009; 2011, 260-262) have observed that pluralist federations 
are more likely to disintegrate if they are put together coercively rather than 
voluntarily, if they are undemocratic, and if minorities at the state level are 
mistreated. In contrast, pluralist federations are more likely to succeed if there is 
some sense of allegiance to the whole state and if there is a strong dominant 
nationality or Staatsvolk.19 Along with other supporters of liberal 
consociationalism and complex power-sharing, McGarry and O’Leary (2011, 
260) also argue that territorial self-governance arrangements should be 
accompanied by consociational power-sharing within central or federal 
institutions.  
 
Similarly, for autonomy, Yash Ghai (2000, 14-24) has observed how self-
governance arrangements are more likely to succeed if no dispute exists over 
state sovereignty, if arrangements include an independent dispute settlement 
mechanism, and in states with established traditions of democracy and the rule 
of law. Since the design features of decentralisation (to the local level) differ 
significantly from those of autonomy and federalism, (it is not merely a diluted 
version of either approach), the circumstances under which decentralisation is 
most likely to succeed or fail undoubtedly differ. However, these dissimilarities 
remain under-researched. This thesis’s focus on the implementation, rather 
than just the design, of local government decentralisation in Macedonia will 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing different 
forms of decentralisation in the longer term. 
                                                          
19
 Other favourable circumstances factors cited by McGarry and O’Leary are appropriately dispersed 
economic prosperity, more than two federal units, and where international agents and nearby states have 
a strong interest in holding the relevant state together (2011, 261-262). See also Hechter (2004) and 
Horowitz (2007) for further discussions on enabling conditions. 
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Decentralisation to the Local Level 
 
The literature on local government decentralisation is extensive and covers a 
broad selection of issues. They range from the deepening of local democracy 
and civic participation, to poverty reduction and the implementation of ‘pro-poor’ 
policies, enhanced local accountability and transparency, and the efficient 
provision of basic public services. The impact of clientelism and political 
patronage on the effectiveness of decentralisation reforms is another popular 
theme in the literature and is particularly relevant to this thesis (see, for 
example, Keefer 2005; Chanie 2007; Barter 2008; and Lambright 2011). In 
addition, an almost entirely separate body of work exists on fiscal 
decentralisation (Oates 1972; Bahl 1999; and Dickovick 2011). Fiscal studies 
are generally preoccupied with issues related to the attainment of local revenue 
autonomy, economies of scale in the delivery of services, and the maintenance 
of macroeconomic stability at the national level. Less frequently discussed 
themes which are however addressed in this thesis are the importance of 
achieving local government autonomy over spending decisions, fiscal 
equalisation between sub-national units, and the appraisal of fiscal 
decentralisation from a political economy perspective. As with the literature on 
power-sharing, federalism, and on autonomy, discussions of all the above-
mentioned issues have become more sophisticated over time. Research that 
argues either in favour or against decentralisation’s ability to achieve particular 
improvements has been gradually surpassed by studies that are more realistic 
and critical of the reform’s potential, and which emphasise the conditions 
required for dececentralisation to succeed (see, for example, Devas and Delay 
2006 and Connerley et al. 2010). 
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Often, individual pieces of academic research, covering an array of different 
themes and geographic areas, are brought together in edited volumes (see, for 
example, Bardham and Mookherjee 2006, and Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). 
Frequently examined case studies include countries in Latin America 
(Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru), Africa (South Africa, Uganda, and Rwanda), 
and Asia (Indonesia, India, and China). Alternatively, a selection of studies may 
be organised around a particular theme, for example on local democracy (Crook 
and Manor 1998), or on effective service delivery (Ahmad and Brosio 2009). A 
large number of policy papers have also been published by international and 
bilateral agencies, which take a more generic approach to decentralisation-
related themes and tend to be based on secondary, rather than primary 
sources. Particularly useful publications include those developed by the United 
Nations (UNDP 2004a; Kauzya 2005), the World Bank (Litvack et al. 1998; 
Burki et al. 1999; Ahmad et al. 2005), USAID (2009), and the German agency 
GTZ (2006).20 Studies of decentralisation in Central and Eastern Europe are 
however rare, with the exception of research published by the Soros 
Foundation’s Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (Kandeva 
2001; Péteri 2006). By focusing on the experiences of a former Yugoslav 
republic, this research makes an important contribution to currently limited 
literature of decentralisation in Eastern Europe and in former communist-ruled 
countries. 
 
In both the academic and policy literature, in-depth case studies of a particular 
country’s experience with decentralisation are uncommon, with the exception of 
De Visser (2005) and Lambright (2011), and are limited to book chapters and 
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 ‘GTZ’ is an acronym for Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Society for Technical 
Cooperation). It was renamed Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for 
International Cooperation / GIZ) in 2011. 
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journal articles. Research into how reforms may unevenly affect different parts 
of a country, such as urban and rural areas, is also unusual.21 Finally, studies 
which address the political, administrative and fiscal aspects of decentralisation 
simultaneously are lacking in the current literature. Economists only research 
fiscal relations between the different levels of government and local economic 
development, while political scientists focus their attention on issues of 
institutional design, election results, inter-governmental relations, and 
accountability mechanisms. Given the multifaceted nature of decentralisation 
reforms, it is surprising that few, if any, researchers have taken a more 
comprehensive, integrated approach to these three different dimensions.22  
This thesis makes important contributions to the literature on decentralisation by 
providing an in-depth, comprehensive assessment of how the reform’s 
implementation affects urban and rural areas within Macedonia differently. It 
also simultaneously examines the political, administrative and fiscal aspects of 
decentralisation and, in doing so, demonstrates how these different dimensions 
interrelate. 
 
As illustrated above, the literature on the ‘decentralisation’-conflict nexus (in its 
broadest sense) in ethnically divided societies has and continues to be 
dominated by studies of federalism and territorial autonomy. While the literature 
on local government decentralisation covers a wide range of issues, very few 
researchers have recognised the reform’s potential for contributing to the 
management of ethnic conflict. Some generic studies do however exist; for 
example, Kälin (2004), Kauzya (2005), Schou and Haug (2005), GTZ (2006), 
                                                          
21
 See, however, Bird and Ebel (2007) and Lessmann (2009) for interesting discussions of how fiscal 
decentralisation may exacerbate socio-economic dispatities. 
22
 Connerley et al. (2011, 186) advocate future researchers taking such an integrated approach to ensure 
that systemic qualities of decentralisation can be accurately assessed. 
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Siegle and O’Mahoney (2007) Braathen and Bjerkreim Hellevik (2008), 
Crawford and Hartmann (2009), Grasa and Camps (2009), and Connerley et al. 
(2010). Scholars have also acknowledged the relevance of other 
decentralisation-related themes, such as local democracy and poverty 
alleviation, for reducing inter-ethnic tensions (see, for example, Sisk 2001; and 
Crawford and Hartmann 2010).  
 
In addition, empirical case studies of decentralisation and its impact on conflict 
dynamics have been published on the following countries: Uganda (Green 
2008; Schelnberger 2010), Indonesia (Diprose 2008, 2009), Malawi (Tambulasi 
2009), South Africa (Hartmann 2010), Rwanda (van Tilburg 2010), and 
Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Monteux 2006). The last 
study, however, focuses only on issues of institutional design and not on the 
reform implementation. Research findings from these few empirical studies 
have so far been mixed. For example, Elliott Green’s research on Uganda found 
that decentralisation has helped to reduce inter-group conflict at the national 
level, but has instead increased locally-based disputes. Rachael Diprose’s 
research also found that the direct election of regional heads in Indonesia 
resulted in heightened local tensions through competition for power, but that 
decentralisation facilitated greater participation in local decision-making 
processes.23 No empirical studies concerning the implementation of 
decentralisation in Macedonia and its ability to contribute to sustainable peace 
exist. Research on the reform’s implementation when it represents part of a 
wider complex power-sharing package is also lacking. Finally, empirical studies 
that examine the impact of fiscal decentralisation on conflict dynamics are rare. 
                                                          
23
 Diprose’s research also argues that the redrawing of local administrative boundaries in Indonesia 
resulted in greater inter-community segregation.  
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This thesis will address all three of these under-researched themes and in doing 
so, aims to contribute to the current literature. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Methodological Approach 
 
This thesis examines in detail the cultural, historical, and political complexities 
that have influenced the implementation of decentralisation in Macedonia until 
March 2012. A case study approach to the research was deemed most 
appropriate, since case studies are designed to deal with the subtleties and 
intricacies of complex processes, rather than superficial descriptions of events 
and outcomes. They also take a holistic approach to a particular theme, and 
offer the opportunity to explain why certain outcomes happen, instead of just 
finding out what the outcomes were (Denscombe 2008, 36). Given the 
multifaceted nature of decentralisation reforms, which involve complex 
relationships between the different tiers of government, as well as between 
citizens and the state, the researcher is required to master several distinct 
policy areas. These include, but are not limited to, fiscal affairs, inter-ethnic 
relations, and political dynamics. 
   
As the preceding review of literature demonstrates, only a limited number of 
academic studies focus on decentralisation as a mechanism for managing ethnic 
conflict, and on Macedonia’s decentralisation reforms more generally. This thesis 
is therefore explorative in nature and develops emergent themes. The research 
also focuses on a phenomenon situated in the ‘real world’, and for this reason a 
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predominantly qualitative approach was taken to data collection. Quantifying 
social experiences inevitably oversimplifies complex phenomena and has the 
potential to ignore or even distort the subtleties of a situation (Blaikie 1993, 81; 
Denscombe 2008, 214). Case study methodology does, however, embrace 
multiple research methods and data sources. Accordingly, and where 
appropriate, quantitative data has also been utilised. Examples include the 
analyses of municipal budgets in Chapters 5 and 6 on fiscal autonomy and 
equalisation, and some survey data where broad comparisons of municipal 
experiences were required. 
 
This thesis adopts a Critical Realist approach to the research, which owes its 
foundational thinking to Roy Bhaskar (2008). Since data collection took place 
within the natural world as opposed to a sterile laboratory, the application of an 
epistemological framework that is comfortable with the “messy and ambiguous” 
was essential (Sayer, 2000: 5). Critical Realists propose a ‘stratified ontology’, 
which seeks to develop an understanding of competing mechanisms, some of 
which may not be observable or remain inactive at the time of observation, and 
of underlying structures which cause events (Robson, 2002: 30). This approach 
is therefore particularly suited to understanding the multifaceted nature of 
decentralisation, as well as the complexities associated with ethnic conflict. 
Finally, this research adheres to another principal characteristic of Critical 
Realist theory: a belief in the emancipatory potential of knowledge and its ability 
to improve a given situation or policy. This thesis includes observations 
regarding the optimum conditions under which decentralisation can promote 
sustainable peace in Macedonia. 
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It is not the intention of this research to offer generalisable findings that may be 
applicable in other contexts. To do so would contradict the Critical Realist 
approach to research, which rejects standard Humean attempts at regulating 
cause and effect.24 Instead, this study offers in-depth, context-specific 
knowledge that is valid only for a particular time, culture, and situation. The 
multi-dimensional nature of the reform, in addition to the diverse circumstances 
within which it is implemented, means that the relationship between 
decentralisation and intra-state conflict is not easy to generalise (Siegle and 
O’Mahony 2010, 157). As Daniel Treisman (2007, 17-18), in his comprehensive 
assessment of political decentralisation, concurs: 
 
Anyone expecting a general theory of political decentralisation will not 
find it here…I do not think such an approach would be fruitful. There are 
simply too many effects, interacting in too many ways, with results 
dependent on conditions that are too numerous and obscure. The 
practical impossibility of netting out the different effects of 
decentralisation so as to form contingent predictions that are useful for 
policy analysis and political judgement is, in fact, my main conclusion. 
 
The research findings contained in this thesis may nevertheless be useful for 
informing future studies within similar contexts; for example the implementation 
of decentralisation in neighbouring Kosovo as a mechanism for managing 
relations between Albanian and Serbian communities. This study’s findings may 
                                                          
24
 Critical Realists are comfortable admitting that Realist research does not claim truth, but rather only an 
approximation to truth, which is specific to a particular context. As Sayer (2000, 42) explains: “Realists do 
not need to suppose that knowledge mirrors the world; rather it interprets it in such a way that the 
expectations and practices it informs are intelligible and reliable”. 
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also be valuable for informing the design of large-N research for testing 
hypotheses. 
 
 
Site and Population Selection 
 
The decision to focus this case study of decentralisation on Macedonian 
experiences has firm grounds. As an example of the emerging practice of 
complex power-sharing, decentralisation within the broader Framework 
Agreement of 2001 represents an excellent case with which to address many 
current gaps in the literature on institutional design and on territorial self-
governance in divided societies. The Agreement’s relative maturity, compared 
with Kosovo’s 2007 ‘Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement’, 
also means that a reasonable amount of time has now passed from which to 
appraise its implementation.25 In addition, having lived and worked in 
Macedonia between 2004 and 2006, the professional and personal contacts I 
have developed facilitated the research.26 Established relationships, for 
example with representatives of the Macedonian municipal association, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) mission in 
Skopje, and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), greatly assisted 
access to the field. Former colleagues acted as gatekeepers, as research 
participants and, in some cases, as critical readers with which to discuss 
research findings. My knowledge of the country, and in particular the former 
                                                          
25
 Kosovo’s settlement proposal also includes substantial decentralisation to the municipal level as a 
mechanism for managing relations between the different ethnic communities, in particular the Serbs 
(UNSC 2007, Appendix III). 
26
 I was employed on a part-time as Co-Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration, South East European 
University in Tetovo, western Macedonia. During this period, and again in 2008 and 2011-12, I was also 
engaged as a consultant on various European Commission-funded projects supporting the Association of 
Kosovo Municipalities and Kosovo’s Ministry of Local Government Administration. 
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crisis region in the west of Macedonia, also enabled me to better understand 
the complex political and cultural nuances that inevitably affect 
decentralisation’s implementation.  
 
Given this study’s focus on local governance, key research participants were 
members of municipal administrations, locally elected figures, and local civil 
society representatives. These were in addition to members of relevant line 
ministries, the municipal association, international and bilateral donors, and 
other NGO representatives. Despite the country’s size, Macedonia is divided 
into 85 municipalities (including the City of Skopje). Of these, 39 have sizable 
non-majority communities (above ten percent) and were therefore considered 
‘multi-ethnic’ for the purpose of this study (SSO 2005). To maintain the research 
focus, as well as for practical reasons, data collection at the municipal level was 
restricted to five carefully selected municipalities: Gostivar, Kumanovo, 
Kruševo, Šuto Orizari, and Struga (Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2). They were 
chosen based on the following criteria: the multi-ethnic profile of the local 
population, inclusion of the five largest non-majority communities (Albanian, 
Turkish, Roma, Serbian and Vlach), the political affiliation of the Mayor, 
proximity to the site of inter-ethnic conflict in 2001, and the municipality’s level 
of development (urban / rural). Despite being located outside the 2001 conflict 
zone, Kruševo was specifically selected for inclusion due to its local Albanian 
and Vlach communities, its predominantly rural characteristics, and its historical 
and cultural significance as the birthplace of the modern (Slav) Macedonian 
nation.27 Whilst not intended to be a representative sample of the entire country, 
concentrating the fieldwork on these five municipalities helped to clarify how 
                                                          
27
 This mountain town was the site of the Ilinden uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1903. For more 
details of Kruševo’s significance in modern Macedonian history, see Brown (2003). 
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formal and informal political linkages affected relations between the central and 
local levels. Including a mixture of urban and rural, wealthy and less developed 
municipalities also enabled an assessment of how decentralisation may affect 
different parts of the country unequally. 
 
Figure 1.2: Location of the Five Selected Fieldwork Municipalities 
 
 
Map Legend: 
 
Gostivar (green) 
Kruševo (blue) 
Kumanovo  (red) 
Šuto Orizari  (yellow) 
Struga          (brown) 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Selected Characteristics of the Five Fieldwork Municipalities 
 
Municipality 
No. of 
Inhabitants 
Area 
(km
2
) 
Urban / 
Rural 
Local 
Population by 
Ethnicity (%) 
Political 
Affiliation  
of Mayor 
Realised 
Budget for 
2008 (MKD) 
No. of 
Municipal 
Employees 
Gostivar 81,042 519 Urban 
Mac: 19.59 
Alb: 66.68 
Turkish: 9.86 
Independent 
(RDK from 
2011) 
652,902,602 73 
Kruševo 9,684 205 
Mainly 
rural 
Mac: 62.79 
Alb: 21.31 
Vlach: 10.53 
VMRO-
DPMNE 
(government) 
100,712,209 22 
Kumanovo 105,484 509 Urban 
Mac: 60.43 
Alb: 25.87 
Serbian: 8.59 
SDSM 
(opposition) 
964,009,961 118 
Šuto 
Orizari 
22,017 7 Urban 
Mac: 6.53 
Alb: 30.32 
Roma: 60.60 
Roma Union 107,943,380 24 
Struga 65,375 507 Urban 
Mac: 32.09 
Alb: 56.85 
Turkish: 5.72 
DUI 
(government) 
715,770,999 95 
Sources: ADI 2010; MCIC 2010.  
  33 
Data Collection 
 
The majority of the data was collected through in-depth and elite interviews with 
people from a range of different backgrounds. Over the course of a three year 
period (March 2009 – March 2012), 137 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with at least 100 different individuals (key informants were 
interviewed more than once). These interviews were completed during six 
separate fieldwork visits which took place in March 2009 (to coincide with 
municipal elections), November 2009, May-June 2010, April 2011, May-June 
2011, and March 2012.28 Most visits lasted approximately ten days, although an 
extended six-week trip took place during May-June 2010. The rationale for 
scheduling multiple fieldwork visits at regular intervals throughout the three-year 
research period was to ensure that the data collected remained current and so 
that research findings could be re-evaluated as the reform’s implementation 
progressed.  
 
Care was taken to ensure the views of individuals from a variety of ethnic, 
political, professional, and geographic backgrounds were documented. 
Concentrating data collection at the local level in the five selected municipalities 
facilitated this process. Since the opinions of the country’s two largest ethnic 
communities (Macedonians and Albanians) have tended to dominate accounts 
of Macedonia’s post-conflict environment, the inclusion of the perspectives of 
Turks, Roma, Vlachs, and Serbs was an important objective of this research. 
The views of local representatives (elected officials, public administrators, and 
citizens) were balanced with those of relevant line ministries and organisations 
working at the central level, for example the Ombudman’s Office and the 
                                                          
28
 Some telephone interviews were also conducted between fieldtrips.  
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government’s Secretariat for Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (SIOFA). 
Mindful of the divergent (and sometimes competing) interests of the various 
international representatives supporting Macedonia’s decentralisation process, 
interviews were also carefully balanced between key international agencies 
(OSCE, UNDP, Soros Foundation, and World Bank) and bilateral donors 
(USAID, European Commission, and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation – SDC). Finally, attention was paid to ensure the gender balance 
of the research participants.   
 
While a significant proportion of this thesis is based on primary data collected 
through interviews, the study also utilised a range of authoritative secondary 
sources to supplement the fieldwork data and to address its limitations. Policy 
reports prepared by respected international agencies and local NGOs 
supporting the decentralisation process proved particularly valuable in this 
respect. For example, nation-wide surveys, such as the OSCE’s annual 
decentralisation survey (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2011) and UNDP’s People 
Centred Analysis reports (2008; 2009; 2010), were useful for illustrating 
country-wide trends. Given the scale and costs involved in undertaking such an 
exercise, it would not have been feasible to have replicated these efforts. 
Similarly, reports prepared by USAID and UNDP projects providing technical 
assistance to the fiscal decentralisation process were invaluable for 
supplementing budgetary data collected in the five fieldwork municipalities. 
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Ethical Considerations 
 
This project’s research design was prepared in accordance with the University 
of Bradford’s ethics policy and received approval from the University’s 
Committee for Ethics in Research in 2010 (UoB 2010).29 The principle of 
informed consent was a central feature of this research project. Anonymity was 
offered to all research participants to ensure the data they provided remained 
confidential and could not be traced back to them. In addition, any unauthorised 
information acquired confidentially was not included in this study. All 
participants were asked at the end of their interview whether they would like, on 
reflection, to rephrase or withdraw anything they have said.  
 
Researching a multi-ethnic society such as Macedonia necessitates that 
particular attention is paid to the ethnic and religious background of 
interviewees, including respecting the choice of language they would prefer to 
communicate in. While many interviews were conducted in English (for 
convenience and with the consent of the research participant), a multilingual 
interpreter (Macedonian / Albanian / Turkish / English) was employed when 
required to assist with the data collection process. Macedonia’s patriarchal 
structure, particularly within political parties, also underlines the importance of 
ensuring the voice of women was included throughout this research. 
 
                                                          
29
 This includes adherence to the Data Protection Act 1998, which requires that data be securely stored 
electronically (both in written form and in sound files) and be retained for a minimum of five years. 
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Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
The collection of fieldwork data on a regular basis throughout the research 
period enabled its analysis to begin at an early stage in the project design. The 
advantage to this approach was that it allowed sufficient time for the data 
collection strategy to be adjusted when troublesome or incomplete data became 
apparent early on. For example, the retraction of local competences by central 
government, along with the role of formal dispute resolution mechanisms, had 
originally been considered a potentially significant research theme to explore. 
However, upon the completion of initial fieldwork in March 2009, it became 
apparent that this concern had been unwarranted (see Chapter 5 for more 
details). Early data analysis also permitted the control of emerging and 
unexpected research themes, such as fiscal equalisation and the impact of 
clientelism on municipal autonomy. Sufficient time could be built into the 
research design to verify and test these new themes on a continual basis.   
 
Efforts were taken to ensure the accuracy and objectivity of the data analysis 
process by triangulating different sources. Regular attempts were also made to 
verify interpretations of the data. These included the discussion of research 
findings with local experts, and the presentation of selected themes at various 
academic conferences and policy workshops. For example, UNDP’s mission in 
Skopje invited me to present my research on the functioning of local 
consociational power-sharing mechanisms to senior practitioners in March 
2012. Participants included representatives from the UN, UNDP, OSCE and 
World Bank. Limited research findings have also been peer reviewed by a 
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respected local journal and think-tank, and were subsequently published (Lyon 
2011; 2012b). 
 
 
Structure of Thesis 
 
The next chapter provides the context in which to examine whether 
decentralisation has contributed to the management of ethnic conflict in 
Macedonia. Guided by the concept of horizontal inequalities, it identifies factors 
unique to Macedonia which influenced the decision to devolve responsibilities to 
the municipalities after 2001. This chapter also examines the particular 
institutional design that Macedonia’s decentralisation took, and demonstrates 
how its combined use of consociational and integrative measures was intended 
to address the concerns of the Albanian and Macedonian communities 
simultaneously. 
 
Chapter 3 will then examine the political aspects of decentralisation and 
considers whether the reform has widened effective political participation and 
strengthened democracy at the local level. It examines whether decentralisation 
in Macedonia has addressed political and cultural horizontal inequalities by:  
(a) improving the political representation of diverse groups in local decision-
making processes; (b) deepening local democracy by providing opportunities for 
local residents to participate in local governance; and (c) enhancing the 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness of municipal governments. 
This chapter also assesses whether the largely consociational power-sharing 
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mechanisms envisaged at the local level have promoted multiculturalism at the 
expense of gender equality. 
 
Chapter 4 examines administrative decentralisation and considers whether 
devolving responsibility for the provision of public services can satisfy the 
demands of non-majority groups for greater autonomy over their own affairs.  
It focuses on the provision of primary and secondary education in Macedonia, 
and considers whether decentralisation has: (a) facilitated the provision of 
heterogeneous local public services; (b) enhanced participation and 
transparency in local decision-making regarding the delivery of services; and  
(c) ensured a more equitable and transparent distribution of public resources. 
 
Chapter 5 assesses fiscal decentralisation from a political economy perspective 
and considers whether the reforms have enhanced the fiscal autonomy of 
Macedonian municipalities. It begins by considering how the short-term political 
calculations of national governing parties may have influenced both the design 
and implementation of fiscal decentralisation. The chapter then evaluates:  
(a) the extent to which municipalities are dependent on central government for 
their revenues; (b) the ability of municipalities to make independent decisions 
over spending; and (c) the ability of municipalities to set independent financial 
contracts with private actors, such as creditors and employees. An appraisal of 
inter-governmental fiscal relations is necessary to determine whether the 
political and administrative dimensions of decentralisation examined in the 
previous two chapters are conceivable in the absence of sufficient fiscal 
autonomy and resources. 
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Chapter 6 considers the apparent conflict between subsidiarity and solidarity, 
and examines whether the fiscal autonomy ensuing from decentralisation has 
been achieved at the expense of economic and territorial cohesion. It does this 
by examining whether decentralisation in Macedonia has addressed socio-
economic horizontal inequalities by: (a) facilitating a more equitable distribution 
of public resources throughout Macedonia; (b) creating the optimal conditions 
for expanding citizens’ access to basic services (thereby reducing social 
exclusion); and (c) reducing longstanding socio-economic disparities between 
urban and rural areas. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 offers some concluding thoughts regarding the extent to 
which decentralisation between 2005 and 2012 has contributed to the 
management of ethnic conflict in Macedonia. It begins by revisiting the political, 
cultural, social, and economic horizontal inequalities (HIs) identified in Chapter 
2, and determines whether the reform has lived up to expectations and has 
indeed contributed to their reduction. It also considers whether decentralisation 
has had any adverse effects on Macedonia’s delicate inter-ethnic relations. 
Finally, this chapter examines what the obstacles have been to 
decentralisation’s successful implementation, before offering some suggestions 
for further research. 
  
This thesis does not offer a comprehensive analysis of whether complex power-
sharing contributes to the management of ethnic difference in Macedonia. Its 
focus is solely on the implementation of decentralisation reforms (including 
consociational power-sharing mechanisms locally), rather than also assessing 
the success of power-sharing arrangements at the national level. In contrast to 
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research on other forms of territorial self-governance, such as federalism or 
autonomy, this study does not also examine in detail the work of formal 
mechanisms of communication and dispute resolution between the central and 
local levels. The decision not to do so was partly based on their relative 
insignificance within a unitary state such as Macedonia, and partly because 
initial research findings suggested that existing mechanisms had not been 
utilised by the municipalities.30 Other issues not appraised in this thesis are the 
capacity of municipalities to deliver the devolved competences, whether 
decentralisation has facilitated an improvement in the quality of local services, 
and the supervision of municipal activities by the central government. 
Concerning these first two themes, insufficient data exists to permit an 
adequate assessment. With regard to the latter, supervision is undertaken by 
relevant line ministries and its review would consequently be a time-consuming 
and complex endeavour.31  
 
This thesis does however argue that, while decentralisation alone may be 
unable to address all of the grievances raised by the Albanian community prior 
to ethnic conflict in 2001, the reform has the potential to address many of the 
horizontal inequalities that were responsible for raising inter-ethnic tensions 
during the 1990s. The research also demonstrates that the success of 
                                                          
30
 As a unitary state, no bicameral chamber exists at the national level. The interests of the municipalities 
are therefore only represented through party political channels or via the municipal association, ZELS. 
Both mediums have been addressed in this thesis. The Law on Local Self-Government states that 
disputes between the different tiers of government should be resolved by the Constitutional Court (Official 
Gazette 2002 Arts. 51, 71, 87). Up until March 2012 no municipality had brought an inter-governmental 
dispute to the Constitutional Court for review. The fact that over 80 percent of municipalities are aligned to 
the national governing coalition means that disputes are generally resolved informally within party 
structures. Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 23/03/09, Skopje. 
31
 In an interview, the Executive Director of the municipal association confirmed that the retraction of local 
competencies by line ministries was not a significant concern for the municipalities. There had been some 
cases, but these had only been for a short period and the competence in question had been subsequently 
returned. Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 23/03/09, Skopje.  
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decentralisation in Macedonia depends as much on contextual factors as it 
does on the reform’s particular design.   
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO MUNICIPAL DECENTRALISATION  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the context for examining whether decentralisation has 
contributed to the management of ethnic conflict in Macedonia. Guided by the 
concept of horizontal inequalities, this analysis identifies factors unique to 
Macedonia which influenced both the decision to devolve responsibilities to the 
municipalities after 2001 and the specific design the decentralisation reform 
took. The discussion focuses initially on the political, cultural, social, and 
economic demands made by Albanian politicians (and later insurgents) on the 
Macedonian state since its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Given the 
lack of consensus regarding the origins of conflict in 2001, the purpose of this 
analysis is not to appraise various claims, but rather to identify specific 
structural causes of group tensions upon which to base the subsequent 
analysis.1 Persistent external threats to the survival of the Macedonian state 
and nation will also be discussed, since lingering threat perceptions contributed 
to the state’s reluctance to provide timely concessions to non-majority 
communities, as well as its attitude towards decentralisation. Finally, the 
chapter examines the particular institutional design of Macedonia’s 
decentralisation, and demonstrates how its combined use of consociational and 
integrative measures was intended to address the concerns of the Albanian and 
                                                          
1
 For an analysis of the perceived ‘spill-over effects’ of war in Kosovo during 1999 and political instability in 
the Preševo Valley, southern Serbia, during 2001 see Hislope (2003), Daskalovski (2004) and Koktsidis 
(2012). For an assessment of how organised criminal networks and state corruption contributed to political 
instability see Hislop (2001) and ICG (2002). 
  43 
Macedonian communities simultaneously. By examining the status and 
dynamics of the horizontal inequalities that existed between Macedonia’s two 
largest ethnic communities prior to 2001, analysis of decentralisation’s ability to 
impact on conflict dynamics - either directly or indirectly - will be possible. 
 
This chapter makes the following arguments. First, the presence of multiple 
horizontal inequalities in the political, cultural, social, and economic spheres, 
experienced simultaneously by Albanian political elites and the masses, made 
Macedonia prone to ethnic conflict. Regardless of whether these grievances 
were genuine or manipulated by political opportunists, the only way to build 
sustainable peace in post-2001 Macedonia was for these inequalities to be 
addressed. Second, the persistent identity disputes with its neighbours during 
the 1990s affected the way in which the Macedonian state approached its 
relations with non-majority communities, in particular the Albanians. Given the 
significance territory plays in the survival of the Macedonian national identity, 
these concerns manifested themselves particularly strongly in questions 
regarding the territorial integrity of the state, and have influenced Macedonian 
decentralisation’s complex design. Third, while decentralisation alone may be 
unable to address all of the grievances raised by Albanian politicians and 
insurgents, such as the National Liberation Army (NLA), placed within the 
broader context of the Framework Agreement, the reform has the potential to 
directly address many of the political, cultural status and social inequalities 
between the Macedonian and Albanian communities that contributed to ethnic 
conflict in 2001.2 
 
                                                          
2
 The National Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare – UÇK – in Albanian) led an insurgency 
against Macedonian state forces during 2001. 
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Horizontal Inequalities and the Structural Causes of Ethnic Conflict  
 
Researchers have for many years appreciated the contribution that group-
based inequalities - either real or perceived - make to the likely emergence of 
ethno-political conflict. Deprivation theorists such as Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 
1993) and Susan Woodward (1995) attribute violence to the discrepancy 
between ethnic groups’ perceptions of what think they deserve in society and 
what they are capable of getting. Those conscious of their relative deprivation 
feel disadvantaged and it is this feeling of injustice, and the resulting frustration, 
which may cause violent group mobilisation along ethnic lines. Similarly, Donald 
Horowitz (2000, 185-6) observes how, “like individual self-esteem, collective 
self-esteem is achieved largely by social recognition…Relative group worth and 
relative group legitimacy thus merge into a politics of ethnic entitlement”. The 
contest for group worth or status, he concludes, is therefore the common 
denominator of ethnic conflict among unranked groups. As intra-group loyalty 
strengthens, the prospect of confrontation increases. Deprivation and group 
entitlement theorists therefore believe that enhancing the political standing of 
certain ethnic groups, in addition to improving socio-economic conditions, may 
reduce feelings of exclusion and with it, the likelihood and intensity of ethnic 
violence (Koktsidis 2012, 22). 
 
While Gurr’s work focuses on how disadvantaged groups mobilise for violence, 
researchers of horizontal inequalities recognise the role that both the deprived 
group and those in positions of power have in managing inter-group inequalities 
(Diprose 2009, 116). Frances Stewart (2004; 2008) refers to the discrepancies 
which exist between culturally defined groups as ‘horizontal inequalities’ (HIs). 
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These can be based on political, cultural, social or economic status, and differ 
from inequalities between individuals or households, which she regards as 
‘vertical’. Political HIs include inequalities in the distribution of political 
opportunities and power among groups and may occur at the levels of the 
presidency, cabinet, parliament, local government or civil service, among 
others. Political exclusion is likely to alienate group leaders and provide an 
incentive for group mobilisation (Stewart et al. 2008c, 306). Cultural status HIs 
include the extent to which a state recognises (or fails to recognise) a group’s 
cultural practices, such as its language or religion. As Bikhu Parekh (2000) has 
observed, where a particular group has historically been dominant, cultural 
‘neutrality’ is often little more than the implicit privileging of that dominant 
culture. Cultural status HIs are particularly potent for group mobilisation due to 
their inherent link to group identity (Langer and Brown 2008, 51). Finally, social 
HIs encompass equitable access to public services, such as education and the 
allocation of state resources and infrastructure; while economic HIs represent 
access to state assets, employment opportunities and income levels (Stewart 
2008, 13). 
 
Horizontal inequalities may be multi-dimensional and this explains the 
persistence of group-based deprivation in many countries. For example, a lack 
of access to education may lead to low incomes, and both may be responsible 
for and also caused by a lack of political power (Stewart et al. 2008a, 55). 
Similarly, the adoption of an official language will not only increases the political 
and cultural status of the group associated with it, but can also bring direct 
material benefits to that group in terms of increased access to employment 
(Langer and Brown 2008, 46). Policies to address HIs can take either a direct or 
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indirect approach. Ethnic quotas in public administrations, for example, 
represent a direct approach to reduce HIs, while regional expenditure policies or 
the decentralisation of power across the country fall into the second category 
(Stewart et al. 2008c, 303). Direct policies unavoidably increase the saliency of 
identity differences, whereas indirect policies are broadly ethnically neutral and 
can contribute to the integration of different ethnic groups over time.  
 
While Stewart and others consider the presence of severe HIs to be a 
necessary motive for political or even violent mobilisation, they recognise that 
conflict is not inevitable where group inequalities exist (Stewart 2008, 11). What 
makes violent conflict more likely is when political, cultural, social and economic 
inequalities coincide, and where the same group is deprived across every 
dimension (ibid., 18; Langer et al. 2012, 7). The existence of HIs is also 
insufficient to explain whether group grievances actually become a political 
issue at the national level. This will only happen if inequalities are experienced 
by group leaders and their followers simultaneously. Even with the presence of 
severe socio-economic inequalities at the mass level, the absence of political 
HIs among elites may reduce the risk of violent group mobilisation because 
group leaders lack the incentives to mobilise their constituents for violent 
conflict (Langer 2008, 164). This may also be the case when group leaders are 
politically included but are not dominant, since they can still enjoy the ‘perks’ of 
office, such as opportunities for personal enrichment and the dispensing of 
patronage (Stewart et al. 2008b, 289-90). The motives of group elites (or its 
potential leaders) are particularly important because they control the resources 
and can arouse support by accentuating common identities or increasing 
perceptions of inter-group inequalities (ibid., 289). 
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Advocates of grievance-based accounts of conflict have been criticised for 
understating alternative economic explanations for conflict, such as the 
existence of organised criminal networks and war entrepreneurs. Predation or 
greed theorists such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004), for example, 
have argued that violent conflicts may be driven by private material gains and 
not by genuine grievances, and when grievances do exist, they are manipulated 
by militant opportunists as pretexts for revolt.3 However, such an interpretation 
has not been without its critics.4 Regardless of whether group-based grievances 
are genuine or have been subject to political manipulation, both deprivation and 
predation theorists agree that within post-conflict situations, the only way to 
construct sustainable peace is to address the subjective grievances of the 
parties to the conflict.5 
 
 
Horizontal Inequalities in the Republic of Macedonia, 1991 – 2001 
 
The Republic of Macedonia became an independent state in September 1991. 
The most southerly located of the former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia shares 
borders with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, and Serbia, and its ethnically 
diverse population, although totalling a mere two million, reflects the cultural 
diversity of the region and a legacy of shifting borders and empirical conquests. 
The most recent census in 2002 found Macedonia’s ethnic breakdown to be 
                                                          
3
 According to Collier (2006, 2): “A rebel organisation simply cannot afford to be regarded as criminal: it is 
not good publicity and it is not sufficiently motivating. Rebel organisations have to develop a discourse of 
grievance in order to function. Grievance is to a rebel organisation what image is to a business.” 
4
 See, for example, David Keen (1996; 1998; 2001) and Christopher Cramer (2006). 
5
 Paul Collier (2006, 17) observes: “Post-conflict, the problem is rather different [to conflict prevention]. 
Rebel organisations have forced themselves onto the political landscape and have generated group 
grievance. Although both the grievances and the groups may be manufactured, they now exist and post-
conflict policy must address them.” In addressing group-based grievances, perceptions are changed and 
with them the ability of militants to generate mass support for future campaigns (ibid., 20). 
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64.18 percent Macedonian, 25.17 percent Albanian, 3.85 percent Turkish, 2.66 
percent Roma, 1.78 percent Serbian, 0.84 percent Bošniak, 0.48 percent Vlach, 
and 1.04 percent who declared themselves ‘Other’ (SSO 2005, 713).  
 
While officially constituting a quarter of the national population, the Albanian 
community represents a majority in certain parts of the country.6 As Figure 2.1 
demonstrates, Albanians reside mainly in compact areas in the north and west 
of the country, along the borders with the Republic of Albania and Kosovo. The 
population of the Polog region, situated in the north-west of the country, for 
example, constitutes a majority of 73 percent Albanians, and within this region 
some municipalities are overwhelming dominated by Albanians (ibid.).7 For 
instance, Tearce municipality has a local Albanian population of 84.39 percent, 
while Zajac and Želino municipalities have local Albanian populations of 97.44 
and 99.20 percent respectively (ibid.). Significant, however, sizable Albanian 
communities also reside in the capital city, Skopje, and in the north-east of the 
country around the Kumanovo valley (see Table 2.2 below). In contrast, the 
smaller Turkish, Roma, Serbian, Bošniak, and Vlach communities are dispersed 
throughout the country and rarely constitute a majority locally. (See Appendix A 
for maps illustrating the pattern of territorial distribution of Turkish and Roma 
communities in the country.)  
 
Ethnic demographics are a contentious issue in Macedonia, given the higher 
fertility rates of Albanian, Turkish and Roma communities. The data in Table 2.1 
demonstrates that the Albanian (as well as Roma) population has increased 
steadily in recent decades at the expense of the majority Macedonian 
                                                          
6
 Albanian politicians frequently claim that the size of the Albanian community in Macedonia is much 
greater than official figures suggest. Interview with Arben Xhaferi: 23/06/2010, Tetovo. 
7
 See also Appendix O for a map of Macedonia’s statistical regions. 
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population.8 As a result of the higher birth rates and migration from Kosovo, the 
number of Albanians recorded in the 2002 census was 25.17 percent; up from 
11.7 percent in 1953 (Brunnbauer 2004, 568 - 575; SSO 2005; Daskalovski 
2006, 80). In the eyes of many Macedonians, this “demographic expansion” of 
the Albanian community was a deliberate political strategy for increasing their 
influence in the state (Brunnbauer 2004, 576). 
 
Figure 2.1:3The Territorial Pattern of Ethnic Demography in the Republic  
of Macedonia (Macedonian and Albanian Communities) 
 
 
Source: SSO 2005. 
 
                                                          
8
 Fluctuations in the Albanian and Turkish populations during the 1953 and 1961 censuses may have been 
caused by the migration of a significant number of Yugoslav Turks (and of Albanians claiming to be 
Turkish) to Turkey during this period (Poulton 2000, 138). 
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Table 2.1:3Population Changes in the Socialist Republic and Republic  
of Macedonia between 1948 and 2002 
 
Ethnic 
Group 
Population Census 
1948 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 1994 2002 
Macedonians 68.5 66.0 71.2 69.3 67.0 65.3 66.6 64.2 
Albanians 17.1 12.5 13.0 17.0 19.8 21.7 22.7 25.2 
Turks 8.3 15.6 9.4 6.6 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.9 
Roma 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.6 2.2 2.7 
Source: SSO 2005. 
 
Despite the Albanian community’s (increasing) dominance in many parts of the 
north and west of Macedonia, these areas remain ethnically heterogeneous. 
The data in Table 2.2 illustrates how the six largest municipalities in the north 
and west of the country, in addition to the City of Skopje, continue to have 
sizable local minority communities. This demographic reality has significant 
implications for the design of local government institutions in Macedonia and, in 
particular, the need to incorporate local power-sharing mechanisms. 
 
Table 2.2:4Degree of Ethnic Heterogeneity in Selected Municipalities  
(2002 Census)9 
 
Municipality 
Local 
Population 
Macedonian (%) Albanian (%) Turkish (%) 
City of Skopje 506,926 66.75 20.49 1.70 
Kumanovo  105,484 60.43 25.87 0.28 
Tetovo 86,580 23.16 70.32 2.17 
Gostivar 81,042 19.59 66.68 9.86 
Kičevo 30,138 53.55 30.53 8.06 
Struga 63,376 32.09 56.85 5.72 
   Source: SSO 2005. 
                                                          
9
 These six municipalities were selected due to their significant population size and location in the north 
and west of the country. Data is based on the enlarged (post-2004 territorial reorganisation) municipal 
boundaries. 
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Political Horizontal Inequalities 
 
According to Kevin Adamson and Dejan Jović (2004, 303), ethnic disputes in 
Macedonia are not the result of ancient hatreds, as some observers would have 
us believe. Rather, they are a consequence of political responses to the task of 
recasting both Macedonian and Albanian post-Yugoslav identities. The 
formation of an independent Macedonian state in 1991 represents one such 
circumstance, since a consequence of this process was that Macedonia’s 
different ethnic communities had to renegotiate their status and the protection 
granted to them within the new state. The declaration of independence and 
subsequent drafting of a new Constitution in 1991 gave rise to very different 
concepts regarding the nature of the state and the status of Macedonia’s ethnic 
communities living within it. Jenny Engström suggests the Macedonian-
Albanian conflict is not merely over rights but, more fundamentally, about who 
controls the state and what kind of state Macedonia should be: “Ultimately, 
then, the conflict between Macedonians and Albanians boils down to the 
question of who holds the power” (Engström 2002a, 6). A senior politician, 
speaking in 2004, validated this interpretation in the following remark:  
 
…each side holds a different view of the ownership of…the country: is it 
a country with one principal nationality plus large ethnic minorities whose 
rights are protected and guaranteed, or is it a multi-ethnic country 
belonging to several ethnic groups? (PER 2004, 15). 
 
The Preamble to the 1991 Constitution demonstrates how, during the 1990s, 
Macedonian leaders perceived the newly independent state as belonging 
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primarily to the majority Macedonian community, with the other ethnic groups 
representing “junior partners” or mere “tenants” (Perry 2000, 277; Engström 
2002b, 15; Milosavlevski 2003; Marko 2004/05, 698). It declared: 
 
Taking as the points of departure the…heritage of the Macedonian 
people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom 
as well as for the creation of their own state…Macedonia is established 
as a national state of the Macedonian people in which full equality as 
citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is 
provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities 
living in the Republic of Macedonia… (Official Gazette 1991). 
 
The sense of state ownership and entitlement is particularly noticeable when 
the text is examined alongside an earlier (1974) version of the Preamble, which 
declared the Socialist Republic of Macedonia to be “a national state of the 
Macedonian people and as a state of the Albanian and Turkish nationalities in 
it…” (Caca 1980, 92; Poulton 2000, 133). According to Gjorgji Caca (1980,  
93-94), nationalities living in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia during the 
Yugoslav period were considered not just citizens, but “an elemental factor of 
the self-managing socialist community” and “equal holders of the sovereignty of 
the people”. The constituent elements of Macedonian statehood under 
socialism were therefore the Macedonian nation and the Albanian and Turkish 
nationalities.  
 
While Macedonian nationalists recognised the existence and rights of the 
communities, including the Albanians, in the 1991 Constitution, they did not 
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recognise that Albanians should be granted the same status as Macedonians 
within the Republic (Adamson and Jović 2004, 305). From an Albanian 
perspective, however, being regarded as mere ‘minority’ effectively downgraded 
the Albanian community to the rank of second-class citizens.10 It also placed 
them on a par with other numerically inferior ethnic groups, such as the Turks 
and Roma. For this reason, Albanian politicians during the 1990s, and later the 
NLA in 2001, demanded the recognition of their community as an equal partner 
in the state.11 In support of their claim that they constitute not a minority but a 
rather ‘constituent people’, Albanian politicians emphasised their relative size in 
relation to the other non-majority communities (Sokalski 2003, 76; Daskalovski 
2006, 79). Arben Xhaferi, leader of the largest Albanian political party in 
government at that time declared in 1998: “…the presumption that Albanians 
are a ‘minority’ in the Balkans flies in the face of historical fact: Albanians are 
the third largest ethnic group in the region…They are a majority that was 
divided by force” (Xhaferi, 1998). Interestingly, as Duncan Perry and others 
have noted, the Albanians made no similar demand on behalf of Macedonia’s 
other ethnic groups. None of the smaller communities, with the exception of the 
Serbs, actively pursued constitutional change during this time (Perry 1997, 253; 
Mandaci 2007, 10). 
 
A second key political grievance voiced by the Albanians during the 1990s was 
the fact that, in an effort to underline the civic character of the state, the 1991 
Constitution put a greater emphasis on individual rights and freedoms of 
citizens, as opposed to the collective rights of national minorities advocated in 
                                                          
10
 For Albanians, the former Yugoslav category of Narodnost (minority) had negative consequences. 
Interview with senior NGO official: 13/11/2009, Gostivar. 
11
 A letter, attributed to the NLA’s commander Ali Ahmeti in April 2001, demanded the Constitution be 
amended to read: “FYROM will be a state of two peoples: a Macedonian-Albanian state or an Albanian-
Macedonian state” (Pettifer 2004, 2). 
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earlier (socialist) versions (Marko 2004/05, 698; Ilievski 2007, 5).12 As a 
consequence, the new Constitution removed the collective rights granted to 
Macedonia’s non-majority communities in terms of proportional representation 
by quota on public bodies, language rights, and the right to fly national flags on 
specific public occasions (Sokalski 2003, 80; Phillips 2004, 64; Ragaru 2008, 5). 
Slavko Milosavlevski (2003) suggested that, at the time, it was assumed that 
the development of democracy would by itself decrease the importance of 
collective rights at the expense of the rights of the individual. Horowitz (2000, 
226) has observed how the composition of a state’s civil service is an important 
indicator of who owns the country, as well as of how groups are doing in their 
struggle for group worth. According to an International Labour Organisation 
report examining the representation of minorities in Macedonia’s public 
administration, Albanians constituted only 2.5 percent of all public employees in 
1991. While their representation in the public administration increased to 10.19 
percent by 2001, it remained well below the Albanian’s estimated population 
size of 25 percent (Daskalovski 2006, 195). Equitable representation for the 
Albanian community in the public administration, as well as the police, army and 
judiciary therefore became another significant political demand.13 
 
A further political demand of Albanian politicians, and later the NLA, was the 
decentralisation of additional responsibilities to the municipalities.14 According to 
                                                          
12
 Chapter 11 entitled 'Equality of Nationalities' stated: “Municipalities and the Republic ensure that 
nationalities be proportionately represented in the municipal assemblies and the assembly of the Socialist 
Republic of Macedonia, and be adequately represented in their bodies (Caca 2001). 
13
 According to an influential Human Rights Watch Report (1996: 2) “Albanians are still grossly under-
represented in the police force…even in areas where they constitute a majority”. Police brutality against 
the Albanian community was also a regular occurrence. Clashes with the police in the Albanian-dominated 
Bit Pazar neighbourhood of Skopje left four dead in November 1992; the forced closure of the Albanian 
language university in Tetovo left one dead in February 1995; and demonstrations in Gostivar during July 
1997 left three dead.  
14
 Additional political demands less relevant to this study were the creation of the post of Vice-President, 
which would be filled by an Albanian, local control over the police, amendments to the Citizenship Law, 
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Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (2004, 2), demands for enhanced territorial 
self-governance are particularly common when groups are territorially 
concentrated. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, this is the case for Albanians in the north 
and west of the country. Prior to Macedonia’s independence in 1991, the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia had been heavily decentralised and 
municipalities had enjoyed a broad range of government competences, 
including economic regulation, national defence, and almost complete financial 
autonomy (Horvat 1976, 244-7; Caca 1980, 107; Ragaru 2005, 6). However, the 
1991 Constitution, which, according to Ilija Todorovski, was developed under 
the pressure of unfavourable domestic and external circumstances, reduced the 
powers of the municipalities considerably and established a strongly centralised 
system of government (Todorovski 2001, 246; Marko 2004/05, 711). This 
process was consolidated in 1995 by a new Law on Local Self-Government 
(Official Gazette 1995).  
 
The recentralisation of the state during the 1990s was of particular concern to 
the Albanian community, who claimed that the consolidation of a centralised, 
unitary state was performed largely at their expense (Xhaferi 1998; Ragaru 
2005, 7). The accompanying process of redistricting municipal boundaries in 
1996 was also widely interpreted among the Albanian community as intended to 
break-up local Albanian majorities within municipalities, with a view to opposing 
possible demands for autonomy (Ragaru 2008, 6). An official statement issued 
by the municipal council of Tetovo in May 1996, condemning the process of 
redrawing administrative boundaries which meant the largest, most developed 
municipalities of western Macedonia would have fewer Albanians, suggests this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
organisation of a new population census, and changes to the Election Law in order to prevent 
gerrymandering.  
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view was not limited to academic circles (Friedman 2009, 215). One Albanian 
opposition figure lamented at the time that the Albanians of Macedonia had lost 
the state in 1991 and the municipality in 1996 (ibid., 215). 
 
It is important to stress that, despite some calls for greater autonomy and even 
independence by Albanian-dominated areas during the early 1990s, by 2001 
the demands of mainstream Albanian politicians and the NLA were for greater 
decentralisation and preservation of the unitary state, rather than independence 
or the merger of territory with neighbouring Albania or Kosovo (Latifi 2001, 104; 
Pettifer 2004b, 2). An important difference between Macedonia’s conflict and 
others experienced in the former Yugoslav region is that, ultimately, it was not 
about competing state projects but rather competing ideas concerning 
ownership of the state (Bieber 2008, 7). This observation is significant since it 
influenced the form the political settlement of territorial demands ultimately took 
and, suggests Florian Bieber, makes the prospect of peace more enduring 
(ibid., 7). 
 
Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005, 5) have suggested that ethnic minorities 
make territorial demands that reflect historic continuities and perceived 
contemporary opportunities. Amid the uncertainties of Macedonia’s first years of 
independence from Yugoslavia, Albanians had organised a clandestine 
referendum on independence for western Macedonia in January 1992. 
However, while voters overwhelmingly supported independence for this 
Albanian-dominated region, and despite the declaration of an ‘Albanian 
Autonomous Republic of Ilirida’ (Republika e Iliridës) within a broader ‘Federal 
Republic of Macedonia’ in Struga three months later, no further actions were 
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taken (Ackermann 2000, 61; Poulton 2000, 136; Daskalovski 2006, 67).15 The 
International Community’s insistence on maintaining the territorial integrity of 
states during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during 
the 1990s may have led to a lessening of Albanian politicians’ demands during 
the 1990s and the NLA’s in 2001 (Weller 2005, 71). Further, evidence suggests 
there was little appetite among the war-weary Albanian community in 
Macedonia for border changes by 2001. According to an opinion poll 
commissioned by the United States State Department in April-May 2001, while 
69 percent of Albanians admitted to being sympathetic to the NLA’s demands, 
87 percent stated it was personally important to them that the country remain 
united. In addition, a majority of Albanians (71 percent) stated that they would 
prefer to live in an ethnically mixed Macedonia than an enlarged Albanian state 
(Daftary and Friedman 2008, 268).  
 
Interestingly, not all calls for territorial autonomy for Albanian-dominated regions 
have come from Macedonia’s Albanian community.16 Most controversial was a 
proposal for partition of the country offered by the Macedonian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts (MANU) in May 2001. According to this plan, proposed 
exchanges of population were designed to turn western Macedonia into a 
homogeneous Albanian enclave, ready for eventual cession to Albania. In 
return, Albania was expected to yield to Macedonia a small area of land 
populated primarily by Macedonians (ICG 2001c, 12; Phillips 2004, 123; 
Friedman 2009, 213).Copies of this proposal, which was published in 
Macedonian and Albanian language newspapers, can be found at Appendix C. 
                                                          
15
 A map illustrating the proposed ‘Republic of Ilirida’, constituting 36 percent of state territory, can be 
found at Appendix B.  
16
 Eben Friedman has traced the first Macedonian call for partition to Saško Tororovski, a career diplomat, 
in a magazine article published in July 1992 (Friedman 2009, 211). 
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While attracting limited support in some Macedonian political circles, the 
proposal was rejected by Albanian politicians and the NLA (Latifi 2001, 102).17 
The Albanian community in Macedonia, it has been suggested, rejected the 
proposal not necessarily because they were against the idea of partition, but 
rather because it was “the wrong map”.18 The MANU proposal ignored the 
needs of approximately half the country’s Albanian community living in Skopje 
and the areas east of the capital, including the Kumanovo valley. Former 
President of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) Arben Xhaferi remarked 
that, given the geographic dispersal of Albanians in Macedonia, partition, 
federalism, or even regional autonomy can only be a viable option if territory is 
forcibly cleansed.19  
 
To summarise, Albanian politicians during the 1990s, and later the NLA in 2001, 
demanded the recognition of their community as a ‘constituent people’, 
equitable representation in the public administration and other public bodies, the 
reinstatement of group rights such as the right to use community flags and 
symbols, and greater decentralisation of powers to local government as a 
means of correcting the perceived political inequalities that existed between 
Albanians and the majority Macedonian community. 
 
                                                          
17
 Then-Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE) did not denounce the proposal and referred 
approvingly to the MANU plan while proposing his own partition scheme (“Theses for the survival of the 
Macedonian nation and state”) whilst in Opposition and politically marginalised in 2003 (Friedman 2009, 
213-14). 
18
 An alternative map, along the lines offered by the ‘Republic of Ilirida’ (available at Appendix B), may 
have generated greater support. Interview with senior NGO official: 13/11/2009, Gostivar. 
19
 Arben Xhaferi does not endorse such steps. Interview with Arben Xhaferi: 23/06/2010, Tetovo. 
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Cultural Status Horizontal Inequalities 
 
The greater emphasis placed on individual as opposed to collective rights in the 
1991 Constitution also adversely affected the cultural status of Macedonia’s 
non-majority groups; particularly in the eyes of the Albanian community. The 
new Constitution declared the Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet to 
be the Republic’s only official language and made no reference to the use of 
Albanian in parliament. While the Constitution did permit the use of community 
languages alongside Macedonian in municipalities where the majority of 
inhabitants belonged to a non-majority community, this right was rarely 
respected and was indeed annulled by the Constitutional Court in 1994 (Official 
Gazette 1991, Art. 7; Caca 2001, 152). The reduction in language rights 
prompted Albanian politicians, and later the NLA, to request that Albanian be 
granted the status of a second official language. On a practical level, this would 
mean that the Albanian language could be used in parliament, in 
communications with representatives of central government branch offices, and 
at all levels of the education system (including tertiary). They also demanded 
reinstatement of the right of communities to use their language locally in 
municipalities where they live in substantial numbers (ICG 1998, 6). Clearly, 
restrictions on the official use of one’s language represent both a political and 
cultural status inequality. According to Horowitz (2000, 220), language is the 
quintessential entitlement issue, as well as a symbol of domination: “As the 
demand for a single official language reflects the desire for a tangible 
demonstration of pre-eminence, so linguistic parity is transparent code for 
equality more generally”. Restrictions placed on the use of one’s language by 
the state also represent an important socio-economic inequality, since it may 
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affect a community’s ability to participate equally in the education system and 
labour force. 
 
Two further culture-related grievances created by the rewording of the 
Constitution were the right of Macedonia's communities to fly their flags in front 
of local public buildings and the official status of Islam in the country. Article 8 of 
the new Constitution maintained Yugoslavia’s legacy of guaranteeing non-
majority communities the right to self-expression, including the use of national 
symbols such as flags. However, during Yugoslav times, these community flags 
had been distinguished from those of their titular countries by the inclusion of a 
red five-pointed star (ICG 1997, 12). When these stars were removed from the 
flags after Macedonia's independence, they became identical to their titular 
state flags. Disagreement over Gostivar and Tetovo municipalities’ right to fly 
“flags of foreign states”, in recognition of sizable local Albanian and Turkish 
communities, led to the flags’ removal by special police forces in July 1997, the 
arrest of both mayors, and riots which resulted in three civilians dead and up to 
400 injured (ibid., 12-14).20 Legislation on the use of community flags was 
repealed by the Constitutional Court in November 1998 and their use 
subsequently became a key political demand (Helsinki Committee 1999; 
Ragaru 2008, 5). Finally, Article 19 of the Constitution referred to the legal 
status of “the Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities 
and groups”. The symbolic ranking of the Macedonian Orthodox Church over 
“other” religious communities further aggravated the (predominantly Muslim) 
Albanian community’s sense of cultural injustice (Daskalovski 2006, 66, 161).  
 
                                                          
20
 A law passed the previous month had stated community flags could only be flown on public buildings on 
certain holidays and alongside the Macedonian flag, but both Mayors had rejected this law (Daskalovski 
2006, 73).  
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To summarise, Albanian politicians, and later the NLA, called for Albanian to be 
granted the status of a second official language and its broader use at the local 
level, greater use of community flags and symbols, and that Islam be granted 
constitutional equality with other religions,  in order to correct perceived cultural 
inequalities between the Albanian and Macedonian communities. 
 
 
Social Horizontal Inequalities 
 
With regard to social HIs experienced by Macedonia’s Albanian community, one 
important area often overlooked in assessments of the factors that exacerbated 
ethnic tensions during the 1990s is equitable access to Albanian-medium 
education at primary and secondary levels. Demands for the establishment of 
an Albanian-language university in Macedonia dominated the political discourse 
during this period and, arguably, its subsequent analysis.21 Dissatisfaction over 
the availability and quality of Albanian, as well as Turkish-medium education 
increased tensions between the different ethnic groups, and Albanian politicians 
considered improving standards as a crucial way of achieving social and 
economic parity with the majority Macedonian community (Poulton 2000; 
Myhrvold 2005). 
 
According to Frances Stewart (2008, 66), persistent differences in the learning 
achievements of students across groups may be caused by language issues 
and/or differences in the quality of education due to inequalities in the quality of 
infrastructure across locations. With regard to the former, although Article 48 of 
                                                          
21
 For details of the establishment of an ‘illegal’ Albanian-language university in Mala Recica, Tetovo in 
1994 and its treatment by the state see ICG 1998; 1999a, and Vetterlein (2006). 
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the new Constitution granted citizens the right to education in their mother 
tongue at primary and secondary levels of education, the reality prior to 2001, 
particularly with regard to secondary education, was very different (Official 
Gazette 1991, Art. 48). A 1985 law on secondary school education, which 
permitted the establishment of Albanian-medium classes only if there were at 
least 30 students enrolled and enough qualified teachers, was more strictly 
enforced in the years preceding Macedonia’s independence. The result was the 
closure of classes with insufficient Albanian students, and this compelled 
Albanians to attend mixed classes with instruction in the Macedonian language. 
While 8,200 students had attended Albanian-language secondary schools in 
1981, the figure had fallen to 4,221 by 1989 (Poulton 2000, 129). Further, while 
ten secondary schools had offered Albanian-medium classes during the 
Yugoslav period, by mid-1993 only one such school remained (ibid., 185). 
According to official data, only 30.75 percent of Albanian students who received 
primary education in their mother tongue continued their studies in Albanian-
medium secondary schools in 1994 (Koktsidis 2012, 82). While numbers did 
improve during the second half of the decade, the proportion of non-majority 
students receiving secondary education in their mother-tongue remained at only 
14 percent in 1998 (Poulton 2000, 185). Resentment towards the new system of 
increased compulsory tuition in Macedonian was so strong that a significant 
number of Albanian students boycotted classes and staged protests in 
Kumanovo and Gostivar during 1997 and 1998 (ibid., 130).22 
 
Restrictions on the availability of Albanian-medium education also affected the 
number of Albanian teachers employed, and many Albanian-medium teachers 
                                                          
22
 In August 1998 at least 128 Albanian protesters in Kumanovo were detained for up to 60 days and the 
organisers were arrested and some later imprisoned (Poulton 2000, 130). 
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who refused to accept these changes were removed from their position 
(Myhrvold 2005, 25). According to Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, the 
number of Albanian teachers employed by the state decreased substantially 
after independence. By 1994, only 400 teachers remained, compared to nearly 
2,500 in the autumn of 1991 (Vickers and Pettifer 1999). The closure of 
Albanian language courses at Pristina University in Kosovo during 1991 also 
meant that access to teacher training for Albanian-medium teachers was 
severely restricted, and this led to a shortage of qualified Albanian teachers. In 
response, Albanian politicians demanded that Albanian-language instruction at 
the two-year Pedagogical Academy be reinstated in Macedonia, and the 
Academy be upgraded to a four-year Pedagogical Faculty (ICG 1997, 11).23 
Legislation was eventually passed in 1997 which reinstated Albanian-language 
instruction at the Pedagogical Academy. However, the Academy was not 
upgraded to a full Faculty and this meant teacher training remained available 
only at pre-school and primary school levels and not at the secondary level 
(Myhrvold 2005, 20). 
 
Finally, considerable discrepancies in the location of educational facilities 
(particularly secondary schools) and their physical condition, in addition to the 
distribution of educational funds, meant that Macedonia’s Albanian community 
perceived the quality and availability of the education they received to be 
inferior. Most primary and secondary schools were built during the 1960s and 
1970s and the school network reflected the demographic situation of this period. 
As the analyses in Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrate, given socialist planning’s 
tendency to concentrate infrastructure in urban areas, secondary schools were 
                                                          
23
 The Academy had prepared teachers for first to fourth grade classrooms only (primary education); 
whereas a Faculty would train teachers for fifth to eighth grade subjects (secondary education). 
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located in towns and cities and were therefore frequently inaccessible to the 
Albanian and Turkish communities that resided in rural areas. This reality also 
affected rural communities’ access to other basic services, for example 
healthcare and public utilities such as water supply.24 Secondary school 
enrolment rates among Albanians were therefore particularly low. Whilst 
constituting 30.2 percent of primary school students in 1998/99, Albanians 
represented only 15.6 percent of secondary school students (and only 5.5 
percent of university students) (Novkovska et al. 2001, 11). Further, uneven 
demographic growth between Macedonia’s ethnic communities meant that 
larger class sizes and overcrowding were common in areas inhabited by 
Albanians. The fact that municipal responsibility for the delivery of education 
and its funding was recentralised meant that decisions over spending became 
less transparent and vulnerable to political manipulation. This exacerbated the 
perception that funding decisions taken in the capital were being made at the 
expense of non-majority communities.  
 
To summarise, Albanian politicians, and later the NLA, demanded greater 
access to Albanian-medium education at all levels, in addition to increased local 
control over the provision of key basic services such as education, healthcare 
and social welfare. Acquiring greater local administrative and financial 
responsibility for the provision of these services, it was assumed, would reduce 
perceived inequalities in their quality of and availability. 
                                                          
24
 This reality also affected rural communities’ access to other basic services, for example healthcare and 
public utilities such as water supply. An opinion poll completed by UNDP in 2001 found that most people 
believed villages in the hills and mountains have too little access to services from medical institutions (88.6 
percent), secondary schools (87.0 percent), social welfare and local government (68.7 percent), and 
culture institutions (90.1 percent) (UNDP 2001, 64).  
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Economic Horizontal Inequalities 
 
Macedonia had always been among the poorest Yugoslav Republics; 
experiencing high rates of unemployment, particularly among its young people 
(Horvat 1976, 60; Fox and Wallich 2007, 400). Registered unemployment had 
been on the rise since the early 1960s, surpassing 20 percent in the early 
1990s (Table 2.4 below). Macedonia’s transition process to a market-orientated 
economy therefore began under very difficult economic circumstances. The 
industrial sector had been in decline since the 1980s, triggered by the loss of 
federal subsidies to its companies and the crisis of the socialist banking sector 
(ESI 2002b, 7). Macroeconomic conditions inherited from Yugoslavia were 
extremely unfavourable, and the country’s economy experienced negative 
growth rates, high inflation, and relatively high levels of domestic and foreign 
debt (UNDP 2006, 13).  
 
As a small landlocked country, Macedonia is heavily dependent on its 
neighbours for trade and the transit of its goods to markets elsewhere. Its 
location therefore makes it vulnerable to the effects of external shocks and 
regional political events. Three events in particular had a significant impact on 
Macedonia’s already fragile economy and greatly increased the pain of 
economic transition. First, the disintegration of the Yugoslav market, in addition 
to sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the United 
Nations between 1992 and 1995, meant that Macedonia lost its principal trading 
partner (ICG 1999b, 7). Access to its overland corridor to markets in Western 
Europe was also blocked as a result. Official estimates suggest that the trade 
embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may have cost Macedonia 
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US$1.3 billion in 1992 alone and more than US$3 billion in total lost trade  
(ICG 1998, 19).  
 
Secondly, the imposition of a unilateral trade embargo by Greece during the 
same period, which cut Macedonia’s access to the sea port of Thessaloniki, 
further affected the country’s economy and led to a real sense of international 
alienation (UNDP 2001, 11). According to UNDP estimates, extended transport 
routes, additional loading and unloading costs, and more customs inspections 
increased transportation costs for exports by as much as 20 percent during this 
period (UNDP 1999, 44). Finally, war in neighbouring Kosovo during 1999, 
along with the burden of having to cope with the influx of over 200,000 refugees 
(representing almost a tenth of Macedonia’s population), took its toll on 
Macedonia’s fragile economy (ICG 1999b, 1). Prolonged regional instability 
meant that Macedonia was unable to attract direct foreign investment of any 
sizeable extent during its first decade of independence. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fell by 44 percent between 1989 and 1997; leading the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) to ominously predict in May 1999: “if the 
economy continues its downward slide, many people can be expected to turn 
against the government” (ibid., 10; UNDP 1999, 36). 
 
Table 2.3:5Indices of Nominal and Real Salaries and Costs of Living 
 
Year Nominal Net Salaries Cost of Living Indices of Real Salaries 
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1991 184.4 210.8 87.5 
1992 1,984.4 3,396.6 58.4 
1993 11,818.8 15,692.4 75.3 
1994 24,231.3 35,825.7 67.6 
1995 26,815.6 41,450.3 64.7 
1996 27,553.1 42,403.7 65.0 
1997 28,321.8 43,506.2 65.1 
  Source: UNDP 1999, 80. 
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According to the European Stability Initiative (ESI), economic insecurities, 
diminishing resources, and collapsing lifestyles during the 1990s represent the 
“other Macedonian conflict”, which was often overlooked by international 
observers (ESI 2002a; 2002b). While a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
resulted in partial macroeconomic stability, it also led to a significant decline in 
living standards (see Table 2.3 above) (UNDP 2004b, 41). Survey data 
published in the UNDP’s National Human Development Report for Macedonia in 
2001 suggests that the principal cause of economic insecurity among citizens 
was unemployment, followed by low and/or irregular remuneration, and 
inadequate social assistance (UNDP 2001, 11). As the data in Table 2.4 
illustrates, unemployment rose significantly during the 1990s and 
disproportionately affected the young.25 While unemployment affected all ethnic 
communities, and the closure of publically owned enterprises undoubtedly 
affected the majority Macedonian community the most, rates were unequally 
distributed across the country, as well as between the different ethnic groups 
(Table 2.5) (World Bank 2003a, 34; UNDP 2004b, 46).26 Combined with the 
effects of chronic rural under-development, ESI observed how large sections of 
the Albanian community were “trapped in a cycle of persistent poverty and high 
unemployment, which provides fertile ground for social and political instability” 
(ESI 2002b, 3).  
                                                          
25
 Almost half of all persons registered unemployed in 2000 were under thirty years old (UNDP 2001, 25). 
26
 High non-activity rates among the Albanian and Turkish communities will inflate their respective 
unemployment rates. 
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Table 2.4:6Unemployment as a Percentage of the Labour Force 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Unemployment 
Rate (%)
27
 
19.2 19.8 28.3 31.4 37.7 31.9 36.0 34.5 32.4 32.2 
   Sources: UNDP 1999, 39; 2001, 23. 
 
 
Table 2.5:7Labour Market Indicators of Selected Groups, According to  
Ethnic Affiliation (2002 Census) 
 
 Average Macedonians Albanians Turks Roma 
Employment Rate 61.9 68.0 38.8 41.8 21.5 
Unemployment 
Rate 
38.1 32.0 61.2 58.2 78.5 
Non-Activity Rate 52.8 46.5 70.7 61.9 52.4 
  Source: UNDP 2004b, 50. 
 
 
To summarise, diminishing public resources, high levels of unemployment - 
which disproportionately affected non-majority communities, and a general 
decline in living standards, formed the backdrop to Albanian politicians’ 
demands during the 1990s. The inability of mainstream politicians to adequately 
address the political, cultural, social and economic grievances of the Albanian 
community during the 1990s led to an erosion of trust in the political class 
among ordinary Albanians. This created an opportunity for new actors, such as 
the NLA, who were prepared to pursue Albanian interests outside the 
discredited political process, to seek to address these demands through other 
means (ESI 2002b, 10).  
                                                          
27
 These figures do not reflect so-called "latent unemployment", which refers to a large  number of 
employed persons whose remuneration arrives late, is received irregularly, or not received at all (UNDP 
2001, 24).  
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A Nation under Threat: the State’s Response to Albanian Grievances 
 
The very existence of the Republic of Macedonia, along with the Macedonian 
national identity and language, has and continues to be contested by its 
neighbours. This ‘new Macedonian question’, temporarily suspended under 
Communism, had a significant impact on the way in which the state approached 
its relations with non-majority communities, particularly the Albanians, during 
the 1990s and arguably ever since (Engström 2002b; Adamson and Jović 2004; 
Brunnbauer 2004; Daskalovsi 2006). Not only did persistent identity disputes 
with neighbouring states during the 1990s mean that the Government was too 
pre-occupied to pay sufficient attention to growing domestic concerns; feelings 
of insecurity and lingering threat perceptions contributed to the majority’s 
reluctance to acknowledge Albanian demands for greater rights (ICG 1997, 2; 
Pettifer 2004a, 11; Engström 2009, 125). Clearly, a state that is self-confident 
and strong can be more accommodating of minority demands than one which is 
afflicted by political and/or economic weaknesses (Safran 2000, 32). Such 
ontological challenges also undermined the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of 
Macedonia’s Albanian community and encouraged them to question the (ethnic) 
Macedonian people’s right of exclusivity over the country (Koktsidis 2012, 126). 
Rogers Brubaker (1996) has claimed that a logical development after a titular 
nationality gains independence is the fear of losing its newly acquired 
statehood, and that this fear can easily develop into protectionism from 
perceived dangers. Such a possibility is even more likely in the Macedonian 
case, observes Kristina Balalovska (2001, 9), due to the long history of denial of 
the existence of the Macedonian nation and political entity, as well as the 
precarious existence of the state during the 1990s. 
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The ‘four wolves’, as Macedonia’s neighbours Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Albania have often been referred to, regarded the Republic as a nation-building 
“test tube”; an “artificial creation of [former Yugoslav President Josip] Tito” 
(Pettifer 2001b, 61; ICG 2009, 1). Indeed, there had been no Macedonian state 
since the days of the Kings of Macedon in the fourth century BC, and between 
that time and 1912 the territory belonged successively to the Roman, Byzantine, 
medieval Bulgarian and Serbian, and Ottoman Empires (Pettifer 2001b, 4). It 
was only in 1944 when Tito, whose motives remain contentious, recognised 
Macedonia as a separate Republic within the Yugoslav federation, and as 
having a distinct Macedonian identity and national language (Palmer 1971, 154; 
Danforth 1997, 66; Ackermann 2000, 55). Consequently, Bulgaria does not 
recognise Macedonian as a distinct language, but rather a local dialect of 
Bulgarian; whilst Serbia refuses to recognise the autocephalous Macedonian 
Church (Lund 2000, 177). Alarmingly, Serbia, until 1996, failed to establish 
diplomatic relations with the new state and implied that the territory was 
historically part of Serbia (Pettifer 2001b, 80). According to Michael Lund (2000, 
178), the behaviour of Yugoslav troops along Macedonia's border during the 
early 1990s exacerbated the perception of persisting Serbian territorial 
aspirations.  
 
While initial disputes with Greece over the design of the Republic’s flag and 
parts of its Constitution were resolved in an Interim Agreement signed in 
September 1995, disagreement over use of the name ‘Macedonia’ remained 
unresolved in mid-2012.28 There are three aspects to the dispute: the name of 
                                                          
28
 The Greek government objected to Article 3 of the Constitution, which declared "the borders of the 
Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the constitution", and Article 49, which 
stated that the Republic “cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian 
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the country, the scope of its usage, and the adjectives for nationality and 
language. The quarrel, concludes Danforth (1997, 154), is ultimately a dispute 
over which group has the rights to everything associated with 'Macedonia' - its 
culture, its history and, in the final analysis, its territory. Greece has argued that 
use of the name ‘Macedonia’ is not only a theft of a Greek birthright, to which 
Greece claims exclusive ownership, but also amounts to staking a future claim 
to Greek Macedonia (Perry 1997, 269). For Macedonians, the choice of their 
name is more than a basic human right; it is about their very existence as a 
separate people. Calling into question their identity is linked to the very survival 
of the state, since Macedonians regard their identity as being inseparable from 
their name (ICG 2009, 1, 3). Macedonian heritage is only one part of the Greek 
identity, whilst for Macedonians there is no other. Letting the name dispute 
fester while continuing to use the provisional name ‘former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia’ was not only a humiliation for the Republic, but also implied only 
a provisional acceptance of the state (ICG 2001a, 15). 
 
Although the Republic of Albania is considered one of the ‘four wolves’, it is 
Macedonia’s Albanian community which is perceived to be a greater threat to 
the territorial integrity of Macedonia than its western neighbour. There have 
been instances when Albania has been associated with calls for the creation of 
a ‘Greater Albania’ (Woodward 1995). However, due to its preoccupation with 
its own political crises and reliance on international support, Macedonia’s 
neighbour has largely avoided becoming embroiled in the country’s domestic 
affairs (Sokalski 2003, 60). Of particular concern to Macedonians, concur Židas 
Daskalovski and Ulf Brunnbauer, is the fact that the size of the Albanian 
                                                                                                                                                                          
people in neighbouring countries [and] assists their cultural development and promotes links with them” 
(Official Gazette 1991). 
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community in the country has increased significantly in past decades (refer to 
Table 2.1). Even though Macedonians still constitute a majority in the state, they 
are outnumbered by Albanians in the region, and are “acutely aware” that many 
Albanians in Macedonia express a greater sense of solidarity with Albanians in 
Kosovo than with their Macedonian fellow-citizens (Brown 2003, 246). 
Memories of Fascist Italy’s annexation of western Macedonia during World War 
II, making a Greater Albania reality for the first time, remain firmly imprinted on 
the Macedonian consciousness (Balalovska 2001, 4).29  
 
It is within this context of the Macedonian people’s perceived need to assert 
their national identity vis-à-vis its neighbours that the Albanian politicians’ 
demands for enhanced political, cultural, social and economic rights should be 
considered. For the Macedonian community, yielding to demands that the 
Albanians be recognised as a constituent nation or that Albanian become a 
second official language was considered a zero-sum game. Any concessions 
granted would dilute the sovereignty or unitary nature of the state and would 
ultimately pose a threat to the survival of the Macedonian national identity. For 
example, elevating the status of Albanians from a minority to a constitutive 
people, with “its Titoist echo”, generated the fear that radical Albanians would 
later demand self-determination and eventually the right of secession (ICG 
2001d, 16; Liotta and Jebb 2004, 67; Minchev 2005, 2). Republic-wide use of 
the Albanian language also provoked concern that the Macedonian people 
would become marginalised in their own country. Macedonians feared 
Albanians would refuse to communicate in the Macedonian language and that 
                                                          
29
In an interview with International Crisis Group, former President Kiro Gligorov declared that all Albanian 
political parties in Macedonia want to secede, adding that, as a first step on the road to succession, “they 
want to rewrite the Constitution and establish a special status for western Macedonia” (ICG 1998, 21). 
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bilingualism would make them no longer eligible for public sector jobs.30 Within 
an environment of diminishing public resources, Macedonians therefore felt 
under siege both socially and economically (ESI 2002a, i). Albanian demands 
for proportional representation in the public administration could only be 
achieved at the expense of Macedonian workers, and it was therefore inevitable 
that such requests were met with trepidation. 
 
Of particular relevance to this analysis is how these threat perceptions affected 
the state’s attitude towards decentralisation. As is the case in most former 
Communist countries, concepts such as federalism and autonomy are 
considered anathema (Palermo 2012, 89).31 However, from a Macedonian 
perspective, the territorial integrity of the state is also associated with the 
preservation and consolidation of the Macedonian national identity (Engström 
2002b, 13). One reason why the state was recentralised during the 1990s, and 
why there was considerable resistance to decentralising power again after 
2001, was concern that devolving further political power to the municipalities, 
particularly those dominated by Albanian communities, would threaten the 
territorial integrity of the state (Latifi 2001; IRIS 2006; Dimova 2008). In the eyes 
of many, decentralisation was regarded as “a step towards federalism” and “de 
facto partitioning of the country”, which made it increasingly possible for 
Albanian-dominated communities to secede from Macedonia (Ragaru 2005, 
18). Any attempt at secession by the Albanian-dominated regions would also 
carry the risk of the country’s remaining ‘rump’ falling prey to predatory 
neighbours (Poulton 2000, 126). 
                                                          
30
 An estimated 90 percent of the Albanian community are proficient in the Macedonian language, whereas 
less than 2 percent of Macedonians can speak Albanian (ICG 2001b, 6). 
31
 Francesco Palermo (2012, 84) observes how “in post-communist societies autonomy is, ‘by default’, 
linked to ethnic claims, and these are automatically associated with a threat to the territorial integrity of the 
state.” 
  74 
A further concern the majority Macedonian population (and to some extent the 
smaller communities) held regarding decentralisation was the threat of 
becoming marginalised in Albanian-dominated municipalities (the so-called 
‘minorities within minorities’ phenomenon (Bieber 2005a, 118; Palermo 2012, 
86). The fear was that they would become “foreigners in their own country”, due 
to extensive use of the Albanian language in these municipalities (ICG 2000, 6; 
Brunnbauer 2002, 17). Daskalovski suggests Macedonians were also anxious 
that they may be denied access to public resources and employment, and 
recalls events in 1991, when the Albanian community took power in Tetovo 
municipality and promptly replaced all Macedonians in charge of the public 
enterprises with Albanians (Daskalovski 2006, 212). The fact that ethnic 
communities in Macedonia regard the decentralisation of power to 
municipalities as a zero-sum game, where one community gains control at the 
expense of the other, exacerbated such concerns (Brunnbauer 2002, 16). As 
Nadège Ragaru candidly observed:  
 
the moment one community comprises above 50 percent of the total 
population in any given unit of government, that unit becomes 
‘hers’…Minority rights might be respected, yet community preference will 
be the rule rather than the exception. In this respect, ‘minorities’ 
(nationally) do not ‘behave’ better than the ‘majority’ when they are 
locally dominant (Ragaru 2008, 25). 
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The Institutional Design of Decentralisation within the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement  
 
The ultimate goal of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed in August 2001, 
was to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian community, whilst at the 
same time address the insecurities of the Macedonians by preserving the 
territorial integrity of the state (Latifi 2001; Bieber 2005a).32 Its aim was to 
achieve peace through a process of integration, institutional bargaining and 
compromise at both the local and state level, rather than through territorial 
division (Bieber 2005a; Ordanoski and Matovski 2007). Unlike Bosnia’s Dayton 
Agreement, Macedonia’s Framework Agreement sought to strike a balance 
between consociational, centripetalist and integrative approaches to peace 
building and in doing so, “square a circle” between the existence of a unitary 
state and institutional recognition of ethnic diversity (Ragaru 2008, 21). 
Consequently, and contrary to widespread perception, Albanian politicians did 
not achieve all of their demands at Ohrid. For example, creation of the post of 
Vice-President with veto powers, which would be filled by an Albanian, along 
with municipal control of local police forces, were not accepted (Daftary and 
Friedman 2008, 278). Demands to elevate the constitutional status of the 
Albanian community to a constituent people, for Albanian to be an official 
language state-wide, and the creation of a second parliamentary chamber were 
also dropped (Ilievski 2008, 27). 
 
In its Basic Principles, the Framework Agreement declared: “The development 
of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of citizens 
                                                          
32
 The Agreement’s Basic Principles declared: “Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the 
unitary character of the State are inviolable and must be preserved. There are no territorial solutions to 
ethnic issues” (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.2). 
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in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities” 
(Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.5). Certainly, the Agreement called for the 
transfer of 11 new municipal competences, along with a revised law on local 
government financing to ensure sufficient resources and fiscal autonomy; “a 
cure against federalisation” remarked one Albanian politician at the time (Official 
Gazette 2001b; PER 2003, 11).33 However, the municipalities have not been 
awarded any legislative functions, and many of the devolved competences 
remain limited and are not held exclusively by them. For example, as the 
analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrates, with regard to primary and secondary 
education, municipalities only have responsibility for the maintenance of school 
buildings, its network, and the payment of staff salaries, rather than an ability to 
set policy or influence the development of curricula (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 
22.8). The municipalities remain ultimately subordinate to the authority of 
central government even though, significantly, their right to the devolved 
competences is constitutionally entrenched (Official Gazette 2001a, Art. 115).34 
Residual powers remain at the central level. Finally, the municipalities are also 
not directly represented at the central level, as federal units would be in a 
bicameral system. The only mechanism available to the municipalities for 
influencing central government policy (apart from utilising informal political party 
channels) is the municipal association, known by its Macedonian acronym 
‘ZELS’.35 
                                                          
33
 Those specifically referenced in the Framework Agreement were: areas of public services, urban and 
rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, primary and 
secondary education, social welfare, and health care (Official Gazette 2001b; 2002, Art. 22).  
34
 The Law on Local Self-Government also states that disputes between the different tiers of government 
will be resolved impartially by the Constitutional Court (Official Gazette 2004, Art. 51, 71, 87). 
35
 ‘Заедница на Единиците на Локалната Самоуправа на Република Македонија’ - ЗЕЛС (Association 
of the Units of Local Self-Governance of the Republic of Macedonia). 
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Despite common perceptions suggesting the contrary, Florian Bieber (2005a, 
116) remarks that decentralisation was framed to conform to European 
standards, especially the principle of subsidiarity, rather than facilitating fully-
fledged self-government for the Albanian community. Ermira Mehmeti (2008, 
73), then spokeswoman for the Albanian party Democratic Union for Integration 
(DUI), remarked how Arend Lijphart’s models of non-territorial corporate 
autonomy and segmental autonomy along ethnic lines were abandoned during 
negotiations due to the government’s insistence on preserving the unitary 
character of the state (Lijphart 1977, 43; 2002, 51).36 Unlike examples of 
territorial autonomy, the ethnic nature of Macedonia’s municipalities is not 
explicitly recognised. In contrast to neighbouring Kosovo, Macedonian 
municipalities comprising a significant non-majority community do not enjoy any 
special asymmetrical status (UNSC 2007, Appendix 3, Art.4; Sulejmani 2008, 
152). All have been granted the same competences, regardless of local 
demographics. Finally, Macedonian municipalities are not permitted to merge 
with neighbouring jurisdictions, although they are allowed to co-operate with 
one another and form joint public institutions (Official Gazette 2002, Art.14). 
Given the territorial concentration of Albanians in the north and west of the 
country, it is of no surprise that the government adopted reforms to disperse 
limited and conditional authority to more than 80 non-ethnically defined sub-
units. This would not have been the outcome had the state endorsed the 
creation of regional units or indeed an autonomous region. 
 
Under the terms of the Framework Agreement and subsequent Law on the Use 
of Languages, the Macedonian language remains the only official language 
                                                          
36
 DUI is the largest Albanian political party and has been in government coalition with the Macedonian 
VMRO-DPMNE since 2008. 
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throughout the country and which can be used at the international level (Official 
Gazette 2001b, Art. 7;  2008). However, any other language spoken by at least 
20 percent of the population locally is also recognised as an official language 
within municipalities and can be used in communication with regional units of 
ministries.37 With regard to languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the 
population within a municipality, the Agreement also allows the possibility for 
their use as an official language, but the decision to do so remains at the 
discretion of the municipality (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 6.6). It is worth 
emphasising that the recognition of community languages comes as a function 
of demographics, rather than as a symbolic recognition of their equal status with 
the Macedonian language. Nowhere in the Framework Agreement or 
subsequent legislation is use of the ‘Albanian’ language, for example, 
specifically mentioned. Such an arrangement risks causing friction in the future 
if a situation arises where local demographic changes mean a particular 
community no longer meets the required 20 percent threshold. Even at the local 
level, community languages are also not in autonomous official use, but should 
be used in addition to the Macedonian language (Sulejmani 2008, 144). The 
Agreement and subsequent Law on the Use of the Flags of the Communities 
also regulates the use of community emblems, such as the flying of community 
flags in front of local public buildings if that community constitutes a majority 
within a municipality (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 7; 2005).  
 
Finally, given the heterogeneity of many local areas, and to protect against the 
marginalisation of non-majority communities within municipalities, Macedonia’s 
decentralisation design incorporates a range of consociational and integrative 
                                                          
37
 Languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population (i.e. Albanian) can also be spoken in 
parliament (with a simultaneous translation provided in Macedonian), in parliamentary committees, and 
used in citizens’ identification cards. However, only Macedonian can be used in government sessions. 
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power-sharing provisions. The combination of local power-sharing mechanisms 
with territorial self-governance in this way, in addition to decentralisation’s place 
within the wider Framework Agreement, represents an example of the emerging 
practice of complex power-sharing. Proportionality within municipal 
administrations, council, committees and local public administration was 
envisaged, although the Framework Agreement does not call for strict ethnic 
quotas (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 4). This is in contrast to other consociation-
inspired political settlements, such as Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement (OHR 1995). 
Qualified voting procedures in Macedonia were foreseen to ensure greater 
consensus in decision-making within municipal councils. They operate along 
similar lines to Arend Lijphart’s concept of minority veto; however they differ in 
that the right to use them is not given to a particular ethnic community. 
Committees for Inter-Community Relations were also envisaged in ethnically 
mixed municipalities to facilitate institutional dialogue locally between different 
ethnic communities (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 55). Finally, two-round, run-off 
elections for mayors were designed to provide an opportunity for ‘voter pooling’ 
across ethnic divides, while the revision of municipal boundaries based on non-
ethnic criteria was envisaged to proliferate points of power and to emphasise 
non-ethnic cleavages (Horowitz 1991, 226; 2000, 598).38 The way in which the 
institutional design of decentralisation carefully combines consociational and 
integrative power-sharing mechanisms to simultaneously accommodate and 
integrate ethnic diversity at the local level is illustrated in Table 2.6.  
                                                          
38
 ‘Voter pooling’ is a practice advocated by centripetalists which encourages vote-seeking politicians to 
reach out to attract votes from ethnic groups other than their own. See Chapter 1 for more details. 
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Table 2.6:8The Accommodation and Integration of Ethnic Difference through 
Decentralisation39 
 
Accommodation of Ethnic Difference 
Integration of Ethnic Difference 
“The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s 
society must be preserved and reflected in 
public life”  
 
“The development of local self-government 
is essential for ... promoting respect for the 
identity of communities”
 40
 
“Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and the unitary character of the 
State are inviolable and must be 
preserved.”
41
 
 
Municipalities remain ultimately 
subordinate to central government 
authority 
Enhanced municipal competences 
Municipalities have no legislative 
functions  
Increased language rights for non-majority 
communities  
Competences remain limited and are not 
exclusive  
Recognition and use of community 
emblems (flags, etc.) 
Municipalities are not directly represented 
at the central level 
 
Consociational arrangements locally: 
 
 proportional elections to municipal  
councils / committees 
 
 equitable representation in municipal 
and local public administration 
 
 Qualified voting procedures 
 
 Committees for Inter-Community 
Relations 
Municipalities participate in institutions of  
the common state 
Symmetrical decentralisation: 
municipalities comprising a significant 
minority ethnic community do not enjoy 
special status 
No formal recognition of the ethnic 
character of municipalities 
No explicit recognition of communities 
benefitting from language rights 
Relatively large number of municipalities 
(proliferating points of power) and no 
regional level of government 
 
Majority run-off system: election of a 
common mayor 
 
 
According to proponents of complex power-sharing, forms of territorial 
autonomy (which may also include decentralisation) will only contribute to the 
management of self-determination conflicts if they are applied in the context of 
an overall institutional design that gives regionally concentrated groups a strong 
stake in the centre (Weller and Wolff 2005; Weller et al. 2008; Wolff 2009). 
                                                          
39
 This table, summarising the accommodative and integrative aspects of decentralisation, has also been 
published in Lyon (2012a). 
40
 Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.3, 1.5. 
41
 Ibid., Art. 1.2. 
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Accordingly, local populations and their representatives are incentivised to 
remain part of the larger state. The need to combine decentralisation with 
additional power-sharing mechanisms at the national level is particularly critical 
in Macedonia, given the demographic strength of the Albanian population (25 
percent of the population). The significance of the territory dominated by the 
Albanian community relative to the rest of the state (Albanian-majority areas 
constitute approximately one third of the country) is an additional factor which 
makes central government power-sharing essential (Wolff 2009). For this 
reason, the broader Framework Agreement included further soft power-sharing 
mechanisms designed to integrate the Albanian community into wider state 
structures. For example, the equitable representation of all communities in the 
national civil service and public administration, police and Constitutional Court 
was envisaged (Official Gazette 2001b). Consociational techniques, such as 
qualified voting in the parliament and the re-establishment of a parliamentary 
Committee for Inter-Community Relations, are also foreseen. Whilst the 
Framework Agreement includes no formal requirements for multi-ethnic 
coalitions in government, the country’s demographic balances, coupled with the 
use of proportional representation in parliamentary elections, makes Albanian 
political parties’ participation in coalition governments likely (Wolff 2008, 432-
434).42  
 
 
                                                          
42
 A general (voluntary) practice of appointing deputy ministers from a different ethnic group to the Minister 
across government is also observed (Bieber 2005b, 94). For a more detailed analysis of the wider 
Framework Agreement and its proposed constitutional amendments which clarified the legal status of 
Macedonia’s ethnic communities, their languages and religions, refer to Bieber (2005a; 2005b; 2008), 
Daskalovski (2006), and Daftary and Friedman (2008). 
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Decentralisation and its Ability to Address Horizontal Inequalities 
 
The design of Macedonia’s decentralisation seeks to directly address many (but 
not all) of the political, cultural status, social, and economic HIs experienced by 
the Albanian community during the decade after the Republic’s independence in 
1991. For example, widening political participation at the local level creates 
alternative sites of power and patronage for local elites and may help legitimise 
government institutions in the eyes of previously marginalised, disenchanted 
communities. Additionally, devolving the management of controversial issues 
such as the use of community languages and symbols to the municipal level 
goes some way to diluting Albanian cultural status demands. Both these themes 
will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Finally, enhancing 
municipal responsibility over the provision of public services such as education 
should lead to a more equitable distribution of state resources, in addition to 
more culturally responsive services. This argument will be discussed at length 
in Chapter 4. In so doing, decentralisation has the potential to address the 
grievances of both Albanian political elites and the masses simultaneously, 
whilst remaining sensitive to the insecurities of the Macedonian majority.  
 
Decentralisation may also contribute indirectly to addressing underlying sources 
of insecurity, such as socio-economic inequalities, that make Macedonia prone 
to group-based conflict. The Framework Agreement does not include any direct 
provisions designed to address the economic HIs experienced by the Albanian 
community in Macedonia; an area often neglected in peace processes and 
agreements (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 90-91; McGarry and O’Leary 2008; 
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Stewart et al. 2008c, 323).43 However, advocates of decentralisation suggest 
devolving responsibility for local economic development and public service 
delivery to municipalities may promote economic growth through increased 
public sector efficiency, in addition to reducing poverty through the design of 
basic services that more effectively meet local needs (Oates 1972; Crawford 
and Hartmann 2008). Decentralisation is also perceived to address rural under-
development by promoting a more equitable distribution of state resources 
locally and by uniting poor areas with more affluent ones (Ahmad and Brosio 
2009, 11). This argument will be examined in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The 
extent to which decentralisation has the potential to address the horizontal 
inequalities that existed between the Macedonian and Albanian communities, 
whilst also recognising the concerns of the majority, is summarised in Table 2.7. 
                                                          
43
 The exception is the requirement of equitable representation for the communities in the public sector. 
However this is likely to benefit only those individuals with sufficient qualifications and political 
connections. 
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Table 2.7:9How Decentralisation in Macedonia May Address Horizontal 
Inequalities 
 
 
Horizontal 
Inequalities 
Ethnic Albanian 
Demands 
Macedonian  
Insecurities 
Addressed by 
Decentralisation? 
Political 
Participation 
   
Constitutional status 
Recognition as a  
Constituent people. 
Equates to a denial of the 
right of Macedonians to 
have their own nation-
state. 
 
Fear of right to self-
determination and 
secession. 
 
No. 
 
Partially addressed 
in OFA and 
subsequent 
constitutional 
amendments 
Constitutional status 
/ equitable 
representation 
Restoration of 
collective rights, e.g. 
proportional 
representation in the 
public administration, 
police, army, judiciary, 
etc.  
 
Concern PR would be 
achieved at the expense 
of Macedonian workers. 
Partially. New jobs 
created in 
municipal 
administrations. 
 
Addressed 
elsewhere in OFA. 
Local government 
Restoration of 
competences and 
fiscal autonomy / 
widen political 
participation by 
creating alternative 
sites of power 
Fear of threats to the 
territorial integrity of the 
state. 
 
Threat of being 
marginalised in Albanian-
dominated areas. 
 
Yes – directly by 
widening political 
participation. 
 
Inclusion of power-
sharing 
mechanisms. 
 
Cultural Status     
Use of language  
Albanian as a second 
official language state-
wide. 
Poses a threat to the 
survival of the 
Macedonian national 
identity. 
 
Fear of bilingualism in 
the public administration. 
 
No. 
 
Not addressed 
elsewhere in OFA. 
Use of language 
Right to use Albanian 
at the municipal level. 
Fear of marginalisation in 
Albanian-dominated 
areas. 
 
Yes - directly. In 
certain 
municipalities, 
alongside the use 
of Macedonian. 
 
Flags and symbols 
Right to fly community 
flags in front of local 
public buildings. 
 
Fear of secession. Yes - directly. 
Constitutional status 
of Islam 
Equal status with 
Macedonian Orthodox 
Church. 
Equates to a denial of the 
right of Macedonians to 
have and control their 
own nation-state / 
‘homeland’. 
 
No. 
 
Addressed in OFA 
and constitutional 
amendments. 
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Horizontal 
Inequalities 
Ethnic Albanian 
Demands 
Macedonian  
Insecurities 
Addressed by 
Decentralisation? 
Social Aspects    
Primary / secondary 
education 
Access to education in 
mother tongue. 
Threat to the superiority 
of the Macedonian 
language. 
 
Yes – directly. 
Primary / secondary 
education 
Equitable and 
transparent allocation 
of educational funds 
and infrastructure. 
 
Threat to the superiority 
of the Macedonian 
language. 
Yes - directly. 
Primary / secondary 
education 
Teacher-training for all 
Albanian-instruction 
teachers. 
 
Threat to the superiority 
of the Macedonian 
language. 
No.  
Addressed 
elsewhere in OFA. 
Tertiary education 
Establishment of an 
Albanian-medium 
university. 
 
Threat to the superiority 
of the Macedonian 
language. 
No.  
Addressed 
elsewhere in OFA. 
Equitable access to 
basic services 
Improve infrastructure 
in rural areas. 
Struggle for control over 
diminishing state 
resources. 
 
Yes - directly. 
Economic Aspects    
Employment and 
income levels 
Improve access to 
public employment at 
all levels. 
Concern PR would be 
achieved at the expense 
of Macedonian workers. 
Partially – directly. 
New jobs created 
in local 
administrations.  
 
Rural under-
development and 
equitable access to 
basic public 
services 
Equitable distribution 
of state resources. 
 
Improve infrastructure 
in rural areas. 
Struggle for control over 
diminishing state 
resources. 
Yes – directly by 
equitable 
distribution of state 
resources, and by 
uniting under-
developed rural 
areas with urban 
ones. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has provided the context in which to examine whether 
decentralisation can address – either directly or indirectly – many of the 
longstanding inter-group tensions that existed between the majority Macedonian 
and non-majority Albanian communities prior to 2001. The analysis identified 
the presence of multiple horizontal inequalities in the political, cultural, social, 
and economic spheres. These inequalities coincided, making them more 
persistent. They also existed simultaneously at the elite and mass levels, and 
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this made the risk of inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia more likely. Regardless 
of whether these grievances were genuine or manipulated by political 
opportunists, this chapter has argued that the only way to build sustainable 
peace in post-2001 Macedonia is for these inequalities to be addressed. 
 
This chapter has also recognised how persistent identity disputes with its 
neighbours during the 1990s affected the way in which the state approached its 
relations with non-majority communities, in particular the Albanians. Ontological 
challenges to the Macedonian identity contributed to the majority’s reluctance to 
acknowledge Albanian demands for greater rights and undermined the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Albanian community. This encouraged 
them to question the Macedonian people’s right of exclusivity over the country. 
Macedonian threat perceptions also affected the state’s attitude towards 
decentralisation and influenced the institutional design the reform ultimately 
took. Despite granting local communities enhanced autonomy over the 
management of their own affairs and resources, decentralisation ultimately 
represents an attempt to integrate non-majority communities (particularly the 
Albanians) into unitary state structures. It does this by ensuring that the 
municipalities remain ultimately subordinate to central government, have no 
explicit ethnic identity, and are sufficiently numerous to fragment the power 
base of non-majority communities across multiple local units. The pre-eminence 
of the Macedonian language, which remains an official language in 
municipalities dominated by non-majority communities, in addition to 
decentralisation’s combined use of consociational techniques locally, also 
reflects a desire to ensure local minorities are not marginalised at the municipal 
level.  
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Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that while decentralisation alone may 
unable to address all of the grievances raised by Albanian politicians and the 
NLA, placed within the broader context of the Framework Agreement, the 
reform has the potential to directly address many of the political, cultural status 
and social inequalities that were responsible for raising tensions between the 
Macedonian and Albanian communities during the 1990s. Importantly, the 
inequalities that decentralisation seeks to address are experienced by both the 
Albanian political elites and the masses, and their resolution should therefore 
make violent group mobilisation less likely in the future. Decentralisation may 
also contribute indirectly to reducing socio-economic inequalities; an important 
underlying structural source of insecurity. The following four chapters will now 
examine the extent to which the implementation of decentralisation in 
Macedonia between 2004 and 2012 has reduced the political, cultural, social 
and economic inequalities experienced by Macedonia’s ethnic communities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECENTRALISATION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF CONSENSUAL, 
PARTICIPATORY LOCAL DEMOCRACY 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers whether the decentralisation process in Macedonia has 
widened effective political participation and strengthened democracy at the local 
level, and has thereby contributed to addressing a significant political grievance 
of the Albanian community during the 1990s. Whilst the creation of sub-national 
tiers of government increases the possibilities for diverse communities to 
participate in political structures, the intrinsic value of local democracy should 
not be overlooked. Indeed, local government represents state structures that 
are closest to the citizens and where the right to participate in public affairs can 
be most directly exercised. Constituting “the main foundations of any democratic 
regime”, municipalities may (or may not) represent the ideal medium through 
which the democratic principles of participation, equity, transparency and 
accountability can be realised (CoE 1985; UNESCAP 2011). It is surprising, 
given the fact that a significant proportion of the minority protection mechanisms 
envisaged in the Framework Agreement are at the local level, that those 
monitoring the realisation of these rights remained preoccupied with their 
implementation at the national level. 
 
This review begins with a discussion of the principal theoretical arguments 
concerning decentralisation and its ability to mitigate ethnic conflict by 
facilitating the effective participation of national minorities in local institutions. It 
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will then determine whether decentralisation in Macedonia has addressed 
political horizontal inequalities by: (a) improving the political representation of 
diverse groups in local decision-making processes; (b) deepening local 
democracy by providing opportunities for local residents to participate in local 
governance; and (c) enhancing the transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness of municipal governments. An assessment of the largely 
consociational power-sharing mechanisms envisaged at the local level will then 
consider whether decentralisation has promoted multiculturalism in Macedonia 
at the expense of gender equality. The role of women in building sustainable 
peace is crucial, and the existence of effective mechanisms to promote gender 
equality demonstrates the degree to which local communities are based on 
principles of equity, inclusion, and tolerance. Finally, the opportunities 
Macedonian citizens had for participating directly in local decision-making 
processes will be evaluated. Municipal government, notes Timothy Sisk (2001, 
12), is only one part of the equation; albeit an important one. The notion of 
citizens’ participation is also central to the concept of local governance.  
 
This chapter does not intend to assess the claims of some smaller ethnic 
communities that the gerrymandering of municipal boundaries in 2004 led to 
their effective political exclusion in some municipalities. Nor does it seek to 
evaluate the participation of the municipalities in national decision-making 
processes. As previous sections have explained, as a unitary state, Macedonia 
does not have a bicameral system where the sub-national level is represented 
centrally. The views of municipalities are only represented formally through the 
municipal association, ZELS, or informally through political party structures. 
Instead the chapter argues that whilst decentralisation has expanded the 
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potential space available for citizens to participate in local governance, it has 
not guaranteed the participation of local communities, or that their participation 
is both equitable and effective. This chapter also suggests that advocates of the 
decentralisation process in Macedonia have failed to sufficiently appreciate the 
extent to which the over-dominance of some political parties, which lack internal 
democracy, and the pervasiveness of patronage-based politics in daily life 
undermine its potential benefits. 
 
 
Decentralised Governance and Conflict Management 
 
The creation or enhancement of sub-national units allows groups which may be 
a minority nationally, but which constitute a majority locally, to exercise 
governmental power in ways that would otherwise be foreclosed if the whole 
country was one undifferentiated territory (Horowitz 2007, 958). Importantly, 
however, it does so whilst maintaining the territorial integrity of the unitary state. 
Increasing the number of arenas in which there are political prizes to be won 
can also have the important distributive side-effect of creating employment 
opportunities within the new bureaucracies and service sectors (Horowitz 2000, 
605). By making government more representative of society, decentralisation 
may help legitimise government institutions in the eyes of previously 
marginalised, disenchanted communities, and thus encourage greater loyalty 
towards state structures. Whilst the authority of central government is reduced 
as a result of decentralisation, concedes Walter Kälin (1999, 49), the legitimacy 
of the state as a whole can be enhanced. 
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Decentralisation’s potential for strengthening local democracy is an argument 
long advocated by development agencies such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (Shah and Thompson 2004) and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID 2009). Attempts to 
strengthen democracy at the local level are of particular concern in post-conflict 
and multi-ethnic environments and compliment the democratic peace 
proposition that democracies are inherently more peaceful than non-democratic 
regimes (Siegle and O’Mahoney 2007; Lijphart 2008; Newman et al. 2009). A 
healthy system of local democracy, in which all groups feel represented and can 
influence the institutions and policy decisions of governance, can help prevent 
feelings of alienation and frustration with the state (Sisk 2001, 74). Such 
institutions may prevent conflict by providing outlets for grievances and creating 
opportunities for consensual (rather than conflictual) problem-solving.  
 
As a system for bargaining and negotiation, democracy can also help manage 
conflict constructively by keeping them within the boundaries of political 
dialogue rather than allowing them to escalate into violence (ibid., 76). Such 
“learning laboratories”, notes Zoë Scott (2009, 16), may facilitate local 
politicians to build trust among groups and acquire political and conflict 
resolution skills that can be used in different social arenas. Training in 
compromise is essential in ethnically divided societies, particularly before local 
politicians rise to the national level where more complex and delicate issues of 
national policy may need to be resolved (Manor 1999, 49, 85; Horowitz 2007, 
960). Finally, local government may serve as an incubator for small ethnic 
parties that choose to form inter- and trans-ethnic alliances (Treisman 2007, 
245). If, as Dawn Brancati (2006, 2008) suggests, decentralisation helps 
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proliferate regional and ethnic political parties, it may be difficult for one group to 
dominate locally and incentives for the formation of inter-ethnic coalitions may 
therefore be enhanced (Horowitz 2007, 962).  
 
Although decentralisation already contributes to the widening of civic 
participation through the creation of alternative sites of power and patronage, 
development agencies advocate supplementing periodic local elections with 
activities that facilitate the continuous involvement of citizens in decision-making 
processes. For people to participate fully in their local community, “the vote 
needs to be reinforced by the ‘voice’” (Kauzya 2005, 7). Citizens’ participation 
follows the school of thought historically associated with Rousseau’s concept of 
democracy being the direct engagement by citizens on virtually all community 
matters (Sisk 2001, 13; Crook 2002, 308). Such activities may take the form of 
frequent public consultations, participatory planning and budgeting, and can 
successfully empower ethnic minorities, women, and those less educated to 
become involved in local affairs (Manor 1999, 97; Crook 2002, 308). Direct 
democracy promotes inter-ethnic dialogue and may avert ethnic conflicts borne 
out of misunderstanding or ignorance (Ghai 2001, 6). It can also promote 
greater transparency and accountability in local governance, resulting in the 
increased responsiveness of municipal institutions to local needs and the 
curbing of corrupt practices (Kälin 1999, 50; Manor 2006, 285; Treisman 2007, 
12). One further important outcome of citizen participation is the creation of 
what the political scientist Robert Putnam (1993) refers to as ‘social capital’. 
Social capital is the basis of legitimacy for government institutions and is 
necessary for effective and efficient governance. Without it, when trust and 
confidence are lacking, communities are dysfunctional and in the worst case 
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scenarios violence among contending social forces may erupt (Sisk 2001, 147). 
Significantly, however, enhanced citizen voice can only be effective if municipal 
governments are ready to listen and citizens have sufficient capacity to 
stimulate change (Crook 2002, 319; Barter 2008, 2).  
 
 
Decentralisation and the Creation of Local Tyrannies 
 
Despite the prevalence of reforms worldwide, the academic community and 
more recently donor agencies have become increasingly sceptical of 
decentralisation’s performance as a panacea for culturally diverse unitary 
states. For example, writing on behalf of the United Nations in 2005, John-Mary 
Kauzya surprisingly concluded: “as a process, it does not possess intrinsic or 
natural predisposition to peace, democracy or development” (Kauzya 2005, 15). 
Many authors have warned that the promotion of decentralised governance in 
ethnically divided societies is not devoid of risk and its success cannot be 
guaranteed. Its implementation may even have unwanted effects which can 
inadvertently exacerbate the causes of conflict (Schou and Haug 2005; GTZ 
2006; Braathen and Bjerkreim Hellevik 2008; Diprose 2008; Grasa and Camps 
2009; Tambulasi 2009; Wolff 2010a). Policy makers, notes Scott (2009, 18), 
should understand that whilst decentralisation alters conflict dynamics, it does 
not necessarily exacerbate or remove them. Devolving contentious issues to the 
local level may quarantine conflict, but weak, nascent local institutions may be 
ill-equipped or unwilling to manage the conflicts that arise (Braathen and 
Bjerkreim Hellevik 2008, 21; Diprose 2008, 395). Once central government has 
relinquished the management of potentially sensitive identity issues to local 
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entities, they may no longer be able to act as arbitrators and to take steps to 
prevent discriminatory behaviour (Illner, 1998; GTZ 2006, 7). 
 
The creation of newly defined sub-national units, together with the 
entrenchment of ethnicity locally, may lead to the creation of “local tyrannies” 
and exacerbate discrimination against small ethnic communities (Nordlinger 
1972, 31; Coakley 2001, 312; Horowitz 2007, 963; Treisman 2007, 239). In this 
respect, decentralisation may not only freeze - as opposed to reduce - 
instances of ethnic conflict; it may relocate them from the national to local level 
and cause them to become more intense. Unless there is complete 
homogeneity in each local area, notes Crook (2002, 305), the system will create 
new ‘minorities within minorities’, who may be subjected to domination by local 
elites who capture power by ‘democratic’ means.  As Chapter 2 has explained, 
anxiety over becoming ‘foreigners in their own country’ was a particular fear 
held by the majority Macedonian community during the 1990s and which 
hindered the implementation of decentralisation reforms to 2001. Ethnic 
minorities that have just ‘won’ greater autonomy from central government may 
resent having to share power with other ethnic groups locally (Weller and Wolff 
2005, 268). Resentment may be particularly intense when local minorities are 
members of the dominant group nationally, and if the creation of new 
boundaries has altered the majority/minority status of local ethnic groups 
(Green 2008, 446). A possible consequence might be a ‘sons of the soil’ type of 
politics which may encourage discrimination against local minorities in the 
development of public policy and investment programmes, service delivery, 
procurement, and public employment (McGarry et al. 2008, 153). Discriminatory 
tactics may also adversely affect women and those who do not share such 
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ethnocentric worldviews (Kälin 2004, 306; Rebouche and Fearton 2005; Beall 
2006). Where rigid employment quotas do exist, notes Florian Bieber (2004, 
20), the inclusion of smaller ethnic communities in decentralised institutions 
may only represent tokenism, with real decision-making power being 
monopolised by the dominant ethnic group. 
 
Another possible negative consequence resulting from the reduction in central 
government influence locally is an increase in elite capture, corruption and rent-
seeking behaviour, along with the entrenchment of patronage or clientelistic 
politics. These can undermine the benefits associated with decentralisation 
(Blunt and Turner 2005, 79; Devas and Delay 2006, 692; Barter 2008; 
Ejobowah 2008, 251; Scott 2009, 7). Where hierarchical chains of patron-client 
relationships are already dominant in politics, devolving political power and 
resources to local governments may simply shift the locus of clientelism and 
corruption (Diamond 1999, 12). This process may even make these problems 
more difficult to control, since disciplined party structures and countervailing 
interests, often found at the national level, are absent. Elite capture and 
patronage politics may also be more acute at lower levels of government, 
contends Sanjay Jeram (2008, 18), because the fixed costs of organising make 
it harder for smaller groups of people to establish resistance groups. 
Clientelistic promises can be easier to make and fulfil at more local levels, due 
to the closer social relations between elected representatives and their clients 
(Ahmed et al. 2005, 16). As a consequence, even the strongest advocates of 
decentralisation argue that effective devolution should be accompanied by 
corresponding mechanisms to ensure accountability of local actors involved in 
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allocating resources and influencing local political decisions (Kauzya 2005, 15; 
Cheema 2007, 170).  
 
 
Representative Democracy: the Design of Municipal Power-Sharing 
Mechanisms 
 
Given the significant risks associated with decentralisation, experts are 
increasingly of the opinion that forms of territorial self-governance should be 
combined with other conflict management mechanisms such as power-sharing 
to reassure groups in deeply divided societies of their ability to participate 
meaningfully in local decision-making processes (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004, 
11; Bunce and Watts 2005, 139; Weller and Wolff 2005, 4; Wolff 2010a, 30). 
Under majoritarian systems, warns Arend Lijphart, governments may constitute 
a “majority dictatorship” and there may be “civil strife rather than democracy” 
(Lijphart 1999, 32-3). Power-sharing arrangements, in contrast, embrace joint or 
consensus decision-making by all major mobilised groups in society, thereby 
offering a viable alternative to destabilising, ‘zero-sum’ democracy (Sisk 2001, 
74; Norris 2008, 223).  
 
The emerging practice of complex power sharing represents an attempt to 
move beyond what Stefan Wolff regards “the rigid theoretical divisions between 
consociational (and integrationist) power sharing and power dividing” (Wolff 
2007, 375). This hybrid model of conflict management, increasingly advocated 
by scholars and practitioners alike, endeavours to address complex self-
determination disputes by retaining self-governance at its heart, but combining it 
  97 
with additional mechanisms for accommodating diversity, especially forms of 
power-sharing (Wolff 2009, 38). As Chapter 2 has demonstrated, the 
Framework Agreement is an example of complex power-sharing. The 
decentralisation process, for example, forms part of a wider package of reforms 
which also include proportionality throughout the national election system and 
public administration, qualified voting procedures to ensure consensus in 
decision-making, the establishment of a national Parliamentary Committee for 
Inter-Community Relations, and enhanced recognition of community languages 
and symbols. Significantly, these predominantly consociational power-sharing 
mechanisms are also envisaged at the municipal level. 
 
Proportionality within municipal councils, committees, and the local public 
administration represents an essential mechanism for assuring the participation 
of different ethnic groups in both elected and administrative bodies. Whilst the 
equitable representation of Macedonia’s communities in the public 
administration had long been a state objective, and was indeed enshrined in the 
1974 Constitution of the Social Republic of Macedonia, as Chapter 2 has 
discussed, the reality during the 1990s had been very different.1 The 1991 
Constitution had removed the collective rights previously granted to 
Macedonia’s communities, including proportional representation by quota on 
public bodies. Consequently, Albanians constituted only 2.5 percent of all public 
employees in 1991; a proportion which had only increased to 10.19 percent by 
2001 (Daskalovski 2006, 195). However, almost ten years after the 2001 
conflict, and the reinstatement of group rights by the Framework Agreement, the 
proportion of Albanians employed in the civil service nationally remains at 16.9 
                                                          
1
 Refer to Chapter 11 of the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, entitled 'Equality of 
Nationalities' stated: ‘Municipalities and the Republic ensure that nationalities be proportionately 
represented in the municipal assemblies ... and be adequately represented in their bodies' (Caca, 2001). 
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percent, despite constituting 25.17 percent of the population (SSO 2005; 
Ombudsman 2011, 33). It is important to note that the Framework Agreement 
and subsequent legislation does not call for strict ethnic quotas in Macedonia’s 
civil service and public administration. Municipalities are not legally obliged to 
employ a certain percentage of different ethnic groups. Municipal councillors are 
also elected by a proportional representation system and are appointed to 
council committees on the same basis. In contrast, mayoral candidates are 
elected according to a two-round, majority run-off system, which represents a 
more integrative approach to power-sharing since it seeks to encourage vote-
pooling across ethnic lines (Horowitz 2000, 601-652; McGarry et al. 2008, 55).  
 
Qualified voting procedures, sometimes referred to as ‘double-majority’ or 
‘Badinter-majority’ voting, are also envisaged to ensure greater consensus in 
decision-making within municipal councils.2  They operate along similar lines to 
Arend Lijphart’s concept of minority veto; however they differ in that the right to 
use them is not given to one particular community. Instead, certain issues 
debated in municipal councils cannot be approved without “the majority of votes 
of the present council members, within which there must be a majority of votes 
… belonging to the communities which are not the majority of [the] population in 
the municipality” (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 41.3). Whilst offering protection to 
minority communities against the strength of the majority in municipal decision-
making, the procedure does not constitute full veto power, and Joseph Marko 
has noted that it represents a much weaker mechanism than comparable 
provisions in other ex-Yugoslav republics (Marko 2004/05, 709). One reason for 
this is the fact that use of ‘double majority’ voting in Macedonia is restricted to 
                                                          
2
 Named after the French judge Robert Badinter. 
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the following areas of municipal decision-making: culture, use of languages and 
alphabets, and determining the use of the municipal coat of arms and flag 
(Official Gazette 2002, Art. 41.3). In all other areas, minority support is not 
required to approve decisions. The advantage of this relatively restrictive 
procedure, notes Florian Bieber (2005a), is that it can help prevent blockage of 
the entire decision-making process, as is the case Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Nevertheless, such limitations on use, he concludes, contain an inherent danger 
that decisions which may have a profound impact on minorities, such as 
education or economic policy, are beyond the reach of the minorities' veto. 
 
The Law on Local Self-Government (2002, Art. 55) also obliges municipalities 
where a minority group represents more than 20 percent of the local population 
to establish Committees for Inter-Community Relations. Municipalities with local 
minority communities comprising less than 20 percent are also permitted to 
establish such Committees, however the decision to do so is at the discretion of 
the municipal council. The Committee’s membership should reflect the ethnic 
structure of the local population and each ethnic community should be 
represented equally. Comparable to Lijphart’s consociational notion of 
arbitration mechanisms, the role of these Committees is to enable institutional 
dialogue between municipal councils and different local minority communities 
that may not otherwise be adequately represented in the municipal council. 
Their task involves reviewing issues pertinent to local inter-ethnic relations, for 
example those requiring the use of qualified voting procedures, and providing 
opinions and solutions on them. Municipal councils are obliged to consider the 
Committee’s appraisals and to make decisions regarding them. 
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One final consociational principle reflected in post-2001 municipal governance 
is the enhanced use of community languages, flags and symbols locally. As 
Chapter 2 has discussed, the inability of Macedonia’s non-majority communities 
to use their languages and flags locally represented a significant cultural 
horizontal inequality during the 1990s. According to the Law on Local Self-
Government (2002, Art.90) and subsequent Law on Use of Languages (2008, 
Art. 41), the Macedonian language remains the official language in the 
municipalities; however any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the 
population locally is also recognised as an official language. With regard to 
languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the local population, the Law also 
allows the possibility for their use as an official language, but the decision to do 
so remains at the discretion of the municipality. Formally recognising a 
community language means it can be used in municipal council sessions and 
citizens are permitted to submit applications to municipal bodies in their mother 
tongue. Municipalities are also obliged to correspond with citizens in their own 
language if requested by the citizen. In such instances, the citizen will receive a 
response from the municipality in both Macedonian and the community 
language requested (Common Values 2009, 53). The Framework Agreement 
and subsequent Law on the Use of the Flags of the Communities also regulates 
the use of community emblems, such as the flying of community flags in front of 
local public buildings if that community constitutes a majority within the 
municipality (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 7; 2005). 
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The Effectiveness of Consociational Power-Sharing Mechanisms Locally 
 
Proportionality 
 
Analyses of the equitable representation process have consistently emphasised 
how the recruitment of non-majority employees has been “high-jacked” by 
political parties and shows little regard for the candidates’ skills and experience 
(EC 2008, 11; 2009, 13; 2010, 10; 2011, 10). Indeed, local interlocutors told 
International Crisis Group in 2011 that a job in the public administration requires 
a DUI or VMRO-DPMNE party card and several thousand euros (ICG 2011, 
10).3 In particular, it has been claimed that DUI see equitable representation as 
an opportunity to “take care” of former NLA combatants and their families. 
Allegedly, every third new recruit must be related to a former NLA member 
(Taleski 2011, 15). The Helsinki Human Rights Committee has claimed that 
party discrimination is particularly prevalent in municipal administrations (ICG 
2011, 10). Employment data from a selection of fifteen multi-ethnic 
municipalities displayed in Appendix D confirms the hypothesis that 
representation of a particular local community in the local administration is more 
likely to improve when the Mayor is from the same ethnic group. This implies 
that Mayors are regularly favouring their own (ethnic) party supporters in the 
recruitment of new employees. Albanian Mayors in the municipalities of 
Brevnica, Čair, Struga, and Vrapčište, for example, have succeeded in 
improving the representation of their community in the municipal administration. 
In contrast, communities constituting more than 20 percent in a given 
                                                          
3
 DUI stands for ‘Democratic Union for Integration’ (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim – BDI – in Albanian). 
It has been a junior member of the national governing coalition with the (ethnic Macedonian) VMRO-
DPMNE (Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација - Демократска партија за 
македонско национално единство - ВМРО-ДПМНЕ) since 2008. 
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municipality, but less than 50 percent (implying the Mayor is of another 
ethnicity), have been less successful (see data for Albanians in Dolneni, 
Petrovec, and Zelenikovo). Such practices also impact negatively on the 
representation of smaller ethnic communities who are often geographically 
dispersed between municipalities and only constitute a majority in a handful 
(see Appendix D).4  
 
Reports of “large-scale dismissals” in the wake of local elections are further 
evidence of the politicisation of municipal administrations (ibid., 10). Whilst 
employed at South East European University, Tetovo, during the March 2005 
municipal elections, the author witnessed first-hand the political pressure placed 
on the Dean of Public Administration to employ individuals who had recently lost 
their job in neighbouring Gostivar municipality.5 Little has changed in recent 
years, prompting the European Commission to remark in its 2010 Progress 
Report on Macedonia how the number of complaints submitted to the Civil 
Service Agency regarding the replacement or dismissal of municipal civil 
servants increased following the 2009 municipal elections (EC 2010, 10). It is 
important to emphasise that, as the political party governing the most Albanian-
dominated municipalities since 2005, DUI has equally disenfranchised 
Albanians who are not party members from potential positions in the local civil 
service and public administration.6 
 
                                                          
4
 In particular the Serbs in Kumanovo, the Roma in Kičevo, and the Bošniak community in Petrovec. It is 
important to note that Serbs in Čučer-Sandevo and Staro Nagoričane are in fact over-represented in the 
municipal administrations. However, staffing numbers are small in both municipalities, which may make the 
proportional analysis less accurate. 
5
 The incumbent Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) lost control of Gostivar municipality to its bitter rival 
DUI in March 2005. 
6
 DUI controlled 15 municipalities compared to DPA’s two as a result of the 2005 elections, and 14 
compared to 1 DPA-led municipality since subsequent elections in March 2009. 
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No doubt influenced by a desire to conceal blatant political bias in the selection 
of non-majority candidates, the process of equitable representation remains 
shrouded in secrecy. The Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (SIOFA) led by the Albanian party DUI, for example, has 
failed to publish any reports on equitable representation in the ten years since 
the Agreement was signed, although the Ombudsman’s Office does publish 
some data in its annual reports.7 SIOFA also remain without a database to 
monitor equitable representation, despite expressing its intention to do so for 
over two years.8 According to leading development experts, the extent to which 
governments adopt mechanisms to regularly monitor the progress of reforms 
represents a litmus test for assessing its true commitment to its outcomes 
(Eaton et al. 2010, 64). This therefore raises interesting questions regarding 
DUI’s commitment to the Framework Agreement’s principles, especially as it 
presents itself as the only true guardians of the Agreement’s implementation.  
 
Where data on equitable representation is available, it is important to note that it 
refers largely to progress made in the recruitment of civil servants as opposed 
to members of the public administration (those employed in schools, health 
centres, public enterprises, etc.). According to 2009 statistics, approximately 
105,500 persons are employed nationally in the public sector, with only 9,700 
(less than ten percent) comprising civil servants (Emurli 2010, 15). This means 
no reliable data currently exists for roughly 40,000 persons employed in the 
public administration locally; not to mention the significant number of individuals 
employed on temporary contracts who are considered neither civil servants or 
members of the public administration for statistical purposes. One senior DUI 
                                                          
7
 However, the Ombudsman’s Office annual reports focus primarily on equitable representation in central 
government institutions rather than in the municipalities. 
8
 Interview with a senior representative of SIOFA: 27/06/10, Tetovo. 
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official estimated that only seven percent of the public administration was 
Albanian in December 2009 (ICG 2011, 15). There is currently no way, 
however, of verifying this claim. 
 
Progress in the promotion of equitable representation in municipal 
administrations is also hampered by practical considerations rather than simply 
a lack of political will. “Often”, observed the OSCE in its 2009 Decentralisation 
Survey, “the municipal leadership is willing to implement the principle of 
equitable representation but possesses only limited resources to do so” (OSCE 
2009, 58-9). Respondents to the Survey indicated that the following factors 
obstruct municipalities’ ability to achieve a representative workforce: the lack of 
qualified candidates from non-majority communities, political pressures to 
employ staff, existing over-employment in the municipality, and the lack of any 
legal obligation to do so. Indeed, considering the post-2001 non-majority 
recruitment drive began at a time when state agencies were under increasing 
pressure to downsize and when public enterprises were scheduled for 
restructuring, privatisation and often closure, equitable representation has 
frequently been regarded as “one of the most sensitive elements of the Ohrid 
Agreement” (Brown et al. 2002, 16; ICG 2003, 13; Ragaru 2008, 14). Given the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms within the regulatory framework to ensure 
public institutions meet recruitment targets for non-majority communities, it is 
understandable that progress at the municipal level has been slow. 
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Qualified Voting Procedures 
 
With regard to the use of the Badinter / ‘double-majority’ voting procedures 
designed to ensure greater consensus in municipal council decision-making, 
research undertaken by both the Institute for Regional and International Studies 
and the Association for Democratic Initiatives (ADI) suggests this practice is 
“rarely respected at the local level” (ADI 2006; IRIS 2009, 14). ADI’s interviews 
with representatives from the multi-ethnic municipalities of Gostivar, Kičevo, 
Struga, and Debar during 2006 found that in many instances local councillors 
were unaware of the compulsory nature of the qualified voting procedures for 
specific topics. The councillors also felt its use unnecessary, since issues 
requiring a double-majority had not featured on the agenda of municipal 
councils (ADI 2006, 17, 64). Other councillors interviewed were opposed to the 
procedure’s application outright, suggesting its use would be perceived as an 
indication of poor community relations and should therefore be avoided (ibid., 
19, 72, 82).  
 
Fieldwork undertaken by the author in selected multi-ethnic municipalities 
during June 2010 found that attitudes towards the use of qualified voting 
procedures have not changed significantly.9 In most cases, political deals 
between the major parties concerning sensitive local issues are made “behind 
closed doors” and long before the issue is debated in municipal councils.10 This 
practice, which Lijphart refers to as ‘summit diplomacy’, may be beneficial in 
divided societies, but has been criticised by opponents of consociationalism for 
being incompatible with concepts of modern participatory democracy (Lijphart 
                                                          
9
 Interview with municipal councillor in Struga municipality: 02/06/11, Struga. 
10
 Interview with Aleksandra Bojadzieva, senior NGO representative and member of the Council of 
Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities: 21/06/10, Skopje. 
 106 
1977, 40; Roeder and Rothchild 2005, 328; Weller et al. 2008, 707). In 
Macedonia’s case, it makes local minority protection mechanisms, such as 
qualified voting procedures and Committees for Inter-Community Relations, 
irrelevant. Given the restricted use of qualified voting procedures, along with the 
narrow interpretation of their use by many municipal councils, ADI has 
recommended its application be broadened to apply more flexibly to other 
issues affecting the lives of non-majority communities, such as local education 
policy and adoption of the municipal work programme and budget (Rahić and 
Haziri 2010, 42). Kenan Hasipi, a prominent Turkish Member of Parliament, has 
also suggested introducing a “triple majority” procedure to ensure smaller 
communities represented with fewer councillors locally are not marginalised 
when it is applied (MCIC 2011, 53). 
 
 
Mediation Processes: Municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations 
 
The effectiveness of veto rights, notes Florian Bieber (2004, 21), depends not 
only on their scope of application; the effectiveness of mediation processes 
activated once a veto is invoked is also crucial. In accordance with the law, the 
20 multi-ethnic municipalities legally required to establish Committees for Inter-
Community Relations had done so by 2010, according to data collated by the 
municipal association, by the end of 2010 a further twelve municipalities have 
established Committees on a voluntarily basis (see data in Appendix E).11 It is 
admirable that so many municipalities have recognised the benefit of 
establishing these Committees, even though they are not all obliged to do so. 
                                                          
11
 However missing membership data for half of these 20 municipalities suggests the Committees may not 
be as active as first thought. 
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However, upon closer examination, an increasing number of research reports 
have questioned the effectiveness of these Committees (CDI 2007; Forum 
2008; OSCE 2009; Rahić and Haziri 2010). Such criticism led a prominent 
United Nations programme in Macedonia to conclude at the end of 2010 that 
the Committees are “generally found to convene for the sake of demonstrating 
that they have done so, and they rarely provide advisory, preventive or reactive 
recommendations” (UN 2010, 5). 
 
One of the criticisms frequently directed against the municipal Committees, 
most notably in the European Commission’s Progress Report on Macedonia in 
2010, is that “their role is still largely unknown by the public” (CDI 2007, 9; EC 
2010, 21). The OSCE’s decentralisation survey for 2009 corroborates this 
conclusion, finding that only 19 percent of respondents were aware of their 
existence, whilst 58 percent of survey respondents did not know whether their 
municipality had established one (OSCE 2009, 62). The European Commission 
has also observed how the Committees’ effectiveness continues to be limited by 
“poor operational capacity”, “unclear competences”, a “lack of resources” and 
that their “recommendations are often disregarded” by municipal councils (EC 
2010, 21; 2011, 20). Unlike municipal Equal Opportunities Commissions, these 
Committees are not permanent bodies of the municipal council, their members’ 
expenses are not reimbursed, and they are not supported administratively by a 
dedicated municipal employee responsible for mainstreaming race equality 
throughout municipal policies and practices. Despite various capacity building 
projects during 2008 - 2011 and the creation of guidance manuals 
recommending the contrary, municipalities generally remain unable or unwilling 
to provide Committee members with the necessary administrative and financial 
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support, along with appropriate working conditions to conduct meetings in 
(Forum 2008, 8-9; ZELS 2009; UN 2010, 20; Metamorphosis and Common 
Values 2011, 22).  
 
Membership of the Committees has also been the subject of much criticism, in 
particular the method by which members are selected. Since members are 
generally not elected by local citizens, but are appointed rather by the 
municipality, ensuring their legitimacy and accountability to the communities 
they represent remains a challenge. The local non-governmental organisation 
‘Forum’ has highlighted the substantial role political parties continue to play in 
the nomination and selection of Committee members. Where municipal 
Nomination Committees exist, Forum’s research has observed, Mayors 
commonly appoint Committee members and consequently “the possible political 
influence and possible pressure on external Committee members is very high” 
(Forum 2008, 12). Very often the four-year mandate of Committee members 
corresponds with that of municipal councils and this also represents “a source 
of undue political influence” (UN 2010, 39). The frequency with which members 
are also municipal councillors is illustrated in the membership data of 32 
municipal Committees in Appendix E. Being both a municipal councillor and a 
member of a Committee is not necessarily problematic, since councillors are at 
least elected by the local community and their involvement in the Committee 
may help raise its profile and integrate it further into municipal structures. 
Committees comprising municipal councillors may also have greater capacity to 
advocate community interests and be better placed to ensure its 
recommendations are adopted by the Municipal Council (ibid., 40).  
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The frequency with which the composition of municipal Committees fails to 
equitably reflect the ethnic structure of the local population is also illustrated by 
the membership data in Appendix E. This data demonstrates how smaller 
communities, particularly the Roma, are often not represented in their local 
Committees. Interestingly, a Macedonian Muslim (or Torbeš) councillor from 
Struga municipality complained how membership of his local Committee was 
restricted to only those ethnic groups recognised by the Constitution.12 His 
community is therefore not directly represented in the Committee and relies on 
the efforts of a local Egyptian, appointed to represent the “Others” (Official 
Gazette 2001a). The data in Appendix E also suggests that, when smaller 
communities are represented, they are frequently outnumbered by the 
representatives of other, larger local communities, notably Macedonians and 
Albanians. The significant under-representation of women in the membership of 
these Committees is another development which undoubtedly affects local 
communities’ ability to represent their diverse needs effectively to the local 
administration. Since there are no consequences for municipalities when a 
particular local community is not represented or where that representation is 
unequal in the Committee, the NGO ‘Forum’ doubts municipal leaders will 
attach a high priority towards resolving such breaches in the law (Forum  
2008, 7). 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Interview with municipal councillor in Struga municipality: 02/06/11, Struga. The Preamble of the 
Constitution, amended in 2001, refers to “the Macedonian people, as well as ... the Albanian people, the 
Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosnian people and 
others...” 
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Community Languages and Symbols 
 
The enhanced use of community languages, flags and symbols in municipalities 
is the final consociational principle reflected in the decentralisation process and 
one which assists municipalities to become more responsive to local 
communities. Reducing the threshold for mandatory use of community 
languages from 50 to 20 percent of the local population has meant that 
Albanian has acquired official status in 29 of the 85 municipalities (including, 
significantly, the capital City of Skopje), Turkish in four, Serbian in one, and 
Romani also in one (Common Values 2009, 53). In addition, Kruševo has 
formally recognised the Vlach language, even though the local Vlach population 
constitutes only ten percent, Gostivar has recognised Turkish, and Kumanovo 
has recognised both the Romani and Serbian languages.13 It is worth 
emphasising that whilst official use of the Albanian language has become 
mandatory in more than a third of Macedonia’s municipalities, use of community 
languages other than Albanian is obligatory in only six (approximately seven 
percent). The Law on Local Self-Government leaves the decision to recognise 
the languages of communities constituting less than 20 percent locally at the 
discretion of municipalities dominated generally by Macedonian or Albanians. 
To date this option has only been considered by a handful, prompting the 
European Commission to conclude in its 2009 progress report on Macedonia 
that “little progress can be reported regarding use of the languages of the 
smaller ethnic communities” (EC 2009, 20). The geographic dispersal of the 
Turkish, Roma, Serbian, and Vlach communities throughout Macedonia means 
                                                          
13
 Interviews with: the President of the Municipal Council in Kruševo municipality: 04/06/10, Kruševo; a 
municipal councillor in Gostivar municipality: 27/5/10, Gostivar; and an OSCE official: 04/04/11, Struga. 
The Roma community represent 4.03 per cent of the local population in Kumanovo municipality, while the 
Serbian community represent 8.59 per cent (SSO 2005). 
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that in most municipalities they fall well below the 20 percent threshold required 
to benefit from the enhanced language rights introduced by decentralisation.  
 
Even when a community language has been formally recognised, there is no 
guarantee that, however well-intentioned the municipality’s decision to do so, it 
will become a working language in practice. This is particularly the case in 
municipalities where a local community in not in the majority and the political 
strength of that community remains weak. Municipalities do not receive 
additional state resources to fund associated costs, such as the salaries of 
translators or interpreters. While larger municipalities can more easily meet the 
expense of hiring additional members of staff, smaller less affluent 
municipalities, such as Kruševo where Albanian and Vlach have been 
recognised as additional official languages, cannot (Koha 2010). In many 
instances, expensive simultaneous interpretation equipment donated to the 
municipalities by international donors remains unused.14 In addition, the quality 
of interpretation, given meagre municipal salaries and a shortage of sufficiently 
qualified candidates locally, even when translators are employed by 
municipalities, is often inadequate (EC 2011b, 19).  
 
An inter-ministerial working group on language usage established by the OSCE 
and comprising SIOFA and ZELS among others concluded in 2010 that smaller 
municipalities are reluctant or unable to fund translation, especially when large 
parts of the local population are bi-lingual. The working group also found that 
citizens’ knowledge of their language rights remains poor and there remains 
little political will locally to implement the law.15 However, and as with equitable 
                                                          
14
 Interview with Albanian municipal councillor in Kruševo municipality: 04/06/10, Kruševo. 
15
 Interview with an OSCE official: 04/04/11, Skopje. 
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representation, no formal mechanism for monitoring language use in the 
municipalities has been established by the Government, including SIOFA, to 
date. This may be one reason why Macedonia had not ratified the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, despite signing it in July 1996 
(CoE 1992).16 In addition, the efforts of the inter-ministerial working group to 
monitor progress were initially delayed due to SIOFA’s reluctance to participate 
in the OSCE-led initiative.17 DUI’s proposal to amend the law on language use 
in the wake of its parliamentary electoral success in June 2011, one year after 
the working group delivered its conclusions, also failed to include measures that 
would improve the realisation of citizens’ language rights locally.18  
 
Realisation of the enhanced use of community emblems has also been beset 
with problems. The Law on the Use of Flags of the Communities was originally 
adopted in 2005 when DUI was in coalition with the Social Democrats (SDSM). 
However, once in government, VMRO-DPMNE subsequently challenged the 
Law in the Constitutional Court and certain provisions were annulled in 2007 
(EC 2008, 21). The situation was rectified when amendments to the Law were 
passed in July 2011. These amendments confirmed the right of communities 
constituting more than 50 percent in a given municipality to display their flag 
alongside the state flag outside public and local buildings. However, the state 
flag must be one-third larger in size than the community flags (IDIVIDI 2011).  
 
                                                          
16
 Data regarding states that have signed and ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages is available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=148&CM= 
8&DF=&CL=ENG [Accessed: 07/11/11]. 
17
 Interview with a senior OSCE official: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
18
 The amendment proposed by DUI included only one change in Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Law: "A 
member of the Parliament, appointed or elected functionary, who speaks a language other than the 
Macedonian language spoken by at least 20 per cent the citizens in the Republic of Macedonia, is eligible 
to use the respective language in the sessions of the Parliament and in the sessions of the respective 
body." The amendment (in bold text) was adopted on the 15 July 2011. Email correspondence with an 
OSCE official: 15/11/11. 
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Is Decentralisation and Consociational Power-Sharing Good for Women? 
 
Since much of the enthusiasm for decentralisation is based on the belief that 
bringing government closer to citizens makes it more accessible to local 
communities, the gender and development literature has tended to argue that 
the reforms are good for women (Evertzen 2001; IDRC 2008, 1). The logic, 
explains Jo Beall (2006, 2), is as follows: since prevailing gender relations in 
most parts of the world continue to see women as being responsible for the 
domestic sphere, they are more likely to be concerned with things homebound 
and thus active in local affairs. Decentralisation is therefore often regarded as 
an important vehicle for increasing women’s representation locally and for 
advancing gender-sensitive policies and services. However, some have 
questioned this assumption, claiming the benefits of decentralisation are not 
always guaranteed to extend to women and when they do, they do not extend 
to all categories of women equally (ibid., 2). Others, such as James Manor 
(1999, 97), have warned that even when reforms are in the form of democratic 
decentralisation, the conditions under which local democracy is advanced are 
rarely ideal for women:  
 
The limited evidence available on the impact of decentralisation on 
women’s interests offers only modest encouragement. It appears that the 
empowerment of arenas at or near the local level, where prejudices 
against women are often stronger than at higher levels, may damage 
their prospects unless provisions are made to give women a meaningful 
voice. In some systems, some seats on councils are reserved for women 
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nominees. This holds little promise for them, because they tend to be 
beholden to the male leaders who secured their nomination. 
 
Similarly, leading feminist writers have argued that while multicultural policies 
such as consociationalism promote inter-group equality, they remain largely 
insensitive to demands for intra-group equality. The idea that ethnic 
communities are both stratified and internally diverse has not been sufficiently 
acknowledged in multiculturalism, notes Gurpreet Mahajan (2005, 93). In her 
seminal work ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, Susan Moller Okin (2005, 
72) argues that group rights should pay special attention to inequalities within 
different groups, especially to inequalities between the sexes, which are often 
less easily discernible, since they are less public than other inequalities. Such 
efforts are essential for ensuring “liberal-multicultural aims do not contribute to 
unequal intra-group social power that is perpetuated by undemocratic means” 
(ibid., 75). 
 
The data in Table 3.1 shows the number of female mayors and councillors 
elected during the four municipal elections in 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009. It 
also explains how many candidates ran for the position of mayor in the two 
municipal elections since the decentralisation process began. The rate of 
women running for mayor remains extremely low and no female mayors 
currently exist. In fact, of the 13 female candidates that ran for mayor in 2009, 
all were out-voted in the first round (CRPM 2010, 15). Further, none of the 13 
candidates were from political parties representing national minorities (EC 
2009).19 Whilst improvements in the proportion of women running for municipal 
                                                          
19
 The 13 female candidates for Mayor were from the following (ethnic Macedonian) political parties:  
VMRO-DMPNE (five), Liberal Democratic Party (two), SDSM (one), Social Democratic Union of 
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council are clearly visible, recent progress is more likely to be a consequence of 
amendments made to the Election Code in 2006. Article 64.5 of the Electoral 
Code, for example, now stipulates that in candidate lists for both municipal and 
parliamentary elections, “in every three places at least one will be reserved for 
the less represented gender” (ODIHR 2009, 17). Given this unambiguous legal 
requirement, one would expect the proportion of female municipal councillors in 
each municipality to be at least 30 percent. However, the data in Appendix F, 
which displays the number of women elected to a selection of 30 mono- and 
multi-ethnic municipal councils in 2009, demonstrates this is clearly not the 
case. The proportion of female councillors in four rural municipalities (Centar 
Župa, 9.1 percent; Dolneni, 13.3; Mavrovo and Rostuše, 18.2; and Studeničani, 
6.6 percent) is particularly concerning. This data also suggests municipalities 
with largely mono-ethnic Macedonian populations may be more effective in 
promoting the political representation of women than their multi-ethnic 
counterparts.20  
 
Table 3.1:10Female Political Representation, Pre- and Post-Decentralisation  
Municipal Election 1996 2000 2005 2009 
Number of female mayors 0 3 (2%) 3 (4%) 0 
Number of female candidates for mayor - - 18 (4.7%) 13 (3.6%) 
Number of female municipal councillors 105 (6%) 161 (8%) 315 (23%) 369 (26.7%) 
Sources: ODIHR 2005, 18; 2009, 17; CRPM 2010, 15. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Macedonia (one), Liberal Party of Macedonia (one), People’s Movement of Macedonia, (one), Party of 
United Democrats of Macedonia (one), and one independent candidate. 
20
 The names of the municipalities with predominantly mono-ethnic Macedonian populations are 
underlined in the first column in Appendix F. Debarca, Kisella Voda and Vevčani are notable examples, 
whereas Mogila disputes this trend. 
 116 
One possible reason for discrepancies in the proportion of female councillors 
across municipalities is a loophole in the Election Code. Articles 153.1 and 
155.1 state that, when the mandate of a Member of Parliament or a municipal 
councillor is terminated, his or her mandate should be taken over by the next 
candidate on the electoral list (CRPM 2010, 18). Since the Election Code 
obliges every third candidate on the list to be female, it follows that positions 
four, seven, ten, etc. on the candidate list will almost certainly be filled by men. 
In its monitoring report of the 2009 municipal elections, the OSCE’s Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported allegations of 
pressure exerted on some elected women to resign their mandate in favour of 
male candidates (ODIHR 2009, 17). The ODIHR also observed how, during the 
course of campaigning, the political parties and candidates in general did not 
make any special appeals to female voters or highlight issues of specific 
concern to women in their programmes. “Fewer women than men attended 
campaign events”, ODIHR observed and, “in some instances, particularly in 
Albanian areas, campaign events were attended exclusively by men” (ibid., 17). 
In the spirit of promoting gender equality, the Center for Research and Policy 
Making (CRPM), based in Skopje, has recommended that candidates who 
decide to resign their mandate are replaced not by the next candidate on the 
list, but rather by the next candidate of same sex (CRPM 2010, 18). CRPM also 
proposed the introduction of a quota of 30 percent for female mayoral 
candidates. However, it is not clear what form such an initiative would take and 
there is a danger the political parties may circumvent it by nominating female 
candidates to municipalities they least expect to win. 
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Increasing the effective participation of women in local public life also involves 
taking steps to improve their representation in municipal administrations. Article 
20 of the Law on Equal Opportunities of Women and Men (Official Gazette 
2006) states that the municipalities are “obliged by law to collect, record and 
work with statistical data” concerning the gender balance of employees. 
Significantly, however, whilst this Law encourages municipal administrations to 
improve their gender balance, it fails to provide a legal basis upon which to take 
positive measures to promote the employment of women (CRPM 2010, 26).  
 
The data in Appendix G shows the number of women employed as civil 
servants in the majority of Macedonian municipalities. Comparing employee 
gender profiles from 2006 and 2010, the data also demonstrates whether 
progress has been achieved since 2006. Despite the legal requirement to do so, 
data collection and publication rates remain poor. Insufficient data currently 
exists to allow a more sophisticated analysis, such as determining whether 
gender profiles vary according to the level of staff seniority. The data in 
Appendix G suggests the employment of women is a particular challenge in 
rural municipalities.21 Comparisons with largely mono-ethnic Macedonian rural 
municipalities however, such as Čaška, Drugovo, Gradsko, Mogila, and 
Vevčani, suggest ethnicity may also be a contributing factor. Indeed, the four 
municipalities with the lowest proportion of female employees (Centar Župa, 
Oslomej, Tearce and Vrapčište) are all dominated by either Albanian or Turkish 
communities. The combination of disproportionately high unemployment rates 
experienced in rural economies, along with the existence of traditional views 
                                                          
21
 For example, the rural municipalities of Bogovinje, Centar Župa, Lipkovo, Mavrovo and Rostuše, 
Oslomej, Plasnica, Rosoman, Saraj, and Tearce (shaded in the table). 
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regarding women’s role in society, clearly represent significant barriers to the 
employment of women in some municipalities.  
 
Given the challenges many women face participating in public life (and not only 
in Macedonia), the existence of effective mechanisms to promote gender 
equality, particularly the ‘equality-proofing’ of operational processes and service 
delivery, is crucial. The Law on Equal Opportunities obliges municipalities to 
establish Equal Opportunities Commissions, which are permanent bodies of the 
municipal council and consist of local councillors (Official Gazette 2006, Art.16). 
Their mandate is to “promote equal opportunities and to respect the principle of 
equal opportunities in the process of adopt[ing] measures and activities” and 
councils are obliged to consider their proposals when local decisions are being 
made. Municipalities are also obliged to employ ‘Coordinators for Equal 
Opportunities of Women and Men’, whose role is to support the work of the 
Commission; particularly in the preparation of local action plans and an annual 
report, which should be submitted to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy for 
monitoring purposes.  
 
According to the Ministry’s website, 66 municipalities had established 
Commissions by October 2011.22 This figure contrasts with those cited in some 
research reports, which suggest as many as 75 municipal Commissions have 
existed since 2009 (MoLSP 2009; UNDP 2010b). Of the 19 municipalities the 
Ministry’s website claims have failed to establish Commissions, no significant 
urban/rural or ethnic trends are apparent.23 However, despite the existence of 
                                                          
22
 Data available at http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/?ItemID=463B79E2DAE454468BBCDFEC8D2D7845 
[Accessed: 27/10/11]. 
23
 Of the 19 municipalities, 11 are considered urban and 8 rural and 8 are led by an ethnic-minority 
community. 
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formal mechanisms in the majority of municipalities, it is clear that the active 
promotion of gender equality at the local level is still in its infancy.24 Thanks to a 
capacity building project initiated by UNDP during 2009, all Commissions now 
possess gender equality action plans. It is however unclear whether these plans 
have been endorsed by municipal councils and whether implementation of 
activities had begun by 2012.25 Research completed by the NGO ‘Akcija 
Zdruzenska’ in 2008 found that the majority of Mayors and council chairmen (60 
percent) admitted that the Law on Equal Opportunities had been only partially 
implemented in their municipality (Akcija Zdruzenska 2008, 9). In addition, only 
half claimed that they had undertaken specific measures to promote gender 
equality locally. Akcija Zdruzenska believes that in most cases the Mayors 
consider their responsibilities to be very limited, i.e. only to establish 
Committees and appoint Coordinators, and fail to take any further steps that 
may advance the rights of women locally.26  
 
Whilst some municipalities, in co-operation with local women’s groups, 
have clearly made progress in reaching women and socially excluded groups, 
development has been limited or non-existent in others, particularly in rural 
areas where local NGOs may be less well established (MoLSP 2009, 30). 
Additional research completed at the end of 2010 confirms that the majority of 
municipalities had yet to initiate any activities related to gender analysis 
or gender-mainstreaming (UNDP 2010b, 28). Frequently experienced barriers 
to the effective working of both Commissions and Coordinators are: insufficient 
disaggregated data upon which to plan activities; a lack of clearly defined 
responsibilities and budgetary support; and a general lack of gender 
                                                          
24
 Interviews with OSCE officials: 06/04/11, Skopje. 
25
 Interview with former UNDP official: 09/05/11, Skopje. 
26
 Interview with Programme Manager, Akcija Zdruzenska: 09/05/11, Skopje. 
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awareness and interest among councillors and staff in addressing what are 
perceived to be “women’s issues” (MoLSP 2009; UNDP 2010b). When 
interviewed, a local expert who had worked on the preparation of UNDP’s 
research lamented: “How can we talk of gender budgeting when we don’t even 
have participatory budgeting?”27 
 
 
Direct Democracy: Participatory Mechanisms and How Municipalities 
Communicate with Citizens 
 
Feminist advocates of deliberative democracy theory argue that the best way to 
resolve tensions between traditional cultural practices and liberal principles in 
socially plural democracies is to extend local deliberation processes beyond the 
limits of formal political processes (Deveaux 2005, 340; Mahajan 2005, 103). 
This requires local politicians to expand their understanding of democratic 
political activity and to increase the space available for continuous civic 
involvement in decision-making. Frequent public consultations, participatory 
planning and budgeting, for example, may enable different sections of the 
community, particularly those previously excluded or marginalised, to have a 
direct say in how local decisions are made. Open debate and dialogue will allow 
local citizens to interrogate existing practices and suggest improvements that 
may result in more appropriate and equitable public services (UNDP 2009a, 
31). Citizens’ participation will also empower local communities; allowing them 
to take ownership of decisions and make it less likely that they resist or withhold 
support for new initiatives (Sisk 2001, 150; Thede 2009, 117). Whilst collective 
                                                          
27
 Interview with former UNDP official: 09/05/11, Skopje. 
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decision-making can be complicated, time-consuming, and sometimes 
unattainable, observes Timothy Sisk (2001, 146), consensus-based decisions 
are generally more legitimate and widely accepted than decisions taken by 
elected officials acting independently. Importantly, those designing such 
activities should consider who commonly participates in these events and how 
meaningful their contribution is. 
 
According to the Law on Local Self-Government (2002, Art. 25), “citizens shall 
directly participate in the decision-making process on issues of local importance 
through civil initiative, citizens' gatherings and referendum...” The Law also 
obliges municipalities to cover the cost of such activities. Since 2006 the 
OSCE’s annual survey on decentralisation has monitored the degree to which 
the municipalities provide opportunities for citizens to participate directly in local 
decision-making processes (OSCE 2006a; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2011). When 
asked what type of participatory planning activities the municipality organises, in 
2011 the vast majority of survey respondents confirmed that they organised 
regular consultation hours during which citizens could discuss issues with the 
Mayor (94.6 percent of respondents) (OSCE 2011, 9). Other popular 
approaches cited by the municipalities were meetings with neighbourhood 
communities (89.2 percent of respondents) and with groups of citizens to 
discuss a particular issue (77 percent of respondents). This is an improvement 
on previous survey findings when in 2008 for example, only 43 percent of 
municipalities arranged regular office hours for citizens, 30 percent consulted 
with neighbourhood communities, and 27 percent organised citizens’ gatherings 
(OSCE 2008, 45).28 
                                                          
28
 The Law on Local Self-Government permits municipalities to establish urban or neighbourhood 
communities. Their competences are to “review issues, take positions and prepare proposals for issues of 
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Similarly, the  2011 survey found that the most popular means of 
communicating issues of local concern to citizens was during individual 
meetings with municipal employees (92 percent of respondents) (OSCE 2011, 
10). Other common forms of communication were by telephone (88 percent) 
and during citizens’ gatherings (68 percent). More transparent, public forms of 
communication, such as web-forums (23 percent), announcements on 
municipal websites (four percent), and use of the local media (three percent), 
were less favoured. In his critique of local participatory democracy in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Edin Hodžic makes the following observation: “[It] is more [...] 
a system of lobbying, advocating and pushing for a certain action through 
certain persons, which depends on personal contacts and connections within 
the municipality”. As such, the inclusion of citizens in local processes represents 
“a chaotic web of lobbying and problem solving, rather than an institutionalised 
and meaningful mechanism of political participation, dialogue and co-decision 
making” (Hodžic 2011, 49). Hodžic’s insight holds resonance for participatory 
approaches in Macedonia. Such initiatives, he and others note, should be open 
and formal, rather than hidden and informal, since the latter may increase the 
potential for corruption and the unfair resolution of local disputes (García-
Guadilla and Pérez 2002, 101; UNDP 2009a, 84). 
 
One successful initiative in Macedonia, which seeks to demonstrate the benefits 
of participatory mechanisms to both municipalities and citizens, is the 
‘Community Forums’ project sponsored by the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC). According to the project’s manager, its purpose is to 
build the capacities of municipalities to organise transparent and inclusive 
                                                                                                                                                                          
direct and everyday importance for the life and work of the inhabitants of that territory” (Official Gazette 
2002, Art.82-86). 
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decision-making practices as well as encourage local citizens to develop a 
sense of responsibility in spending municipal funds.29 Through participating in 
structured discussions which are open to all, citizens become better acquainted 
with how the municipality’s budget is spent and, consequently, more 
appreciative of the fact that it is impossible to meet the needs of all citizens 
when funding is limited. Since 2006, 25 municipalities have participated in the 
project, with a further 18 municipalities participating in its third phase which 
began in September 2011.30 Significantly, the municipalities do not just consult 
Forum members on local priorities. Participants decide which local needs 
should be prioritised, in accordance with the municipality’s Strategic and/or 
Local Economic Development Plans, and municipal representatives are granted 
the same voting rights as other members. Realised projects are therefore varied 
and have addressed local needs, such as infrastructure, economic 
development, water supply and waste water, and environmental protection. 
Since September 2011, municipal budget forums have also been initiated. 
When asked whether those municipalities that had already participated in the 
project had welcomed the opportunity to involve citizens more actively in local 
affairs, the project manager’s response was mixed. In some cases she believed 
the municipalities had been genuinely appreciative of the opportunity to “share 
the burden” of local decision-making, whilst in others they were clearly only 
taking part in the project to receive additional funds.31 It is too early to say 
whether this process will be sustainable. However, by June 2011 38 
municipalities had amended their Statutes to include Community Forums as a 
                                                          
29
 Interview with Community Forums project manager: 23/03/09, Skopje. 
30
 Interview with Community Forums project manager: 16/06/11, Skopje. 
31
 The municipalities must contribute at least 50 percent of the project funds with the SDC providing match 
funds. Initially municipal contributions ranged from 19-48 percent, but a requirement of 50 percent has 
been imposed since 2011. Interview with Community Forums project manager: 16/06/11, Skopje. 
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mechanism for involving citizens. This means they were now legally obliged to 
initiate such practices in the future.32 
 
Whilst the OSCE’s survey measures municipal perceptions on a range of local 
governance issues, in contrast, the UNDP’s ‘People Centered Analysis’ reports 
are based on large-scale, nationally representative opinion polls (UNDP 2008; 
2009b; 2010). As a result, their research findings paint a very different picture of 
the municipalities’ success at reaching out to local citizens. The data in Table 
3.2, for example, illustrates the extent to which respondents to the 2010 UNDP 
survey were active in local affairs. The low proportion of citizens that had either 
participated in municipal activities or intend to do so in the future suggests 
citizens were generally not interested in exercising their voice (UNDP 2010a, 
91). The previous year’s survey also found that, when asked whether they had 
contacted a municipal representative for assistance in the preceding six 
months, relatively few respondents had done so. Only seven percent of 
respondents, for example, had reported an issue to their municipal council and 
eight percent had contacted their Mayor to solve a problem, with only a third of 
these having their problem resolved in this way (UNDP 2009b, 84). Overall, 80 
percent of respondents in 2009 believed they had no influence over the 
decisions made in their municipality (ibid., 81). Subsequent research confirms 
that this “culture of passivity” among citizens remains as significant a challenge 
to the success of participatory practices as the reluctance and capacities of 
municipalities to share power (Forum 2011; OSCE 2011). Such inertia may be 
because the average citizen is either apathetic or unwilling to participate in local 
affairs, or simply that they are satisfied with their current level of involvement 
                                                          
32
 Interview with Community Forums project manager: 16/06/11, Skopje. 
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and quality of service provision (UNDP 2009b, 83). However, some have 
claimed that the political culture of former Communist societies has left an 
indelible mark on the socialisation process of citizens (Illner, 1998: 30; Bunce 
and Watts 2005). If democracy is to be successful in these transition countries, 
remarks Tina Mavrikos-Adamou (2010, 517), it needs to change how people 
perceive their role as citizens, and to empower them with a sense that they can 
and need to participate in society. This realisation is essential, since the 
existence of a vibrant civil society represents an important pre-condition for 
successful decentralisation (Tranchant 2007, 3; Barter 2008, 3).  
 
Table 3.2:11Levels of Citizens Participation at the Municipal Level 
Proportion of Respondents Who in 
the Past 12 Months Have: 
 
Proportion 
(%) 
Respondents with a 
Future Interest (%) 
Participated in meetings 6 29 
Made a telephone call 6 27 
Signed a petition 4 22 
Filled a questionnaire 11 33 
Participated in a focus group /  
telephone interview 
4 18 
Wrote a letter / sent an email 3 19 
Source: People Centered Analysis Household Survey September 2009 (UNDP 2010a, 92). 
 
 
Internal Political Party Democracy and Discipline 
 
Although in theory, the introduction of local elections is perceived to enhance 
the responsiveness and accountability of municipal governments to their 
constituencies, the extent to which this change actually takes place depends on 
how power is distributed within the political parties. The structure of parties is 
therefore a crucial factor in determining the autonomy of sub-national politicians 
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and their ability to respond to diverse local needs effectively (Coppedge 1994; 
Bahl 1999, 5; Burki et al. 1999, 15; Willis et al. 1999, 48; Montero 2005, 64). 
Political parties in decentralised governance systems, remarks Pieter van 
Houten, should ideally be relatively decentralised in their own organisational 
structures. If not, the promise of enhanced local autonomy and responsive 
governance will remain unfilled (Manor 1999, 35; van Houten 2004, 11). Strong 
and disciplined parties can “make a mockery” of decentralisation (Eaton and 
Connerley 2010, 5). 
 
In his seminal work on federalism, William H. Riker (1964, 131) observed how 
the federal relationship may be centralised according to the degree to which: 
“(1) …one party controls both levels of government; and (2) …each potential 
governing party at the national level controls its partisan associates at the level 
of constituent governments”. Others have since operationalised Riker’s theory 
by focusing on the following elements of national party organisation and 
discipline: the nomination, approval and funding processes of candidates for 
public office, enforcement of the party line in political decision-making, the 
arbitrary removal of local politicians from office, and the existence of clientelistic 
relationships within parties. National control over the selection and financing of 
local candidates, for example, means local officials may remain beholden to 
their national sponsors rather than local constituents, since the success of their 
careers will depend largely on respecting the party leadership (Burki et al. 1999; 
Eaton 2001, 106; Hopkin 2003, 231; Bland 2010, 51). The use of closed-lists in 
electoral systems based on proportional representation has also been identified 
as a particularly effective tool for allowing party leaders more discretion over the 
selection and control of local candidates (Coppedge 1994, 22; Sisk 2001, 130; 
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Montero 2005, 66). Strong, centralised party discipline is not necessary 
negative. What is bad for democracy, concedes Michael Coppedge (1994, 37), 
may actually be good for stability. However, the experience of Venezuelan 
politics during the 1980s demonstrates that, although in the short term strong 
parties may make a regime more resilient, in the long term they undermine the 
quality of democracy, ultimately making the regime less stable (ibid. 1994, 9). 
 
Based on Riker’s first observation, the dominance of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI at 
both municipal and parliamentary levels in Macedonia suggests the potential for 
national parties to exercise control over local counterparts at the expense of 
responsive and accountable municipal government is considerable. Since 2009, 
VMRO-DPMNE has controlled 56 (including the City of Skopje) out of a possible 
85 municipalities; whereas their coalition partners DUI control a further 14 
(ODIHR 2000; 2005; 2009). This means that between them the national 
governing coalition controlled over 80 percent of all municipalities. Similarly, 
since 2009 the four largest national parties33 have controlled 77 municipalities 
(over 90 percent), whilst the number of independent mayors has declined 
steadily since the start of decentralisation in 2004.34 This leaves little room for 
dissent between local and national level political priorities. As an NGO critic 
remarked: “You cannot count on the Mayors coming from the ruling coalition to 
push decentralisation too far... they are not in a position to stand up as they will 
lose the support they have been getting until now.”35 Another expert continued: 
“The Mayors respect the party line and are silenced by additional sources of 
                                                          
33
 VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI, and DPA. 
34
 During the 2005 municipal elections there were 90 independent candidates for Mayor (in only 24 
municipalities), of which seven were elected. In the 2009 municipal elections, there were 52 independent 
candidates for Mayor (in 12 municipalities) and only two were elected (ODIHR 2005, 2009). 
35
 Interview with Foundation Open Society Macedonia official: 27/06/11, Skopje. 
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funding.”36 The fact that the municipal association is dominated by government-
aligned municipalities, and its President is a VMRO-DPMNE Mayor for the 
influential City of Skopje, furthers this impression. According to the International 
Crisis Group, ZELS has “fallen under the patronage of the ruling parties” and 
international donors are no longer “happy about how it is run” (ICG 2011, 20). 
Observers have noted how, during the 2009 municipal elections, VMRO-
DPMNE campaign posters featured images of Prime Minister Gruevski beside 
individual mayoral candidates proclaiming “together we can do more”. Similar 
posters were prepared for DUI mayoral candidates (Siljanovsja-Davoka 2005, 
45). Such images “run counter to decentralisation logic” and suggest the parties 
“treat the municipalities like an extended hand of the government”.37 
 
High levels of central control and member discipline within Macedonian political 
parties (Riker’s second condition) also implies the subordination of local 
politicians in party structures at the expense of local democracy. In a 2011 
report appraising the ten years since the adoption of the Framework 
Agreement, the International Crisis Group questioned whether “non-democratic 
parties, operating within a non-democratic structure” can “bring democracy to 
Macedonia” (ICG 2011, 9). The report described Macedonian political parties as 
being: 
 
… highly centralised and ethnically based. Policy-making capacity is 
poor, and rank and file have little opportunity to participate in decisions. 
An ex-parliament speaker argued: “Every party is conquered by one man 
and a small group around him. MPs get direct orders”…The popular 
                                                          
36
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
37
 Interviews with Foundation Open Society Macedonia official: 27/06/11, Skopje; and Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy project official: 24/06/10, Skopje. 
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wisdom in Macedonia calls political parties with incumbent leaders 
“sultan” parties (ibid., 8). 
 
Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, Professor of Law at Ss. Cyril and Methodius 
University in Skopje, believes most parties in Macedonia continue to operate 
under organisational principles inherited from the League of Communists 
(Siljanovsja-Davoka 2005, 56). Her research emphasises the role central party 
presidencies (supported by a closed list system), rather than local party 
organisations, play in nominating office holders, and notes how “the leadership 
selects / elects obedient party friends rather than persons with integrity, who 
can properly represent the electorate…” (ibid., 49). Tight party discipline, 
concludes Siljanovsja-Davoka, ensures party factions or critics are banned, 
members lack the courage to speak up for fear of being considered a ‘traitor’, 
and a general lack of transparency prevails, where decisions are not taken 
openly or with consensus (ibid., 41). What may appear to be representative 
local governments, responsive to the needs of local citizens, may in reality only 
be a de-concentration of central government. 
 
 
The Pervasiveness of Patronage Politics 
 
One significant factor deterring citizens from participating in local affairs is the 
pervasiveness of patronage politics or clientelism in Macedonia. Research 
suggests that, as a post-Communist country, Macedonia may be particularly 
predisposed to patronage-based party-voter linkages. Martin Shefter (1994), for 
example, has argued that if democratisation occurs within the context of an 
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unconsolidated state, strong pressures are created for patronage politics. This 
is particularly true in ethnically diverse democracies, where intra-ethnic party 
competition may act as a powerful catalyst for intensifying clientelism (Kitshelt 
and Wilkinson 2007, 32). Conor O’Dwyer (2006) has gone further by suggesting 
the presence of robust and institutionalised party competition determines 
whether the predisposition to patronage politics becomes the practice of 
patronage politics. Failure to establish coherent governments and credible 
oppositions, both composed of stable programmatically-defined parties, leaves 
voters unable to discipline governing parties (ibid., 19, 192). Others have 
suggested the level of economic development of a state is the most commonly 
confirmed predictor of differential modes of democratic accountability, since 
programmatic parties are only attractive to voters with sufficient assets to 
become indifferent to clientelistic-targeted goods (Kitshelt and Wilkinson 2007, 
24). Finally, O’Dwyer and others have suggested the Communist Party's 
nomenklatura system, through which the Party carefully vetted applicants to 
administrative positions and used them as rewards for the party faithful, has left 
a lasting legacy in post-Communist states (O’Dwyer 2006, 13; Hale 2007, 
247).38 While the fall of Communism may have formally ended the 
nomenklatura system, in practice there have been few effective constraints on 
the continuation of these appointments by governing parties.  
 
The prevalence of clientelism at both the national and local levels in Macedonia 
is not without consequences, most of which undermine the potential benefits of 
decentralisation this chapter has sought to evaluate. The capture of local 
institutions by the political parties, for example, weakens the ability of 
                                                          
38
 The term nomenklatura derives from the Latin ‘nomenclatura’, meaning a list of names. It referred to the 
Communist Party's authority to make appointments to key governmental, as well as throughout the party's 
own hierarchy (Georgiev 2008, 70). 
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decentralised governance to promote the representation of diverse groups in 
decision-making processes. As this chapter has already demonstrated, closed 
candidate lists that are generally tightly controlled by national parties has done 
little to facilitate women, independent candidates, and local party 
representatives from entering public life. The immense resources required to 
satisfy horizontal clientelistic relationships, between political parties and 
citizens, reduces the competitiveness of democracy by making it very difficult 
for challengers (either independent or opposition candidates) to establish 
credibility as a potential alternative source of benefits (Kitshelt and Wilkinson 
2007, 13; Van de Walle 2007, 64).  
 
This chapter has also demonstrated how patronage politics has dominated the 
recruitment of municipal administrative employees, and no doubt the more 
extensive public administration at the expense of transparent merit-based 
criteria. It is also the cause of what Conor O’Dwyer refers to as “runaway state-
building”: the rapid expansion in the size of state administrations without a 
commensurate increase in its professionalism and effectiveness (2006, 28). In 
2011 the International Crisis Group estimated in that the Macedonian public 
administration had grown by 40,000 in three years and was “over-staffed, 
[where] old employees have been pushed aside and are still getting paid, while 
party loyalists were hired and now make most decisions” (ICG 2011, 10). The 
data in Appendix G shows the rate of expansion in municipal administrations 
between 2006 and 2010. Patronage-based recruitment not only means that 
local communities are denied equal access to state employment. Unchecked 
patronage-based expansion limits the effectiveness of municipal 
administrations, makes them less accountable, and may even weaken the 
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legitimacy of the new democratic order itself (O’Dwyer 2006, 192). 
 
Pervasive patronage politics also undermines decentralisation’s ability to 
deepen local democracy, and the relationship between patronage and weak 
social capital is cyclical. Disenchantment in local political processes increases 
the likelihood of patronage-based party-voter linkages, since the parties have 
no other effective way of attracting and holding on to voters. The absence a 
vibrant civil society serving as public watchdogs and checks on the exercise of 
state power may also encourage clientelism since the risks associated with 
political strategies based on the distribution of patronage are reduced (O’Dwyer 
2006, 22; Van de Walle 2007, 67). In turn, patronage fuels voter apathy and 
deters local residents from becoming active in municipal affairs. One could 
therefore argue that the introduction or extension of democratic party politics in 
local environments where levels of civic engagement is low may in fact lead to 
the expansion of patronage politics (García-Guadilla and Pérez 2001, 105; 
O’Dwyer 2006, 170). 
 
Finally, the existence of horizontal clientelistic relationships between political 
parties and voters and vertical patronage-based relations within parties, 
reinforced by undemocratic party structures, undermines decentralisation’s 
ability to enhance the accountability and responsiveness of municipal 
governments. Democratic accountability in systems dependent on clientelistic 
exchange between parties and voters does not derive from local politicians’ 
success in delivering collective benefits, such as improvements to public 
services. Instead, the voting preferences of citizens are frequently influenced by 
the promise of a job or financial reward (Kitshelt and Wilkinson 2007, 2). It is for 
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this reason that a municipal councillor, in the wake a disappointing 
parliamentary election result for his party in June 2011, lamented how it had lost 
votes to the domineering DUI “political machine”39 despite doing much to 
improve local traffic management.40 In such environments, there is little 
incentive for politicians to abide by electoral promises, since voters will 
generally not reward them for doing so. Similarly, the existence of vertical 
clientelistic dependencies between local politicians and the national leadership 
within parties also frustrates decentralisation’s perceived ability to promote 
responsive local governance. Such relations allow party leaders to maintain 
control over political decisions as well as state resources by nominating loyal, 
subservient ‘clients’ at the sub-national level (Chanie 2007; Lambright 2011, 
69). 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has examined whether decentralisation in Macedonia, including its 
combined use of local power-sharing mechanisms, has facilitated the effective 
participation of diverse communities in municipal governance. While 
decentralisation has undoubtedly expanded the potential space available for 
citizens to participate in local governance - either directly or through elected 
representatives, it has not guaranteed the participation of local communities, or 
that this participation is both equitable and effective. Implementation of the 
consociational power-sharing mechanisms envisaged locally remains in its 
                                                          
39
 The term ‘machine politics’ was first used by James C. Scott and refers to a “non-ideological 
organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and 
distributing income to those who run it and work for it” (Scott 1969, 1144). 
40
 Interview with municipal councillor from Gostivar municipality (National Democratic Renaissance, RDK): 
28/06/11, Gostivar. 
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infancy and is vulnerable to being high-jacked by the political parties or ethnic 
groups constituting a majority locally. Macedonia’s smaller ethnic communities, 
living scattered throughout the country and who fail to reach the thresholds 
required to benefit from protection, have also been marginalised in the 
decentralisation process, which benefits only territorially concentrated 
communities. Macedonians and Albanians residing in small numbers in 
municipalities where another ethnic community is in the majority are also 
subject to a similar fate. There is a danger local consociational mechanisms will 
continue to advance multiculturalism at the expense of gender equality and 
broader intra-ethnic relations, i.e. between members of different political parties. 
Similarly, the use of power-sharing techniques such as ‘summit diplomacy’, 
where political deals concerning sensitive local issues are made ‘behind closed 
doors’, threaten the deepening of local democracy and make some protection 
mechanisms irrelevant. Irrespective of even the most carefully designed reform 
package, successful decentralisation requires a context in which dominant 
political values are genuinely supportive. These may include a commitment to 
popular participation, support for bottom-up decision-making, and special 
consideration of the most vulnerable communities (Blunt and Turner 2005, 77). 
 
The pervasiveness of patronage politics in Macedonia, exacerbated by 
undemocratic party structures, undermines the potential benefits of 
decentralisation, namely: (1) improving the political representation of diverse 
groups in local decision-making processes; (2) deepening local democracy by 
providing opportunities for local residents to participate in local governance; and 
(3) enhancing the transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of 
municipal governments. The damage caused by clientelism has not been 
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sufficiently appreciated by local and international observers, and threatens to 
undermine the entire decentralisation process. Inefficient, opaque, and corrupt 
public institutions and civil servants - all consequences of clientelism, warns 
UNDP - undermine democratic local governance, de-legitimises the state, and 
can generate grievances which may give rise to further conflict (UNDP 2009b, 
38). The extension of democratic party politics in such an unfavourable 
environment may have even facilitated the expansion of patronage politics. The 
recruitment of party soldiers at the local level under the pretext of ‘equitable 
representation’ clearly demonstrates how the political parties in Macedonia 
have exploited the principles of good governance, and indeed European Union 
conditionality. Attempts to improve local governance and transparency in 
Macedonia through decentralisation will fail unless greater consideration is paid 
to the often directly opposing incentives facing politicians charged with 
implementing reforms in patronage-based environments. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 DECENTRALISATION AND THE PROVISION OF  
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines whether devolving responsibility for the provision of 
public services can satisfy the demands of non-majority groups for greater 
autonomy over their own affairs. Whilst responsibility for a range of public 
services was decentralised to municipalities in Macedonia, I have chosen to 
concentrate this assessment on primary and secondary education for a variety 
of reasons.1 First, primary and secondary education was one of the first 
competences to be devolved to the municipalities in July 2005. Expenditure on 
education constitutes almost half of all government transfers to municipalities 
and “...the success of the entire decentralisation process is now in large 
measure dependent of what happens in primary and secondary education” 
(Levitas 2009, 5). Second, how education systems are designed and delivered 
is of particular importance to minority ethnic communities, since education is 
crucial for reproducing (and re-creating) the identity of a group (Bieber 2007, 
17). Without the transmission of the aspects of their identity through education, 
observes Florian Bieber, non-majority cultures may disappear. Third, as one of 
the basic factors of human development, education is an important means of 
improving life chances, reducing poverty, and promoting social inclusion. It 
therefore represents a significant mechanism for addressing economic 
horizontal inequalities; an underlying cause of conflict between different ethnic 
                                                          
1
 Primary healthcare, social welfare and child protection, utilities, etc. (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 22). 
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groups (UNDP 2004b; 2010a). Finally, and as Chapter 2 has demonstrated, 
given the various education-related disputes that had undermined community 
relations during the 1990s, education was and remains a highly contested 
political issue in Macedonia (Poulton 2000; Petroska-Beška and Najčevska 
2004; Myhrvold 2005; Vetterlein 2006). Its delivery, notes UNDP (2009, 43), can 
either promote or block reconciliation, depending on the education policies 
adopted and the way they are implemented. 
 
This review begins with the principal arguments in favour and against devolving 
responsibility for the provision of education to local communities. An 
assessment of the Macedonian education system prior to decentralisation will 
follow, accompanied by a discussion of the reforms introduced in 2005. Three 
key theoretical arguments will then be considered within the Macedonian 
context: (a) whether decentralisation facilitates the provision of heterogeneous 
local public services; (b) decentralisation’s ability to enhance participation and 
transparency in decision-making regarding the delivery of services; and  
(c) whether decentralisation ensures a more equitable and transparent 
distribution of public resources. This chapter does not intend to assess whether 
decentralisation has improved educational outcomes in Macedonia, since 
measuring the quality of education is problematic due to a lack of reliable data. 
Educational standards are also affected by additional factors unrelated to 
decentralisation, such as teacher training, which cannot be easily isolated. 
Instead, it argues that the decentralisation of primary and secondary education 
to municipalities has enabled local communities to more effectively meet the 
diverse needs of citizens. Persistent challenges, such as the politicised nature 
of the education system, increasing ethnic segregation in schools, and the 
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limited capacity of local stakeholders, unless adequately addressed, may 
however undermine the benefits of reform in the longer term. 
 
 
Decentralised Public Services and Conflict Mitigation 
 
One of the most frequently cited theoretical arguments which promote 
decentralisation as tool for managing ethnopolitical conflict is its ability to offer 
spatially concentrated groups greater control over their own affairs, thereby 
providing greater scope for the protection of their cultural identity (Kälin 1999, 
307; Horowitz 2000, 217-20; Safran and Máiz 2000, 259). By granting non-
majority groups greater control over their own destinies, decentralisation is 
believed to instil a greater sense of security within these groups so that they will 
not be subject to discriminatory practices and unwanted intrusions in the future 
(Manor 1999, 97; Jeram 2008, 9). Having greater decision-making power over 
local affairs may also allow different ethnic groups to better meet the diverse 
needs of their communities. The ability to differentiate policy for heterogeneous 
tastes can allow locally elected representatives to proactively address would-be 
tensions before conflict situations arise (Illner 1998; Lake and Rothchild 2005, 
121; Siegle and O’Mahoney 2007, 1; Norris 2008, 159). The remoteness of 
central governments to citizens often leads to insufficient information regarding 
local needs and problems (Kälin 1999, 47; Linder 2010, 9). Bringing 
government ‘closer to the citizen’ (the subsidiarity principle) can therefore allow 
local communities the opportunity to more effectively express their preferences 
for public services and to participate in their design (CoE 1985, Preamble). 
Local administrations, concludes Kälin (2004, 304), can be more physically 
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accessible to the average person and thus more ‘human’ than a very distant 
and mighty central administration. 
 
The proliferation of self-governance units, coupled with a greater degree of 
fiscal decentralisation, may also have a moderating effect on another principal 
cause of conflict: the allocation and distribution of public resources. Feelings of 
grievance regarding obvious relative deprivation, note Grasa and Camps, often 
become the source of potential conflict (Grasa and Camps 2009, 32). As 
Chapter 2 has discussed, this was certainly the case with regard to the 
allocation of education funding in Macedonia during the 1990s. Decentralisation 
may, according to Manor (1999, 104), alleviate inter-regional disparities by 
promoting a more equitable distribution of state resources by giving remote, 
poor, and previously under-represented areas greater access to resources and 
influence. Decentralisation can also promote “political realism”, since a local 
government’s daily interactions - and frustrations - with central institutions will 
make them more aware of budgetary constraints and generate a more realistic 
understanding of what is and is not possible from the public purse (ibid., 48). 
This realisation, concludes Manor, should promote political stability, since it will 
protect the political system from the backlashes which can occur when 
expectations are inflated and feelings of deprivation exist (ibid., 48-49). 
 
Arguments that favour devolving responsibility for education to the sub-national 
level as a means of easing ethnic tensions are particularly relevant in multi-
ethnic and multilingual societies such as Macedonia. The significance of being 
able to differentiate the delivery of public services for heterogeneous tastes, for 
example providing education in a community’s mother tongue cannot be 
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underestimated. As Chapter 2 illustrates, many of the school-based conflicts 
that arose in Macedonia during the 1990s, for example, developed out of a 
widespread dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of Albanian and 
Turkish-medium education (Vetterlein 2006, 8). Devolving management 
responsibilities to representative local bodies, such as municipal and school 
councils, enables greater participation from local communities in decision-
making processes and can allow citizens to more effectively express their 
preferences. Enhanced participation may also improve community 
empowerment, accountability, transparency, and institutional responsiveness to 
local needs, since local communities will possess better knowledge of local 
conditions than a distant central government (the asymmetric information 
argument) (Cohen 2004, 5; Di Gropello 2004, 1; Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009, 34). 
Involving local, diverse communities in the management of schools will 
therefore increase the legitimacy of the decisions that are made and possibly 
the education system more generally (McGinn 1999, 31; Poiana 2011, 436). 
The problem of “legitimacy crisis”, notes Péter Radó (2010, 77), together with 
an inability of central governments to implement decisions locally, is often cited 
as the reason why governments devolve education responsibilities to local 
communities. Devolving education can therefore contribute to correcting the 
deficiencies associated with overly centralised systems.  
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Striking a Balance between Centralised and Decentralised  
Education Systems 
 
Despite the prevalence of decentralised education reforms worldwide, the 
academic community and more recently donor agencies have become 
increasingly doubtful about their ability to improve the delivery of education 
locally. Such scepticism stems from both a lack of empirical evidence to validate 
theoretical claims and the existence of negative consequences associated with 
decentralisation that could potentially dilute the benefits of reform. Researchers 
warn, for example, that reducing a central government’s ability to act against 
capture by local elites may lead to the entrenchment of patronage politics under 
decentralisation. As the previous chapter has shown, this risk is particularly 
great in Macedonia. If the capture of political processes by interest groups is 
easier at the local level, decentralisation may favour those local groups 
disproportionately (Galiani et al. 2004, 4; Blunt and Turner 2005, 79; Devas and 
Delay 2006, 692; Barter 2008; Scott 2009, 7). As Chapter 6 will subsequently 
demonstrate, differences in ﬁscal and administrative capacities at the local level 
may also exacerbate disparities in spending and educational outcomes within 
municipalities (De Grauwe 2004, 3; Winkler and Yeo 2007, 1). In a paper 
entitled ‘helping the good get better but leaving the rest behind’, Galiani, 
Schargrodsky and Gertler (2004) researched the effect of secondary school 
decentralisation on education quality in Argentina. Their results found that the 
higher the provincial fiscal deficit, the smaller the positive impact of 
decentralisation, and the effect of school decentralisation on test outcomes was 
in fact negative in provinces running significant fiscal deficits (ibid., 28).  
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Given the risks associated with devolving education responsibilities to 
municipalities, it is no wonder that many countries maintain centralised systems. 
One argument in favour of centrally controlled education finances is based on 
egalitarian principles which regard central control as the key for reducing or 
eliminating disparities perceived to be unfair (Radó 2010, 13). Advocates claim 
that people (and especially those who are poorly educated), if left to their own 
devices, will invest less in education than is good for them individually (Levitas 
2002, 6). Central government is thus obliged to take action to ensure 
investments in education reaches socially desirable levels. This can be 
achieved by redistributing wealth through equalising grants or the direct 
provision of education services, although, observes Tony Levitas, this rarely 
results in the degree of equality sought. Another argument in favour of 
maintaining central control over education policy emphasises how 
decentralisation may weaken the education ministry’s ability to implement 
necessary structural and curriculum reforms (Levitas 2002, 7; World Bank 2002, 
16; Winkler and Yeo 2007, 1). Given these conflicting - but entirely rational - 
arguments, it comes as no surprise that many educational systems not only 
combine central and local responsibilities, they are continually being fine-tuned 
in the search for the most socially acceptable, economically efficient, and 
educationally productive balance (Levitas 2002, 7). 
 
 143 
Education Provision in the Republic of Macedonia Prior to 
Decentralisation 
 
As Chapter 2 has explained, in response to economic and political instability in 
the wake of the break-up of Yugoslavia, newly independent Macedonia 
abandoned the Yugoslav tradition of extensive autonomy and ﬁnancial 
independence for municipalities and initiated a policy of centralisation. This 
process, notes Jan Herczyński (2009) an expert working with the Ministry of 
Education and Science (MoES), was particularly severe in the education sector. 
The MoES explained the damage centralisation did to the education system in 
its ten year strategy, published on the eve of decentralisation:  
 
This situation has generated many problems such as an inflexible 
structure of the system, marginalisation of the idiosyncrasies which stem 
from the specific features of the environment or place ... the existence of 
complex bureaucratic procedures in reaching decisions, the inability of 
the system to adapt to dynamic changes ... The procedures for choosing 
teaching and management staff have been focused towards one power 
point - the Ministry, which has resulted in the domination of party political 
and ethnic and personal interests when implementing the procedure of 
selecting staff, and marginalisation of professional quality as a key 
criterion ...  Moreover, the responsibility of the schools, parents and local 
community for efficient functioning, and the opportunities for designing 
and implementing school development plans have been limited by 
complex bureaucratic procedures and restricted opportunities for finding 
alternative sources of finance (MoES 2005, 22). 
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As a result of the centralisation, schools’ autonomy was retracted and they 
became directly responsible to the MoES. The powers of School Boards were 
also revoked and transferred to the MoES. Although the Boards formerly 
retained a limited advisory role, their voice was routinely disregarded by central 
authorities. This structure led to the undemocratic governance of schools and 
key stakeholders, such as parents and teachers, were neither consulted nor 
informed of government decisions (World Bank 2002, 3; Myhrvold 2005, 23). 
Centralisation also led to the politicisation of the process of nominating and 
dismissing School Directors, since the decision was taken by the Minister 
himself (Herczyński et al. 2009, 108). Some schools, notes Merle Vetterlein, 
also received preferential treatment due to better contacts with those 
responsible in the Ministry (Vetterlein 2006, 9). Centralised decision-making 
regarding staffing and the opening and closing of the schools seldom 
corresponded with local needs, particularly in remote and sparsely inhabited 
areas of the country (Kumanovo 2010, 8). A further consequence of the 
centralising tendencies of the MoES was that its burgeoning administrative load 
distracted it from performing crucial strategic functions effectively, such as 
policy formulation, long-term planning, and standards setting (World Bank 2002, 
13; Myhrvold 2005, 22). 
 
The ﬁnancial dimension of the centralisation was no less extreme than the 
political one and was motivated by a desire to control spending in a period of 
ﬁscal constraints (Herczyński et al. 2009, 109). Between 1996 and 2004, the 
budgets of all schools were prepared by the MoES and all school expenditures 
(even minor ones, such as magazine subscriptions) were processed by the 
centralised treasury system operated by the Ministry of Finance. The system of 
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allocation norms for salaries and material expenditures based on the number of 
eligible classes a school provides was supposed to ensure a basic level of 
equity of school funding and, concludes Herczyński, to a certain extent it 
succeeded. However, it also blocked any local initiatives in the system, failed to 
ensure efficiency, and was unable to keep pace with shifting demographic 
patterns (ibid., 110). Population changes at the time were characterised by 
rapidly increasing growth rates in Albanian-dominated municipalities and 
declining student numbers in Macedonian-majority rural areas. The result was 
substantial disparities in education spending across municipalities, which to a 
large extent reflected lower spending per student in dominant Albanian schools 
(World Bank 2008, 23; UNICEF 2009, 31). 
 
Table 4.1 (below) illustrates significant disparities in primary education spending 
across municipalities based on urban/rural and ethnic characteristics in 2003. A 
comparable analysis based on fiscal data for 2005 was prepared by the World 
Bank and its findings corroborate these conclusions (World Bank 2008, 24). The 
data in Table 4.1 shows that the average per-student expenditure for primary 
schools in 2003 was 20,459 Macedonian denar (MKD) (highlighted in table). 
However, education expenditure varied considerably across municipalities from 
MKD 16,117 in the large cities, such as the predominantly Albanian municipality 
of Tetovo, to MKD 27,573 in rural, predominantly-Macedonian municipalities. 
Such disparities were matched by variations in class size: 27 students per class 
in Tetovo and 18.3 students in the rural Macedonian municipalities (Herczyński 
et al. 2009, 127). Since rural Albanian communities have school networks with 
urban characteristics (large class sizes), per-student spending in rural Albanian 
dominated municipalities, notes Herczyński, was also smaller than in rural 
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Macedonian ones. The World Bank’s analysis concludes that while spending 
disparities can be partially explained by different student-teacher ratios across 
municipalities, funding inequalities appear to reflect the practice of allocating 
resources to schools on the basis of number of classes rather than the number 
of students (World Bank 2008, 23). The World Bank’s analysis also notes that 
these spending outcomes prior to decentralisation were similar at the secondary 
level. 
 
Table 4.1:12Class Sizes and Expenditures in Primary Education per Student  
by Type of Municipality, 2003  
 
 
Type of 
Municipality 
Data 
Macedonian 
Mixed 
Albanian 
Macedonia > 95  
Percent 
70-95 
Percent 
70-95 
Percent 
> 95  
Percent 
Skopje 
Municipalities 2 3 3 1 1 10 
Class size 27.3 26.0 26.9 23.3 23.2 26.2 
Cost/ student 
(MKD) 
18,806 19,005 17,372 22,098 20,415 18,527 
Large 
Cities 
Municipalities 2 2 1 1  6 
Class size 23.2 23.7 24.9 27.0  24.52 
Cost/ student 
(MKD) 
20,752 21,514 18,364 16,117  19,286 
Small 
Cities 
Municipalities 18 6 3   27 
Class size 21.9 22.4 23.6   27 
Cost/ student 
(MKD) 
23,067 21,545 18,501   21,271 
Rural 
Municipalities 16 9 7 3 6 41 
Class size 18.3 18.8 19.0 23.4 23.6 20.89 
Cost/ student 
(MKD)  
27,573 27,516 26,564 17,977 18,317 22,647 
Macedonia 
Municipalities 38 20 14 5 7 84 
Class size 22.39 23.17 23.92 25.39 23.55 23.35 
Cost/ student 
(MKD)  
22,366 21,496 19,255 17,005 18,784 20,459 
Source: Herczyński et al. 2009, 127. 
 
A further consequence of economic stagnation and uneven demographic shifts 
prior to 2005 was that, since the government could no longer afford to invest 
sufficiently in education, the school infrastructure was unable to keep pace with 
the rapidly changing student population. The data in Table 4.2 (below) 
illustrates that the space per student in Macedonian-majority municipalities was 
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signiﬁcantly higher (more than double) than in predominantly Albanian 
municipalities. This suggests many more Albanian students were obliged to 
attend school in multiple shifts during this period (Herczyński et al. 2009, 106). 
Since funds for heating were calculated according to the size of heated space, 
in addition to the number of class shifts, heating costs per student also varied 
significantly across municipality and ethnic group. Finally, the data in Table 4.2 
shows how maintenance costs per student during 2003 also varied significantly 
across municipality; much greater than the disparities in total per-student 
spending (Table 4.1) (ibid., 129). While both Jan Herczyński and the World 
Bank’s analysis concentrate on funding disparities between Albanian and 
Macedonian-dominated municipalities, it is logical to assume the funding 
system would have created similar inequalities for other ethnic groups 
experiencing rapid birth rates and who were living in densely populated areas, 
for example Roma communities in Skopje. 
 
Table 4.2:13Utilities and Maintenance Costs in Primary Education per Student, 
2003 
 
Data 
Macedonian 
Mixed 
Albanian 
Macedonia >95  
Percent 
70-95 
Percent 
70-95  
Percent 
>95  
Percent 
Municipalities 38 20 14 5 7 84 
Heated space for 
students (m
2
) 
4.97 4.42 3.63 2.19 2.20 3.95 
Heating cost per 
student (MKD) 
1,240 1,503 1,081 712 611 1,149 
Maintenance per 
student (MKD) 
2,786 2,818 1,787 854 708 2,139 
Source: Herczyński et al. 2009, 129. 
 
The legacy of more than a decade of over-bureaucratic, centralised 
management and the insufficient funding of school infrastructure was an 
education system no longer able to meet the diverse needs of its citizens. This 
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was particularly true for ethnic and linguistic communities, whose educational 
preferences differed from the majority, and those living in rapidly expanding 
urban areas. Undemocratic school governance structures and an increasingly 
politicised educational environment often led to tensions locally and resulted in 
the de-legitimisation of educational reforms and possibly also of the government 
in the eyes of marginalised local communities. Dissatisfaction over unequal 
educational standards - whether perceived or real - also increased tensions 
between different ethnic groups (Poulton 2000; Petroska-Beška and Najčevska 
2004; Myhrvold 2005). The next section examines the changes introduced as a 
result of the decentralisation process in 2005. It will be followed by a discussion 
of whether this process has been successful in addressing some of the negative 
legacies of the previous decade. 
 
 
Changes to the Education System as a Result of Decentralisation 
 
The decentralisation process, which seeks to enable greater community 
involvement in educational matters either directly or indirectly through their 
municipal representatives, began on 1 July 2005. Table 4.3 (below) summarises 
the division of key responsibilities between stakeholders at the central, 
municipal, and school levels. Responsibility for primary and secondary 
education was transferred to the municipalities and they became ‘founders’ of 
schools, assuming ownership over school buildings, responsibility for their 
maintenance, and the payment of staff salaries. Municipalities acquired the task 
of organising transport for students living more than two kilometres from school, 
student dormitories, and for taking decisions on the opening and closing of 
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schools, based on pre-defined criteria and the approval of the MoES. Local 
influence over the appointment of School Directors was also enhanced by 
granting Mayors responsibility over their appointment and dismissal, based on 
proposals from School Boards (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 22.1; 2008; 2009). It 
is important to point out that responsibilities crucial to the design of the 
education system, such as the development of curricula, the approval of 
textbooks, teacher training, and ultimate approval of many local decisions 
remained with at the central government level. 
 
Given the increase in responsibilities at the local level, municipalities were 
obliged to establish education units within their administrations, as well as 
appoint Municipal Education Inspectors to supervise the provision of education 
locally. Whilst the role of Municipal Education Officers remains to be 
standardised, a project managed by the OSCE, in coordination with MoES, the 
municipal association, and Municipal Education Officers during 2009 sought to 
define their function more precisely. It suggested that their key roles were to: 
supervise the start and end of the school year; compile school data on behalf of 
the MoES; monitor procedures for supplying heating materials to schools, 
transportation, and food for students; liaise with schools and the MoES; and to 
mediate education-related disputes (OSCE 2008a, 9; 2009b, 3). The role of 
Municipal Education Inspectors, when appointed by Mayors, also remained 
unclear.2 However, it is assumed their task was to supervise the working 
conditions in schools, the enrolment of students, and ensure satisfactory 
arrangements for transport, food and student accommodation (OSCE 2006b, 
14). 
                                                          
2
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 08/04/2011, Skopje. 
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Table 4.3:14Responsibilities of Stakeholders within the Decentralised Education 
System 
 
Central Government Municipalities Schools 
Prepares legislation, 
curricula, standards and 
strategic policy 
Is the ‘founder’ of school and 
is responsible for 
maintenance of school 
buildings and staff salaries 
 
Adopts schools’ statute 
Adopts plans and 
programmes for schools  
Establishes and/or closes 
down schools and decides 
on their location 
Proposes annual work 
programme; reports on 
schools’ performance to 
Municipal Council 
 
Defines the conditions to be 
met for founding a school 
Adopts school decision to 
open or close classes, 
including those in different 
languages of instruction 
 
Proposes annual financial 
plan to municipality 
Manages and partially 
finances the education 
system through transfers to 
municipalities 
 
Appoints and/or dismisses 
School Director, upon the 
proposal of School Board 
Proposes annual balance 
of accounts to municipality 
Approves draft textbooks 
Organises and pays for 
transport and/or 
accommodation for students 
living far from schools 
 
Advertises for election of 
School Director, conduct 
interviews and propose two 
candidates to Mayor  
Adopts policies, procedures 
and conditions for 
professional and 
pedagogical training 
 
Manages spending of central 
government transfers and 
provides own-source 
finances 
Provides opinion on 
appointment of teachers 
and professional associates 
to School Director  
Carries out external 
assessments of students’ 
achievement (exams) 
 
Appoints municipal 
representatives to School 
Boards 
Makes decisions regarding 
complaints and appeals by 
school employees, students 
and parents 
Supervises legal 
compliance of school 
programmes and monitors 
quality and efficiency of 
system 
 
Supervises working 
conditions in schools, 
enrolment, transport, food, 
accommodation of students, 
etc. (municipal inspector) 
Operates the information 
system of education (data 
collection) 
 
 
 
Increasing the powers of School Boards, the management body of schools, was 
another important element of decentralisation which aimed to promote greater 
democratic governance in schools. It represents an example of power-dividing; 
an approach to institutional design proposed by Philip Roeder and Donald 
Rothchild (2005) which is discussed in the literature review in Chapter 1. The 
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Boards were assigned signiﬁcant powers, including the authority to propose the 
school’s annual work plan and budget to Municipal Councils, adopt the school 
statute, and propose the selection and dismissal of School Directors to the 
Mayor. Membership of the School Boards was also amended in 2005; with 
parents assuming a third of seats and municipalities about the same. Other 
School Board members include teachers and professional associates, the 
MoES and, in the case of secondary schools, a representative of the local 
business community (Official Gazette 2009b, Art. 88). The role of School 
Directors was also strengthened in 2005. Key aspects of their job were to 
undertake measures for the implementation of the school’s work plan, select 
staff and make decisions on their deployment and termination, and report on the 
implementation of the work plan to the MoES and municipality (OSCE 2006b, 
18). In an attempt to further de-politicise their appointment, a state exam for 
School Directors was introduced in 2009 (Official Gazette 2009b, Art. 128, 129). 
Whilst not strictly a feature of the decentralisation process per se, steps to 
professionalise the School Director’s role should be regarded as a direct 
consequence of their enhanced responsibilities and could lead to the more 
effective management of education locally.3 
 
The process of politically and administratively decentralising in the education 
sector was accompanied by fiscal decentralisation reforms, which were carried 
out gradually in two phases. The division into two stages, whereby progression 
into the second phase was only permitted when municipalities fulfilled certain 
legal criteria, was proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and was 
motivated by the fear that poor ﬁscal management on behalf of the 
                                                          
3
 Interview with senior representative of the State Examination Centre: 07/04/2011, Skopje. 
 152 
municipalities could contribute to an excessive budget deﬁcit (Herczyński et al. 
2009, 131).4 During the first phase, which commenced in July 2005 and 
continued for two years, municipalities received earmarked grants from central 
government to cover maintenance costs (heating, electricity, etc.), repairs, and 
student transportation. Staff salaries, however, continued to be paid directly by 
the central government (Herczyński 2011, 8). In the second phase, which began 
in September 2007 for those municipalities that satisfied the criteria, 
municipalities were entrusted with the payment of staff salaries. The earmarked 
grants received from the Ministry of Finance during the first phase were 
transformed into block grants, and both these and the block grants received for 
salaries could not be smaller than the equivalent funds previously allocated to 
the municipalities (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 12). While the receipt of block, as 
opposed to earmarked grants allowed municipalities greater discretion over how 
they could assign funding locally, neither the categorical grants for school 
maintenance nor the grants for salaries could be used for purposes other than 
education (Herczyński 2011, 8).  
 
Another crucial fiscal reform introduced as a result of the decentralisation 
process was the move to a weighted education funding allocation formula 
based on the numbers of students in schools located in the municipalities, 
rather than on historical costs. The significance of this formula for the funding of 
primary and secondary education cannot be underestimated, since a weighted 
per-student system of financing over the longer term is the only way of ensuring 
funds flow to where they are needed, i.e. where students attend school (Levitas 
2009, 24). Not only does the use of such an allocation formula seek to ensure 
                                                          
4
 Municipalities possess an adequate staff capacity for financial management, shows good financial results 
for at least 24 months, has no arrears to suppliers or any other creditors exceeding those ordinary terms of 
payment (Official Gazette 2004, Art. 46). 
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greater equity of funding across different municipalities, it also aims to improve 
transparency within the allocation of resources and reduce the possibility of 
discretionary payments. Such an approach to funding therefore has the 
potential to resolve an important grievance raised by the Albanian community 
during the 1990s. 
 
The formula introduced for allocating primary education categorical grants to 
municipalities consisted of the following three elements: a lump sum, allocated 
to each municipality irrespective of the number of students located in its 
territory; payment based on the number of students attending schools located in 
municipalities, which was weighted for schools located in municipalities with low 
population density; and lower and upper buffers used to protect municipalities 
from excessive changes to the previous year’s allocation (Herczyński et al. 
2009, 140). The role of the lump sum was to protect smaller municipalities with 
fewer students that still need to maintain schools for them. The role of the 
weights for students in municipalities with low population densities was to 
provide additional funds to the small schools with small classes, where 
maintenance costs per student are higher (ibid., 141). The formula for allocating 
secondary education categorical grants to municipalities was very similar to that 
of primary education; however it initially did not include a lump sum and used 
only one density threshold. This changed in 2008 when the density threshold 
was abandoned and a lump sum added (Herczyński 2011, 17). As with the 
categorical grants, the allocation formula for block grants for primary education, 
introduced in 2008 for those municipalities in the second phase, included a 
lump sum, weighted per-student payments based on population density, and 
the use of lower and upper buffers. However, it also included two additional 
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coefficients, for students with special needs and for subject teaching to reflect 
the higher costs of teaching in higher classes (ibid., 19-20). In contrast, the 
allocation formula for block grants for secondary education was much simpler 
and includes only a lump sum and one coefficient for students of vocational 
education (ibid., 21). 
 
 
Decentralised Education and the Promotion of Heterogeneous  
Policy-Making 
 
Mother Tongue Education Provision 
 
One of the most broadly acknowledged rights in international minority protection 
standards is the right of non-majority communities to receive education in their 
mother tongue. Whilst various international treaties indicate such an approach, 
the key document for states aspiring to membership of the European Union is 
the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) and specifically Articles 12 and 14 (CoE 1995).5 It is worth 
emphasising that Macedonia has maintained an impressive record of ratifying 
international minority rights treaties and incorporating them into national 
legislation, although it had not ratified the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages by mid-2012.6 Despite this, and as Chapter 2 has 
illustrated, the provision of education in non-majority languages such as 
                                                          
5
 Article 5 of the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education and Article 4 of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 
6
 This is reflected in the Constitution (Official Gazette 2001, Art. 48), both laws on Primary and Secondary 
Education (ibid. 2008, Art. 9; 2009, Art. 4), and legislation promoting and protecting the rights of members 
of communities which are less than 20 percent of the population (ibid. 2008b, Art. 5). Details of states that 
have ratified the European Charter can be found at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Cherche 
Sig.asp?NT=148&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG [Accessed: 20/08/12]. 
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Albanian and Turkish during the 1990s had been problematic. Two particular 
incidents prior to the start of decentralisation in 2005 demonstrated the extent to 
which the provision of education in languages other than Macedonian remained 
a contentious issue in some localities. In Bitola during May 2000, for example, 
several thousand teachers, students and parents took to the streets to express 
discontent with government plans to open Albanian-medium classes for 
students at the ‘Josip Broz Tito’ gymnasium (Myhrvold 2005, 36). Protests of a 
similar magnitude erupted at the school once again in September 2003 when 
for a second time the government tried to open Albanian-medium classes (ICG 
2003, 22; Myhrvold 2005, 38). In the Skopje municipality of Čair, tensions also 
arose during September 2003 when the government transferred seven 
Albanian-medium classes to the secondary economics school ‘Arseni Jovkov’ 
(ICG 2003, 22; Myhrvold 2005, 31). 
 
Despite such high profile cases, data published by the State Statistical Office 
confirms that the vast majority of Albanian students had access to primary 
education in their mother tongue between 2006 and 2011 (Table 4.4). Whilst the 
actual number of students learning in Albanian has been gradually declining for 
a variety of reasons, the overall proportion of students attending Albanian-
medium classes increased and in 2010/11 stood close to 100 percent.7 The 
proportion of Turkish students learning in their mother tongue is much lower 
(approximately 60 percent in 2004/05, see Table 4.5), however this too 
increased between 2004/05 and 2010/11. The official data verifies that the 
number of primary schools offering instruction in Albanian also increased from 
280 to 288 between the academic years 2004/05 and 2010/11 (Appendix H). 
                                                          
7
 Two possible reasons for the reduction in the numbers of Albanian students learning in their mother 
tongue is the effect of lower birth rates within the Albanian community and increasing rates of migration. 
Interview with Municipal Education Officer, Gostivar Municipality: 22/06/2011, Gostivar.  
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Further, primary schools offering Turkish-medium classes increased from 57 to 
62 during this time. In contrast, the number of primary schools offering 
instruction in Macedonian and Serbian languages decreased from 764 to 731 
and from 11 to 7 respectively. The number of primary school class sections 
available in the community languages reflects a similar trend, with classes in 
Albanian and Turkish increasing during this period from 3,087 to 3,403 and from 
272 to 352 respectively, whilst classes in both Macedonian and Serbian 
languages decreased. 
 
Table 4.4:15Proportion of Albanian Students Learning in their  
Mother Tongue (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools) 
 
Year 
No. of 
Students 
No. of Students Learning 
in Mother Tongue 
Students Learning in 
Mother Tongue (%) 
2004/05 75,491 73,932 97.93 
2005/06 - - - 
2006/07 78,467 76,718 97.77 
2007/08 75,141 73,571 97.91 
2008/09 72,570 71,091 97.97 
2009/10 69,922 68,668 98.21 
2010/11 66,156 65,121 98.44 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
Table 4.5:16Proportion of Turkish Students Learning in their  
Mother Tongue (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools) 
 
 
Year 
No. of 
Students 
No. of Students Learning 
in Mother Tongue 
Students Learning in 
Mother Tongue (%) 
2004/05 
 
9,514 5,561 58.45 
2005/06 
 
- - - 
2006/07 
 
9,599 5,998 62.49 
2007/08 
 
9,451 5,977 63.24 
2008/09 
 
9,304 5,715 61.43 
2009/10 
 
9,161 6,038 65.90 
2010/11 9,011 6,043 67.06 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
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The data for secondary education, however, shows a slightly different picture. 
Here, the proportion of Albanian students attending classes in their mother 
tongue is lower, but remained over 90 percent of all Albanian students (Table 
4.6). Interestingly, while the number of Albanian students attending Albanian-
medium classes has been on the increase since 2006, particularly since 
secondary school attendance became compulsory in 2008, so too has the total 
number of Albanians attending secondary school generally. The result is that 
the proportion of Albanian students attending Albanian-medium classes actually 
fell between 2004/05 and 2009/10, but improved in 2010/11 when the 
proportion stood at 95.02 percent. Surprisingly, this had not been the 
experience of Turkish students who, between 20004/05 and 2010/11, enjoyed 
secondary education in their mother tongue in increasing - if only moderately so 
- numbers (Table 4.7). The data does however show that the number of 
secondary schools offering instruction in Albanian increased impressively 
between the academic years 2003/04 and 2010/11 from 23 to 34, and the 
number of class sections from 521 to 912, even though the proportion of 
Albanians learning in their mother tongue had in fact fallen (Appendix I). 
Schools and class sections offering instruction in Turkish also increased 
significantly (more than doubled), as the student numbers would suggest. 
 
Table 4.6:17Proportion of Albanian Students Learning in their  
Mother Tongue (Higher Secondary Schools) 
 
Year 
No. of 
Students 
No. of Students Learning 
in Mother Tongue 
Students Learning in 
Mother Tongue (%) 
 
2004/05 
 
20,409 19,352 94.82 
2005/06 
 
- - - 
2006/07 
 
23,282 21,835 93.78 
2007/08 
 
24,225 22,357 92.29 
2008/09 
 
25,857 23,914 92.49 
2009/10 
 
27,663 26,028 94.09 
2010/11 27,955 26,563 95.02 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
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Table 4.7:18Approximate Proportion of Turkish Students Learning  
in their Mother Tongue (Higher Secondary Schools)8 
 
 
Year 
No. of 
Students 
No. of Students 
Learning in Mother 
Tongue 
Approx. No. of 
Students Learning in 
Mother Tongue (%) 
2004/05 
 
2,378 1,090 45.84 
2005/06 
 
- - - 
2006/07 
 
2,632 1,216 46.20 
2007/08 
 
2,695 1,326 49.20 
2008/09 
 
2,845 1,465 51.50 
2009/10 
 
2,948 1,476 50.07 
2010/2011 3,071 1,542 50.21 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011. 
 
The official data, corroborated in interviews with Municipal Education Officers, 
suggest that since the decentralisation process began, it has become relatively 
easy for municipalities to open new classes where the language of instruction is 
either Albanian or Turkish. Indeed, in reviewing Macedonia’s second State 
Report on the implementation of the FCNM, the Council of Europe’s Advisory 
Committee noted how:  
 
efforts have been made to improve the situation of schools providing 
instruction in Albanian and experiencing problems because of increased 
demand ... The Advisory Committee notes that, although tensions arose 
several years ago between students and families from the Macedonian 
and Albanian communities concerning the introduction of Albanian-
language classes and schools, these tensions have gradually eased... 
(CoE 2008, 28). 
 
                                                          
8
 I have calculated the proportion of Turkish students studying in their mother tongue by dividing the total 
number of students learning through the medium of Turkish with the total number of Turkish students. 
There is a possibility that students from other ethnic backgrounds, such as Albanians, may have chosen to 
study in Turkish and this has therefore inflated the overall proportion. 
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Despite clear progress, a few examples exist which suggest the provision of 
mother tongue education remained contentious in some municipalities. These 
challenges related to the minimum threshold of students required to establish 
new classes (24), resistance to employing additional Albanian or Turkish-
speaking teachers (at the expense of Macedonian-speaking teachers), and the 
fact that any initiative required final approval from the MoES, in addition to the 
Ministry of Finance if there were financial implications.9 Persistent difficulties in 
the opening of Albanian-medium classes in Bitola had still not been resolved by 
mid-2012, and other cases in Ohrid, Prilep, Veles, and the secondary school 
‘Cvetan Dimov’ in Skopje were given frequent, high profile coverage in 
Albanian-language newspapers such as Koha (Hasani 2010, 2; Papraniku 
2011, 5). This undoubtedly provided (Albanian) readers with the perception that 
the challenges facing mother tongue education provision are much greater than 
they actually are. 
 
A particularly high profile case, which remained unresolved in mid-2012, 
concerns the primary school ‘Goce Delčev’, located in the village of Podgorci, 
Struga municipality. Prior to the start of the academic year 2008/09 the school’s 
Board requested permission by the municipality to open Albanian-medium 
classes. Since the number of students (11) involved was below the legal 
threshold, the municipality agreed to pay the salaries of the three teachers 
required and submitted the request to the MoES. In the absence of any 
response from the MoES, the classes were formed in November 2008 after a 
two-month delay. The request eventually received approval from the (Albanian) 
Deputy Minister of Education and Science on 9 March 2010; only to be reversed 
                                                          
9
 Classes with fewer students can be established if the municipality concerned agrees to pay related 
staffing costs. Such initiatives still require approval from the MoES, however. 
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three weeks later by the Minister himself (of Macedonian ethnicity). The Minister 
declared the classes illegal, because they lacked ministerial approval, and the 
parents of the students affected were fined and issued with a court summons. 
Questioning the level of Albanian language proficiency of the 11 students, the 
MoES proposed to establish a commission in order to assess their right to 
‘mother tongue’ education in Albanian.  
 
This case is controversial because it involved Macedonian Muslims (Torbeš), 
vulnerable to the assimilationist tendencies of the local Albanian population. It 
also occurred in Struga, a municipality significantly affected by the territorial 
reorganisation of 2004 (discussed at length in Chapter 6), and where relations 
between the (now majority) Albanian and (previous majority) Macedonian 
communities are often fragile. Parallels can and have already been drawn with 
the forced closure of two private primary schools offering Turkish medium 
classes in Centar Župa municipality by the police in 1995. A subsequent 
Constitutional Court ruling, contrary to the principle of self-identification for 
national minorities, supported the government’s decision to close the schools. It 
emphasised how the Turkish minority in the area “did not speak sufficient 
Turkish” to claim the right to mother tongue education for their children (Wilson 
2002, 57). 
 
Primary and secondary education in a student’s mother tongue was only 
available to Albanian and Turkish students during this period, while a small 
proportion of Serbs (less than ten percent) attended classes in their mother 
tongue (Appendix J). As a consequence, other communities living in 
Macedonia, such as the Roma, Vlach, Bošniaks, in addition to most Serbs and 
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many Turks, generally attended Macedonian-medium classes (Table 4.8 
below). In response to recommendations from the Council of Europe’s Advisory 
Committee on the FCNM that “requisite attention is paid also to the needs of the 
smaller minorities”, the MoES introduced a selection of elective classes (‘the 
Language and Culture of Roma / Vlachs / Bošniaks’) in 2008 (CoE 2008, 29). 
These classes were offered once a week for third grade students and in two 
classes per week for students attending grades four to nine (MoES 2010a, 24). 
As a method of promoting language proficiency for the smaller communities in 
their mother tongue, the elective classes were not offered to students of other 
ethnicities (i.e. Macedonians interesting in learning Romany), nor were they 
available to Turkish and Serbian students unable to attend Turkish or Serbian-
medium classes locally (ibid., 86). Elective classes in Albanian language were 
however available to all students from sixth grade.  
 
Whilst the classes represent a central government initiative, it is the 
responsibility of schools and municipalities to offer these classes and to 
promote their availability to students and their parents. A survey carried out by 
the MoES in 2009 found that only a relatively small number of Roma and 
Bošniak students had signed up for these elective classes, although the 
numbers of Vlach students doing so was more impressive. Low participation 
rates, concluded the MoES, “raises doubts about the procedures and manner in 
which the schools offer [the] subject to the students” (ibid., 25). The fact that at 
least 15 students are required to form an elective class represents an additional 
challenge to opening additional classes in the future. 
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Table 4.8:19Proportion of Students, according to Ethnicity, Learning in the 
Macedonian Language (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools) 
 
Ethnicity 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/2009 2009/10 2010/11 
% % % % % 
Macedonian 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Albanian 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 
Turkish 37.3 36.4 38.4 34.0 33.3 
Roma 97.1 96.9 97.1 96.7 96.6 
Serbian 91.4 91.5 90.9 91.8 91.6 
Vlach 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Other 98.8 99.1 99.0 99.0 98.4 
  Sources: SSO 2005; 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
 
Rationalisation of the School Network 
 
A second example of how decentralisation may enhance communities’ ability to 
meet local needs more effectively is the devolution of responsibility for opening 
and closing schools to municipalities.10 As previously discussed, the existing 
school network reflects the demographic situation of the 1960s and 1970s when 
most primary and secondary schools were built. This has resulted in 
considerable discrepancies in the location of educational facilities. As elsewhere 
in the post-communist world, Macedonia inherited a large number of rural 
primary schools; schools that were largely responsible for making literacy nearly 
universal during the socialist period and to which people understandably are 
deeply attached (Levitas 2002, 13). However, continual demographic decline in 
rural areas which disproportionately affects Macedonian communities, 
combined with increasing migration from rural to urban areas, has left many of 
these rural schools with very few students. Approximately 30 percent of all 
primary schools, for example, have less than twenty students and are 
                                                          
10
 However, final approval was required by the MoES. 
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increasingly costly to maintain (Appendix K). In contrast, population growth in 
urban areas, particularly those populated by Albanian and Roma communities 
in the north and west of the country, has resulted in significant overcrowding in 
schools (OSI 2007, 25). As Chapter 6 will examine in more detail, considerable 
urban / rural disparities also exist in the secondary school network. Socialist 
planning’s tendency to concentrate investments largely in urban areas has 
meant that secondary schools are generally only located in the major towns and 
cities. Not only has uneven demographic growth resulted in significant 
overcrowding in many urban secondary schools, the lack of secondary schools 
in rural areas means students are required to travel long distances in order to 
attend classes. Any decision concerning the redistribution of resources from 
under-populated (predominantly Macedonia) areas in the east of the country to 
over-populated (predominantly Albanian) areas in the north and west is 
understandably a sensitive issue.  
 
One example of how the inadequate school network manifests itself is the 
significant proportion of schools required to operate multiple shifts in order to 
accommodate students. As the data in Table 4.9 shows, over one third of 
primary schools in 2010/11 were obliged to operate two shifts, which usually ran 
from 07.30 to 12.00 and from 12.30 to 18.00 each day (OSCE 2008a, 23). 
Whilst multiple school shifts is not a new phenomenon, it represented a 
persistent challenge to the provision of equitable educational standards and 
only limited progress has been made since 2005 to resolve it. The data in Table 
4.9 also confirms that approximately ten percent of primary schools operated 
three shifts on a daily basis. During the academic year 2010/11 these schools 
were located in the municipalities of Šuto Orizari, Gjorce Petrov, Gostivar, 
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Kičevo, Kumanovo and Strumica.11 Operating multiple shifts not only requires 
lesson times to be shortened so that classes can be appropriately scheduled; it 
also limits the time and space available for extra-curricular activities or classes 
for students with additional support needs, such as language ‘catch-up’ classes. 
Interviews with Municipal Education Officers and a Secondary School Director 
in Šuto Orizari, Kumanovo and Gostivar municipalities verified that in such 
circumstances schools are compelled to shorten lessons to 30 minutes 
(Kumanovo 2010, 109).12 Legally, the duration of lessons in primary schools 
must be 40 minutes and in secondary schools 45 minutes (Official Gazette 
2008, Art. 27; 2009, Art. 39). 
 
Table 4.9:20Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools and Students,  
According to the Number and Types of Shifts 
 
No. of Schools 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
One shift 601 598 - 591 583 586 597 616 
Two shifts 399 402 - 390 401 394 383 366 
Three shifts 12 10 - 19 3 11 10 8 
Total 1,012 1,010 - 1,000 997 991 990 990 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
For secondary schools, the situation was more complicated since the schools 
function in multiple buildings and the shifts occur there.13 Instead, the main 
source of complaints was overcrowding and reduced lesson time. Official data 
on either secondary school class sizes or the proportion of schools operating 
double or triple shifts is not publically available. However, a 2008 report 
prepared by the World Bank estimated that as many as 87 percent of secondary 
                                                          
11
 Interview with OSCE official: 12/04/2011, Skopje. 
12
 Interviews with: education expert, Šuto Orizari municipality, 06/04/2011, Šuto Orizari; Municipal 
Education Officer, Gostivar Municipality, 22/06/2011, Gostivar; Secondary School Director, Kumanovo 
municipality, 05/04/2011, Kumanovo. 
13
 Interview with OSCE official: 12/04/2011, Skopje. 
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schools operate on a two-shift basis (World Bank 2008, 30). Secondary schools 
in the urban municipalities of Kumanovo, Gostivar and Tetovo - all with 
significant Albanian and Roma student profiles - are known to experience 
particularly acute spatial problems (Kumanovo 2011).14 In a survey 
commissioned by UNDP in 2010, a quarter of interviewees complained of large 
classes; the proportion of which was higher among Albanian respondents since 
class sizes for this group are typically between 35 and 40 students (Sonce 
2010, 15; UNDP 2010a, 98; Kumanovo 2011, 3).  Not only is such practice 
illegal, since the maximum class size permitted in both primary and secondary 
schools is 34; it is also contrary to good pedagogical practice and has an impact 
on the quality of learning (Official Gazette 2008, Art. 28; 2009, Art. 41; World 
Bank 2008, 26).  
 
There is evidence to suggest that the overcrowding experienced in secondary 
schools may have been exacerbated by two reforms introduced by the MoES to 
improve student participation rates (OSI 2007, 170). The first was the 
introduction of the ‘class zero’ in the academic year 2007/8, increasing the 
number of primary school years from eight to nine. The second reform was the 
decision to make secondary education compulsory from the academic year 
2008/09. Clearly, the ensuing rise in student numbers at both primary and 
secondary schools will exacerbate existing spatial problems. It has been 
estimated that the changes to secondary education alone will result in a rise in 
students numbers of between four and ten percent until 2012 (OSCE 2008c, 4; 
UNDP 2008, 41). Such increases will understandably be greater in those areas 
where historically secondary school enrolment rates have been low (Roma, 
                                                          
14
 Interview with OSCE official: 12/04/2011, Skopje. 
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Albanian, and Turkish communities) (UNDP 2004b, 67). The result will be a 
disproportionate burden on those schools already significantly overcrowded 
(see Figure 4.1), unless substantial capital investments can be made to improve 
current facilities.  
 
Figure 4.1:4Map to Show Increases by Region in the Number of Enrolled 
Secondary School Students between 2003/04 and 2008/09 
 
 
Source: SSO 2010b, 25. 
 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the attempts that have been made to rationalise 
both the primary and secondary school networks between 2002/03 and 
2010/11. A monitoring report on the decentralisation process prepared by the 
Center for Local Democracy Development found that initiatives to establish new 
or close down existing primary schools were frequently raised by municipalities; 
however their implementation is slow (CLDD 2011c, 9). In 2008 for example, 
five of the twelve municipalities monitored by the Center raised initiatives aimed 
at rationalising the school network; however only three of which were 
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successful. The record in 2009 was just as poor (from nine municipalities, only 
three initiatives were successful (ibid., 10). An important obstacle to 
rationalising the school network, notes the report, was the MoES’s delay in 
responding to applications, which took anything from one to three years (ibid., 
63). Other barriers to initiatives for rationalising the school network, apart from 
the obvious challenge of accessing resources, were unresolved property and 
tenure issues regarding school buildings, in addition to vague cadastral records 
(Bakiu 2010, 28; ZELS 2010b; CLDD 2011c, 10; Herczyński 2011, 8). 
 
Table 4.10:21Number of Regular  Table 4.11:22Number of Regular 
Primary and Lower Secondary   Upper Secondary School Buildings 
Schools  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
A dilemma exists regarding the building of additional secondary schools in 
areas not already integrated into the existing network. A UNDP survey in 2008, 
for example, found that a significant proportion of secondary school students 
(21.3 percent) travelled more than ten kilometres to attend classes (UNDP 
2008, 79). This is particularly evident in rural areas, where 47 percent of 
population travelled over ten kilometres to the nearest secondary school. Whilst 
shortening the distance students must travel to school will improve access to 
Year No. of Schools 
2002/03 1,020 
2003/04 1,012 
2004/05 1,010 
2005/06 1,005 
2006/07 1,000 
2007/08 997 
2008/09 991 
2009/10 990 
2010/11 990 
Year No. of Schools  
2002/03 96  
2003/04 96  
2004/05 100  
2005/06 101  
2006/07 104  
2007/08 107  
2008/09 110  
2009/10 110  
2010/11 114  
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education, there is a risk that building additional schools will ‘ghettoise’ rural 
communities by cutting them off from urban centres and with it, the prospect of 
integration into the wider (multicultural) society. Such dilemmas have influenced 
debates on whether to build new secondary schools in the predominantly Roma 
municipality of Šuto Orizari in Skopje, in Lipkovo and in Struga (both 
predominantly Albanian municipalities).15 Until discrepancies in the secondary 
school network are resolved, it is vital that municipalities provide free transport 
for students travelling long distances so that the potential for educational 
exclusion is minimised.  
 
 
The Renaming of Schools 
 
The ability to change the name of a school so that it more closely reflects local 
preferences is a further example of heterogeneous policy making at the local 
level. It is also another issue which caused controversy prior to 2005 and led 
the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities to observe how 
“decisions on renaming schools are currently taken by a simple majority and 
can have a polarising effect in multi-ethnic areas” (HCNM 2008, 4). An incident 
in 2003, for example, where Albanians in the village of Semsevo, Jegunovce 
municipality north-east of Tetovo, ignored procedures and renamed the primary 
school ‘Dame Gruev’ after the first Albanian teacher from the region (‘Jumni 
Junuzi’) led Macedonian parents to withdraw their children from classes (ICG 
2003, 22; NDC 2005, 3). In response, the High Commissioner recommended: 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Interview with OSCE official: 04/04/2011, Skopje. 
 169 
Changing the procedure for decisions on school name changes to a 
more consensus-based procedure that includes all relevant stakeholders 
to ensure that the new name is perceived as legitimate and does not 
offend people with different cultural backgrounds. This could be achieved 
through involvement of consultative bodies such as school boards ... 
(HCNM 2008, 5). 
  
Observers have noted a trend in the years since decentralisation of renaming 
schools previously called after Macedonian heroes and dates of historical 
significance with the names of Albanian or Turkish heroes and holidays 
(UNICEF 2009, 22). However, a review of school name changes initiated by the 
OSCE in 2011 found that, whilst some schools changed their names, it is 
inaccurate to conclude that a significant proportion had done so, or that school 
names were replaced with controversial choices.16 Indeed, a comparative 
review of school names in 2006 and 2010 suggests only around 14 schools 
changed their name during that period, although there have been some 
additional cases since then and prior to 2006 (MCIC 2006; 2010). The OSCE’s 
review did however find evidence of a handful of controversial cases. For 
example, schools were renamed after former NLA members in the 
municipalities of Lipkovo, Struga, and Bogovinje; and of members of the 
Macedonian security forces killed in 2001 in Makedonska Kamenica and 
Zrnovci.17 Another high profile case arose in Gostivar when the name of a 
primary school ‘Bratstvo i Edinstvo’ (‘Brotherhood and Unity’ in Macedonian) 
was replaced with the single word ‘Bashkimi’, meaning ‘Unity’ in Albanian. 
                                                          
16
 Interview with OSCE official: 12/04/2011, Skopje. 
17
 These schools are: ‘Ismet Jashari’, a secondary school in Lipkovo; ‘Nuri Mazari’, a primary school in 
Delogozda, Struga; ‘Sabedin Bajrami’, a primary school in Kamenjane, Bogovinje; ‘Mile Janevski Dzingar’, 
a secondary school in Makedonska Kamenica; and ‘Sinisa Stoilkov’, a primary school in Zrnovci. 
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Macedonian students refused to accept their graduation certificates featuring 
the new school name for more than two years. However, a compromise was 
eventually found in 2009 and the school is known as ‘Bashkimi / Edinstvo / 
Birlik’, the word ‘unity’ in Albanian, Macedonian, and Turkish languages.18  
 
Formal procedures for renaming schools do exist. Proposals for name changes 
must be initiated by the School Board, which requires the consent of the 
Municipal Council before being submitted to the MoES for final evaluation and 
approval. However, a senior representative of the MoES conceded that 
problems can and do still arise locally, although such incidents have been less 
frequent since 2010 since most schools that have wanted to change their name 
have already done so.19 Given the decisive role School Boards play in the 
process, it is essential that they function democratically and are representative 
of local communities if further disputes are to be avoided. 
 
 
The Role of School Boards: Enhancing Participation and Transparency  
in Decision-making? 
 
In a comprehensive review of school-based management processes on behalf 
of the World Bank, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) argue that greater community 
participation in school decision-making processes can improve accountability, 
transparency and responsiveness to local needs. However, they also observe 
how decentralisation does not necessarily give more power to the general 
public, since the powers devolved are susceptible to elite capture. The risk is 
greater, they note, in countries where local democracy and political 
                                                          
18
 Interview with Municipal Education Officer, Gostivar Municipality: 22/06/2011, Gostivar. 
19
 Interview with a senior representative of the MoES: 07/04/2011, Skopje. 
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accountability may be weak, where “in some cases, the local community 
members [have] organised to take over one or more school councils and then 
used the councils for their own political ends rather than for the better education 
of children” (ibid., 35). Indeed, in his recommendations to the Minister of 
Education and Science during 2004, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities warned how, “in the extremely politicised environment, combined with 
a lack of an experience of democratic decision-making, it is unlikely that the 
situation [of governance in schools] would dramatically improve” (HCNM  
2004, 4). 
 
“It is often the case”, observed the OSCE in 2008, “that School Boards are 
politicised thus upholding their political party's interests...many Directors lobby 
among teachers and parents in order to get their preferred candidate elected” 
(OSCE 2008a, 16). While one OSCE official remarked how School Boards often 
operate as “mini municipal councils”, with the appointment of representatives 
being highly politicised and discussions dominated by only a handful of 
members, experiences, the official also noted, are mixed and many Boards do 
function well.20 In her of review of participatory administrative reform in South 
East European schools, Sinziana-Elena Poiana stressed the importance of 
further efforts to improve the capacity of Board members and parents’ 
awareness of their rights more generally in order that participatory school 
management becomes a reality (Poiana 2011, 450). A survey commissioned by 
the UNDP in 2010, for example, found that as many as 80 percent of parents 
indicated that they would not like to complain about the education their child 
receive, even if they had cause to do so (UNDP 2010a, 97). Relations between 
                                                          
20
 Interview with OSCE official: 12/04/2011, Skopje. 
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School Boards and Municipal Education Units and Councils also needed 
improvement, since many Boards considered their role has been marginalised 
by municipal management (OSCE 2008e, 13). Only a few municipalities have 
established mechanisms for regularly reporting School Board decisions, with 
the majority of School Boards reporting to Municipal Councils only once a year 
(OSCE 2008e, 15; CLDD 2011c, 62). 
 
A School Board’s ability to respond to heterogeneous needs, thus increasing 
the legitimacy of the decisions it makes, also depends on how well its 
membership reflects the diversity of the local community (Winkler and Yeo 
2007, 2). Analysis of the membership of 60 primary School Boards that applied 
to the USAID’s Schools Renovations Project during 2010 confirms that over half 
(34 schools) did not fully represent the local student population they are 
supposed to serve (Appendix L). Of these 34 School Boards, Roma students 
were under- or unrepresented on 18 Boards, Albanian students in ten, Turkish 
students in five, and other ethnic groups on six. Macedonian students were not 
under-represented on any of the 60 School Boards monitored. What the data 
does not reveal is whether satellite schools, an important issue which will be 
discussed in a subsequent section, were adequately represented on the School 
Boards. The under-representation of Roma communities, as well as other non-
majority communities, on School Boards was verified by other, more 
comprehensive reviews (OSI 2007, 238; REF 2007, 52). Their representation is 
particular important given the fact that the Roma represent the fastest growing 
student profile in Macedonia (OSI 2007, 193; see also Table 4.8). Roma 
students also experience specific challenges in relation to their educational 
achievement, such as low enrolment and attendance rates, high drop-out rates, 
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in-school segregation and discrimination, as well as over-representation in 
educational facilities for students with learning difficulties (REF 2007; CoE 2008, 
30; Demarchi 2010; EC 2010, 62; ECRI 2010, 8). While the enhanced powers 
devolved to School Boards may facilitate increases in the participation of Roma 
representatives in decision-making processes, the Roma Education Fund has 
warned that massive local-level capacity building is required in Municipal 
Councils, Municipal Education Commissions, School Boards, and parents to 
ensure positive effects on the educational outcomes of Roma children (REF 
2007, 24).  
 
 
Towards a More Equitable and Transparent Distribution of  
Public Resources 
 
Equitable Allocation of Funds for Education 
 
Moving to a weighted funding allocation formula based on the numbers of 
students in schools, rather than the number of classes, has contributed 
significantly to the promotion of a more equitable distribution of state education 
resources. Since 2005, funds have flowed directly to where they are needed 
and the use of lump sum payments, in addition to weights for schools located in 
sparsely populated areas, ensured the higher costs of providing educational 
services in rural areas were met. However, an analysis of education funding 
completed by USAID in May 2011 suggests that the simultaneous use of both 
the lump sum payment and population density weights in the calculation of 
primary education categorical and block grants was excessive and as a result, 
rural municipalities received relatively too much compared to their urban 
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counterparts (Herczyński 2011, 26). The situation was exacerbated in 2008 
when changes were made to both the population density thresholds and 
weights, resulting in the creation of even greater disparities between categorical 
and block grants for urban and rural municipalities (ibid., 14-15). Whilst it is 
reasonable that per student allocation formulas should take the higher cost of 
providing education in rural areas into account, the USAID analysis shows that, 
as a direct consequence of these changes in 2008, the differences between per 
student amounts in densely populated urban and sparsely populated rural 
municipalities grew considerably between 2006 and 2011 (ibid., 25). As the next 
chapter will examine, it may be no coincidence that the sparsely populated, 
rural municipalities that have benefited most from these changes correlate with 
areas where VMRO-DPMNE electoral strength was greatest. Regardless of the 
need to fine-tune the current allocation formula for primary education, it is 
important to emphasise that per-capita funding seeks to ensure greater equity 
over the longer term (Levitas 2009, 24-25). Significant capital investments will 
also be required in areas previously neglected so that persistent regional 
disparities can be addressed (EC 2010, 62).  
 
One area where per-capita funding is unable to address funding inequalities in 
education is the process by which resources are distributed at the school level; 
between the central school and its branches or satellites. These units are 
subsidiary entities belonging to the central school and are managed by the 
Director of that school. Their unequal treatment, remarked an expert that had 
worked with the MoES for more than five years, “is like a family secret, which 
everyone knows but nobody wants to talks about” (Herczyński 2007, 2). In 
primary schools the satellites often provide teaching from first to fourth grades, 
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with older students commuting to the central school (or sometimes to a larger 
satellite school) (ibid., 1). Approximately two thirds of all primary school facilities 
in Macedonia are satellite schools, with a large proportion providing instruction 
in languages other than Macedonian. A comprehensive review of the treatment 
of satellite primary schools located in eight municipalities was prepared at the 
request of the ZELS’ Education Committee in 2007 (ibid. 2007). While the 
review acknowledged that satellite schools are not an easy subject to discuss, 
since considerations of equity directly contradict considerations of efficiency, it 
concluded that the unequal treatment of satellite schools is unacceptable on 
both social and moral grounds (ibid., 2).21 
 
Table 4.12:23Conditions in Satellite Schools in Eight Municipalities 
 
 
Condition Satellite Central 
Facilities with unsafe roofs 16.7 % 3.5 % 
 
Facilities with inadequate school furniture 51.3 % 12.0 % 
 
Facilities with damaged floors 52.8 % 34.5 % 
 
Facilities with old electrical networks 61.1 % 13.8 % 
 
Facilities with inadequate toilets 63.0 % 21.0 % 
 
Facilities heated with stoves for wood 91.7 % 44.8 % 
 
Facilities without fire protection 98.3 % 83.3 % 
 
Source: Herczyński 2007, 4. 
 
The data in Table 4.12 illustrates the disparities in the condition of central and 
satellite school buildings located in the eight municipalities reviewed during 
2007 (ibid., 3).22 The ZELS review found that pedagogical support staff such as 
                                                          
21
 “It is difficult, indeed probably impossible, to provide adequate school equipment for extremely small 
school facilities, when even large schools find it hard to secure adequate furniture and teaching aids” 
(Herczyński 2007, 2). 
22
 The eight municipalities were Berovo, Brvenica, Kruševo, Pehcevo, Resen, Strumica, Tearce and 
Vasilievo.  The report stresses that the general structure of central and satellite schools in these 
municipalities is similar to the national structure. 
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psychologists, speech therapists etc., tended to be concentrated in the central 
schools and very rarely, if ever, worked with satellite school students. The 
equitable distribution of teaching materials was also found to be problematic 
(ibid., 5, 7). Given the significant differences in the conditions of buildings and 
their access to school equipment, regular co-operation between central and 
satellite schools is extremely important. However, the review found that in many 
instances such co-operation was lacking. In order to improve conditions in 
satellite schools, so that students experience the equal educational standards 
guaranteed by the Constitution, the review recommended that schools collect 
and maintain data on the educational processes in each entity (Official Gazette 
2001, Art. 44). School Boards, which operate at the level of the central schools, 
could also be required to include representations from the satellite schools. 
Other recommendations proposed by the report were for municipalities to 
introduce registries of resources to monitor access to equipment, teaching aids, 
and staff time, and request schools to submit for review and approval separate 
financial plans for each school entity, rather than one for the whole school (ibid., 
10). Municipalities could also employ Municipal Education Inspectors to monitor 
the quality of education in the satellite facilities. It is unclear whether any of 
these actions have been regularly undertaken by municipalities, if at all.23 
 
A further source of inequality left unaffected by changes to central government 
funding allocation is how much municipalities themselves contribute to local 
education budgets. Within a decentralised context, central governments 
assume municipalities will contribute to the cost of providing education services 
                                                          
23
 Although this review of the conditions experienced by satellite schools was originally commissioned by 
the municipal association’s Education Commission, the report was subsequently not approved by them 
and has not been published. The recommendations included in this review were therefore not shared with 
the municipalities generally, or with the public. 
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locally. However, two separate reports commissioned by USAID in 2011 
suggest that the overall level of contributions to education funds from municipal 
budgets in 2009 and 2010 was low (Herczyński 2011; MLGA 2011). In 2009, for 
example, 35 of the 66 municipalities in the second fiscal phase of 
decentralisation contributed 88,372,560 MKD to local primary education 
budgets; representing 1.3 percent of overall municipal expenditure. In 2010, the 
number of contributing municipalities increased to 37 and the proportion of own-
source funding increased to 1.5 percent (MLGA 2011, 10, 17). For those 
municipalities responsible for secondary education functions and in the second 
phase, 11 provided 20,081,953 MKD to complement central government 
transfers during 2009. This, however, represented only 0.7 percent of the total 
amount transferred to second phase municipalities in 2009, although the 
amount increased to 3.7 percent in 2010 (ibid., 14, 21). While the proportion of 
own-source funding for education provision is insignificant compared to central 
government transfers, both reports confirm that those contributing most to local 
education budgets were the wealthier, urban municipalities, such as Karpoš, 
Centar (both in the City of Skopje) and Ohrid (Herczyński 2011, 42). As 
municipal contributions increase in the future, care could be taken to ensure 
educational standards in less affluent municipalities do not decline.  
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The Transparent Allocation of Funds for Education 
 
While the use of a standardised formula should promote greater funding equity 
across the municipalities, it also aims to improve transparency and reduce 
opportunities for discretionary payments. Unfortunately, however, key financial 
elements of the formula have not been are not routinely made public, even to 
the municipalities, and so very few people in Macedonia actually understand its 
impact on education financing (Levitas 2009, 24; Herczyński 2011, 5). USAID’s 
2011 assessment of education financing suggests certain procedural 
abnormalities further obscure how these funds are allocated, which fuels 
misconceptions within the municipalities and the general public. The 
assessment found excessive use of both lower and upper buffers to regulate 
annual payments adjustments the amount of block grants in a way that is 
unclear to municipalities (Herczyński 2011, 5, 31). The fact that the allocation 
formula for the fiscal year is adopted in April, long before initial budget 
guidelines from the Ministry of Finance are issued which confirm how much 
funding is available and before final student numbers are known, also reduces 
transparency (ibid., 12). The result is that MoES officials are no longer able to 
set important allocation coefficients in accordance to the actual relative needs of 
municipalities (ibid., 13). 
 
 
Persistent Challenges to Decentralised Education 
 
Ethnic Segregation in Schools 
 
There is a growing trend of ethnic segregation in both primary and secondary 
schools,  epitomising Marcel Baumann’s concept of “voluntary apartheid” 
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(Baumann 2009). In the longer term, it threatens to undermine the cohesion of 
Macedonian society and ultimately the state. Rather than represent a tool for 
promoting mutual understanding, the education system in Macedonia currently 
perpetuates mutual mistrust and intolerance between the different communities 
(HCNM 2004, 2; MoES 2010b, 8; Schenker 2011, 20). Improvements in the 
provision of mother tongue education, which necessitates students being taught 
in separate classes according to the language of instruction, may have been 
made at the expense of social cohesion (UNDP 2004b, 71; UNICEF 2009, 23). 
Multiple shifts, operating in most primary and secondary schools, are frequently 
organised along linguistic (and therefore ethnic) lines rather than by grade. In 
more acute cases, students of different ethnicities are relocated into separate 
buildings and ultimately, if local politics and resources permit, schools may split 
into separate legal entities. According to a review prepared by the OSCE in 
2008, more than half of all secondary students attending multilingual schools 
were separated according to ethnicity in either different buildings24 or 
monolingual shifts25 (OSCE, 2008d). The most high profile instances of ethnic 
separation in schools are found in Kumanovo and Struga municipalities, 
although additional examples exist in Kičevo, Šuto Orizari, Tetovo and Gostivar. 
The two new secondary schools that were opened for Albanian students in 
Kumanovo and Lipkovo during 2010 are examples of this increase in the 
number of monolingual schools with Albanian-medium classes (UNICEF 2009, 
55-58).26 Efforts by international donors to prevent two further schools from 
dividing in Kičevo and Kruševo during 2011 have so far been mixed (the school 
in Kičevo divided, while the school in Kruševo remained united in mid-2012). In 
                                                          
24
 Four schools (all in Kumanovo municipality), which account for approximately 27 percent of all students 
attending multilingual schools. 
25
 Six schools in Gostivar, Debar, Struga, Tetovo and Skopje municipalities, which account for a further 24 
percent of students attending multilingual schools. 
26
 ‘Sami Frashëri’ school in Kumanovo and ‘Ismet Jashari’ in Lipkovo; both previously part of the 
secondary school ‘Goce Delčev’ in Kumanovo. 
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most instances, the segregation affects Macedonian and Albanian students, 
although the physical separation of Roma students is also a growing concern 
(OSI 2007, 243; Demarchi 2010, 37; Sonce 2010, 6). 
 
Increasing ethnic segregation in schools is not a direct consequence of the 
decentralisation process; its roots date back to the Yugoslav system of 
‘separate but equal’ education for the different communities, whilst ethnic 
conflict in 2001 acted as a catalyst (Petroska-Beška and Najčevska 2004, 3). 
However, observers have suggested that the enhanced ‘voice’ local politicians, 
teachers, and parents now have in deciding important educational matters, such 
as the opening of new classes and schools, may have exacerbated this trend. 
Research suggests initial demands for segregating students have often come 
from parents, citing security concerns, via the School Board.27 Local politicians 
have also been blamed for encouraging separation, since the opening of new 
classes, buildings and/or schools is considered an issue of political status, as 
well as an opportunity to create new jobs for one’s own community.28 Splitting 
schools into separate entities represents a lack trust in the discretionary powers 
assigned to School Directors, since local communities believe that unless they 
have a school “of their own” they will not receive their fair share of resources.29 
In the words of one international expert: “The political parties are not fighting for 
improving the educational experiences of students. If they were, they would 
never allow Albanian children to learn in that building in Kumanovo!”30 While the 
                                                          
27
 Interviews with: a representative of UNDP: 25/06/2011, Skopje; representative of Forum Civil Peace 
Service, 25/05/2011, Skopje. 
28
 Interviews with: a municipal councillor, Struga municipality, 02/06/2010; and an education expert, OSCE, 
12/04/2011, Skopje. 
29
 Interview with an international expert, 04/04/2011, Skopje.  
30
 The expert was referring to the ZIK building in Kumanovo, where ethnic Albanian students from ‘Goce 
Delčev’ secondary school were relocated to in 2001. (Interview: 04/04/2011, Skopje) The school became 
an independent entity in 2010 (named ‘Sami Frashëri’), however reports suggest significant spatial 
challenges exist, with some classes being held in the corridors (ICG 2011, 18). 
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municipalities may not have been responsible for starting this trend, 
international observers have implied that they have done very little to reverse it  
(ECRI 2005, 32; CoE 2008, 63). Given the extensive decision-making powers 
bestowed on them, municipalities could do much more to promote the 
construction of larger multi-ethnic schools, located in areas accessible to all 
communities, rather than smaller mono-ethnic ones (HCNM 2004, 2; UNDP 
2009b, 63). Municipalities could also persuade local School Boards to maintain 
teaching shifts based on class grades rather than on the language of 
instruction, and to implement joint school or inter-municipal projects aimed at 
fostering co-operation between students of different cultural backgrounds 
(UNICEF 2009, 10). 
 
 
Entrenchment of Patronage Politics 
 
A second persistent challenge to the delivery of quality, equitable education in 
Macedonia is the highly politicised environment within which decisions are 
made at the school, municipal, and central levels. While progress has been 
made in the de-politicisation of School Directors' appointments (through the 
involvement of School Boards and creation of a School Director’s exam), 
political influences remain and affect the appointment of school administrators, 
teachers; even cleaning ladies! (Grozdanovska Dimishkovska 2009; HCNM 
2009, 4; Bakiu 2010, 28). Indeed, when asked by the OSCE whether the 
influence of politics in education has decreased or increased since the 
decentralisation process began, 18 percent of municipal respondents believed it 
had increased, 42 percent thought it had stayed the same, and 40 percent felt it 
 182 
had decreased (OSCE 2009a, 65).31 In the same survey, a citizen’s poll found 
responses to the same question to be 23.3 percent, 41.6 percent and 9.6 
percent respectively (ibid., 66). 
 
Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that relations between the 
municipalities and central authorities are also affected by party politics. There is 
a widely-held perception that centrally-appointed state inspectors target 
opposition-led municipalities, although this has become less of a problem since 
the 2009 municipal elections since very few opposition-led municipalities 
subsequently exist. Opposition-led municipalities also experience prolonged 
delays in receiving responses from the MoES and there is a perception that the 
annual budgets they submit to the Ministry of Finance have been “trimmed 
down” (Bakiu 2010, 27).32 Finally, it is commonly assumed that those 
municipalities that are led by the political parties in government receive 
preferential treatment in the allocation of capital grants for infrastructure projects 
(ICG 2011, 19). Indeed, of the 54 municipalities that changed their political 
affiliation in the 2009 municipal elections, two-thirds of them received a larger 
allocation of capital funds once they became aligned with parties in the 
governing coalition (Appendix M). Whilst the decision to allocate capital funds to 
these municipalities may be based on entirely rational circumstances, in the 
absence of transparent criteria and the involvement of key stakeholders, such 
as representatives of the municipal association, decisions regarding the 
allocation of capital education funds are likely to remain vulnerable to political 
                                                          
31
 Responses to the same question one year earlier were: 13 percent (increase), 40 percent (stayed the 
same), 47 percent (decreased) (OSCE 2008e, 17). 
32
 This has been confirmed by the SDSM opposition-led municipalities of Karpoš, Kumanovo, Strumica 
and Ohrid. OSCE official – interview, 24/06/2010, Skopje. 
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influence (ZELS, 2010).33 A review of capital funding transfers in the next 
chapter discusses this issue in more detail. 
 
 
The Capacity of Municipalities to Manage Education 
 
Based on extensive empirical research, Donald R. Winkler and Boon-Ling Yeo 
(2007) conclude that simply changing the organisation of education has little, if 
any, impact on its actual delivery. It is how these new responsibilities are 
ultimately executed that has the greatest impact on service provision. Effective 
education provision therefore depends upon the capacity of local stakeholders. 
It is worth considering the fact that when an opinion poll commissioned by 
UNDP asked citizens who they believed could best provide educational services 
(central or local government), for three consecutive years the majority of 
respondents believed central government was best placed to do so (UNDP 
2008, 81; 2009, 78; 2010, 94).34 It is particularly surprising that this survey also 
reported that a greater proportion of Albanian respondents were in favour of 
central rather than local government provision than any other ethnic group 
(UNDP 2008, 81; 2009, 79). The survey findings indicate a low level of public 
confidence in the capacity of municipalities to provide quality educational 
services (UNDP 2010a, 103). 
 
In an interview for a local think tank in 2010, former Minister of Education and 
Science Sulejman Rushiti confirmed the “lack of administrative capacity” within 
                                                          
33
 Interviews with: a representative of the World Bank, 08/04/2011, Skopje; and Executive Director, ZELS, 
08/04/2011, Skopje. 
34
  In fact, the proportion of citizens preferring central government control over education increased 
annually, from 52.2 percent in 2008, to 55 percent in 2009 and 69 percent in 2010. In contrast, support for 
municipal control fell from 41.1 percent, to 30 percent and 28 percent in the respective years.  
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some municipalities to effectively identify local education needs: “Most of the 
municipalities count only one or two employees in the sector for education, 
which...is far from sufficient” (Bakiu 2010, 28). As with own-source contributions 
to local education budgets, significant disparities exist regarding the 
administrative capacities of larger urban and less affluent rural municipalities. 
This is not a surprise when municipalities such as Rosoman, with a total staff of 
six people, and Aračinovo with seven, were tasked with delivering the same 
responsibilities as Strumica and Tetovo municipalities with 134 and 158 
employees respectively (MCIC 2010). More than three years after the 
decentralisation of education responsibilities, less than half (40) of all 
municipalities employed a dedicated officer for education matters in 2009. The 
remaining municipalities either designated officers already employed in another 
area of work or had no-one at all.35 A similar practice exists with the 
appointment of Municipal Education Inspectors, where approximately only 15 
municipalities had appointed one by 2011.36 Even Kumanovo, which employs 
118 people and has a combined primary / secondary student population of 
19,154, has only two officers working on education issues and does not employ 
a Municipal Education Inspector (SSO 2011).37 Given the inability of many 
municipalities to assign sufficient resources to the management of educational 
matters, and in the absence of much needed inter-municipal co-operation, it is 
little wonder citizens were failing to notice any significant improvements in 
service delivery. 
                                                          
35
 Interview with an OSCE official: 04/04/2011, Skopje. 
36
 Interviews with: a senior representative of the MoES, 07/04/2011, Skopje; and an OSCE official, 
04/04/2011, Skopje. 
37
 Interview with a Municipal Education Officer: 05/04/2011, Kumanovo. 
 185 
Summary 
 
This chapter has examined whether decentralisation has satisfied the demands 
of non-majority groups for greater control over how primary and secondary 
education is provided. Following an evaluation of the system prior to 
decentralisation, a comprehensive analysis of the administrative and fiscal 
reforms introduced in 2005 was conducted. The chapter argues that the 
decentralisation process has facilitated heterogeneous policy-making in the 
provision (but not design) of educational services, although further progress has 
been hampered by a lack of finances and central government support. The 
provision of Albanian and Turkish-medium education has, for example, 
generally improved; although some would argue this has come at the expense 
of quality. However, the experiences of the smaller communities in accessing 
education in their mother tongue – either as the language of instruction or in 
elective classes – have been less positive. Greater community involvement in 
decision-making processes has also improved transparency and allowed what 
were once highly contentious issues, such as the renaming of schools or the 
opening of a new school, to be generally made on a rational basis. Finally, the 
move to a per-capita education funding allocation formula in 2006 has facilitated 
a more equitable distribution of state resources. Nevertheless, challenges 
remain and further work needs to be done, to fine-tune funding formulae and to 
ensure School Boards are genuinely representative of student populations, if 
the progress made in the first seven years of decentralisation is to continue. 
 
Decentralisation is no panacea, however. Problems which existed in the 
education system prior to decentralisation in 2005 remain and may indeed have 
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been exacerbated by the reforms. Ethnic segregation in schools is increasing at 
a disturbing rate and, despite having the legal competences to do so, 
municipalities have done little to reverse this trend. The entrenchment of 
patronage politics, a persistent feature of the education system, is also 
unrelenting, and may now be more visible to citizens, given their proximity to 
where decisions are being made. The decentralisation process is still in its 
infancy and it is reasonable that the capacities of municipalities to carry out new 
functions will require further strengthening. Nevertheless, these persistent 
challenges, unless adequately addressed by both the municipalities and central 
government, threaten to undermine the benefits of decentralised education in 
the longer term. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MUNICIPAL FISCAL AUTONOMY AND THE  
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL BALANCE OF POWER 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter assesses fiscal decentralisation from a political economy 
perspective and considers whether the reforms have enhanced the fiscal 
autonomy of Macedonian municipalities. It also demonstrates the ways in which 
central government, in the absence of legislative changes and despite 
constitutional guarantees to municipal devolved competences, can interfere with 
anticipated improvements in the balance of power between local and central 
levels. As the previous two chapters have discussed, decentralisation is 
believed to mitigate ethnic conflict by offering spatially concentrated minority 
ethnic groups greater political and administrative control over their own affairs. 
The vertical division of power realised through decentralisation is also expected 
to restrain the monopoly central government has on state power and resources, 
and to facilitate a more balanced, inclusive system of government. An appraisal 
of inter-governmental fiscal relations in Macedonia is therefore essential in 
determining whether the political and administrative decentralisation examined 
in Chapters 3 and 4 is conceivable in the absence of sufficient fiscal autonomy 
and resources. 
 
Decentralisation is an inherently political process and even when reforms are 
purely administrative or fiscal, it is still politicians who decide how they are 
conceived (Manor 1999, 53). This review begins by considering how the short-
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term political calculations of national governing parties may influence both the 
design and implementation of fiscal decentralisation. It will then evaluate the 
fiscal autonomy of Macedonian municipalities through an assessment of the 
following dynamics: (a) the extent to which municipalities are dependent on 
central government for their revenues; (b) the ability of municipalities to make 
independent decisions over spending; and (c) the ability of municipalities to set 
independent financial contracts with private actors, such as creditors and 
employees. By dismantling inter-governmental relations in this way, this 
analysis will determine whether decentralisation has enhanced, as anticipated, 
the fiscal autonomy of the municipalities or has indeed facilitated the 
maintenance of central government control over state resources. 
 
This chapter makes the following three arguments. First, the political-economic 
context within which fiscal decentralisation has been conceived and 
implemented thus far in Macedonia has not been conducive to enhancing the 
fiscal autonomy of the municipalities. Second, in spite of substantial reforms, 
decentralisation has done little to restrain the monopoly of central government 
on state power and resources. This is confirmed by the limited revenue, 
expenditure, and contractual autonomy of the municipalities, which has resulted 
in only the partial decentralisation of fiscal responsibility. Finally, while 
constitutionally-guaranteed decentralisation processes may be harder to 
reverse than others, it is not impossible. Advances in either administrative or 
democratic decentralisation can easily be undermined by tightening controls 
over fiscal relations. 
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A Political Economy Approach to Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
Fiscal decentralisation refers to a set of reforms designed to increase the fiscal 
autonomy of sub-national governments and is essential if local institutions are to 
exercise their devolved public policy functions autonomously (Faletti 2009, 329). 
It can assume different forms, such as the creation of new local taxes or the 
delegation of tax authority that was previously national, and/or an increase in 
fiscal transfers from central to local governments. In his seminal work, Wallace 
E. Oates (1972) argues that the economic rationale for fiscal decentralisation is 
based on the capacity of sub-national units to improve resource allocation by 
delivering heterogeneous public services which are more closely aligned to 
local needs. Fiscal decentralisation may also promote economic efficiency by 
increasing experimentation, innovation and, ultimately, local competition in the 
design and delivery of public services. Finally, Oates suggests decentralisation 
will lead to more efficient levels of public spending by encouraging greater local 
recognition of the cost of public programmes. If local communities are required 
to finance basic services themselves, they are more likely to weigh their 
benefits against actual costs, in addition to holding locally elected officials 
accountable for the quality of these services, than if it were funded centrally 
(ibid., 11, 13). What matters most, Oates concludes, is “simply that decisions 
regarding levels of provision of specified public services for a particular 
jurisdiction reflect to a substantial extent the interests of the constituency of that 
jurisdiction” (ibid., 17). 
 
Research on inter-governmental fiscal relations have become increasingly 
conscious that these normatively inspired principles of efficiency, local 
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accountability, and democratic legitimacy are not always prominent in the minds 
of central governments when they choose to decentralise. Instead, and as the 
introductory chapter to this thesis suggests, the reasons why governments 
decentralise are often less benign, and the short-term political calculations of 
governing parties frequently take precedence over fiscal concerns. In contrast 
to more traditional studies, which “treats each level of government as a 
benevolent social planner, maximising the welfare of the residents of its 
jurisdiction”, experts have increasingly taken a political economy approach to 
fiscal decentralisation (Manor 1999; Lockwood 2009, 79; Eaton et al. 2011). 
These studies seek to identify how political dynamics affect the design of fiscal 
decentralisation and, significantly, how the incentives of stakeholders may 
weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in the political and 
economic environment that arise after reform begins. Decentralisation, note 
Eaton et al., “is a process, not a one-time act, and the trajectory of reform is 
heavily influenced by how the often-conflicting incentives of different actors are 
pursued” (Eaton et al. 2011, xii, xv). 
 
Mindful of these considerations, one may consider why the Macedonian 
government decentralised power to the municipalities after 2001. Clearly, a long 
Yugoslav tradition of strong local government, Albanian grievances, civil unrest, 
and the subsequent internationally-sponsored peace process are significant 
contributory factors explaining why the reforms were adopted. However, despite 
pressures from below and externally, decentralisation was principally a ‘top-
down’ affair, with the design and pace of reforms being negotiated at the 
parliamentary, rather than local level.1 Although the government’s first 
                                                          
1
 Decentralisation was also strongly promoted by international agencies active in Macedonia, such as the 
World Bank, USAID, and the United Nations Development Agency. The European Union’s support for the 
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decentralisation programme talks of “secur[ing] local democracy” and providing 
“effective public services and economic development”, the governing parties at 
the time may also have been motivated by short-term electoral concerns 
(Government of RM 2004, 4).2 Indeed, as Kathleen O’Neill’s research suggests, 
it seems unlikely that politicians will admit to decentralising for electoral benefits 
(O’Neill 2005, 12). Interviews with a senior DUI party official confirm that local 
party structures are considered essential for building grassroots support for 
parties at the national level.3 Further interviews conducted by the International 
Crisis Group in April 2011 found that “all of a sudden political parties saw 
decentralisation as an opportunity to gain votes” (ICG 2011, 19-20). 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (below) display the election results of the largest political 
parties during every parliamentary and municipal election since 1998. If 
O’Neill’s theory holds true for Macedonia, one would expect the electoral 
strength of governing coalition partners SDSM and DUI to be strong at the 
municipal level during the time decentralisation was being designed and 
adopted (2002 – 2004).4 This is clearly the case for SDSM, which controlled 
almost 40 percent of Macedonia’s 124 municipalities during this period. 
However, it is more difficult to apply O’Neill’s theory to DUI, which was only 
established in 2002 and after municipal elections in 2000. One can only 
speculate that DUI, elated by its landslide parliamentary victory in 2002, was 
confident it could replicate its national success in subsequent local elections. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
principle of subsidiarity means that decentralisation also features prominently in the accession process for 
EU membership. 
2
 The largest parties in coalition at this time were SDSM and DUI. 
3
 Interviews with senior DUI party member: 27/06/10 and 14/06/11, Tetovo. 
4
 O’Neill argues: “Political parties distribute political and fiscal power to the arenas in which their political 
allies seem most likely to gain control of it. When political parties predict that they will be unable to control 
central power in a centralised governing structure and also predict that they could win a substantial 
proportion of subnational offices were they contested democratically, decentralisation becomes more 
attractive” (O’Neill 2003, 1087). See Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation. 
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 Table 5.1:24Parliamentary Election Results (% of Vote) 
 
Political Party 1998 2002 2006 2008 2011 
VMRO-DPMNE 28.10 25.02 32.50 48.78 38.98 
SDSM 25.15 41.59 23.31 23.64 32.78 
DUI - 12.18 12.12 12.82 10.24 
DPA 19.27 5.35 7.50 8.26 5.90 
   Source: European Election Database.
5
  
 
 Table 5.2:25Municipal Election Results (% of Vote) 
 
Political 
Party 
2000
6
 2005 2009 
No. of 
Municipalities 
% of 
Municipalities 
No. of 
Municipalities 
% of 
Municipalities 
No. of 
Municipalities 
% of 
Municipalities 
VMRO-DPMNE                 27 21 24.7 56 65.9 
SDSM                38 36 42.4 6 7.1 
DUI                 - 15 17.6 14 16.5 
DPA                 13 2 2.4 1 1.0 
Independent   7 8.2 2 2.4 
Other   4 4.7 6 7.1 
Total           124   85 100.0 85 100.0 
   Sources: ODIHR 2000; 2005; 2009. 
 
 
The data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 also demonstrates that SDSM lost its 
parliamentary majority in 2006 and has been in opposition ever since. However, 
its success in the 2005 municipal elections meant it was able to maintain control 
of the majority of municipalities until 2009. Based on the discussions above, 
SDSM’s strength at the local level during this period suggests there was little 
incentive for VMRO-DPMNE to maintain the momentum of the decentralisation 
process between 2006 and 2009; a critical period in the design and 
consolidation of fiscal reforms.7 To do so would mean reducing the control it 
                                                          
5
 Data available at: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/macedonia/ 
[Accessed: 24/01/12]. 
6
 Results data for the 2000 local elections is incomplete. 
7
 The second phase of decentralisation, when municipalities were eligible to receive block as opposed to 
earmarked grants for devolved public services, began on 1 July 2007. 
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had in central government and rewarding political rivals at the local level. 
Indeed, VMRO-DPMNE’s impressive victory during municipal elections in 2009, 
combined with its continued success nationally, also suggests that it has had 
little incentive to consolidate the reforms ever since. Given VMRO-DPMNE’s 
strength centrally, further fiscal devolution would, in its opinion, be unnecessary 
since it is able to reward politically-aligned municipalities through other (party-
controlled) means, for example centrally-administered grants. The same logic 
would also apply to DUI, which has maintained its dominance in the Albanian 
political arena (locally and nationally) since 2002. The effect of the global 
economic crisis on the Macedonian economy since 2009 adds further credence 
to the government’s reluctance to devolve additional fiscal responsibility to the 
municipalities at the expense of macroeconomic stability (see Table 5.3). It is 
therefore not surprising that decentralisation fails to feature as a strategic 
objective in the government’s work programme for 2011-2015 (or in previous 
programmes), and has been given little or no attention in recent party election 
manifestos.8 One could speculate that a success for SDSM in the 2013 
municipal elections may have major repercussions for the future of 
decentralisation in Macedonia. VMRO-DPMNE would have little incentive to 
decentralise further, and may even consider reversing the progress made to 
date.  
 
                                                          
8
 The strategic objectives of the “Work Program of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia for the 
period 2011–2015” are available to read at: http://vlada.mk/?q=node/260andlanguage=en-gb [Accessed: 
29/12/11]. Interviews with Foundation Open Society in Macedonia official: 27/06/11, Skopje; and UNDP 
official: 29/06/11, Skopje. During the 2011 parliamentary elections, only the National Democratic Rebirth 
party (Rilindja Demokratike Kombëtare - RDK), led by the Mayor of Gostivar, Rufi Osmani, campaigned on 
decentralisation-related issues.  VMRO-DPMNE’s manifesto made minimal reference to decentralisation; 
whereas the policy did not feature at all in SDSM and DUI’s election manifestos. 
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Table 5.3:26Gross Domestic Produce Annual Growth Rate (2000 – 2010) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP Growth 
Rate
9
 (%) 
4.5 -4.5 0.9 2.8 4.6 4.4 5.0 6.1 5.0 -0.9 1.8 
Source: EC 2011b, 79. 
 
To summarise, the political and economic environment within which fiscal 
decentralisation has been conceived and implemented thus far may not be 
conducive to enhancing the fiscal autonomy of Macedonian municipalities. 
Instead, the electoral strength political parties have enjoyed concurrently at the 
central and local levels (SDSM and DUI until 2006; VMRO-DPMNE and DUI 
since 2009) suggests governing parties may prefer to rely on (party-controlled) 
inter-governmental transfers and capital grants to fund devolved competences, 
rather than enhance local fiscal autonomy. The remaining sections will examine 
in detail the revenue, expenditure, and contractual autonomy of the 
municipalities and will determine whether this hypothesis is correct. 
 
 
The Revenue Autonomy of the Municipalities 
 
Using J. Tyler Dickovick’s analytic framework for operationalising ‘revenue 
autonomy’, this section will determine how independent Macedonian 
municipalities are for their revenues, an essential component in any 
decentralised system. Dickovick recognises two main types of local revenue:  
(1) own-sources (local taxes, communal fees, etc.); and (2) inter-governmental 
transfers. The latter includes municipal shares of taxes collected nationally, 
                                                          
9
 The figures represent the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate percentage change on the previous 
year. The amount for 2010 is based on an estimate. 
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grants for devolved public services, and capital funds (Dickovick 2011). He 
measures the degree of local autonomy with regard to own-revenues by 
determining the extent to which local governments are empowered to raise 
taxes, and asks whether central governments can ensure sub-national 
dependence by refusing to devolve sufficient tax authority (ibid., 4). If the centre 
grants sub-national governments the right to enact taxes that were not 
previously authorised, Dickovick considers this to be more decentralising (ibid., 
17). Similarly, Dickovick determines the scope of local autonomy over inter-
governmental transfers by assessing whether these transfers are automatic and 
formula-based, rather than ad hoc and discretionary. Unconditional transfers 
guaranteed by constitutions would clearly increase sub-national revenue 
autonomy; whereas central governments’ ability to impose conditions on 
municipalities for receiving these transfers would not. The size of the fiscal 
transfers is also crucial in determining the extent of local revenue autonomy, 
since inadequate resources will only increase local dependency on other forms 
of central funding (ibid., 66).  
 
Table 5.4:27Evolution of Municipal Revenue, 2004-2010 (in 2010 MKD) 
 
Year 
GDP 
(billion 
MKD) 
Public 
Expenditure 
(billion MKD) 
Municipal 
Revenue 
(billion MKD) 
% of 
GDP 
% of Public 
Expenditure 
Per- 
Capita 
2004 306.0 101.7 5.1 1.7 5.0 2,532 
2005 - - - - - - 
2006 358.3 119.9 7.2 2.0 6.0 3,553 
2007 395.1 133.6 10.6 2.7 7.9 5,234 
2008 435.1 153.1 20.1 4.6 13.1 9,933 
2009 409.9 140.5 19.9 4.9 14.2 9,857 
2010 430.6 151.6 23.3 5.4 15.3 11,510 
Source: Levitas 2011a, 9. 
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Table 5.4 displays the extent to which municipal revenues have increased since 
the start of the decentralisation process in 2005. As a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), municipal revenues grew impressively from 1.7 
percent to 5.4 percent between 2004 and 2010. Similarly, as a percentage of 
overall public expenditure, municipal revenues increased from 5.0 percent in 
2004 to 15.3 percent in 2010. Both values had more than tripled since the 
beginning of decentralisation, while the per-capita revenues of the municipalities 
more than quadrupled. Rather than assume that the increases received by 
Macedonian municipalities were accompanied by the desired increase in fiscal 
autonomy, an analysis of the main municipal sources of revenue will now follow. 
This will determine whether local government dependency on the centre for 
revenue has declined as a result of decentralisation. 
 
 
Own-Source Revenues 
 
According to the Law on Financing of the Units of Local Self-Government, 
Macedonian municipalities are entitled to the following forms of own-source 
revenue: local taxes (on property, the transfer of real estate tax, and 
inheritances and gifts), fees (utilities, administrative, etc.), charges (i.e. for 
urbanisation of construction land, communal activities, spatial and urban plans, 
etc.), and revenue from municipal assets, donations, fines, and self-
contributions (Official Gazette 2004, Art.4). In 2010, on average, own-source 
revenues accounted for approximately 30 percent of municipal revenue; the 
largest share being generated by property-related taxes and construction land 
development fees (Levitas 2011a, 14). Other important sources of revenue for 
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the municipalities are shared taxes (six percent), general grants (five percent), 
earmarked and blocked grants to pay for devolved public services (55 percent), 
and capital transfers (four percent10) (ibid., 13). 
 
The decentralisation process assigned new revenue-generating responsibilities 
to the municipalities. Significantly, the transfer of property-related tax 
administration to the local level means that municipalities are now responsible 
for collecting the property and property transfer taxes. Both represent a 
substantial proportion of own-revenue income in many, particularly urban 
municipalities. The municipalities also acquired discretion to set the rate of 
these taxes, within parameters set by the centre; while a further reform in 2008 
meant that the tax base was enlarged to include properties owned by legal 
entities, such as businesses (ibid., 6).11 In the past, while all property-related 
taxes had been administered centrally by the Public Revenue Office and were 
shared one hundred percent with the municipalities, collection had been 
inefficiently managed and the Office had little incentive to improve collection 
rates (Nikolov 2007, 7; Feruglio et al. 2008, 23). After devolving responsibility 
for collecting these taxes to the municipalities, collection rates for property-
related taxes more than tripled between 2006 and 2010 (Levitas 2011a, 15). 
Other government-led initiatives which have increased own-source revenues 
are the doubling of the rate of the public lighting fee and the decision to begin 
sharing revenue earned from the sale of urban construction land 80/20 in favour 
of the municipalities from 2011 (ibid., 16). Own-source revenues not only 
                                                          
10
 Including contributions from the Road Fund. 
11
 The Law on Property Taxes (2004) gave discretion to the municipalities to set the property tax rate 
between a minimum of 0.10 percent and a maximum of 0.20 percent of the ‘market’ value. Municipalities 
can set the rate of the property transfer tax within a range of two and four percent of ‘market’ value 
(Feruglio 2008, 28- 30). However, the Executive Director of the municipal association, ZELS, confirmed 
that it is very rare for municipalities to increase rates above the minimum for fear of upsetting constituents. 
Interview: 21/06/10, Skopje. 
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represent important autonomous sources of funding for the municipalities, they 
also promote greater fiscal accountability between the municipality and local 
constituents (tax / service fee payers) – a principal objective of fiscal 
decentralisation (Bahl 1999, 10; Smoke 2007, 132).  
 
Whilst these changes have resulted in significant increases in municipal own-
source revenue (see Table 5.5 below), some observers believe the reforms did 
not go far enough, especially since most of the revenue instruments assigned to 
the municipalities have limited revenue yield (Cyan et al. 2012, 55). The 
variable range set by central government for the property tax rate (0.10 – 0.20 
percent), for example, was much lower than the rates set in neighbouring 
countries (1.5 percent in Bulgaria and 0.3 – 0.8 percent in Greece) (Sapuric et 
al. 2007, 32). Others have pointed out that the number of taxes assigned to 
Macedonian municipalities is much fewer than those in comparable countries 
(Sapuric et al. 2007, 31; Levitas 2011a, 8).12 In particular, the municipal 
association has been lobbying central government for more than five years to 
allow rural municipalities to acquire the right to manage agricultural land and 
forests.13 Despite regular demands by fiscal experts that the Government 
introduce new revenue instruments as a means of strengthening local revenue 
capacities, concrete steps have yet to be taken (Feruglio et al. 2008, vi; IMF 
2009, 30; OSCE 2011, 52).14  
 
                                                          
12
 For example in Slovenia, municipalities are responsible for taxes on games of chance, local tourism, and 
the use of farming land. In Bulgaria, municipalities administer taxes on vehicle registration and on roads. 
Finally, in Albania municipalities also administer taxes on vehicles and on agricultural land.  
13
 Municipal concessions on construction land benefit urban municipalities only. Interview with the 
Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
14
 “Continued strengthening of the revenue capacities of the municipalities, through more efficient 
collection of the tax revenues, as well as with introduction of new revenue instruments” Official website of 
the Government of the Republic of Macedonia: http://vlada.mk/?q=node/275&language=en-gb [Accessed: 
02/02/12]. 
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Table 5.5:28Structure of Municipal Revenues, 2005-2009 
 
Year 
Own-Revenues 
of All 
Municipalities 
(MKD) 
Transfers and 
Donations of 
All 
Municipalities 
(MKD) 
Total 
Revenues of 
All 
Municipalities 
(MKD) 
Own-Revenues 
as a 
Proportion of 
Total Municipal 
Revenues 
Transfers and 
Grants as a 
Proportion of 
Total Municipal 
Revenues 
2005 3,488,498,031 2,070,981,673 5,573,119,704 62.60% 37.16% 
2006 4,654,143,061 3,380,717,701 8,035,194,599 57.92% 42.07% 
2007 5,375,216,448 5,523,015,581 11,195,984,165 48.01% 49.33% 
2008 7,431,216,279 13,575,361,332 21,036,979,696 35.32% 64.53% 
2009 6,803,020,251 16,299,071,076 23,139,188,375 29.40% 70.44% 
Source: Popovska 2011, 101. 
 
The data presented in Table 5.5 demonstrates that, while own-source revenues 
have grown in absolute terms annually, they have not kept pace with an overall 
growth in municipal revenues.15 Own-source revenues may have doubled 
between 2005 and 2009, but their relative share of total municipal revenues 
more than halved in the same period (Cyan et al. 2012, 8). This is largely the 
result of an increase in municipal revenues based on inter-governmental 
transfers, and in particular the education block grants to cover the salaries of 
primary, secondary, and pre-school teachers (Levitas 2011a, 10). To 
summarise, although own-source revenues have increased substantially since 
the start of the decentralisation process, Macedonian municipalities remain 
highly dependent on central government transfers to meet their expenditure 
needs. 
 
                                                          
15
 With the exception of 2009, due to the effects of the global economic crisis. 
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Inter-governmental Transfers: Shared Taxes 
 
To further strengthen the fiscal base of Macedonia’s municipalities, the 
decentralisation process created two new economic activity-related sources of 
local revenue. The first was a general purpose grant for all municipalities, based 
on a percentage of the Value Added Tax (VAT) collected nationwide and 
distributed according to a formula which seeks to consider the fiscal strength of 
individual municipalities. The second was a share of the Personal Income Tax 
(PIT), calculated on a derivation basis (Official Gazette 2004, Art. 5, 9). 
Revenue sharing in this way attempts to realise some of the advantages of 
centralised taxation without relinquishing local expenditure authority (Oates 
1977, 14). Previously, both taxes had been at the exclusive disposal of central 
government; whereas by 2010, combined, they accounted for approximately  
11 percent of total municipal revenue (see Figure 5.1 below). While municipal 
shares of both the VAT and PIT can be spent autonomously by the 
municipalities, it is important to stress that revenue assigned through sharing 
national taxes does not provide municipalities with a comparable level of 
revenue autonomy as own-sources. Central government retains control over 
determining the base rate of these taxes, discretion over the proportion shared 
with the municipalities and, importantly, the methodology used to allocate 
revenue locally. This means that municipalities may see the value of “their” 
share erode as national governments amend tax rates and/or distribution 
formulas (Levitas 2009, 31). 
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Figure 5.1:5Average Composition of Municipal Revenue (2010) 
 
 
Source: Levitas 2011a, 13. 
 
 
An important point to emphasise regarding how the VAT and PIT are shared 
between the central and local levels in Macedonia is that, in both cases, the 
proportion allocated to municipalities is very low. Significant vertical imbalances 
therefore exist over the control of public revenue. Initially, the municipalities 
were assigned three percent of the VAT to form the basis of a general grant 
allocated to each. This amount was amended in 2009 so that the local share 
increases gradually to 4.5 percent by 2013.16 However, the municipalities 
remain unsatisfied with the extent of this increase and the municipal association 
continues to lobby for a six percent local share of the VAT.17 In particular, ZELS 
points out that, whilst the municipal share of VAT revenue has increased 
moderately since 2010, the effects of the global economic crisis on income 
generated national through VAT has meant that the amount of funds the 
municipalities actually receive remained almost the same.18 Similarly, the 
municipalities are entitled to only three percent of the PIT of local residents and 
                                                          
16
 Municipal share of the VAT increased to 3.4 percent in 2010, 3.7 percent in 2011, 4.0 percent in 2012, 
and 4.5 percent in 2013.  
17
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 21/06/10, Skopje. 
18
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
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100 percent of the personal income of independent artisans. This proportion 
has also been criticised for being too small or “even trivial”, since it represented 
only around three percent of total municipal revenues in 2006 (Feruglio et al. 
2008, 33). The local PIT yield has in fact declined by a further ten percent since 
then, largely due to the government’s unilateral decision to introduce a ten 
percent flat rate on income tax in 2007 (FOSM 2010, 49; Levitas 2011a, 6). The 
municipalities, through ZELS, are consequently lobbying for their share of the 
PIT to be increased to thirty percent on regular income and 100 percent of 
personal income based on agricultural activities (OSCE 2011, 54; ZELS 2011a). 
 
 
Inter-governmental Transfers: Grants for Devolved Public Services 
 
It is common that municipal own-source revenues, even when supplemented 
with general purpose grants, remain insufficient to cover the full cost of 
providing the public services devolved to them. Inter-governmental grants, from 
line ministries to municipalities, are therefore an accepted way of offsetting 
vertical imbalances between local expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and 
should not be considered an “unavoidable evil” (Prud'homme 1995, 214; Smoke 
2007, 132; IMF 2009, 4). However, in practice these grants are vulnerable to 
political manipulation and may represent an instrument for maintaining local 
dependency on the centre (Devas and Delay 2006, 684). To overcome this risk, 
experts emphasise that stable, objective and transparent formula-driven 
transfers should be promoted, since they reduce the uncertainty and bargaining 
that can accompany inter-governmental fiscal relations (Burki et al. 1999, 29; 
IMF 2009, 37; Dickovick 2011, 66). Formula-based transfers also reduce the 
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political leverage central government has over local politicians by removing its 
ability to exercise discretion over the distribution of funds (Willis et al. 1999, 22; 
Eaton 2001, 115). Transfer formulas should focus on the demand (clients or 
outputs) rather than the supply (inputs and infrastructure) of local government 
services in order that grants match the expenditure needs of individual 
municipalities (UNDP 2005a, 6). Finally, inter-governmental transfers should not 
be too large as to eliminate the need for local taxes, which ensure municipal 
accountability to citizens for spending decisions, but should provide sufficient 
revenue to cover expenditure needs (Litvack et al. 1998, 117). Inadequate 
transfers may force municipalities to redirect a larger proportion of autonomous 
own-source revenues to cover expenditure gaps than they might otherwise 
have done, and promote local dependency on the centre for additional sources 
of funding (Keefer 2005, 2).  
 
With regard to the earmarked and block grants Macedonian municipalities 
receive to fund decentralised public services, the previous chapter has shown 
how shifting to a formula-based transfer system promoted greater equity in the 
funding of primary and secondary education.19 This move also increased local 
autonomy over education revenues, since the allocation of funding on a per-
student basis reduced the possibility of discretionary payments and, to a certain 
extent, removed municipal uncertainly over how education grants are 
calculated. However, the analysis in Chapter 4 also demonstrated how central 
government adjusted the funding formulas to suit national priorities and possibly 
as a means of rewarding municipalities controlled by their allies. Changes to 
                                                          
19
 Earmarked grants are assigned to municipalities still in Phase One of the decentralisation process and 
cover the operating costs of social service institutions. Block grants are assigned to municipalities which 
have graduated to Phase Two and also include employee wages. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed 
explanation. 
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both the population density thresholds and weights used in the education 
funding formulas, for example, as well as excessive use of both lower and 
upper buffers which regulate annual payments adjustments, have resulted in 
increasing funding disparities across municipalities (Herczyński 2011, 14-15, 
31). It may be no coincidence that those sparsely populated, Macedonian-
majority municipalities that benefit most from the 2008 adjustment to the 
education funding formula correlate with areas where VMRO-DPMNE electoral 
strength is greatest. 
 
The municipalities are also entitled to three block grants to finance the provision 
of cultural services, social welfare and child protection, and primary health. 
According to the law on local government financing, the methodology for 
calculating these grants should be “formula-based using appropriate need 
indicators for each programme” and should therefore also be calculated on a 
per-client basis (Official Gazette 2004, Art.12.2, 22). However, this shift had not 
occurred by mid-2012. The allocation of grants for cultural and social welfare 
continues to be based on the existence of a physical facility (libraries, 
kindergartens, homes for the elderly, etc.) within a municipality’s territory, and 
means that those municipalities historically lacking such facilities received no 
funding for the realisation of these two competences (Levitas 2011a, 25). This 
approach is highly problematic since it contradicts one of the basic principles of 
fiscal decentralisation (that “funds should follow functions”), and because of the 
inequity it creates between municipalities (IMF 2009, 25). It also prevents those 
municipalities lacking the required institution to receive any funding to ‘buy-in’ 
services from neighbouring municipalities or the private sector.20 Significantly, 
                                                          
20
 Interview with UNDP official: 29/06/10, Skopje. 
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the management of primary health remains to be adequately decentralised and 
all municipalities, regardless of whether they have facilities located in their 
territory, do not receive a grant for the financing of this competence.21 Finally, 
when eligible municipalities do receive grants from the Ministries of Culture, 
Youth and Sport, and of Social Welfare, observers have noted how the 
allocation system lacks “an objective transparent method” for calculating the 
expenditure needs associated with the assigned competences (Feruglio et al. 
2008, 3). These grants also only cover the basic running costs of institutions, 
and municipalities remain dependent on ad hoc funding from relevant line 
ministries to run specific events or programmes.22 
 
Clearly, a system that allows only a proportion of municipalities to realise some 
of the expenditure responsibilities devolved to them is inadequate and 
represents a breach of both the European Charter of Local Self-Government, of 
which Macedonia is a signatory, and the Framework Agreement (Official 
Gazette 2001b, Appendix B).23 However, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest both primary and secondary education services also remained woefully 
underfunded, as well as municipal governments generally. While earmarked 
and block grants for education combined accounted for 2.8 percent of GDP in 
2010, this is considered at the low end of European norms since countries 
typically spend three to five percent of their GDP on pre-tertiary education. As a 
consequence, many municipalities complain that the education transfers they 
receive do not meet expenditure needs (particularly with regard to funding 
student transportation) and, contrary to legal guarantees, have in fact reduced 
                                                          
21
 Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
22
 Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
23
 Article 9.2 of the Charter states: “Local authorities' financial resources shall be commensurate with the 
responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the law” (CoE 1985). 
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in size in recent years (FOSM 2010, 46; Herczyński 2011, 40-41; ZELS 
2011a).24 The situation became so critical that in November 2011 the 
municipalities threatened to collectively return responsibility for organising 
student transportation to central government unless sufficient funds were 
assured to them in the future.25 In light of such circumstances, when asked her 
view concerning the government’s failure to decentralise the primary health 
competence to the municipalities, the Executive Director of ZELS declared she 
was “begging God” that it would not happen in the near future.26 Given the 
functions assigned to them, fiscal decentralisation expert Tony Levitas suggests 
Macedonian municipalities should receive revenues equal to at least eight or 
nine percent of the GDP, and not five or six (Levitas 2011a, 2-3).  
 
To summarise, since decentralisation began, grants for the delivery of primary 
and secondary education have been allocated according to an automatic, 
formula-based transfer system. While difficulties remain over the design of this 
formula, this move has in general increased the revenue autonomy of the 
municipalities and reduced the possibility of discretionary payments by the 
centre. However, grants for culture and social welfare remain ad hoc and 
discretionary, with a significant proportion of municipalities receiving no grants 
at all. Further, responsibility for the management of primary health remains to 
be devolved to the municipalities as of mid-2012 and as a consequence, they 
                                                          
24
 Article 2.3 of the Law on local government financing stipulates: “The total amount of block grants shall 
not be lower than the amount of the funds from the Budget of the Republic of Macedonia used for the 
same purpose in that area in the previous year from the year when a certain competence is transferred” 
(Official Gazette 2004).  Examples where education grants have failed to keep up with increasing 
expenditures needs are: increases in student transport costs resulting from the decision to make 
secondary education compulsory, pay raises for teachers, and inflationary increases in the cost of heating 
oil and petrol. Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 08/04/11, Skopje. 
25
 Such action is particularly significant given the fact that over 80 percent of the municipalities are aligned 
with the national governing coalition. Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
26
 “It would be a disaster for the municipalities; especially as the healthcare system is in a very bad 
position. We have learned our lesson from education.” Interview with Executive Director of ZELS: 
20/03/12, Skopje. 
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have yet to receive any grant for the delivery of this competence. Finally, the 
inter-governmental grants municipalities receive for the delivery of education, 
culture, and social welfare are inadequate to cover local expenditure 
responsibilities. This has increased municipal dependence on other forms of 
central government funding, such as capital transfers. 
 
 
Inter-governmental Transfers: Capital Grants for Infrastructure Projects 
 
Capital grants are distributed to the municipalities by competent line ministries 
and the Public Roads Fund, and are used to finance local infrastructure 
investments that cannot otherwise be funded by either municipal own-revenue 
or block grants. Examples of possible interventions are the erection of new 
school buildings, waste-water treatment plants, and the construction, 
reconstruction, and maintenance of local roads. The system of grant distribution 
in Macedonia is uncoordinated and fragmented, with at least six ministries plus 
the Public Roads Fund and the Bureau for Regional Development authorised to 
allocate capital funding.27 Whilst these grants officially represented only four 
percent of municipal revenue in 2010 (see Figure 5.1 above), they constituted a 
significant source of additional funding for cash-strapped municipalities, in 
addition to creating considerable tension between the central and local levels, 
and among the municipalities themselves.28   
                                                          
27
 The six ministries are: the Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Transport and Communications; Ministry of 
Education and Science; Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water 
Economy; and Ministry of Local-Self Government. 
28
 Based on official figures from the Ministry of Finance. However, there is a possibility further discretionary 
payments have been made to some municipalities which are not included in this data or appear elsewhere. 
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Of greatest concern regarding the distribution of capital grants, and one raised 
by the European Commission in its 2011 Progress Report on Macedonia, is the 
almost complete lack of transparency upon which funding is allocated to the 
municipalities (EC 2011b, 9).29 In most cases line ministries fail to respect their 
legal obligations and do not announce or even establish the criteria upon which 
municipal project proposals are assessed.30 Application procedures and 
deadlines are also not commonly published (Kocevski 2009). This leaves the 
system highly vulnerable to discretionary decision-making, and where ‘pork 
barrel’ projects may be easily targeted to honour clientelist commitments and 
reward loyal constituents (Keefer 2005, 13; Remmer 2007, 375; Khemani 2010, 
2).31  Decisions regarding the allocation of funds are also not commonly 
published in the Official Gazette. This means that both the public and the 
municipalities do not know how much individual municipalities receive from 
central government (Feruglio et al. 2008, 49; Kocevski 2009, 12).32 The 
prevailing perception – real or imagined – is therefore that capital grants are 
largely distributed to those municipalities aligned with the governing coalition 
parties.33  
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that VMRO-DPMNE-governed 
municipalities have gained most from the current system of capital funding 
(Nikolov 2007, 85; FOSM 2010, 48).34 This suggestion was verified during 
fieldwork interviews and personal visits to both government-aligned and 
                                                          
29
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 08/04/11, Skopje. 
30
 Interview with the head of a USAID fiscal decentralisation project: 10/05/10, Skopje. 
31
 Pork-barrel projects / spending: “involving the spending of large amounts of money in an area in order to 
become more popular with local voters”. Cambridge Dictionaries Online, available: 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/pork-barrel?q=pork-barrel [Accessed: 05/02/12]. 
32
 With the exception of funds allocated for the construction of water-supply and sewerage systems 
(Kocevski 2009, 27). 
33
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 21/06/10 and 08/04/11, Skopje. 
34
 Interviews with: Mayor of Struga: 01/06/10; President of the Municipal Council: 03/06/10, Kruševo; 
Municipal Councillor: 25/06/10, Kičevo; Municipal Councillor: 05/04/11, Kumanovo; municipal officer: 
06/04/11, Šuto Orizari. 
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opposition-led municipalities. Being aligned to the governing parties is therefore 
regarded as critical, especially for the smaller municipalities with limited access 
to independent revenues.35 One Councillor from Struga municipality even 
suggested that, without forming a local coalition with VMRO-DPMNE in the 
Municipal Council, the governing DUI would be unable to obtain sufficient 
political support centrally for its project applications to be approved.36 When 
interviewed by International Crisis Group, an official from the Ministry for Local 
Self-Government confirmed that the awarding of capital grants remained highly 
politicised. The official also suggested such discretionary practices had the 
potential to aggravate inter-ethnic relations (ICG 2011, 19).37  
 
Significantly, the municipal association is excluded from all capital investment 
decision-making processes, and has lobbied central government to establish 
transparent, formula-driven criteria for the allocation of funds (FOSM 2010, 51; 
ZELS 2011a). ZELS also campaigns to participate in the setting of national 
investment priorities and budgets, and would like to be involved in the selection 
of municipal projects.38 Ultimately, ZELS would want all capital grants to be 
devolved to the municipalities so that they will be able to set funding priorities 
independently of central government and decide which projects will be allocated 
funds (ZELS 2011a). ZELS is not alone in this request, with the influential 
Foundation Open Society Institute - Macedonia (FOSM) and others questioning 
the logic behind the central government retaining control over decisions to build 
schools, construct cultural monuments, and purchase educational equipment 
                                                          
35
 Interview with Macedonian independent researcher: 25/06/10, Skopje. 
36
 Interview with Municipal Councillor: 01/06/10, Struga. This is despite the fact that DUI are a junior 
coalition partner. 
37
 Ministry official: “This makes them [central government] look like they discriminate on ethnic lines, but it 
is political not ethnic. Awarding your own people capital investments funds was a SDSM practice as well, 
so this is consistent of parties in power”. 
38
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 21/06/10 and 08/04/11, Skopje. 
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such computers, all of which fall under the jurisdiction of the municipalities 
(Kocevski 2009, 26): 
 
Such practices do not speak of the municipalities’ autonomy and 
independence from the central government … nor of the successful 
implementation of decentralisation. On the contrary, this encourages 
[the] politicisation of local governments, implies their servitude and 
obedience to the central government, which ultimately leads to [the]  
re-instatement of centralisation, or at least to ‘centralised 
decentralisation’.            (FOSM 2010, 44) 
 
 
The Expenditure Autonomy of the Municipalities 
 
Using J. Tyler Dickovick’s framework for operationalising ‘expenditure 
autonomy’, this section will assess how much latitude the municipalities have in 
the use of local revenues. Expenditure autonomy, explains Dickovick (2011), is 
substantial when sub-national governments can spend revenue as they see fit, 
including in the form of political goods and patronage, and when they can 
transfer resources from sector to sector at will. In contrast, lower levels of 
expenditure autonomy exist when budgets are only applicable in a given sector 
or detailed line item, when sub-national governments are obliged to spend on 
nationally established priorities, and when unspent budgets must revert to 
central government. Dickovick’s analytic approach is based on the assumption 
that sub-national governments seek greater expenditure autonomy in order to 
internalise the political benefits of spending. Conversely, ministers and 
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bureaucrats seek to ensure that sub-national governments comply with national 
standards, spend according to top-down directives, and do not divert resources 
to suit other ends (ibid., 92-94). It may be easier for states to centralise 
expenditure decisions than it is to centralise revenues (ibid., 121). For this 
reason, examining the extent of centrally imposed restrictions on local 
expenditures is crucial when assessing municipal autonomy in countries where 
increases in municipal revenue may (incorrectly) imply extensive 
decentralisation. 
 
The previous section demonstrated how an over-dependence on inadequate 
and often discretionary inter-governmental transfers has reduced the revenue 
autonomy of Macedonian municipalities. However, such circumstances have 
also reduced local expenditure autonomy. While municipal revenues deriving 
from own-sources and general grants allow municipalities maximum discretion 
over how they can be spent, limited or inadequate grants to finance 
decentralised public services have forced the municipalities to spend a larger 
proportion of their autonomous revenue on what are in fact recurrent 
‘earmarked’ expenditures (salaries, transport costs, etc.). Diverting own-source 
revenue in this way also means that the municipalities have fewer funds 
available to spend on local priorities as they see fit. Since the largest proportion 
of municipal revenue originates from inter-governmental transfers (earmarked, 
block, and capital), the remainder of this section will appraise the extent of 
centrally imposed restrictions on how they are spent locally. 
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Table 5.6:29Progress of Municipalities to the Second Phase of Decentralisation 
 
Date No. of Municipalities Cumulative Total 
1 September 2007 42  
1 January 2008 9 51 
1 April 2008 8 59 
1 July 2008 5 64 
1 November 2008 2 66 
1 November 2009 2 68 
1 April 2010 5 73 
1 July 2010 1 74 
1 January 2011 3 77 
1 July 2011 2 79 
1 January 2012
39
 5 84 
Sources: EC 2011b, 8; Herczyński 2011, 10. 
 
For the purpose of this review, it is important to differentiate between 
Macedonian municipalities still in the first phase of the decentralisation process, 
which receive earmarked grants to cover only the operating costs of public 
service institutions, and those that have progressed to the second phase and 
are entitled to receive unconditional block grants. As of March 2012 only one 
municipality (Plasnica) remains in the first phase, and its autonomy over 
spending is therefore severely restricted. However, as the data in Table 5.6 
illustrates, the advance of municipalities into the second phase has been slow, 
with eight (almost one tenth of all municipalities) only progressing into this 
phase after January 2011, five of which only entered the second phase in 
January 2012 once the criteria for doing so had been significantly eased.40 
Since more than four years have lapsed since the first cluster of municipalities 
graduated into the second phase, some have questioned the government’s 
                                                          
39
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
40
 These five municipalities are: Delčevo, Ohrid, Vinica, Vraneštica, and Želino). Changes to the Law on 
local government financing meant that from 2010 municipalities with unpaid arrears in the first phase were 
permitted to borrow money to clear debts and enter the second phase. During 2011 a decision was taken 
to allow municipalities to progress into the second phase without resolving significant debts first. Interview 
with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
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commitment to supporting the municipalities’ progress and ability to assume 
greater expenditure autonomy. This is particularly the case regarding the 
influential, opposition-led municipality of Ohrid, which was only permitted to 
enter the second phase in January 2012 (Feruglio et al. 2008, 23).41 
 
Concerning the spending autonomy of those municipalities in the second phase 
of decentralisation and in receipt of block grants, the following observations 
need to be emphasised. First, comparable with restrictions placed on 
earmarked grants in phase one, block grants can only be used for the sector to 
which they are allocated (Herczyński 2011, 8; Levitas 2011a, 7). This means 
that the municipalities are not free to transfer resources from sector to sector. 
The expenditure autonomy of the municipalities is restricted further by the fact 
that instead of receiving a single block grant for the delivery of educational 
services, they receive three separate block grants for primary and secondary 
education, and another for kindergartens. Similarly, eligible municipalities 
receive three separate grants for libraries, museums, and theatres, instead of 
one block grant for cultural programmes (Levitas 2011a, 5). In both cases, the 
municipalities are unable to transfer funds between these separate grants. This 
approach is in contrast to good practice which advises consolidating as many 
block grants as possible into a general grant, thereby increasing space for 
meaningful expenditure decisions locally (Levitas 2009, 32). The municipalities 
also remain unable to transfer funds between different budget lines, such as 
those allocated to public sector salaries and material expenditure, and are 
                                                          
41
 Interviews with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje; and representative of the Delegation 
of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 16/03/12, Skopje. 
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“strongly encouraged” to return any unspent revenue to the centre at the end of 
each fiscal year (Herczyński 2011, 44).42 
 
The second observation is that total inter-governmental transfers to the 
municipalities are dominated by primary and secondary education grants, and 
within these grants, the payment of teachers’ salaries. Eighty-six percent of 
block grants for primary education, for example, was spent on teachers’ pay 
during 2010, leaving only 14 percent for the municipalities to use at their 
discretion on maintenance and student transport costs (MLGA 2011, 16). 
Similarly, in 2010, 77 percent of secondary education block grants went on 
teachers’ salaries, leaving only 23 percent for municipalities to spend as they 
wished on maintenance and transport needs (ibid., 20). The dominance of 
salary payments within the block grants is further compounded by the fact that 
both teacher employment numbers and remuneration levels remain strictly 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance and the national treasury system 
respectively (Herczyński 2011, 44). Municipalities complain, for example, that if 
a teacher retires or even dies, they are unable to hire a replacement, and the 
funds planned for their salary must be returned to the central budget (ibid.,45). 
Procedures for receiving permission to employ a replacement teacher are also 
slow and in some instances municipalities do not receive a response from the 
Ministry of Finance at all.43 Municipalities therefore have very little control over 
their expenditures since personnel costs, which account for the vast majority of 
‘unconditional’ block grants, are essentially dictated by central government. 
 
                                                          
42
 In theory and according to the law, the municipalities are granted discretion over how surplus funds are 
used. However in reality there is pressure, particularly from the International Monetary Fund, to promote 
cost-saving measures and return unspent revenue to the Treasury. Interview with the head of a USAID 
fiscal decentralisation project: 10/05/10, Skopje. 
43
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 08/04/11, Skopje. 
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Third, several municipalities in the second phase of the decentralisation process 
have had their bank accounts blocked due to unpaid arrears. This may be 
because they have acquired debts since entering the second phase, or because 
some municipalities were able to graduate to the second phase by restructuring 
rather than clearing outstanding debts.44 An original pre-condition for entering 
the second phase of decentralisation was that a municipality carried no debts in 
the 24 months prior to assessment. However, this criteria was later relaxed to 
allow more municipalities to advance (hence the debt restructuring) and was 
later removed altogether. Ohrid, for example, was permitted to move into the 
second phase in January 2012 with significant outstanding debts, but 
immediately had its account blocked upon entering.45 Consequently, whilst 
block grants to fund devolved public services remain unaffected, the operational 
revenues section of a municipality’s bank account is frozen and only earmarked 
costs for municipal overheads (salaries, etc.) can leave the account. All other 
revenues automatically go towards paying off the debt.46 It is impossible to 
know exactly how many municipalities have had their accounts blocked at any 
one time since the situation changes daily and data on this issue do not exist. 
However, some estimate the figure to be as many as one third of all 
municipalities at any one time.47 Often the accounts are blocked for short 
periods (a few weeks or months) until the debt is cleared. However, for more 
substantial debts, the situation will take longer to resolve. While entry to the 
second phase of decentralisation enabled Ohrid to receive block grants for 
services and to borrow commercially, the long-term freezing of its account 
                                                          
44
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
45
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 21/06/10, Skopje. 
46
 Interview with a representative of the World Bank: 16/03/12, Skopje. 
47
 Interview with representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: 16/03/12, Skopje. 
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meant that the municipality had even less expenditure autonomy over its own-
source revenues than it had before. 
 
Finally, as the previous section has revealed, certain line ministries have control 
over capital grants to support devolved public service competences, leaving the 
municipalities with little or no influence over how these funds are spent. While it 
is reasonable that the central government remains able to promote national 
policies and fund expensive infrastructure projects, capital grants are being 
misused by line ministries to retain control over the procurement of smaller 
items such as computers, school furniture, and cultural events. These spending 
decisions should be the responsibility of individual schools and municipalities. 
However, since the block grant payments are insufficient to meet local material 
needs, schools and municipalities remain dependent on supplementary capital 
payments in order to do so (Kocevski 2009, 26). The result is that the 
government’s ‘A computer for every child’ programme, costing an estimated  
50 million euros, distributed over 200,000 computers to schools that, in many 
cases, were not adequately consulted, lacked the necessary internet connects 
and software, and had no IT Administrator to maintain the machines (Hadzi-
Zafirova 2011). In summary, the existence of stringent expenditure mandates 
on inter-governmental transfers, which dwarf autonomous municipal own-
source revenues, suggests the expenditure autonomy of Macedonian 
municipalities remains tightly constrained by the centre. In such circumstances, 
municipalities are barely autonomous and instead represent de-concentrated 
entities of central government. The frequent blocking of municipal bank 
accounts due to outstanding debts also undermines the municipalities’ ability to 
take independent spending decisions. 
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The Contractual Autonomy of the Municipalities 
 
This final analysis will briefly examine the contractual autonomy of Macedonian 
municipalities. Dickovick defines this form of sub-national autonomy as an 
ability to set independent financial contracts with different sets of private actors, 
such as creditors and employees, in addition to the degree of legal or 
jurisdictional autonomy municipalities are granted (2011, 5). The previous 
section discussed how Macedonian municipalities are unable to control the 
wage bills of public officials under their jurisdiction. Further, since more than 80 
percent of municipalities have been aligned with political parties in the national 
governing coalition since 2009, the retraction of local competences by line 
ministries happens very infrequently and will also not be reviewed in this 
section.48 In the few instances where competences have been retracted on a 
temporary basis, the initiative has in general been politically motivated and has 
disproportionately affected opposition-led municipalities.49 It remains to be seen 
whether this potential threat to municipal autonomy will gain in significance if 
and when the political landscape changes after local elections are held in 
2013.50 This section will therefore focus specifically on the borrowing ability of 
the municipalities. Sub-national governments that control their own debt 
burdens are more autonomous than those who must look to central 
governments to set these parameters (ibid., 5). 
 
                                                          
48
 Since decentralisation began, local competences have been retracted only four or five times by either 
the Ministry of Education and Science or the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Interview with a 
representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 
16/03/12, Skopje. 
49
 Usually the municipality in question has indeed acted inappropriately. However, so have many other 
(government-aligned) municipalities and they are not targeted. Interview with a local government expert: 
20/03/12, Skopje. 
50
 Often there is a valid reason why the competence has been retracted, i.e. if a municipality has breached 
regulations. However, prohibited behaviour also happens in government-aligned municipalities and in such 
circumstances no action is taken. Interview with local expert working with the municipalities: 20/03/12, 
Skopje. 
 218 
Shahid Javed Burki et al. for the World Bank notes that borrowing can play an 
important role in sub-national financing, particularly in the financing of long-term 
capital development projects since costs can be spread out to match the 
duration of benefits to citizens (Burki et al. 1999, 29). It is particularly important 
for municipalities in pre-accession countries to the European Union since they 
are often required to ‘match’ payments provided by European structural funds.51 
Significantly, access to external capital also means that municipalities are less 
dependent on central government for funding such initiatives. Macedonian 
municipalities in the second phase of decentralisation are permitted to contract 
debt under certain circumstances tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance; 
however their right to borrow is not guaranteed by the Constitution (Official 
Gazette 2001a).52 The law on local government financing differentiates between 
short- and long-term borrowing. With regard to short-term indebtedness, the 
loan must be paid off by the end of the fiscal year and its amount must not 
exceed 20 percent of total municipal revenues (Official Gazette 2004, Art. 19).53 
Long-term borrowing within Macedonia and from abroad is permitted only to 
finance capital assets or investment projects (and not to repay long-term debts), 
and the amount borrowed cannot exceed 15 percent of total municipal revenues 
(ibid., Art. 20).54 In both instances, municipalities can only borrow in domestic 
and/or foreign capital markets with prior consent from the Ministry of Finance.55    
 
 
                                                          
51
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
52
 This possibility was later extended to municipalities in the first phase of decentralisation so that they 
could progression into the second phase. 
53
 The limit was amended to 30 percent in 2009 (CSLD 2011, 21). 
54
 This limit was also amended to 30 percent in 2009 (CSLD 2011, 21). 
55
 Article 50, for example, states: The Municipality may take long-term loans … after the Ministry of 
Finance confirms that: it has regularly submitted positively assessed financial reports for the period of at 
least 24 months from the day this law enters into force; and it does not have any arrears towards the 
creditors in the last two years from the day this law enters into force (Official Gazette 2004). 
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Whilst borrowing represents an important component of municipal financing, 
unlimited sub-national borrowing can destabilise macroeconomic governance 
and lead to central government deficits (Burki et al. 1999, 30). It is therefore 
understandable that the Ministry of Finance tightly regulates municipal 
borrowing and maintains a hard budget constraint (UNDP 2005a, 6; World Bank 
2006, 28; Smoke 2007, 133; IMF 2009, 8). However, restrictions on municipal 
borrowing in Macedonia have had a significant impact on both the revenue and 
expenditure autonomy of the municipalities, as well as obstructing progress with 
the decentralisation reforms. Municipalities still in the first phase of the 
decentralisation process, for example, were initially unable to borrow and 
therefore had no possibility of paying off the debts that prevented them from 
entering the second phase. However, this issue was partly addressed by an 
amendment to the law on local government financing in December 2009, which 
permitted those municipalities still in the first phase to apply for short- and loan-
term loans from central government to service their debts.56 In addition, limits on 
the amount a municipality can borrow, the fact that long-term borrowing is only 
permitted to finance capital investments (and not to clear debts), and the strict 
requirement that a municipality has no arrears in the two years prior to 
borrowing (see footnote 55), effectively blocked those municipalities in the 
second phase with frozen accounts from being able to clear their outstanding 
arrears (OSCE 2011, 71; ZELS 2011a).  
 
Further challenges regarding implementation of municipal borrowing initiatives 
are also apparent. Most significantly, the effect of the global economic crisis on 
Macedonian state funds has meant that the government has had little if any 
                                                          
56
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
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money available to loan to the municipalities since restrictions on borrowing 
were relaxed at the end of 2009.57 Additionally, there is a common perception 
that the assessment process for loan approval is politically biased, with the 
opposition-led municipality of Ohrid waiting more than four years for a response 
from the Ministry of Finance.58 Even a World Bank-financed loan programme for 
municipal capital investments, administered by the Ministry of Finance, has 
been suspected of political bias in its loan approvals. A World Bank 
representative has noted that, despite the multi-million euro programme having 
sufficient funds to service all 85 municipalities with loans, only one SDSM-led 
municipality (Strumica) has applied to the programme since it began in 
September 2009. Whilst Strumica’s application was not formally rejected by the 
Ministry, the decision on its approval was delayed for so long the Mayor of 
Strumica eventually withdrew his application and funded the proposed 
infrastructure project locally.59 
 
The record of municipalities borrowing on the commercial market and/or issuing 
municipal bonds is even less impressive. According to the Executive Director of 
ZELS, Macedonian municipalities remain reluctant to take out commercial loans 
and, prior to March 2012, only three municipalities had done so.60 The municipal 
association blamed the municipalities’ fear of taking on too much debt in a 
financial crisis, along with a general cultural aversion to taking out loans. ZELS 
is unclear whether more municipalities applied to the Ministry of Finance for 
permission to arrange commercial loans and had either received negative 
                                                          
57
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
58
 In the meantime, Ohrid is forced to pay penalty rates of interest as high as 20 – 25 percent on its debts. 
Interview with the head of a USAID fiscal decentralisation project: 10/05/10, Skopje. 
59
 Interview with a representative of the World Bank: 15/03/12, Skopje. 
60
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
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responses or, as is the case of Ohrid, no response at all (CSLD 2011, 21).61 
Similarly, despite being granted permission to issue local bonds in mid-2011, 
the municipalities have yet to do so.62 To summarise, whilst necessary, the 
restrictions placed on municipal borrowing, in addition to initial central 
government resistance to help the municipalities address outstanding debts and 
the reluctance of most municipalities to borrow commercially, suggests the 
contractual autonomy of Macedonian municipalities remains weak. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has examined whether the decentralisation process in Macedonia 
has enhanced the fiscal autonomy of Macedonian municipalities; a key 
theoretical assumption underpinning the reform’s ability to mitigate ethnic 
conflict in unitary states. The review began by considering why the national 
parties governing Macedonia at the time the reforms were adopted chose to 
give up political and fiscal power to the local level, and suggests short-term 
political calculations were decisive. It also suggests fluctuations in the electoral 
strength of the governing parties, in particular a change of government in 2006, 
adversely affected central government’s commitment to enhancing the fiscal 
autonomy of the municipalities and will continue to do so in the future. The 
outcome of municipal elections in 2013 will be critical for determining whether 
central government continues to support the decentralisation reforms or will 
seek to reverse progress made to date. 
 
                                                          
61
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
62
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
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Detailed examination of the revenue, expenditure, and contractual autonomy of 
the municipalities suggests decentralisation has done little to restrain the 
monopoly of central government on state power and resources. What appear to 
be representative local governments are in most cases little more than a de-
concentration of central government control, especially since the vast majority 
of municipalities are politically aligned to the national governing coalition. 
Limited access to own-source revenues and an over-dependence on insufficient 
and often discretionary inter-governmental transfers imply the revenue 
autonomy of municipalities is weak. Stringent expenditure mandates for block 
grants and the frequent freezing of municipal bank accounts due to unpaid 
arrears indicates the expenditure autonomy of the municipalities remained 
tightly constrained by the centre.  
 
Finally, the limited ability of municipalities to enter into financial contracts with 
different sets of private actors suggests their contractual autonomy is also 
fragile. Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio refer to such occurrences as 
‘partial decentralisation’, since sub-national governments remain heavily 
dependent on the centre for their revenues and cannot therefore be held 
accountable all budgetary decisions and outcomes locally (Ahmad and Brosio 
2009, 9). Whilst in the short-term, tight control of peripheral areas by central 
government may promote political stability, in the long-term, it will undermine 
the benefits associated with decentralisation and may even make the regime 
less stable. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of taking an integrated approach 
to assessing the fiscal autonomy of Macedonian municipalities. Fiscal inter-
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governmental relations are inherently political and political forces substantially 
determine the way they are designed and implemented. Similarly, without 
sufficient ﬁnancial resources, municipalities cannot adequately perform their 
newly assigned competences. This analysis has also shown that national 
governments, along with the political parties they comprise, remain central 
players in any decentralisation process. Their motives for the reforms 
succeeding (or indeed failing) should be prudently and continually considered. 
Finally, this chapter has illustrated that, while constitutionally-guaranteed 
decentralisation processes may be harder to reverse than others, it is not 
impossible. Central governments can and do find ways to retain control, even 
as supposedly decentralising reforms proceed. Advances in either 
administrative or democratic decentralisation, examined here in Chapters 3 and 
4, can easily be undermined by tightening controls over fiscal relations. The 
potential to recentralise or, in Macedonia’s case, partially decentralise, is 
therefore greater than the literature on decentralisation suggests.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DECENTRALISATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A COHESIVE STATE 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the apparent conflict between subsidiarity and solidarity, 
and determines whether the (limited) fiscal autonomy ensuing from 
decentralisation has been achieved at the expense of economic and territorial 
cohesion. Whilst the previous chapter examined the differences between local 
revenue and expenditure, known as the vertical fiscal imbalance between 
different levels of government, the following sections review the extent of 
horizontal imbalances in municipal revenues. It highlights the essential role 
played by equalisation transfers and other mechanisms designed to overcome 
such inevitable distortions, for example inter-municipal cooperation and regional 
development policy. This chapter also examines whether decentralisation has 
indirectly addressed longstanding socio-economic inequalities which contributed 
to conflict in 2001 by promoting a more equitable distribution of state resources 
and by improving citizens’ access to public services. Whilst the Framework 
Agreement’s primary focus was on resolving the political and cultural 
inequalities that existed between Macedonia’s two largest ethnic communities, 
as Chapter 1 indicated, it fails to directly address significant socio-economic 
insecurities. The Agreement’s emphasis on preserving territorial integrity and 
the unitary character of the state also neglects the importance of promoting 
socio-economic development and cohesion within the state; a key theme of the 
European Commission’s cohesion policy (Official Gazette 2001, Art. 1.2; EC 
2011a). 
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This analysis begins by considering the on-going theoretical debate regarding 
decentralisation’s ability to reduce territorial disparities within a country. It then 
builds upon the analysis of socio-economic disparities in Chapter 2 by 
examining the presence of regional disparities and rural under-development in 
Macedonia. Finally, the chapter discusses the impact municipal boundary 
changes and fiscal decentralisation has had on the municipalities’ ability to 
deliver basic services that meet the needs of local citizens. This chapter will 
consider whether decentralisation in Macedonia has: (a) led to a more equitable 
distribution of public resources throughout Macedonia; (b) created the optimal 
conditions for expanding citizens’ access to basic services (thereby reducing 
social exclusion); and (c) reduced longstanding socio-economic disparities 
between urban and rural areas. The intention is not to evaluate the various 
claims that decentralisation may improve the quality of local services, promote 
economic development and growth through increased public sector efficiency, 
and reduce poverty through job creation. Insufficient monitoring data currently 
exists in Macedonia to enable an assessment of the first claim, and it is unclear 
to what extent the latter claims can be ascribed to decentralisation alone. 
Instead this chapter argues Macedonia’s experience with decentralisation is at a 
critical juncture and will require further reform, particularly in the sphere of fiscal 
equalisation, if all municipalities (and citizens) are to benefit equally from its 
potential. 
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Decentralisation and Regional Disparities 
  
Researchers have failed to reach a consensus over whether decentralisation 
improves or exacerbates pre-existing regional disparities within a country. The 
empirical evidence available, observe Andres Rodríguez-Pose and Roberto 
Ezcurra (2010, 626), is both scarce and inconclusive. Most single country case 
studies, for example West and Wong (1995) for China, and Bonet (2006) for 
Colombia, have found that decentralisation has been accompanied by an 
increase in territorial disparities. In contrast, the number of single country 
studies that find decentralisation is either unrelated to, or alternatively, 
associated with a reduction in regional inequalities (note Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra) is far more limited. One possible explanation for such contradictory 
empirical findings is that decentralisation may be less able to address regional 
disparities in low income countries than in more developed states. The logic 
behind this assumption is that higher income countries are less likely to have 
significant territorial inequalities to begin with, and are more likely to have a 
strong welfare state and well-established territorially progressive fiscal systems 
designed to address them (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010, 639). 
 
Experts have argued that decentralisation may alleviate disparities between 
regions by promoting economic development and growth through increased 
public sector efficiency. For example, Wallace E. Oates (1972) has suggested 
decentralisation improves government efficiency and, as a consequence, 
economic growth by increasing experimentation, innovation, and local 
competition in the design and delivery of public services. Similarly, others have 
suggested that devolving responsibility for local economic development to the 
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very people that know the local business environment best, means communities 
are more knowledgeable, motivated, and able to pursue policies that will 
promote a more favourable investment climate (Canaleta et al. 2004, 74; 
Treisman 2007, 12; Qian and Weingast 1997). Decentralisation is also claimed 
to promote a more equitable distribution of state resources; either by providing 
the institutional channels through which remote, poor, and previously under-
represented areas can access resources, or by uniting poor areas with more 
affluent ones (Ahmad and Brosio 2009, 11). “If urban bias is a concern”, 
remarks James Manor (1999, 103), “the safest way to tackle it is to give rural 
areas their own decentralised authorities”. Finally, but most importantly, 
decentralisation is believed to be conducive to poverty reduction, since local 
governments are assumed to have better information and higher incentives than 
central government to design and deliver basic public services that effectively 
meet the needs of local people (UNDP 2004a, 3; Crawford and Hartmann 2008, 
18). 
 
There are however a variety of reasons why decentralisation may ignore and in 
fact even exacerbate disparities that exist within a unitary state. The most 
commonly cited argument is the inherent conflict between subsidiarity and 
solidarity, or between local revenue autonomy and national redistribution. 
Increasing the own-revenue powers of local governments almost always 
benefits jurisdictions with stronger tax bases, since less well-endowed regions 
experience greater difficulty in raising the revenues required to meet local 
needs (Canaleta et al. 2004, 75; UNDP 2005a, 5; Bakke and Wibbels 2006, 17; 
Spahn and Werner 2007, 104; Levitas 2009, 30; Thede 2009, 118; Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra 2010, 622). This is particularly the case if local revenues are 
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dominated by sources that favour urbanised areas, for example property-related 
taxes and construction fees. Further, Rémy Prud'homme has argued that in a 
decentralised state, existing disparities may even reinforce themselves 
(Prud'homme 1995, 203). Wealthier local governments may be able to lower 
local taxation and in doing so, further broaden their tax base by attracting 
additional settlement and investment at the expense of neighbouring 
jurisdictions. “Decentralisation”, Prud'homme concludes, “can therefore be the 
mother of segregation”. 
 
A second reason why decentralisation may reinforce pre-existing disparities is 
the fact that wealthier regions, with more developed local infrastructure and high 
quality public services, will find it easier to attract private investment, capital 
investment, and indeed talent (Bartlett et al. 2010, 150; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra 2010, 625; Dragoman 2011, 666). Richer regions, observes Christian 
Lessman (2009, 7) are often disproportionately strong negotiators because 
central governments are more concerned with maintaining their political 
support. They are therefore more likely to wield a greater influence over central 
decision-making regarding the allocation of discretionary funds or even the 
design of formula-based grants. Wealthier jurisdictions would also have more 
own-source revenue at their disposal to invest in local infrastructure projects 
which can then be used to further improve the local investment climate. An 
additional reason why decentralisation may benefit wealthier and possibly more 
populous local jurisdictions at the expense of others is their ability to benefit 
from economies of scale in the provision of public services. Smaller local 
governments, with fewer local citizens and tax payers, will have higher average 
costs and will therefore be less able to deliver public services efficiently (UNDP 
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2004a, 9; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010, 622). Clearly, such disparities will 
impact on individual local governments’ ability to provide local services in an 
equitable manner. Finally, but significantly, it is important to stress that 
decentralisation does little to address disparities that may exist within local 
jurisdictions. By facilitating local discretion in decision-making, inequalities in the 
distribution of resources locally may increase. This may be particularly true in 
jurisdictions which extend over both urban and rural areas, where urban voters 
outnumber their rural counterparts, and where local corruption is easier to 
sustain (Manor 1999, 104; Crawford and Hartmann 2008, 176). 
 
The arguments outlined above emphasise the need for decentralisation reforms 
to include a fiscal equalisation mechanism that would compensate for the 
disparities that inevitably arise from the differing fiscal capacities of local 
governments. While this process of revenue redistribution inevitably undermines 
the fiscal accountability between local governments and tax payers that 
decentralisation seeks to enhance, equalisation transfers are important for 
ensuring all jurisdictions have the necessary fiscal means to provide a 
comparable level of basic public services. However, the enhanced local 
revenue autonomy ensuing from fiscal decentralisation undermines the ability of 
central governments to play an equalising role, since its fiscal capacity is more 
limited than it would be in a centralised state (Canaleta et al. 2004, 75; Bird and 
Ebel 2007, 18; Lessmann 2009, 2). Individual local governments are also 
unable to equalise horizontal revenue disparities themselves, as attempts to 
increase tax rates in poorer regions (to compensate for narrower tax bases) 
would be self-defeating since local residents can move to neighbouring regions 
and undermine the policy (Prud'homme 1995, 202). It is not by chance, observe 
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Richard Bird and Robert Ebel (2007, 9), that the so-called welfare state was a 
centralising one: “a country cannot have both its autonomous cake and eat its 
redistributive one”.  
 
 
Disparities within and between Regions in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
Chapter 2 has examined how an already fragile Macedonian economy was 
severely damaged by a prolonged process of economic transition, war in 
neighbouring former Yugoslav Republics, and a trade embargo imposed on 
Macedonia by Greece in 1994. Such challenges led to a significant decline in 
living standards, rising unemployment, and increasing poverty levels, all of 
which contributed to a general loss of faith in the ability of the state to provide 
for its citizens. The analysis in Chapter 2 also demonstrated how significant 
socio-economic disparities between Macedonia’s ethnic communities produced 
increasing Albanian frustration with the state and majority Macedonian 
community. Such disparities took on both an ethnic and territorial dimension, 
with persistent rural under-development representing a “severe poverty trap” for 
(predominantly Albanian) rural communities (ESI 2002b, i). This next section 
discusses two issues that continue to polarise local development in Macedonia: 
the development of urban municipalities at the expense of rural ones; and the 
concentration of economic growth and investment in the capital city, Skopje. 
 
Despite rural under-development being a constant feature of Macedonian life for 
decades, it was only with the start of decentralisation that the extent of 
disparities between urban and rural municipalities was comprehensively 
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measured. An analysis of the socio-economic performance of municipalities 
was completed for the first time in 2004 by UNDP (2004b; 2004c). It revealed 
considerable differences in social and economic development across different 
parts of the country, as well as between urban and rural municipalities. For 
example, the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), a summary measure of 
human development, was found to average 0.796 in urban municipalities and 
only 0.765 in rural ones (UNDP 2004b, 35).1 Skopje measured the highest, with 
an HDI of 0.822; while rural Zajas, Dolneni, and Rosoman measured 0.737, 
0.745, 0.759 respectively (ibid., 36). While Zajas was the focus of the European 
Stability Initiative’s report ‘Ahmeti’s Village’, an exposé of how chronic rural 
under-development disproportionately affects Macedonia’s Albanian 
community, it is important to note that both Dolneni and Rosoman are both 
majority-Macedonian municipalities.2 The UNDP’s analysis also found that 
average annual income levels per capita in sampled rural municipalities were 
around US$500 lower than in sampled urban municipalities, and at least 
US$300 below the national average. Unemployment, although significant 
throughout the country, also varied considerably between urban and rural 
areas, with unemployment rates exceeding employment rates by as much as 
two or three times in some rural municipalities (ibid., 15). 
 
As Chapter 2 and 4 have already discussed, rural under-development is a 
legacy of Yugoslav times and socialist planning’s tendency to concentrate 
investments largely in urban areas. Throughout socialist Yugoslavia, as in many 
capitalist countries, infrastructure development, employment creation, and 
                                                          
1
 The UNDP’s Human Development Index is based on life expectancy, literacy and school enrolment rates, 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. 
2
 The report ‘Ahmeti’s Village’ examines the political economy of interethnic relations in Macedonia. Zajas 
is home to Ali Ahmeti, leader of the NLA and subsequent head of the political party DUI. The population of 
Dolneni in 2004 was 42 percent Macedonian, 21 percent Albanian, and 22 percent Turkish; Rosoman’s 
was 89 percent Macedonian and ten percent Serbs; and Zajas’ was 97 percent Albanian (ESI 2001a). 
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public services were developed to service urban areas and socially owned 
enterprises at the expense of surrounding rural villages (UNDP 2001; ESI 
2002b, 5). It was assumed that concentrating public investments in the cities 
would encourage economic growth that would filter into outlying areas 
(Woodward 1995, 66). However, there are three important consequences of this 
legacy which continue to impact upon local governance in Macedonia. First, in 
the absence of substantial capital investment in rural areas to correct the 
distorted infrastructure of the past, significant disparities between urban and 
rural areas remain. Clearly, poor local infrastructure impacts upon the ability of 
rural municipalities to deliver equitable public services to local citizens and to 
combat social exclusion. When surveyed in 2011, for example, 64 percent of 
municipalities admitted that they remain unable to provide communal services 
to all local residents (OSCE 2011, 67). Secondly, the concentration of socially 
owned enterprises in urban areas has brought a strong spatial dimension to the 
privatisation process in Macedonia (Bartlett et al. 2010, 125). While urban 
municipalities may now be better placed to compete for economic investment 
than their rural counterparts, significant job losses in secondary towns due to 
the closure of many enterprises have exacerbated unemployment rates and 
made poverty an increasingly urban phenomenon (see Figure 6.1) (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2007, 16; World Bank 2009, 1919). Finally, given the employment 
trends of Macedonia’s ethnic communities during the Yugoslav period, rural 
areas have and remain home to significant Albanian and Turkish communities. 
Urban-rural disparities therefore often (but not always) have unintended ethnic 
consequences (Brunnbauer 2004, 579-86; ICG 2011, 19).  
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Figure 6.1:6Changes in Poverty Rates in the Republic of Macedonia,  
2002 – 2006 (%) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2009, xiii. 
 
A second issue that continues to impact upon local development in Macedonia 
is the existence of persistent socio-economic disparities between regions and, 
in particular, between Skopje and the rest of the country.3 The high level of 
concentration of business activities in the capital city makes it increasingly 
difficult for the other regions to compete (Bartlett et al. 2010, 126). When GDP 
is calculated on a regional, per-capita basis (see Appendix N), persistent 
discrepancies in levels of economic activity throughout the country are clearly 
apparent. The Skopje region has consistently enjoyed the highest level of GDP 
per capita in the country; rising to more than a third above the national average 
in 2010. This constitutes almost half of all economic activity in Macedonia (see 
Table 6.1 below). With the exception of Pelagonia, GDP per capita in all other 
regions has been and remains below the national average. The lowest levels 
are found in Polog and the Northeast regions, where levels have remained 
consistently around half the national average since 2000. It is important to bear 
                                                          
3
 Macedonia’s eight regions are referred to as either ‘statistical’ or ‘planning’ regions and do not hold any 
political or institutional significance.  
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in mind that regional GDP values refer to production generated within the 
region, rather than the average income of citizens in a given region (UNDP 
2004c, 98). Commuter flows, concentrated around major cities, may therefore 
have a significant influence on regional income distribution (Bartlett et al. 2010, 
132).4 Also, official data does not capture the impact of informal economic 
activity or remittances from abroad, which represent important sources of 
income in some parts of the country. A map of Macedonia’s statistical eight 
regions is available in Appendix O. 
 
Table 6.1 illustrates how official employment rates, in addition to basic 
healthcare measures, also vary significantly between regions. Although the 
unemployment rate in the Skopje region remained on a par with the national 
average in 2009, it decreased significantly in the years since 2009 at the 
expense of secondary cities (refer back to Figure 1). However, this data masks 
significant differences in employment rates within the Skopje region. For 
example, the Roma-majority municipality of Šuto Orizari in the City of Skopje 
experiences unemployment at least twice the rate of employment (UNDP 
2004b, 15).  Interestingly, the unemployment rate in the predominantly Albanian 
Polog region is below the national average, despite the official data implying a 
low level of regional economic activity. Such discrepancies could be due to 
residents commuting to work in nearby Skopje, a prevalent grey economy, 
and/or low labour force participation rates, particularly among Albanian and 
Turkish women.5   
 
                                                          
4
 While the average GDP per capita in Polog is the lowest in the country, its mean household equivalised 
income is above the national average and is similar to that found in the Skopje region (Bartlett et al. 2010, 
133). 
5
 According to the 2000 Labour Force Survey, the participation rates of ethnic Albanian women were 
11percent, compared to 51percent for female ethnic Macedonians (World Bank 2009, 72). 
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Table 6.1:30Key Development Indicators, According to Regions (2009) 
 
Region 
Share in National  
GDP Creation (%) 
Unemployment 
Rates (%) 
Population  
per Doctor
6
 
East 7.5 17.0 703 
Northeast  4.5 64.8 806 
Pelagonia  12.5 33.2 528 
Polog  7.2 27.3 1,106 
Skopje  45.5 33.5 638 
Southeast 8.0 14.4 755 
Southwest 7.6 32.7 848 
Vardar  7.3 39.7 622 
R. of Macedonia 100.0 32.2 713 
Sources: Regional Statistic Database, SSO; Mojsovska 2011,18. 
 
The data presented in Table 6.1 and in Appendices N and S suggests a very 
strong mono-centric model of development has been pursued in Macedonia for 
many decades. Unlike during the Yugoslav period, between its independence 
from Yugoslavia in 1991 and 2008 Macedonia had no policy for promoting 
balanced development among its regions. The only form of development 
support during this period was applied to highly underdeveloped, mainly rural 
areas, but without any coherent measures to redress disparities between 
regions (Official Gazette 1994; GTZ 2008b, 10).7 Funds distributed by the 
Bureau for Economically Underdeveloped Regions during this period were also 
insufficient, and were generally allocated according to the political affiliation of 
the municipalities rather than based on need (UNDP 2005b, 146; Karajkov 
2006, 10; Ministry of Agriculture 2007, 12). The lack of balanced regional 
development policy until 2008 therefore resulted in devastating outcomes for 
peripheral urban and rural areas that lag behind Skopje in terms of economic, 
social, and cultural dimensions (Mojsovska 2011, 19).  
                                                          
6
 These figures are for 2008. 
7
 According to the Law on the Stimulation of the Development of the Economically Underdeveloped 
Regions (1994, Art. 2, 6), eligible regions were hilly-mountainous and border regions, and those where the 
degree of economic development was less than 75 percent of the national average. 
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Territorial Reorganisation and the Optimum Size of Municipalities  
 
Experts recognise that while municipal boundary changes should be regarded 
as principally an administrative issue, involving considerations of scale 
economies and equity in the provision of services, local economic sustainability, 
and appropriate levels of citizen participation, they are also of profound local 
and national political significance (Boex et al. 2004, 7; Skaburskis 2004, 43; 
Devas and Delay 2006, 692). As the debates in the literature on power-sharing 
and on federalism examined in Chapter 1 have illustrated, boundary changes 
may have a significant impact on community relations in multi-ethnic states - 
serving to either encourage integration or secure enhanced autonomy for a 
particular ethnic group (Meligrana and Razin 2004, 227). John Meligrana and 
Eran Razin distinguish between explicit and implicit goals in the design of local 
territorial reform. Explicit goals, they observe, are contained in official 
regulations or laws, while implicit goals represent the aspirations of political 
parties and/or population groups to gain a political advantage from the new 
territorial configuration (ibid., 236). 
 
The UNDP’s 2004 analysis of the economic characteristics of Macedonian 
municipalities provoked a debate regarding what the optimal size of the 
municipalities after decentralisation should be. An earlier attempt at territorial 
division in 1996 had resulted in an over-fragmentation of local government 
structures, with many small municipalities being unsustainable in terms of their 
demographic structure, economic viability, and organisational capacity (UNDP 
2004b, 98) (see Appendix P for an analysis of this territorial reorganisation). For 
example, over a third of the 123 municipalities created had populations of less 
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than 5,000 (see Table 6.2 below), the minimum threshold recommended by the 
Council of Europe for viable local entities (ICG 2003, 20). With the devolution of 
additional competences to the municipalities after 2004, in particular those 
related to local economic development, education, and primary health, 
Macedonia’s fragmented municipal structure required further consolidation. The 
explicit goals of the territorial reorganisation stated by the Government were 
therefore to make the municipalities more sustainable and effective, with 
boundary changes being based on ethnically neutral criteria (Kreci and Ymeri 
2010, 275).8 However the implicit goals envisaged by the political parties were 
summarised by an Albanian politician at the time as follows: 
 
We want to maximise the number of municipalities where Albanians 
make up 20 percent of the population (and thereby make Albanian an 
official language) and we want to bring Albanians in connection with the 
urban centre; the Macedonians want the opposite – to preserve 
Macedonian urban control, keeping Albanians in rural areas and 
minimising the number of 20 percent Albanian municipalities. 
(ICG 2003, 20) 
 
                                                          
8
 Article 17 of the Law on Local Self-Government states: “The territory on which a municipality is 
established should represent a naturally, geographically and economically linked entity, with 
communication among populated places and gravitation towards the common centre, and it should have 
infrastructure facilities as well as facilities of social standard build therein” (Official Gazette 2002). 
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Table 6.2:31Number of Municipalities after Territorial Reorganisation  
in 1996 and 2004 
 
Population 
No. of 
Municipalities 
(1996) 
No. of 
Municipalities 
(2004) 
Up to 1,000 5 0 
1,000 – 5,000 42 16 
5,001 – 10,000 24 16 
10,001 – 20,000 26 21 
20,001 – 50,000 15 17 
50,001 – 100,000 9 13 
Over 100,001 2 1 
Total 123 84 
  Source: SSO 2005. 
 
The 84 municipalities that survived the reorganisation, 16 of which still have 
populations less than 5,000, suggests the process was based largely on 
political and ethnic compromises, rather than on establishing economically 
viable jurisdictions (Friedman 2009, 217; Siljanovska-Davkova 2009, 112; Kreci 
and Ymeri 2010, 271). According to a senior local government expert working 
for UNDP at the time, “there were so many experts, so many study visits, but in 
the end the decisions made were political”.9 Indeed, as the analysis in Appendix 
Q suggests, the vast majority of these 16 municipalities were saved either 
because their Mayor was from SDSM (the largest party in government at that 
time), or because the local population included a sizable ethnic community 
(SEC 1996).  
 
The most controversial boundary changes proposed were those affecting the 
municipalities of Struga and Kičevo, which were due to be enlarged to ensure 
Albanians became the majority in both municipalities. For Struga, expansion 
meant that the local Albanian population increased from 42 percent to 57 
                                                          
9
 Interview with UNDP official: 12/11/09, Skopje. 
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percent; while in Kičevo, the local Albanian population was set to rise from 31 
percent to 59 percent (ICG 2004, 5). Boundaries of the City of Skopje were also 
extended to include rural Saraj municipality and ensure the Albanian population 
reached the 20 percent threshold required to make Albanian an official 
language in the capital. It is no coincidence that one of the two VMRO-DPMNE-
led municipalities with fewer than 5,000 residents that survived merger with a 
neighbouring municipality was Vevčani. It was originally selected for union with 
Struga, but to do so would have tipped the municipality’s delicate ethnic balance 
in favour of local Macedonians once again.10 Similarly, Kičevo’s proposed 
enlargement, initially delayed due to significant local resistance, remained 
unrealised in mid-2012. At the time the decision for amalgamation was taken in 
2004, both Kičevo municipality and neighbouring Drugovo were led by VMRO-
DPMNE.11 However, the subsequent election of a VMRO-DPMNE led 
government in 2006 has meant Kičevo’s expansion has been postponed twice. 
As long as VMRO-DPMNE remain in government, it seems unlikely the 
proposed mergers will go ahead. 
 
Did Macedonia’s territorial reorganisation in 2004 achieve its objectives? With 
regard to the implicit goals held by the Albanian political parties at the time, the 
answer to this question is undoubtedly ‘yes’. The proportion of Albanians living 
in municipalities where they form a majority has increased from 69.30 prior to 
the reform in 2002 to 79.33 percent in 2004 (Kreci and Ymeri 2010, 279).12  
 
 
                                                          
10
 Interview with representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: 16/03/12, Skopje. 
11
 Drugovo is the second VMRO-DPMNE led municipality with a population less than 5,000 to survive the 
reform. 
12
 Based on population statistics from the 2002 Census. 
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Further, many smaller rural municipalities have now been consolidated with 
neighbouring urban jurisdictions. This means that, at least in theory if not in 
practice, previously marginalised rural communities will benefit from the 
superior fiscal resources, public services, and political influence experienced by 
the urban municipalities. However, with regard to the reform’s explicit goals 
(scale economies, economic viability, enhancing local democracy, etc.) the 
verdict is less than positive. The reality of Macedonia’s territorial reorganisation 
has created two significant consequences which adversely affect the ability of 
municipalities to deliver basic services to citizens in an equitable and/or efficient 
manner. 
 
First, while the 2004 reform significantly reduced the fragmentation of municipal 
government in Macedonia, a substantial number of small municipalities with 
questionable fiscal and organisational capacity still remain.13 Experts had 
initially recommended that the number of municipalities be reduced by half to 
around 60 (ICG 2003, 19; World Bank 2003b, 16). The decision to retain as 
many as 84 municipalities means that approximately 40 percent still have 
populations of less than 10,000 (Table 6.2 above). It is worth bearing in mind 
that no analysis of the fiscal capacity of the proposed 84 municipalities was 
completed at the time of the reform (Nikolov 2004, 32; UNDP 2005b, 152). In 
fact, neither the Government nor international experts had any idea how much 
revenue the proposed municipalities could generate, since fiscal records were 
mainly based around the original 34 municipalities.14 The consequence is 
therefore the existence of significant inequalities in the size and fiscal capacities 
                                                          
13
 The reform reduced the proportion of municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants from 37 percent to 
19 percent and increased the share of municipalities with populations between 20,000 and 50,000 from 12 
percent to 30 percent (Karajkov 2006, 16).  
14
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
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of the remaining municipalities. For example, Vraneštica municipality has a 
population of 1,322, a staff of 13, and had an annual budget of approximately 
200,000 euros in 2010; while Kumanovo has 105,484 residents, 133 
employees, and an annual budget of 23 million euros (UNDP 2011b, 5, 7). 
Since Macedonia has adopted a symmetrical model of decentralisation, 
whereby all municipalities - regardless of their size or fiscal capacity - are 
required to provide the same functions and services to citizens, it is inevitable 
that the smaller, less well-endowed municipalities will experience serious 
challenges in the realisation of their competences.15 According to an influential 
assessment published by UNDP in 2008, “one fifth of municipalities are too 
small even to efficiently provide the most basic municipal services … another 
one fifth … are well above the ‘minimum efficient scale’ for public services” 
(Feruglio et al. 2008, 6). 
 
Secondly, the manner in which the political parties carried out the territorial 
reorganisation undermined the very values of subsidiarity and local democracy 
that decentralisation is intended to enhance. Contrary to Article 5 of the 
European Charter on Local-Self Government, there was no public consultation 
on the proposed boundary changes and the results of at least 40 local 
referenda were ignored by central government (CoE 1985; Kreci and Ymeri 
2010, 280).16 As Homi Bhabha has somewhat ironically observed, local 
boundaries are often constructed to serve the imaginations and interests of 
those at the centre (Bhabha 1990). The way in which the territorial 
reorganisation was conducted also meant that decentralisation, whilst originally 
                                                          
15
 The exception is within Skopje, where the City of Skopje municipality provides secondary education, 
health, fire-fighting, and water services for the citizens of the ten Skopje municipalities (Official Gazette 
2004, Art. 10). 
16
 Interview with OSCE official: 24/03/09, Skopje. 
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intended to be an ethnically-blind process, became immediately ethnicised.  
The process raised inter-ethnic tensions to a level not experienced since the 
cessation of hostilities in 2001 and succeeded in tapping into deep insecurities 
among Macedonians, many of whom fear their country’s division (ICG 2004, 7). 
The influential International Crisis Group remarked at the time: “quite literally, 
the process will either make or break Macedonia” (ibid., 4). To a certain extent, 
the boundary reform has tainted the implementation of decentralisation ever 
since. In particular, it made it more challenging politically to discuss solutions to 
the disparities which exist between municipalities, for example inter-municipal 
co-operation or forms of asymmetrical decentralisation, in a rational manner.17 
 
 
Fiscal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia: Subsidiarity  
at the Expense of Solidarity? 
 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the revenues of all municipalities in 
Macedonia have increased substantially since the start of fiscal decentralisation 
in 2006. However, local revenue growth has been uneven across the country, 
and the fiscal disparities between urban and rural municipalities are intensifying. 
The data in Table 6.3 shows that the basic revenues of Macedonia’s 21 
wealthiest municipalities (represented in the fourth data quartile) increased at a 
much greater rate than in the other municipalities.18 Further, revenue growth in 
the 21 poorest municipalities (the first quartile) has been the slowest of all. As a 
consequence, the ratio of total, per capita, basic revenues of the wealthiest 
                                                          
17
 Interviews with: Foundation Open Society Macedonia official: 27/05/10, Skopje; and two UNDP officials: 
12/11/09 and 26/06/11, both in Skopje. 
18
 ‘Basic revenues’ are revenues from all sources other than capital grants and grants for social sector 
functions. 
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municipalities to the poorest increased from 3.2 to 1 in 2006, to 5 to 1 in 2010 
(Levitas 2011, 20). The presence of such significant horizontal disparities 
impacts negatively upon the municipalities’ ability to provide basic services to 
citizens in an equitable manner. It also limits the ability of poorer municipalities 
to invest locally in expanding public services, funding infrastructure 
programmes, and maintain fiscal autonomy from central government (see Table 
6.4 below). 
 
Table 6.3:32Per Capita Basic Revenues of Local Governments by Quartile  
2006 - 2010 (2010 MKD) 
 
Municipalities 
Basic Revenues per Capita (MKD) 
Growth 
Rate 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 / 2006 
1
st
 Quartile 1,208 1,437 1,511 1,681 1,849 53% 
2
nd
 Quartile 1,841 2,236 2,668 2,731 3,184 73% 
3
rd
 Quartile 2,425 3,218 3,456 3,485 4,033 66% 
4
th
 Quartile 3,905 4,653 5,633 6,718 9,200 136% 
Average 2,762 3,447 4,348 4,083 5,186 88% 
Source: Levitas 2011, 19. 
 
Table 6.4:33Composition of Per Capita Expenditure from Municipal Basic 
Budgets by Quartile in 2010 (2010 MKD) 
 
Municipalities 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Goods, 
Services and 
Reserves 
Wages and 
Benefits 
Transfers, 
Subsidies, Social 
Assistance, etc. 
1
st
 Quartile 575 635 581 147 
2
nd
 Quartile 1,219 1,131 736 222 
3
rd
 Quartile 1,570 1,285 813 235 
4
th
 Quartile 5,044 1,909 1,024 355 
Average 2,238 1,506 856 375 
Source: Levitas 2011, 31. 
 
The principal reason for such significant disparities in the revenue-raising 
capacities of urban and rural municipalities is their over-reliance on three 
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property-related sources: the real estate transfer tax, asset income, and the 
construction land development fee. As Chapter 5 has explained, in the absence 
of other potential local taxes (vehicle registration, tourism, etc.), these sources 
dominate municipal basic revenues. However, the extent to which they do so 
varies considerably between urban municipalities that have real-estate markets 
and their rural counterparts that do not. For example, fees on construction land 
accounted for approximately 25 percent of basic revenue in urban municipalities 
outside Skopje in 2008 and less than 15 percent in rural municipalities (Feruglio 
et al. 2008, 32). A second reason for such disparities is the concentration of 
economic activity in the urban centres, discussed in an earlier section. Although 
the share of Personal Income Tax municipalities receive is calculated on a 
derivation basis, those municipalities with more extensive commercial activity 
are likely to benefit more substantially than those with less economically active 
jurisdictions (Levitas 2009, 4). The result is that, as of 2010, the average share 
of tax and non-tax revenue in the principal budget of municipalities was 69 
percent in the City of Skopje, 51 percent in urban municipalities outside Skopje 
(minimum = 11 percent, maximum = 76 percent) and 34 percent in rural 
municipalities (minimum = 5 percent, maximum = 67 percent) (Cyan et al. 2012, 
55). The municipal association’s efforts to increase the local share of PIT from  
3 to 30 percent of regular income will only exacerbate the revenue disparities 
between municipalities. 
 
A further consequence of the municipalities’ over-dependence on property-
related income is the significant and increasing disparity between the capital’s 
revenues, where property construction rates and prices are at a premium, and 
other urban municipalities. Property-related income accounted for an impressive 
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70 percent of the City of Skopje’s total basic revenues in 2010, but only 33 
percent in municipalities outside of the capital (Levitas 2011, 17). This meant 
that by 2010, the ten Skopje municipalities accounted for 47 percent of all 
municipal basic revenues, despite only 25 percent of the population living in 
them. The result is that the average per capita basic revenues of Skopje grew to 
almost three times that of all other jurisdictions in 2010 (ibid., 16-17).  
 
A separate but related problem is the significant inequalities in the per capita 
revenues of the ten Skopje municipalities. Three of Skopje’s municipalities are 
among the poorest in the country, while three are among the richest (ibid., 22-
23).19 As elsewhere in the country, these differences have been driven by the 
property market in different parts of the capital. While it is common that the per 
capita revenues of capital cities exceed those of other jurisdictions, the excess 
is usually only five to ten percent greater.20 The cost of providing services in the 
capital may be slightly higher than elsewhere and Skopje undoubtedly provides 
services to many commuters, in addition to local residents. However, such 
significant income disparities mean that, unlike in the rest of the country, the 
capital is able to invest substantially in improving local services and 
infrastructure (Table 6.5).  
 
                                                          
19
 The three poorest municipalities in Skopje are Šuto Orizari (Roma-majority), Čair and Saraj (both 
Albanian-majority); the richest are Aerodrom, Karpoš and Centar (all Macedonian-majority). 
20
 Interview with the head of a USAID fiscal decentralisation project: 10/05/10, Skopje. 
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Table 6.5:34Disparities in Per Capita Expenditures from the Basic Budget,  
2006 – 2010 (2010MKD) 
 
 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Skopje Others Skopje Others Skopje Others Skopje Others Skopje Others 
Investment 2,749 842 2,781 938 4,009 1,369 3,912 1,212 4,714 1,410 
Goods and 
Services 
1,729 681 1,677 740 2,495 971 2,068 947 2,628 1,130 
Wages and 
Benefits 
614 511 699 595 835 701 894 748 969 819 
Source: Levitas 2011, 30. 
 
A second feature of Macedonia’s model of fiscal decentralisation that 
exacerbates local fiscal inequalities is the practice of allocating cultural and 
social welfare grants according to the existence of a physical facility within a 
municipality’s territory, rather than on the potential number of service users 
(MoLSG 2011b, 8). As the previous chapter discussed, this form of ‘institutional’ 
rather than ‘functional’ decentralisation means that those municipalities 
historically lacking libraries, kindergartens, homes for the elderly, etc. receive no 
grants for the realisation of these competences (Levitas 2011a, 25; Cyan et al. 
2012, 36-37). Given socialist planning’s tendency to concentrate public services 
and infrastructure in urban areas, this practice clearly entrenches the urban-
rural inequalities inherited from Yugoslav times and limits the municipalities’ 
ability to provide services to all citizens in an equitable manner.  
 
Table 6.6 (below) shows that the proportion of citizens with access to specific 
devolved public services varies significantly. For example, only 41 percent of 
citizens have access to elderly care. The data also suggests many 
municipalities are either unable or unwilling to invest their own-source revenues 
in improving access to these services. While anti-rural bias may be offset to a 
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certain extent by rural residents using facilities located in adjacent urban 
municipalities, there is no guarantee that these services will be responsive to 
the needs of rural residents, or that they are available on an equal basis 
(Feruglio et al. 2008, 44). Correcting such inequalities will require a 
considerable amount of new money to fund capital investment which, in a poor 
country such as Macedonia, will take many years. According to the Executive 
Director of the municipal association, ZELS, “if rural municipalities remain 
unable to cover the required investment themselves, they may never have 
these institutions”.21 Merely redistributing available funds in a more equitable 
manner may cause those municipalities already with the required institutions to 
receive insufficient funding to sustain them, while those municipalities without 
will receive inadequate funding to provide the services in a meaningful way 
(Levitas 2011, 27). While central government has recognised that a problem 
exists, according to one local government expert, they are “pushing it under the 
carpet” (MoLSG 2011b, 8).22 A systematic solution is yet to be found and 
national minimum service standards have not been established.23 
 
Table 6.6:35‘Institutional’ Decentralisation and Local Service Delivery 
 
Programme 
No. of 
Municipalities 
Receiving 
Grant 
Proportion of 
Municipalities 
Receiving 
Grants 
No. of 
Municipalities 
Spending 
without 
Grants 
Proportion of 
Municipalities 
Spending 
without 
Grants 
Proportion 
of Citizens 
“Served” 
Libraries 23 27% 1 19% 56% 
Museums 17 18% 3 9% 49% 
Theatres 22 26% 1 13% 48% 
Elderly Care 3 4% 2 3% 41% 
Fire Protection 30 35% 6 1% 81% 
Kindergartens 43 51% 0 33% 78% 
Primary Education 85 100% 0 33% 100% 
Secondary 
Education 
32 38% 0 21% 80% 
Source: Levitas 2011, 27. 
                                                          
21
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
22
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
23
 Interviews with: a UNDP official: 29/06/11, Skopje. 
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Fiscal Equalisation in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
The existence of significant and increasing disparities in the revenue-raising 
capacities of municipalities throughout Macedonia suggests enhancing local 
revenue autonomy through fiscal decentralisation may have been achieved at 
the expense of economic and territorial cohesion. Fiscal inequalities among the 
municipalities, and between Skopje and the rest of the country, demonstrate the 
importance of incorporating a fiscal equalisation mechanism into Macedonia’s 
decentralisation design. This would (ideally) neutralise the economic distortions 
that have arisen from the differing fiscal capacities of the municipalities, and 
ensure they all have the necessary means to provide a comparable level of 
services to residents. According to Macedonia’s system of equalisation, a 
proportion of VAT revenue is distributed to all municipalities by means of a fixed 
general purpose grant of three million MKD and a variable amount based on 
pre-defined criteria. Of the VAT revenue remaining after the general purpose 
grants are paid out, 12 percent is allocated to the City of Skopje, while 88 
percent is distributed to the rest of the country. Skopje’s allocation is then split 
40:60 between the City of Skopje and its ten municipalities, and the 60 percent 
assigned to the City’s municipalities is subsequently divided according to a 
formula based on population (60 percent), surface area (27 percent), and 
number of settlements (13 percent). The same criteria are also used to 
distribute the rest of the country’s allocation among the remaining  
74 municipalities. 
 
There are however a number of serious problems with the current system of 
equalisation which undermine its ability to neutralise fiscal disparities between 
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the municipalities and, in some instances, actually exacerbate them. Most 
significantly, the formula adopted to distribute VAT funds does not take into 
account differences in the revenue-raising capacity of the municipalities (Cyan 
et al. 2012, 10). None of the criteria used (population size, land area, number of 
settlements) contain information on the relative fiscal capacity (tax base) of 
individual municipalities (Feruglio et al. 2008, 48). According to one local expert, 
the Government is too afraid to advocate reducing funds for those wealthier 
municipalities that raise revenue above a certain level.24 A second problem with 
the system is that, paradoxically, poorer municipalities receive less money from 
the VAT Fund than their more well-off counterparts (Levitas 2011, 21). As the 
data in Table 6.7 confirms, in 2010 the 21 poorest municipalities (represented in 
the first quartile) received less money from both the VAT Fund and the Public 
Roads Fund than all other municipalities, and considerably less money than the 
wealthiest municipalities represented in the fourth quartile. They also received 
significantly less capital transfers than the 21 wealthiest municipalities, an issue 
that will be examined in a subsequent section. 
 
Table 6.7:36Distribution of the VAT Fund, Road Fund, and Capital Grants  
among Municipalities, 2010 (per Capita MKD) 
 
Municipalities 
Average 
Population 
of 
Municipality 
in Quartile 
Total 
Basic 
Revenue 
VAT 
Fund 
Road 
Fund 
Capital 
Grants and 
Other 
Transfers 
1
st
 Quartile 20,819 1,849 511 133 142 
2
nd
 Quartile 34,092 3,184 534 134 245 
3
rd
 Quartile 22,126 3,959 611 185 145 
4
th
 Quartile 14,897 9,200 641 207 1,289 
4
th
 without the four 
largest municipalities 
5,335 7,290 1,645 467 329 
Source: Levitas 2011, 20. 
 
                                                          
24
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
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The reason for such a perverse outcome is the fact that, comparable to the 
formulas for distributing primary and secondary education block grants 
examined in Chapter 4, the current equalisation formula over-compensates 
larger and less populous municipalities at the expense of more densely 
populated, smaller jurisdictions (ibid., 3; Cyan et al. 2009, 20). As the data in 
Table 6.7 confirms, the average population size of the 21 wealthiest 
municipalities (represented in the fourth quartile) is significantly lower than 
those found in the other quartiles, and particularly those in the second quartile. 
According to fiscal decentralisation expert Tony Levitas (2011, 20), such results 
are unusual since in most countries more populous jurisdictions tend to have 
larger per capita budgets. The situation is even more surprising when the 21 
wealthiest municipalities are examined more closely, since 17 of these 21 
municipalities have populations of less than 10,000. When the data for the other 
four more populous municipalities is removed from the fourth quartile, it is clear 
that, not only does the average population size of the wealthiest municipalities 
drop substantially (from 14,897 to 5,335), the per capita VAT and Road Fund 
payments received by these 17 municipalities is more than three times greater 
than the amount allocated to the poorest municipalities (represented in the first 
quartile).  
 
While it may be justifiable to include variables such as ‘surface area’ or ‘number 
of settlements’ in the formula to compensate for the additional costs involved 
with delivering services in less densely populated jurisdictions, using both 
simultaneously works against those municipalities with more concentrated 
settlement patterns (Levitas 2009, 20). The decision to incorporate a fixed 
general grant payment for all municipalities, regardless of population size, into 
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the equalisation process from 2009 only exacerbated this outcome since it 
reduced the total funds available for distribution according to the formula 
(Levitas 2011, 4).25 As with the legacy of rural under-development during 
Yugoslav times and with the allocation of education block grants, over-
compensating larger, less populated jurisdictions has ethnic consequences, 
since Albanian communities tend to live in smaller, more densely populated 
municipalities with fewer settlements.26 (See also Appendix R for data on 
regional population density rates.) 
 
A further example where the system has failed to neutralise fiscal disparities 
between the municipalities is that it has gradually become less equalising 
between the City of Skopje and the rest of the country over time. While 
municipalities outside of the capital received approximately three times the 
amount of revenue per capita than those in the City of Skopje in 2006, by 2010 
this ratio had fallen to 2.4 (ibid., 18). The reason for this is partly because the 
City of Skopje lobbied successfully to increase its share of the VAT Fund from 
10 to 12 percent in 2008, and partly because the decision to allocate lump sum 
payments to all municipalities reduced the amount available to distribute to non-
Skopje municipalities.  
 
Skopje’s share of the VAT funds vis-à-vis the rest of the country does not mean, 
however, that its ten Skopje municipalities benefit equitably from the revenue it 
receives, or that existing fiscal disparities between Skopje’s municipalities have 
been reduced. The data in Table 6.8 (below) demonstrates that Skopje’s two 
poorest municipalities (Šuto Orizari and Čair) receive less money from both the 
                                                          
25
 The fixed three million denar grant greatly enhances the revenues of the smaller, less populous 
municipalities, but the amount is relatively insignificant in more populous jurisdictions.  
26
 Interview with the head of a USAID fiscal decentralisation project: 10/05/10, Skopje. 
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VAT and Road Funds on a per capita basis than the other jurisdictions. This is 
because they are both densely populated and have fewer settlements. In 
contrast, another poor municipality (Saraj) fared better under the system due to 
its territory’s size and number of settlements. It is interesting to observe, 
however, that while Saraj received more VAT revenue on a per capita basis 
than any of the other nine Skopje municipalities, it would have received far 
greater funds had it not been part of the City of Skopje.27 DUI’s objective of 
amalgamating the Albanian-majority Saraj municipality with the City of Skopje in 
2004 to ensure the capital became a bilingual city has therefore been made at 
the expense of its residents.28  
 
Table 6.8:37Distribution of the VAT Fund, Road Fund, and Capital Grants 
Revenue among Municipalities in the City of Skopje, 2010 (per capita MKD) 
 
Municipality 
Majority 
Ethnic 
Community  
Total 
Basic 
Revenue 
Population 
(2002 
Census) 
Area 
(km2) 
No. of 
Settlement
s 
VAT 
Fund 
Road 
Fund 
Capital 
Grants & 
Transfers 
Šuto Orizari Roma 1,138 22,017 7 0 253 59 0 
Čair Alb. 1,441 64,773 4 1 130 56 48 
Saraj Alb. 1,513 35,804 241 0 485 92 218 
Gazi Baba Mac. 2,227 72,617 92 9 204 81 63 
Butel Mac. 3,108 36,154 58.6 0 226 95 472 
Kisela Voda Mac. 3,481 57,236 47 8 160 183 468 
Gjorce Petrov Mac. 4,079 41,634 67 5 232 106 500 
Aerodrom Mac. 7,111 72,009 21 11 136 82 0 
Karposh Mac. 7,933 59,666 35 0 158 89 51 
Centar Mac. 19,249 45,412 10 16 158 149 8,533 
Source: Levitas 2011, 23-24. 
 
In an attempt to overcome some of these challenges, UNDP began a process to 
improve the equalisation formula in 2008. The principal aim was to incorporate 
a fourth variable into the allocation formula which measures the relative fiscal 
                                                          
27
 Recall that in 2010, non-Skopje municipalities received approximately 2.4 times the amount of revenue 
per capita from the VAT Fund than those which are part of the City of Skopje. 
28
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
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imbalance of each municipality, based on the difference between estimated 
local expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.29 The process proved challenging: 
first, due to the lack of available and reliable data upon which to base the 
analysis; and second, because support for amending the formula among the 
major stakeholders has been inconsistent.30 In particular, the municipal 
association is against making any changes to the formula, since to do so would 
inevitably mean some of its wealthier members would lose out to the poorer 
ones. Such a dilemma, which is reminiscent of the break-up of Yugoslavia and 
the role asymmetric fiscal redistribution policies played in its dissolution, “could 
tear ZELS apart” (Woodward 1995, 61, 80).31 Instead, ZELS (whose President 
is the Mayor of the City of Skopje) advocates further increases in the proportion 
of VAT revenue available to the municipalities.32 While such an approach may 
maintain the peace among ZELS’ members in the short-term, increasing the 
overall VAT pot would do nothing to equalise disparities between municipalities 
and will indeed exacerbate them. Changes to the distribution of VAT revenue 
are further complicated by the legacy of past equalisation systems, which 
rewarded wealthier municipalities as a means of motivating further revenue 
mobilisation.33 The result is that the wealthier municipalities, and in particular 
Skopje which generated almost 50 percent of national VAT revenue in 2009, 
expect money back (see VAT revenue data at Appendix S). Given the 
challenges experienced in improving the formula and the fact that the 
                                                          
29
 Interview with UNDP officials: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
30
 The analysis of individual municipality’s fiscal imbalance is based on local Personal Income Tax 
revenue, the number of registered residential properties, and the number of square metres of residential 
property. The presence of a sizable grey economy in some jurisdictions, in addition to inconsistent tax 
collection rates and illegal construction, has adversely affected the reliability of this analysis. 
31
 Interview with the head of a USAID fiscal decentralisation project: 10/05/10, Skopje. 
32
 Interview with the Executive Director of ZELS: 20/03/12, Skopje. 
33
 Prior to fiscal decentralisation, property-related taxes collected locally and transferred to the treasury 
system were subject to a public expenditure limit (PEL) or “mini-equalisation system”. The revenues 
distributed to each municipality were capped according to local expenditure needs and any excess was 
transferred into a common fund for equalisation purposes. 65 percent of this surplus was subsequently 
allocated to poorer municipalities, while 35 percent was distributed to those municipalities that had 
collected revenue above the cap as an incentive for maintaining high tax collection rates in the future. 
Interview with USAID project official: 14/03/12, Skopje.   
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municipalities themselves have not pushed hard for its reform, it may be many 
years before Macedonia has a functioning fiscal equalisation system.  
 
 
Further Approaches to Minimising Horizontal Disparities:  
Co-operation between Municipalities 
 
The challenges imposed on Macedonian municipalities by the 2004 territorial 
reorganisation, along with the failure to address persistent fiscal disparities 
through equalisation, encouraged the pursuit of innovative approaches to 
facilitate the equitable delivery of public services. Inter-Municipal Co-operation 
(IMC), through the establishment of joint public agencies or administrative 
bodies, and of outsourcing service delivery to larger municipalities or the private 
sector, is considered one way of compensating for the limited fiscal and 
administrative capacities of the rural municipalities, and of capturing scale 
economies (Official Gazette 2002, Art. 14; 2009; Boex et al. 2004, 9; Budds 
2004, 6;). It also represents a politically viable alternative to further municipal 
mergers, asymmetric decentralisation, or the establishment of a regional tier of 
government. According to a 2011 UNDP report on local governance in 
Macedonia, the concept of IMC emerged as “the only light at the end of the 
tunnel” (UNDP 2011b, 7). Although IMC is a relatively new concept in 
Macedonia, a number of successful co-operative arrangements have been 
established between municipalities since 2005; particularly in the spheres of 
fire-fighting, local economic development, and tax administration (Mojsovska 
2011, 11). While there have been examples of smaller municipalities  
co-operating among themselves to deliver basic services, it is more common for 
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the smaller municipalities to co-operate with their wealthier, urban neighbours. 
For example, between 2007 and 2009, Tetovo municipality entered into an 
agreement with Brvenica municipality to provide tax collection and 
administration services on its behalf. Paying Tetovo 6,000 euros annually to 
provide this facility saved Brvenica an estimated 24,000 euros in administrative 
costs and the salaries of at least three employees.34 
 
Nevertheless, IMC’s potential is yet to be realised for several reasons. Firstly, 
despite the efforts of UNDP and USAID in raising awareness of the concept, 
many municipalities remain unaware of its benefit (ibid., 24). IMC remains a 
voluntary process, dependent upon the goodwill of Mayors, although some local 
experts have suggested a need to further institutionalise co-operation in some 
areas, for example social welfare and education inspection (Official Gazette 
2009a, Art. 3).35 Secondly, a survey commissioned by the Ministry of Local Self-
Government in 2008 found that 73 percent of municipalities identified a lack of 
finances as the primary obstacle to IMC (Mojsovska 2011, 11). The stringent 
expenditure mandates on both block and earmarked grants, discussed in the 
preceding chapter, mean that the municipalities are unable to use these funds 
to establish co-operative arrangements.36 Despite the law on IMC permitting the 
Government to “financially stimulate and support inter-municipal co-operation 
between two or more municipalities”, three years after this law was adopted  
(i.e. by mid-2012), no further action had been taken to do so (Official Gazette 
2009a, Art. 32).37 Finally, it is clear that many municipalities remain reluctant to 
establish partnerships with their neighbours, despite being aware of the 
                                                          
34
 Information available from UNDP’s online database of IMC practise: 
http://www.imc.org.mk/index.php/en/dbase-of-imc-practices [Accessed: 08/05/12]. 
35
 Some forms of IMC are however legally required, for example fire-fighting and the use of eight regional 
landfills. Interview with UNDP officials: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
36
 Interview with UNDP official: 29/06/11, Skopje. 
37
 Interview with UNDP officials: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
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challenges they face in providing services to local citizens (UNDP 2011a, 8). 
This may be because rural municipalities fear losing their newly won 
independence, or due to the existence of ethnic or, more commonly, political 
animosities with their neighbours (World Bank 2006, 32).38 For example, while 
Tetovo’s co-operation agreement with Brvenica made financial sense to both 
municipalities, it was swiftly dissolved with the election of a new Mayor of 
Tetovo in 2009.39 Co-operative agreements do exist between municipalities of 
different political and ethnic backgrounds; however, according to one local 
expert, “the process runs much more smoothly if the municipalities are of the 
same party”.40 It remains to be seen whether existing co-operative 
arrangements survive if and when the local political landscape changes after 
municipal elections are held in 2013. 
 
A related process, intended to correct the legacy of many years of mono-centric 
development policy, is the regional development agenda which began in 2008. 
Whilst not directly related to improving local services, its emphasis on promoting 
balanced economic growth and infrastructure development among the eight 
planning regions should create the conditions required for equal access to 
public services (GTZ 2008a, 11; MoLSG 2011, 2). In some ways the process 
may be regarded as undermining the spirit of localism and subsidiarity. 
However, as this review has demonstrated, decentralisation and municipalities 
acting alone are insufficient for addressing the persistent socio-economic 
inequalities that exist at the regional level. 
                                                          
38
 One local expert pointed out that, particularly in an election year (municipal elections are scheduled for 
March 2013), some Mayors are afraid their political opponents will suggest the existence of IMC 
agreements with neighbours proves they are unable to deliver basic services to citizens without having to 
rely on the support of others. Interview with UNDP official: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
39
 Interview with USAID project official: 14/06/10, Skopje. 
40
 For example, (ethnic Albanian-majority) RDK-led Gostivar municipality provides fire protection services 
to (Macedonian-majority) VMRO-DPMNE-led Mavrovo and Rostuša. Interviews with: the Head of Local 
Economic Development Office, Gostivar Municipality: 28.06.11, Gostivar; UNDP officials: 14/03/12, 
Skopje. 
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The Law on Balanced Regional Development (Official Gazette 2007) prescribed 
the creation of eight regions as functional territorial units for the purpose of 
development planning. Previously, these regions had only been used for 
statistical purposes. (A map of these eight regions is available in Appendix O.) 
The Law also instigated the creation of an institutional framework, at both the 
national and regional level, upon which to implement policy. At the national 
level, the Council for Regional Development, chaired by the Deputy Prime 
Minister for Economic Affairs and comprising relevant line ministries, regional 
representatives, and the President of ZELS, is responsible for harmonising 
regional development policy with national strategies and for determining which 
project proposals receive funding. The Bureau for Regional Development, 
situated in the Ministry of Local Self-Government, is tasked with preparing 
strategic documents, such as the ten-year Strategy for Regional Development 
and its Action Plan (MoLSG 2009a; MoLSG 2009b). At the regional level, eight 
Councils for the Development of the Planning Region, involving all Mayors from 
each planning region, are responsible for creating and implementing 
development programmes in their respective region. They are supported in their 
work by eight Centres for Regional Development.  
 
The Law states that at least one percent of GDP should be reserved for the 
purpose of stimulating balanced regional development (Official Gazette 2007, 
Art. 27). Funds are allocated to finance projects that benefit the regions (70 
percent), “areas with specific development needs” (20 percent), and villages 
(ten percent); and should be distributed on a regional basis according to 
development index in Table 6.9.41 Interesting, while the Polog region scores 
                                                          
41
 An index of 1 indicates that the development of the region is equal to the national average. An index 
higher (or lower) than 1 indicates the development of the region is above (or below) the national average. 
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lowest in terms of socio-economic development,42 its high population density 
means that its overall development rating (calculated by combining both 
indexes) is greater than that of wealthier regions, for example Pelagonia (refer 
to regional GDP data in Appendix N).43 Once again, the criteria used for 
allocating funding seems to favour sparsely populated areas at the expense of 
others, a practice which has ethnic implications in Macedonia. 
 
Table 6.9:38Classification of the Planning Regions according to  
the Development Index (2008-2012) 
 
Planning 
Region 
Development 
Index 
Socio-economic 
Index 
Demographic 
Index 
Macedonia 1 1 1 
East 0.67 0.95 0.5 
Northeast 0.56 0.33 0.70 
Pelagonia 0.73 0.79 0.69 
Polog 0.72 0.18 1.05 
Skopje 1.48 1.86 1.25 
Southeast 0.89 1.38 0.58 
Southwest 0.72 0.50 0.86 
Vardar 0.69 0.63 0.73 
  Source: MoLSG 2009b, 7. 
 
Macedonia achieved significant progress in developing a comprehensive legal 
and institutional framework for regional development in only four years. The 
reforms suggest the allocation of development funds is now institutionalised, 
with the distribution of funding based on agreed priorities and pre-determined, 
published criteria.44 The progress made also implies that an important shift in 
national and local stakeholders’ approach to development has been 
accomplished, and is now more focused on regional, as opposed to sectorial 
                                                          
42
 The economic-social index is based on GDP per capita, gross value added of the non-financial sector, 
fiscal revenues per capita and the rate of unemployment. 
43
 The demographic index is based on the rate of population growth, the ageing coefficient, rate of 
migration and the proportion of university degrees per 1,000 inhabitants. 
44
 Interview with UNDP officials: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
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and local priorities.45 However, this latter assumption may be premature, since a 
review of the types of projects funded by the Bureau for Regional Development 
between 2009 and 2011 suggests most do not include a regional component 
and instead only benefit one or two municipalities (OSCE 2011, 46). 
 
The regional agenda’s potential for promoting balanced economic growth and 
infrastructure development throughout Macedonia is however severely 
restricted by the very limited funding apportioned to it. Despite the Law requiring 
funding of at least one percent of GDP, since 2009 approximately only 0.05 
percent of GDP has been allocated to finance regional initiatives, and actual 
funds have in fact fallen between 2009 and 2011 due to the effects of the global 
economic crisis on the Macedonian economy (ibid., 51).46 Moreover, in 2009 the 
available funds were only used to establish the eight Centres for Regional 
Development and not to fund projects (Mojsovska 2011, 20). The amounts 
allocated for regional development also represent a significant fall in funding 
compared to the amounts previously assigned to the Bureau for Economically 
Underdeveloped Regions prior to 2008. This is despite the fact that the Bureau 
also received considerably less funding than it was entitled to (see data at 
Appendix T).  
 
In response to mounting criticism, in particular DUI’s pre-election demand in 
June 2011 that more money be allocated to regional development, Prime 
Minister Gruevski claimed that the Government was in fact investing 1.1 percent 
of GDP in local development initiatives (ICG 2011, 7; ZELS 2011b). However, 
                                                          
45
 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Local Self-Government: 29/06/11. 
46
 Interview with representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: 16/03/12, Skopje. Funding for balanced regional development fell from 188,300,000 MKD in 
2009, to 168,800,000 MKD in 2010, and 131,522,523 in 2011 (OSCE 2011, 51). 
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this amount has been distributed through the budgets of relevant line ministries 
and agencies, rather than through the appropriate regional institutions. Even if 
this claim is true, allocating funds in this way makes it very difficult to verify 
whether resources are being spent according to regional priorities, especially 
since the Ministry of Local Self-Government has yet to establish a system for 
monitoring regional progress.47 It also means that decisions over spending 
remain centralised within line ministries, are vulnerable to political influence, 
and are not made in a transparent manner which respects the views of the 
municipalities.48  
 
One further issue which undermines the balanced regional development 
agenda is the fact that capital investments, including those referred to by Prime 
Minister Gruevski, continue to be allocated unfairly throughout the country. A 
review completed by the Center for Local Democracy Development found that, 
while accounting for only 25 percent of the population, the ten Skopje 
municipalities received 70 percent of total capital investments in 2010. In 
contrast, the remaining 33 urban municipalities, home to approximately 50 
percent of the population, received 20 percent of capital spending, while the 41 
rural municipalities received only ten percent (see also the data in Tables 6.7 
and 6.8) (CLDD 2011a; 2011b, 22). This means that the wealthiest 
municipalities, most capable of funding capital projects themselves, continue to 
benefit disproportionately from central government funds (Table 6.5). It also 
means that, in the absence of substantial investment in rural areas, little 
progress is being made to correct the distorted infrastructure networks of the 
past. This reality has led Rufi Osmani, Mayor of Gostivar and leader of the 
                                                          
47
 Articles 10 and 57 of the Law on Balanced Regional Development states the Ministry will monitor the 
process of regional development. Interview with UNDP officials: 14/03/12, Skopje. 
48
 Interview with UNDP official: 29/06/11, Skopje. 
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Albanian party ‘National Democratic Rebirth’, to demand that allocation of the 
state budget, and particularly of capital funds, be made proportional to the 
ethnic make-up of the country (Zenku and Ajrullau 2011, 3). The well respected 
Albanian economist Abdylmenaf Bexheti has also called for all decisions 
regarding the allocation of public funds to be subject to the double-majority or 
‘Badinter’ voting procedures (Bexheti 2011, 178). As Chapter 2 explains, the 
use of qualified voting procedures in both the Parliament and municipal councils 
is currently restricted largely to cultural matters. 
 
The main cause of such distorted funding decisions is the Government’s 
controversial facelift of the capital city, entitled “Skopje 2014”. Launched in 
February 2010, this divisive urban renewal programme includes at least 20 
buildings in neo-classical style, 17 large statues, two bridges with 28 
monuments on each, a ‘triumphal’ marble arch, and new parliamentary and 
government buildings within a one square kilometre precinct.49 An area plan of 
the project, current in May 2012, is available at Appendix I.50 The project has 
been dubbed a Balkan-style “Pirates of the Caribbean” theme park for its 
inclusion of a city beach, replica wooden galleon ships, in addition to a London-
style big wheel and double decker red buses (Marusic 2012). It has been widely 
criticised for its largely mono-ethnic portrayal of Macedonian cultural heritage, 
for increasing tensions between ethnic communities and between socialist and 
nationalist political camps, the illegal manner in which urban planning was 
approved, claims of state-sponsored money laundering and corruption, and for 
damaging diplomatic relations with neighbouring Greece (ICG 2011; Marusic 
2011d; Mijalkovic and Urbanek 2011; Surroi 2011; TI Macedonia 2011; Vangeli 
                                                          
49
 The Government’s promotional video of the project, entitled ‘Macedonia Timeless Capital Skopje 2014’, 
is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iybmt-iLysU [Accessed: 10/05/12].  
50
 Additional features are being constantly added to the project. 
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2011). The initiative also inspired a rival Albanian project in Čair municipality, 
which added to claims that Skopje is fast becoming an ethnically divided city.51  
 
However, it is the vast sums spent on this project which pose the greatest threat 
to Macedonia’s territorial cohesion, raising questions regarding the 
Government’s priorities during a global financial crisis.52 Questions have also 
been raised concerning the risk that local priorities, affecting the lives of 
Skopje’s citizens, have been ignored as a consequence.53 Given the opaque 
manner in which work has been procured, cost estimates vary widely between 
250 and 500 million euros (Marusic 2011c; Ilijevski 2012). To put these figures 
in perspective, even the conservative estimate is far greater than the 
131,522,523 euros spent on regional development projects in all eight regions 
during 2011. Moreover, the 22-metre high ‘Warrior on Horseback’ statue of 
Alexander the Great, estimated to have cost  nine million euros, represents 
more than eleven times the country’s entire budget for preserving cultural 
heritage (Marusic 2011a; Ilijevski 2012). It remains an open question, remarks 
Tony Levitas, whether the developmental needs of an entire country are best 
served by spending almost half of all public revenue in the capital city where 
only 25 percent of the population (at least officially) reside. Indeed, Levitas 
believes Macedonia is at risk of falling into a vicious circle, where increasing 
numbers will migrate to Skopje, putting ever greater financial pressure on the 
capital as public services deteriorate throughout the rest of the country (Levitas 
2011, 18-19). 
                                                          
51
 Interview with municipal councillor in Čair municipality: 01/07/11, Skopje. A promotional video of the 
project ‘Sheshi Skenderbeu’ (Skenderbeu Square) is available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxgGGZ4fsF4 [Accessed: 10/05/12]. 
52
 Interview with representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: 16/03/12, Skopje. 
53
 Centar municipality has been obliged to spend a proportion of its local budget on monuments while 
priorities such as the renovation of primary school buildings, canalisation, and traffic management remain 
unfunded. Interview with a senior employee of Centar municipality: 01/07/11, Skopje. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has considered whether the fiscal autonomy ensuing from 
decentralisation has been achieved at the expense of economic and territorial 
cohesion. The analysis began by considering the on-going theoretical debate 
regarding decentralisation’s ability to moderate territorial disparities within a 
country. The literature, whilst inconclusive, suggests that decentralisation may 
be less able to do so in developing and low income countries. Certain aspects 
of Macedonia’s model of decentralisation, along with its impact on the ability of 
municipalities to deliver basic services an equitable manner, were then 
discussed. This analysis found that, whilst municipal boundary changes in 2004 
may have achieved implicit political objectives, the process created a 
substantial number of small municipalities with questionable fiscal and 
organisational capacities. This has had profound consequences on the ability of 
Macedonian municipalities to realise their enhanced competences, particularly 
when they have been devolved to them on a symmetrical basis. The design of 
fiscal decentralisation, with its over-dependence on property-related taxes, has 
been responsible for significant and growing fiscal disparities between urban 
and rural municipalities, and between Skopje and the rest of the country. This 
situation is exacerbated by the adoption of ‘institutional’, as opposed to 
‘functional’ decentralisation, whereby those municipalities historically lacking the 
required institutions, are ineligible to receive the necessary funds. Finally, this 
review has demonstrated how Macedonia’s system of fiscal equalisation has 
been unable to offset the disparities that exist between the municipalities and in 
some instances has actually exacerbated them. 
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Given the Yugoslav legacy of concentrating investment in urban areas, has 
decentralisation led to a more equitable distribution of public resources 
throughout Macedonia? The short answer to this question is ‘so far, no’. The 
design of fiscal decentralisation favours urban municipalities over rural ones 
and, paradoxically, over-compensates larger and less populous municipalities at 
the expense of more densely populated, smaller jurisdictions. It also does little 
to compensate those areas that have been marginalised in the past. Such 
practices entrench the urban-rural inequalities inherited from the Socialist period 
and have important ethnic implications in Macedonia which should not be 
overlooked. Meanwhile, the dysfunctional system of equalisation and grossly 
unbalanced patterns of capital spending mean Macedonia’s model of 
development remains mono-centric. In view of persistent and increasing fiscal 
disparities between municipalities and the regions, decentralisation has also 
done little to create the conditions required to expand citizens’ access to basic 
services. In the absence of substantial capital investment in rural areas, those 
municipalities unable to deliver services in the past remain largely incapable of 
doing so. Co-operative arrangements with neighbouring municipalities have 
however alleviated this problem in some instances.  
 
Finally, it is clear that decentralisation has so far failed to reduce longstanding 
socio-economic disparities between urban and rural municipalities. Notably, 
Macedonia’s decentralisation process led to the creation of fewer rather than 
additional rural municipalities and therefore reduced the number of institutional 
channels through which rural areas can access resources independently.54 It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to ascertain whether enhancing municipal 
                                                          
54
 Often decentralisation leads to the creation of new municipalities, as for example in neighbouring 
Kosovo. 
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discretion over local funding priorities has facilitated a reduction in disparities 
between urban and rural areas within individual municipalities. However, given 
the very limited own-source revenue available in most municipalities outside of 
Skopje, it seems likely that elected municipal representatives will choose to 
concentrate investment in areas where voters are concentrated (i.e. urban), and 
particularly where support for the governing local political party exists. 
Decentralisation is a process, not a one-off act, and experts recognise policies 
designed to indirectly address horizontal disparities between ethnic 
communities are often slow and partial in their impact (Stewart et al. 2008, 318). 
Macedonia’s experience with decentralisation is at a critical juncture and will 
require further reform to consolidate the process, particularly in the sphere of 
fiscal equalisation, if all municipalities (and citizens) are to benefit equally from 
its potential. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Decentralisation alone is unable to address all of the grievances raised by 
Albanian politicians and the NLA during Macedonia’s first decade as an 
independent state. Given the multifaceted concerns of the Albanian community 
during this period, this is hardly surprising. However, the reform does have the 
potential to directly as well as indirectly address many of the horizontal 
inequalities that were responsible for raising tensions between the Macedonian 
and Albanian communities during the 1990s. Importantly, it may do so by 
remaining sensitive to the concerns of the majority Macedonian community.  
 
Based on the empirical evidence contained in this thesis, this chapter offers 
some concluding thoughts regarding the extent to which decentralisation has 
contributed to the management of ethnic conflict in Macedonia over the years 
2005 to 2012. It begins by revisiting the political, cultural, social, and economic 
horizontal inequalities (HIs) identified in Chapter 2, and determines whether the 
reform has lived up to expectations and has indeed contributed to their 
reduction. This section will also consider the extent to which decentralisation, 
and its combined use of power-sharing mechanisms locally, has simultaneously 
addressed the concerns of local minorities, including the Macedonian 
community residing in Albanian-dominated municipalities. The first part of this 
concluding chapter will finally consider whether decentralisation has had any 
adverse effects on Macedonia’s delicate inter-ethnic relations. As the literature 
review in Chapter 1 demonstrated, decentralisation is no panacea and research 
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findings from the few empirical studies that have examined the decentralisation-
conflict nexus have so far been mixed. 
 
Where decentralisation’s potential has not been reached, the second part of this 
concluding chapter considers the obstacles to its successful implementation. 
This analysis distinguishes between factors related to the particular design that 
decentralisation in Macedonia took, and the political, social, and economic 
context within which the reform has so far been implemented. Accordingly, this 
thesis will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing 
different forms of decentralisation in the longer term. It will also offer insight into 
the optimum conditions required for decentralisation to promote sustainable 
peace in Macedonia. The chapter ends with suggestions for further research.  
 
 
Decentralisation’s Ability to Address Horizontal Inequalities in the 
Republic of Macedonia 
 
Political Horizontal Inequalities 
 
The decentralisation of 11 new competences to the municipal level has 
undoubtedly enhanced the ability of communities that are a minority nationally, 
but which constitute a majority at the local level, to have greater political 
(although not necessarily fiscal) control over their own affairs. The reform has 
addressed a significant demand of Albanian politicians and later the NLA for 
greater internal self-determination. Chapter 3 considered whether the 
decentralisation process in Macedonia has widened the effective political 
participation of diverse communities in local decision-making processes and 
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has also strengthened local democracy. As Chapter 2 explained, the inability of 
mainstream politicians to address the political, cultural, social, and economic 
grievances of the Albanian community during the 1990s had led to an erosion of 
trust in the political class among ordinary Albanians. Broadening political 
participation through decentralisation at the local level creates alternative sites 
of power and patronage for local elites and is believed to help legitimise 
government institutions in the eyes of previously marginalised and disenchanted 
groups.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, Chapter 3 shows that while decentralisation 
has certainly expanded the potential space available for citizens to participate in 
local governance - either directly or through elected representatives, it has 
guaranteed neither the participation of diverse local communities, nor that this 
participation is both equitable and effective. The capture of local institutions by 
national political parties, operating tightly controlled candidate lists, has done 
little to facilitate women, independent candidates, and smaller local parties from 
entering public life. Further, the immense resources required to satisfy 
horizontal clientelistic relationships between political parties and local citizens 
has made it very difficult for would-be challengers (either independent or 
opposition candidates) to establish credibility as a potential alternative source of 
benefits. This has significantly reduced the competitiveness of local democracy 
in Macedonia. A pervasive ‘culture of passivity’ among citizens also represents 
a significant a challenge to the success of participatory practices at the local 
level. The low proportion of citizens that had either participated in municipal 
activities or intend to do so in the future suggests citizens are generally not 
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interested in exercising their voice or in holding local political representatives to 
account. 
 
Chapter 3 also appraised the effectiveness of various consociational power-
sharing tools envisaged at the local level. The combined use of local power-
sharing mechanisms with territorial self-governance in this way represents an 
example of complex power-sharing and is essential for ensuring that local 
minorities, including Macedonians living in municipalities dominated by a 
different ethnic community, are not politically marginalised and become 
‘foreigners in their own country’.  
 
While the implementation of local power-sharing mechanisms remains in its 
infancy, seven years of experience is sufficient to demonstrate how vulnerable 
these tools are to being high-jacked by the dominant political parties and by 
those ethnic groups which constitute a majority locally. The result is that these 
minority protection mechanisms have so far not been effective in ensuring local 
democratic processes remain inclusive. For example, with regard to the 
realisation of equitable representation in municipal administrations, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that mayors regularly favour their own 
(ethnic) party supporters in the recruitment of new employees and show little 
regard for candidates’ skills and experience. Reports of large-scale dismissals 
in the wake of local elections are further evidence of the politicisation of local 
public administrations. As the political party governing the largest number of 
Albanian-dominated municipalities since 2005, DUI has equally disenfranchised 
Albanians who are not party members from potential positions in the local civil 
service and public administration.  
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Qualified voting procedures, designed to ensure greater consensus in municipal 
council decision-making, have also been made ineffective by the dominant 
political parties. This power-sharing mechanism is rarely used at the local level 
and, in most cases, political deals between the major parties on sensitive local 
issues are made “behind closed doors” and long before the issue is debated in 
municipal councils. Such practice makes this local minority protection 
mechanism irrelevant. Restrictions on its use also mean that the mechanism is 
unable to protect the views of minority communities in many areas of 
importance to them; for example education provision and adoption of the 
municipal work programme and budget. Further, whilst it is admirable that so 
many municipalities have established Committees for Inter-Community 
Relations, even though they are not all obliged to do so, their effectiveness 
remains questionable. The Committees’ ability to facilitate institutional dialogue 
between different ethnic groups has been hindered by poor operational 
capacity, unclear competences, a lack of resources, and their marginalisation 
by municipal councils. As with municipal administrations, their membership has 
also become frequently politicised and often fails to reflect the ethnic structure 
of the local population they are intended to represent. 
 
It is important to emphasise that Macedonia’s smaller ethnic communities, living 
scattered throughout the country, generally fail to benefit from these three 
consociational-inspired protection mechanisms. Macedonians and Albanians 
residing in small numbers in those municipalities where another ethnic 
community is in the majority are subject to a similar fate. There is also a danger 
that these local power-sharing mechanisms will continue to advance the 
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interests of (some) ethnic communities at the expense of gender equality and of 
broader intra-ethnic relations, i.e. between members of different political parties.  
 
 
Cultural Status Horizontal Inequalities 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how restrictions on the use of community languages 
and symbols at the local level represented two cultural status horizontal 
inequalities that increased tensions between the Macedonian and Albanian 
communities during the 1990s. Albanian politicians, and later the NLA, 
demanded that the right to use their language in municipalities where significant 
Albanian communities reside be reinstated, and that the Albanian flag be 
permitted to fly outside public buildings in Albanian-majority municipalities. 
 
Devolving the management of controversial issues such as the use of 
community languages and flags to the municipal level has gone some way to 
diluting Albanian cultural status demands. While Albanian politicians have so far 
been unable to realise their request that Albanian become a second official 
language state-wide, reducing the threshold for the mandatory use of 
community languages from 50 to 20 percent of the local population has meant 
that Albanian has acquired official status in 29 of the 85 municipalities, including 
(significantly) the capital City of Skopje. This means that the official use of the 
Albanian language has become mandatory in more than a third of Macedonia’s 
municipalities. Similarly, displays of the Albanian flag alongside the state 
(Macedonian) flag is permitted outside public buildings in the 16 municipalities 
where local Albanian communities constitute more than 50 percent. 
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However, the positive impact of having Albanian as a second ‘language in 
official use’ in so many municipalities has been restricted by the various 
challenges experienced in its implementation. Difficulties are particularly 
prevalent in the 13 municipalities where Albanians do not form a majority (but 
represent at least 20 percent of the local population), i.e. where the mayor is 
from a different ethnic group and where the political strength of Albanian parties 
in the municipal council is weak. The fact that municipalities do not receive 
additional state resources to fund associated costs, such as the salaries of 
translators or interpreters, represents another significant barrier. Similarly, 
realisation of the enhanced use of community flags has also been beset with 
problems. While amendments to the 2005 law on the use of flags in 2011 
eventually re-confirmed the right of local majority communities to display their 
flag alongside the state flag, the state flag must now be one-third larger in size 
than the community flags. 
 
As with the use of consociational power-sharing mechanisms locally, the 
geographic dispersal of the Turkish, Roma, Serbian, and Vlach communities 
throughout Macedonia means that in most municipalities these smaller 
communities fall well below the thresholds required to benefit from rights 
permitting the enhanced use of community languages and symbols. The use of 
languages other than Albanian and Macedonian is consequently obligatory in 
only six municipalities (approximately seven percent); while flags of the smaller 
communities may only be used in three municipalities.  
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Social Horizontal Inequalities 
 
Dissatisfaction with the availability of Albanian-medium education during the 
1990s represented a significant social HI experienced by Macedonia’s Albanian 
community and which exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions. The recentralisation of 
education provision during the 1990s also meant that decisions over spending 
became less transparent and exacerbated the perception that funding decisions 
were being made at the expense of non-majority communities. Acquiring 
greater local administrative and financial responsibility for the provision of 
primary and secondary education services, it was assumed, would reduce 
perceived inequalities in their quality and availability. Chapter 4 therefore 
examined whether decentralisation has improved access to mother-tongue 
education by facilitating the provision of heterogeneous local public services, 
enhancing participation and transparency in local decision-making, and 
ensuring a more equitable and transparent distribution of public resources.  
 
The empirical evidence confirms that the provision of Albanian as well as 
Turkish-medium education has generally improved since responsibility for its 
provision was devolved to the municipalities in 2005. However, the experiences 
of the smaller communities in accessing education in their mother tongue – 
either as the language of instruction or in elective classes – have been less 
positive. The proportion of Albanian students attending primary education in 
their mother tongue was already high (97.93 percent in 2004/05), and improved 
further in the following years (98.44 in 2010/11). Similarly, whilst the proportion 
of Turkish students attending primary education in their mother tongue has 
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historically been much lower than for Albanian students, this too increased, from 
58.45 percent in 2004/05 to 67.06 percent in 2010/11.  
 
However, the data for secondary education shows a slightly different picture. 
Here, the proportion of Albanian students attending classes in their mother 
tongue is lower, but has also increased in recent years and remains over 
90 percent. Interestingly, while the number of Albanian students attending 
Albanian-medium classes has been on the increase, so too has the total 
number of Albanians attending secondary school generally. The result is that 
the proportion of Albanian students attending Albanian-medium classes actually 
fell between 2004/05 and 2009/10, but improved in 2010/11 when the 
proportion stood at 95.02 percent. This has not, however, been the experience 
of Turkish students, who have accessed Turkish-medium secondary education 
in increasing numbers. The official data, corroborated by Municipal Education 
Officers, therefore suggests that, with the exception of a few controversial 
cases, since decentralisation began it has become relatively easy for 
municipalities to open new classes where the language of instruction is either 
Albanian or Turkish. 
 
The analysis in Chapter 4 also suggests that enhanced community involvement 
in decision-making processes has promoted greater democratic governance 
within schools. It has also allowed what were once highly contentious issues, 
such as the renaming of schools or the opening of a new school, to be generally 
made on a rational basis. While some School Boards may operate as “mini 
municipal councils”, with the appointment of representatives being highly 
politicised and discussions dominated by only a handful of members, many 
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School Boards do function well. However, ensuring their membership fully 
reflects the local student population they serve is an on-going challenge, with 
Roma students being particularly under-represented in these structures.  
 
A further potential benefit of decentralisation was to facilitate a more equitable 
and transparent distribution of education resources. The empirical evidence 
contained in Chapter 4 confirms that moving to a per-capita education funding 
formula in 2006 undoubtedly facilitated a more equitable distribution of funds 
through block and earmarked education grants. Basing funding calculations on 
the number of students attending school rather than on historical costs meant 
that funds flow directly to where they are needed. The use of lump sum 
payments, in addition to weights for schools located in sparsely populated 
areas, also ensures that the higher costs of delivering educational services in 
rural areas are met. The use of a pre-defined allocation formula has also 
improved transparency in the distribution of resources and has reduced the 
possibility of discretionary payments from central government. Nevertheless, 
challenges remain and further work could be done to fine-tune the funding 
formulae to ensure rural municipalities do not receive too much relative to their 
urban counterparts. The fact that key financial elements of the formulae are not 
routinely made public, even to the municipalities, also suggests that greater 
effort could be made to ensure local stakeholders understand its impact on 
education financing. 
 
Two crucial areas where per-capita funding is unable to address funding 
inequalities in education, and which disproportionately affect Albanian students, 
are the process by which resources are distributed at the school level (between 
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the central school and its branches) and the allocation of capital expenditure to 
the municipalities. The analysis in Chapter 4 illustrated how approximately two 
thirds of all primary school facilities are satellite or branch schools, with a large 
proportion providing instruction in languages other than Macedonian. Their 
unequal treatment is “like a family secret”, which everyone knows but does not 
want to talk about. Significant disparities exist in the physical condition of central 
and satellite school buildings, in addition to students’ access to teaching 
materials and pedagogical support staff. This unresolved issue clearly impacts 
on the equity of educational standards throughout Macedonia and between the 
different ethnic groups. 
 
A further issue left unaddressed by changes in the calculation of block and 
earmarked education grants is the distribution of capital expenditure to the 
municipalities. As the discussions in Chapters 2 and 6 have demonstrated, 
given socialist planning’s tendency to concentrate public infrastructure in cities 
and towns, many rural areas that are home to sizable Albanian and Turkish 
communities remain outside the secondary school network. Significant capital 
investment is therefore needed to address persistent disparities in these 
previously neglected areas. Substantial investment is also required to counter 
the effects of uneven demographic growth, which has resulted in significant 
overcrowding in many urban secondary schools. However, capital grants for 
school infrastructure projects remain under the control of central government 
and, as the evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 suggests, their allocation lacks 
transparency and is highly vulnerable to discretionary decision-making. The 
prevailing perception – real or imagined – is therefore that capital funds are 
largely distributed to those municipalities aligned with the governing coalition 
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parties. While the municipalities are legally competent to rationalise the local 
school network, the ability of some to access the capital investments required to 
build new schools or extend current facilities is severely constrained. The result 
is that overcrowding remains in significant problem in many schools, with some 
required to operate multiple class shifts in order to accommodate students. 
 
 
Economic Horizontal Inequalities 
 
The analysis in Chapter 2 illustrated how high levels of unemployment, a 
general decline in living standards, and chronic rural under-development formed 
the backdrop to Albanian politicians’ demands during the 1990s. The economic 
context to inter-ethnic conflict was examined further in Chapter 6. This 
assessment demonstrated how significant and persistent disparities between 
urban and rural areas were a legacy of Yugoslav times and often had 
unintended ethnic consequences. The result was that citizens’ access to basic 
public services was restricted in some rural areas; a situation which led to 
significant levels of social exclusion, particularly within non-majority 
communities. Decentralisation is believed to alleviate disparities between 
regions by promoting a more equitable distribution of state resources, and by 
facilitating economic development through increased public sector efficiency. 
 
Chapter 6 considered whether decentralisation in Macedonia has facilitated a 
more equitable distribution of public resources, created the optimal conditions 
for expanding citizens’ access to basic services, and reduced longstanding 
socio-economic disparities between urban and rural areas. It did not, however, 
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evaluate whether the reform has promoted economic development and reduced 
poverty through job creation since it is unclear whether these claims can be 
ascribed to decentralisation alone. 
 
With regard to the equitable distribution of public resources, as the previous 
section has already discussed, significant improvements in the allocation of 
education funding were achieved by the adoption of a per-capita funding 
formula in 2006. However, and despite a legal requirement to do so, the 
allocation of grants to finance the provision of cultural services, social welfare 
and child protection, and primary health remain based on historical costs. This 
means that funding for the realisation of these competences is dependent on 
the existence of a physical facility within a municipality’s territory. Those 
municipalities historically lacking such facilities receive no funding and are 
unable to even ‘buy-in’ services from neighbouring municipalities or the private 
sector. This form of ‘institutional’, as opposed to ‘functional’, decentralisation 
does nothing to facilitate a more equitable distribution of public resources, or 
create the optimal conditions for expanding citizens’ access to basic services.  
Instead, it reinforces pre-existing disparities between urban and rural areas. 
 
A second aspect of fiscal decentralisation which inhibits the reform’s ability to 
reduce socio-economic disparities between urban and rural areas is its over-
reliance on property-related taxes as a form of municipal own-source revenue. 
This feature, examined at length in Chapters 5 and 6, favours those (urban) 
municipalities with real-estate markets, rather than their rural counterparts. The 
same applies to the municipalities’ share of personal income tax, which benefits 
those (predominantly urban) areas with more developed local economies. The 
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result is that discrepancies in municipal own-source revenues, between urban 
and rural areas, and between Skopje and towns outside of the capital, have 
actually intensified after decentralisation began. Attempts to reduce horizontal 
inequalities through fiscal equalisation and regional development have so far 
been unsuccessful and have in fact - pervasively - exacerbated current 
inequalities. The presence of such significant horizontal disparities impacts 
negatively upon the municipalities’ ability to provide basic services to citizens in 
an equitable manner. It also limits the ability of poorer municipalities to invest 
locally in expanding public services and funding much needed infrastructure 
programmes. 
 
One final issue that undermines decentralisation’s ability to alleviate socio-
economic disparities between regions is the grossly unbalanced patterns of 
capital spending that favour Skopje over the rest of the country, and wealthier 
urban municipalities at the expense of their poorer rural counterparts. This 
means that the wealthiest municipalities, most capable of funding capital 
projects through their own-source revenues, continue to benefit 
disproportionately from central government funds. It also means that little 
progress has been made to compensate those predominantly rural areas that 
have been marginalised in the past. In the absence of substantial capital 
investment in these areas, those municipalities unable to deliver services in the 
past remain largely incapable of doing so. Despite (limited) efforts to establish a 
system of balanced regional development, Macedonia’s model of development 
remains principally mono-centric.  
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Decentralisation and Ethnic Conflict: Some Counterproductive Effects 
 
To summarise, based on empirical evidence from seven years of the reform’s 
implementation, decentralisation has positively addressed some of the 
horizontal inequalities that existed between the Albanian and Macedonian 
communities prior to 2001. First, devolving additional competences to the 
municipal level has enhanced the political control diverse communities have 
over the management of local affairs. Second, the creation of alternative sites of 
power for local elites has expanded the space available for citizens to 
participate in local governance. Third, devolving the management of 
controversial issues such as the use of community languages and flags to the 
municipal level has gone some way towards diluting Albanian cultural status 
demands. Finally, decentralising responsibility for the delivery of primary and 
secondary education has also contributed positively to the management of inter-
ethnic tensions. Access to mother-tongue education has improved, community 
involvement in local decision-making processes has increased, and education 
funds are now distributed in a more equitable and transparent manner. 
 
However, decentralisation may also have had adverse effects on inter-
community relations. For example, since the reform only benefits territorially 
concentrated groups, Macedonia’s smaller ethnic communities, living scattered 
throughout the country, generally fail to benefit from its consociational-inspired 
power-sharing mechanisms. Macedonians and ethnic Albanians residing in 
small numbers in municipalities where another ethnic community may be in the 
majority are also subject to a similar fate. The smaller communities may have 
been more capable of accessing primary and secondary education in their 
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mother tongue had a more personal, rather than territorial, form of autonomy 
been applied. However, the Framework Agreement was never actually 
designed to offer equal protection to all Macedonia’s ethnic communities, since 
its principle aim had been to address the grievances of the Albanian community 
and in doing so, avert further conflict. A consequence of this may be that 
Macedonia has moved a step closer to becoming a bi-national state, rather than 
the multi-national state anticipated by its Constitution’s Preamble (Engström 
2002a). 
 
A second example where decentralisation may have had a counterproductive 
effect on inter-community relations is the growing trend of ethnic segregation in 
both primary and secondary schools, examined in Chapter 4. This threatens to 
undermine the cohesion of Macedonian society. While this phenomenon is not a 
direct consequence of the decentralisation process, the enhanced ‘voice’ local 
politicians, teachers, and parents now have in deciding important educational 
matters may have exacerbated this trend. Similarly, improvements in the 
provision of mother tongue education, which necessitates students being taught 
in separate classes according to the language of instruction, may have been 
made at the expense of social cohesion. The municipalities may not have been 
responsible for starting this trend, however it appears they are doing very little 
to reverse it. 
 
Third, as the previous section has mentioned, aspects of fiscal decentralisation 
have in fact intensified discrepancies in own-source revenues between urban 
and rural municipalities. Attempts to reduce horizontal inequalities through fiscal 
equalisation and regional development have so far failed and have actually 
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exacerbated current inequalities. This means that some municipalities have 
been unable to expand citizens’ access to basic services as desired and 
significant levels of social exclusion remain. 
 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the use of consociational-inspired 
power-sharing mechanisms at the local level has increased the saliency of 
ethnicity within municipalities. While it is clear that these mechanisms may have 
advanced multiculturalism at the expense of gender equality, the empirical data 
suggests that some smaller communities, such as the Torbeš, are feeling the 
pressure to assimilate with more dominant ethnic groups. The controversial 
request to open Albanian-medium classes in a primary school in Podgorci, 
Struga municipality, where the students involved are Macedonian Muslims, is 
one example of such assimilationist tendencies. The fact that the 2011 
population census was abandoned because it became “marred by ethnic rows” 
is further evidence of the enduring contentious of nature of ethnic demographics 
in Macedonia. Since the recognition of community languages comes as a 
function of demographics, rather than as a symbolic recognition of their equal 
status with the Macedonian language, it is possible decentralisation may have 
exacerbated this longstanding tension (Marusic 2011b). 
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Table 7.1:39Decentralisation’s Ability to Address Horizontal Inequalities  
in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
Horizontal Inequalities Addressed by Decentralisation? 
Political participation  
Broadened political 
participation by creating 
alternative sites of power 
(mayors and councillors) 
Yes / partially: 
 
Devolved competences have enhanced communities’ political 
control over local own affairs; 
 
Limited fiscal autonomy has constrained local political 
autonomy; 
 
Space for citizens to participate in local governance has 
expanded; 
 
Party capture has reduced the competitiveness of local 
democracy; 
 
‘Culture of passivity’ among citizens weakens local 
democracy. 
 
Proportional 
representation in the 
municipal and local public 
administration 
Yes / partially: 
 
New jobs created in municipal and local public 
administrations; 
 
Politicisation of process disenfranchises non-party members 
(of ruling coalition) and smaller communities. 
 
Power-sharing 
mechanisms to protect 
local minorities  
 
Generally no: 
 
Qualified voting procedures are rarely used and are 
ineffective; 
 
CICRs are ineffective and fail to represent local ethnic 
communities; 
 
Mechanisms unable to protect the needs of smaller 
communities. 
 
Cultural status   
Use of community 
languages at the 
municipal level 
Yes / partially: 
 
Albanian has acquired official status a third of municipalities; 
 
Practical and political obstacles remain regarding language 
use; 
 
Smaller communities rarely benefit from right to use 
language. 
 
Use of community flags 
and symbols at the 
municipal level 
 
Yes / partially: 
 
Albanian flag on display in 16 municipalities; 
 
Smaller communities rarely benefit from right to display 
symbols. 
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Horizontal Inequalities Addressed by Decentralisation? 
Social aspects  
Access to education in 
mother tongue at the 
primary and secondary 
levels 
Yes / partially: 
 
Provision of Albanian and Turkish-medium education has 
improved at both primary and secondary levels; 
 
Smaller communities less able to access mother tongue 
education. 
 
Enhanced community 
involvement in decision-
making processes 
Generally yes: 
 
School Boards have increased local community involvement; 
 
Politicisation of membership remains a challenge, as well as 
the representation of all local communities. 
 
Equitable and transparent 
distribution of education 
resources 
Yes / partially: 
 
Per-capita formula has improved equity and transparency; 
Distribution of funds and resources remains unfair at school 
level; 
 
Inequitable allocation of capital grants for school 
infrastructure. 
 
Economic aspects  
Improve access to public 
employment at all levels 
Yes / partially: 
 
New jobs created in municipal and local public 
administrations; 
 
Politicisation of process disenfranchises non-party members 
(of ruling coalition) and smaller communities. 
 
Rural under-development 
and equitable access to 
basic public services in 
rural areas 
No: 
 
Some grants dependent on existence of a physical facility; 
 
Fiscal reforms exacerbate disparities in own-source 
revenues; 
 
Inequitable allocation of capital grants reinforces inequalities;  
 
Fiscal equalisation and regional development has been 
ineffective. 
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Obstacles to the Successful Implementation of Decentralisation in the 
Republic of Macedonia 
 
Design Features: Symmetry and an Over-Reliance on Property-Related  
Own-Source Revenue  
 
With regard to the design of decentralisation, what matters most is the degree 
to which the reform addresses the concerns and demands of conflicting parties, 
and whether it reflects the structural conditions of the conflict situation (Wolff 
2012, 32). Considering the territorial distribution of the Albanian community in 
Macedonia, decentralisation to the local level is more suitable for addressing 
Albanian concerns than other form of self-governance, for example federalism 
or autonomy (territorial or personal).1 The ethnic heterogeneity of Albanian-
majority areas also requires that Macedonia’s decentralisation model 
incorporates local power-sharing mechanisms. As this thesis has argued 
throughout, decentralisation, in its design and choice of devolved competences, 
has the potential to address most of the demands of Albanian political elites and 
the masses simultaneously, whilst remaining sensitive to the concerns of the 
Macedonian majority.  
 
However, there are two particular features of decentralisation’s design that has 
failed to address the structural conditions of the conflict situation in Macedonia. 
This is the decision to devolve competences to the municipalities on a 
symmetrical basis, despite the existence of significant inequalities in their size 
and fiscal capacity. Consequently, municipalities such as Rosoman with a total 
                                                          
1
 Macedonia’s Albanian community resides in compact areas in the north and west of the country, but also 
with sizable communities in Skopje and the eastern regions. 
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staff of six, are tasked with delivering the same functions and services to 
citizens as Strumica and Tetovo municipalities with 134 and 158 employees 
respectively. It is therefore inevitable that the smaller, less well-endowed 
municipalities will experience serious challenges in the realisation of their 
competences. A structural feature of the Macedonian environment which 
exacerbates this situation is the existence of longstanding socio-economic 
disparities between urban and rural areas.2 So far, the success of short-term 
solutions, such inter-municipal co-operation agreements, in addressing this 
problem has been mixed. Unless the situation is resolved in a more systematic 
manner, significant parts of the Macedonian population will remain 
marginalised, without equitable access to basic services. It is possible that 
these areas may once again provide fertile ground for social and political 
instability. 
 
One final design feature of Macedonian decentralisation which provides an 
obstacle to the reform’s successful implementation is its over-reliance on 
property-related taxes as a form of municipal own-source revenue. The 
consequence is that those predominantly rural areas that have been most 
marginalised in the past remain least capable of funding much needed local 
infrastructure projects themselves. Other features of fiscal decentralisation 
which have been shown to exacerbate regional disparities, i.e. ‘institutional’ as 
opposed to ‘functional’ decentralisation, and unbalanced patterns of capital 
spending, are the result of abuses of the reform’s design, rather than of 
decentralisation itself, and are therefore not discussed here. 
 
                                                          
2
 Significant socio-economic disparities between urban and rural areas do not necessarily represent an 
obstacle to decentralisation’s successful implementation (and is therefore not discussed in the next 
section). However, failure to accommodate these structural features into the reform’s design does. 
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Contextual Factors: A Political Climate that is Not Conducive to Decentralisation 
 
In their review of institutional designs in conflict-torn societies, Sunil Bastian and 
Robin Luckham point out that “often it is not the formal institutional choices that 
are important, so much as the politics surrounding them” (Bastian and Luckham 
2003, 305). Democratic institutions are never introduced in a political and 
economic vacuum. Researchers of decentralisation have become increasingly 
aware of how international donors tend to focus on the attainment of 
normatively desirable outcomes with very little consideration or understanding 
of the politics behind them (Manor 1999; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). 
Scholars have also observed how international agencies are inclined to frame 
decentralisation programmes on the basis of normative Western conceptual 
models which embody explicit or implicit assumptions that may not always apply 
in developing and transition country contexts (Litvack et al. 1998; Connerley et 
al. 2010). It is important that this conclusion therefore reconsiders how the 
motives of political elites, changes to the national economy, and the political 
configuration of party politics has had on decentralisation’s chances of success.  
 
An assessment of the motives behind Macedonia’s decision to decentralise 
power to the municipal level found that the political environment within which 
the reform had been conceived and implemented may not have been conducive 
to its success. Initially, since the reform represents part of the wider Framework 
Agreement package, majority Macedonian political parties had been placed 
under great pressure from external actors to decentralise. As the analysis in 
Chapter 2 demonstrates, prior to conflict in 2001, there had been very little 
political will to devolve further political and fiscal responsibilities to the 
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municipalities. This suggests that there may have been very little genuine 
enthusiasm to decentralise among Macedonian political circles at the time the 
reform were adopted. Given the international community’s involvement, 
decentralisation may also have lacked legitimacy and local ownership in the 
eyes of citizens. Peace, note Lake and Rothchild (2005, 110), consolidates 
majority power, and it is possible that the dominant political parties may have 
used their political strength to recentralise state authority and resources once 
the immediate political crisis had receded. 
 
Analysis of the electoral strength of Macedonia’s largest political parties 
between 1998 and 2011 also suggests that fluctuations in the electoral strength 
of the governing parties, and in particular a change of government in 2006, may 
have adversely affected central government’s commitment to decentralise 
(Roeder and Rothchild’s ‘transient majority problem’ discussed in Chapter 1). 
SDSM’s strength at the local level until 2009, for example, suggests there has 
been very little political incentive for VMRO-DPMNE to consolidate the reform 
process since the latter came to power nationally in 2006. To do so would mean 
reducing the control the party has in central government and rewarding political 
rivals at the local level. The electoral strength that both VMRO-DPMNE and DUI 
have enjoyed concurrently at the central and local levels also suggests that 
these governing parties may prefer to rely on (party-controlled) inter-
governmental transfers and capital grants to fund devolved competences, rather 
than enhance local fiscal autonomy. The effect of the global economic crisis on 
the Macedonian economy since 2009 adds further credence to the 
government’s reluctance to devolve additional fiscal responsibility to the 
municipalities at the expense of macroeconomic stability. The outcome of 
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municipal elections in 2013 will be critical for determining whether central 
government continues to support the decentralisation reforms or will seek to 
reverse progress made to date. 
 
One further feature of Macedonian politics which has not made the political 
environment conducive to decentralisation is the over-whelming dominance of 
national political parties at the municipal level. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, 
since 2009 the four largest national parties have controlled over 90 percent of 
all municipalities.3 The number of independent mayors and candidates 
representing smaller, local parties has consequently declined since the start of 
decentralisation. Similarly, the two main parties in the current national governing 
coalition (VMRO-DPMNE and DUI) control over 80 percent of all municipalities. 
This means that there is very little room for dissent between local and national 
level political priorities. It also means that the municipal association ‘ZELS’, the 
only formal channel available to the municipalities for raising local concerns at 
the national level within the unitary state, has become dominated by mayors 
representing central government-aligned municipalities. According to one local 
government expert in Macedonia, “ZELS’ hands are completely tied”.4 
 
 
Contextual Factors: Undemocratic Parties Undermine Democratic 
Decentralisation 
 
According to the pre-conditions for successful decentralisation outlined in 
Chapter 1, central government must be genuinely prepared to share power with 
sub-national units, and both the central and local levels must regard each other 
                                                          
3
 VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI, and DPA. 
4
 Interview with Foundation Open Society Macedonia official: 27/06/11, Skopje. 
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as equal partners. However, high levels of central control and member 
discipline within Macedonian political parties implies the subordination of local 
politicians in party structures at the expense of local democracy. The 
dominance of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI at both municipal and parliamentary 
levels also suggests that the potential for national parties to exercise control 
over their local counterparts is considerable. Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova has 
observed how most parties in Macedonia continue to operate under 
organisational principles inherited from the League of Communists. Parallels 
can therefore be made with McGarry and O’Leary’s description of the Soviet 
Union as a “sham pluralist federation”, in which real power lay in the tightly 
centralised Communist Party (McGarry and O’Leary 2011, 259). In August 
2004, the International Crisis Group observed how party reform is the missing 
element in consolidation of Macedonia's democratic political system (ICG 2004, 
10). Eight years on and in the absence of such reform, the question remains 
whether “non-democratic parties, operating within a non-democratic structure” 
can bring democracy to Macedonia (ICG 2011, 9).  
 
A second feature of Macedonian politics which undermines the autonomy of 
local politicians is the existence of vertical clientelistic relationships within 
parties. Such relations allow party leaders to maintain control over political 
decisions as well as state resources by nominating loyal, subservient ‘clients’ at 
the municipal level. Examples of this practice include the municipalities’ fiscal 
dependency on discretionary, ad hoc inter-governmental transfers and on pork 
barrel projects designed to reward loyal constituents. What may appear to be 
representative local governments, responsive to the needs of local citizens, may 
in reality only be a de-concentration of central government. Left unchecked, 
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patron-client relations within political parties can undermine the benefits 
associated with decentralisation by limiting the effectiveness of municipal 
administrations and by making them less accountable to local citizens. Vertical 
clientelistic relationships may even weaken the legitimacy of the new 
democratic order itself. 
 
 
Contextual Factors: Limited Fiscal Autonomy Undermines Political and 
Administrative Decentralisation 
 
The detailed examination of the revenue, expenditure, and contractual 
autonomy of Macedonian municipalities in Chapter 5 suggests that 
decentralisation has done little to restrain central government’s monopoly of 
state power and resources. As a result, Macedonia’s decentralisation has only 
been partial. Limited access to own-source revenues and an over-dependence 
on insufficient, and often discretionary, inter-governmental transfers imply the 
revenue autonomy of municipalities is weak.5 Stringent expenditure mandates 
for block grants and the frequent freezing of municipal bank accounts due to 
unpaid arrears indicates the expenditure autonomy of the municipalities remains 
tightly constrained by the centre. Finally, the limited ability of municipalities to 
enter into financial contracts with different sets of private actors suggests their 
contractual autonomy is also fragile. These aspects of fiscal decentralisation are 
the result of a conscious political decision by central government to maintain 
power, rather than a general design feature of decentralisation per se. The 
                                                          
5
 Additionally, on the two occasions where formula-based systems have been used to allocate state 
resources (education funding and equalisation grants), there is evidence to suggest that central 
government may even have manipulated coefficients in a way that rewards those municipalities controlled 
by its political allies. 
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result is that Macedonia appears to be more decentralised than it really is, since 
the political and administrative aspects of decentralisation are more visible than 
the discrete and complex fiscal regulations that undermine the reform’s 
potential. 
 
This thesis confirms that while constitutionally-guaranteed decentralisation 
processes may be harder to reverse than others, it is not impossible. The 
administrative and political aspects of Macedonian decentralisation are 
constitutionally guaranteed; however, the municipality’s right to meaningful 
fiscal autonomy is not. Rules pertaining to the management of fiscal 
decentralisation are defined in legislation which can be easily amended, and 
there is evidence to suggest that central government has in fact acted contrary 
to its own legal procedures on some occasions.6  
 
Tulia Falleti (2005) has observed how political, administrative, and fiscal 
decentralisation may be rolled out in different sequences on the basis of 
politically motivated strategies. For example, where democratisation is the 
reform’s principal objective, establishing mechanisms for the election of local 
representatives is likely to be a priority. When national politicians devolve 
powers in order to more effectively harness resources for developmental ends, 
fiscal aspects of decentralisation may become further advanced. Connerley et 
al. (2010, 169) argue that when decentralisation is introduced as a security-
enhancing reform, local governments are often given greater administrative 
control over the provision of public services, such as education, rather than 
enhanced fiscal or political powers. If this observation is applied to the 
                                                          
6
 Examples include the failure to distribute cultural, social welfare, and primary health grants on a per-client 
basis and a failure to allocate one percent of GDP to fund regional development initiatives. 
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Macedonian context, it suggests that the partial implementation of 
decentralisation may not be accidental, but rather represents a conscious 
decision on behalf of central government to maintain overall control. Non-
simultaneous transfers of political, administrative, and fiscal powers pose fewer 
threats to politicians at the centre; as does the simultaneous transfer of only 
limited amounts of administrative, fiscal, and political authority (Eaton et al. 
2010, 19). 
 
Figure 7.1:7The Sequencing of Different Decentralisation Dimensions  
in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
 
 
As this integrated assessment of decentralisation’s implementation in 
Macedonia has shown, progress in one of the reform’s dimensions, i.e. 
administrative aspects, does not necessarily mean that improvements have 
simultaneously occurred in its other dimensions, i.e. fiscal decentralisation and 
to a certain extent, political decentralisation. Figure 7.1 illustrates how the 
political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralisation in Macedonia 
(represented by the small grey triangle) have not occurred at a balanced pace 
(symbolised by the red triangle). This review has also shown that changes in 
decentralisation’s political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions may not always 
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occur in the same direction. The increasing dominance of national parties in 
local politics, for example, has meant that political decentralisation has actually 
become more centralising over time. While the sequencing of decentralisation in 
a post-conflict environment may be justified in the short-term, attempts to solve 
self-determination conflicts through decentralisation in the longer term will fail if 
self-governance continues to exist only in form but not in substance. 
 
 
Contextual Factors: A ‘Culture of Passivity’ among Citizens 
 
The presence of a vibrant, inclusive civil society is another important pre-
condition for successful decentralisation. Decentralisation alone is insufficient 
for fostering democratic processes conducive to conflict management. 
However, the low proportion of Macedonian citizens that had either participated 
in municipal activities or intend to do so in the future suggests citizens are 
generally not interested in exercising their voice. This “culture of passivity” 
remains a significant challenge to the success of participatory local governance 
and is a particularly common problem in post-Communist societies.  
 
The pervasive nature of patronage politics in Macedonia also undermines 
decentralisation’s ability to deepen local democracy, since patronage fuels voter 
apathy and deters local residents from becoming active in municipal affairs. 
Societies dependent on clientelistic exchange between parties and voters are 
not conducive to encouraging the development of responsive and accountable 
local governance. This is because the voting preferences of citizens tend to be 
influenced by the promise of a job or financial reward, rather than a politician’s 
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success in providing collective local benefits. The absence a vibrant civil 
society, serving as public watchdogs, may also encourage clientelism which, left 
unchecked could undermine the legitimacy of decentralised governance 
structures.  
 
 
Albanian Political Elites and the Politics of Betrayal 
 
As the analysis in Chapter 2 suggests, the existence of horizontal inequalities is 
insufficient to explain whether group grievances actually become a political 
issue at the national level. This will only happen if inequalities are experienced 
by group leaders and their followers simultaneously. Even with the presence of 
severe socio-economic inequalities at the mass level, the absence of political 
HIs among elites may reduce the risk of violent group mobilisation because 
group leaders lack the incentives to mobilise their constituents for violent 
conflict.  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the blame for decentralisation’s only 
partial success in meeting the needs of ordinary Albanian citizens may lie with 
the Albanian political elites currently in government. According to leading 
development experts, the extent to which governments adopt mechanisms to 
regularly monitor the progress of reforms represents a litmus test for assessing 
its true commitment to its outcomes (Eaton et al. 2010, 64). The fact that more 
than eleven years after the Framework Agreement was signed in August 2001, 
the DUI-led Secretariat for Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement has failed to 
establish any system to monitor the implementation of equitable representation 
and community language use locally raises questions regarding the party’s 
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commitment to the Framework Agreement’s principles. Additionally, DUI had an 
opportunity to improve the realisation of citizens’ language rights locally when it 
was invited to propose amendments to the law on use of languages during 
parliamentary coalition negotiations in 2011. Instead, DUI proposed an 
amendment to the law that would benefit only appointed or elected party 
functionaries at the expense of their constituents. 
 
There are various reasons why DUI party elites have become engaged in a 
‘politics of betrayal’ and have turned their back on their constituents. First, 
decentralisation, along with the use of power-sharing mechanisms nationally, 
may have successfully integrated (DUI) Albanian political elites into state 
structures and they no longer feel political aggrieved. They may also be 
sufficiently satisfied with the ‘perks’ of office, such as opportunities for personal 
enrichment and the dispensing of patronage, and no longer interested in 
pushing for further reform that will benefit their constituents. Second, DUI 
political elites may have entered into an agreement with their (VMRO-DPMNE) 
coalition partners not to pursue further reforms that will benefit Albanians at the 
expense of majority Macedonian voters. Instances where minority ethnic parties 
have been ‘bought off’ by the dominant community is common in ethnically 
divided societies. An example of this phenomenon is how Palestinian elites 
have postponed or effectively abandoned the struggle for Palestinian national 
rights in return for being given the opportunity to “bask in the warmth of Israeli 
economic growth” (Khalidi and Samour 2011, 17). Of course, another pertinent 
example is the behaviour of Albanian political elites in coalition with SDSM and 
later VMRO-DPMNE during the 1990s. Third, given the extent to which DUI has 
tied its political reputation to the fate of the Framework Agreement (it regards 
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itself as the true guardian of its implementation), the party may feel it 
tantamount to political suicide to admit that, eleven years on, the Agreement 
may not have lived up to expectations and requires improving. Finally, and as 
greed theorists would argue, the conflict in 2001 may have in fact been driven 
by private material gains of militant opportunists, with the genuine grievances of 
the Albanian community only being manipulated by them as pretexts for revolt. 
 
Whatever the motivation, the inability of mainstream Albanian politicians to 
adequately address the grievances of their community during the 1990s led to 
an erosion of trust in the political class among ordinary Albanians. This created 
an opportunity for new actors, who were prepared to pursue Albanian interests 
outside the discredited political process, to seek to address these demands 
through other means. There is a danger of history repeating itself if Albanian 
political elites in Macedonia continue to put their own needs above those of the 
people they are supposed to represent. 
 
 
Suggestions for Further Research  
 
This thesis has focused specifically on decentralisation’s implementation, 
including the effectiveness of local power-sharing mechanisms, rather than on 
how the reform fits within the wider Framework Agreement. An important area 
of further research would therefore be to take a broader look at decentralisation 
within the wider peace agreement, and to consider whether complex power-
sharing has contributed to the management of ethnic difference in Macedonia.  
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This study has not examined in detail the work of (limited) formal mechanisms 
of dispute resolution between the central and local levels.7 The decision not to 
do so was based on their relative insignificance within a unitary state such as 
Macedonia, and because initial research findings suggested that existing 
mechanisms had not been utilised by the municipalities. In light of the significant 
financial difficulties experienced by the municipalities, it would therefore be of 
interest to research why no municipality brought an inter-governmental dispute 
to the Constitutional Court for review between 2005 and 2012.  
 
Decentralisation is believed to promote a more equitable distribution of state 
resources by uniting poor areas with more affluent ones. Significantly, and 
unlike in other countries such as Kosovo, Macedonia’s decentralisation process 
led to the creation of fewer rather than additional rural municipalities. It would 
therefore be of interest to ascertain whether the reform has facilitated a 
reduction in disparities within individual Macedonian municipalities.  
 
Finally, whilst it has not been the intention of this thesis to offer generalisable 
findings, it would be beneficial to test the research findings in future studies 
within similar contexts, for example the implementation of decentralisation in 
neighbouring Kosovo as a mechanism for managing relations between Albanian 
and Serbian communities. 
 
There is plenty of scope for building on the implementation aspects of 
decentralisation. This thesis has provided a starting point for deeper 
consideration of how to fill the gap in decentralisation research in the context of 
ethnically divided states and societies. 
                                                          
7
 Disputes between the different tiers of government should be resolved by the Constitutional Court 
(Official Gazette 2002 Arts. 51, 71, 87). 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A: The Territorial Pattern of Ethnic Demography in  
the Republic of Macedonia (Turkish and Roma Communities) 
 
 
 
Source: SSO 2005. 
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Appendix B: Map of the Proposed ‘Republic of Ilirida’  
within a Federal Republic of Macedonia8  
 
 
 
       Source: Ejupi 1992. 
                                                          
8
 The map’s legend explains that the area shaded red represents the proposed ‘Republic of Ilirida’, within a 
broader ‘Federal Republic of Macedonia’, and is where Albanians constitute more than 80 percent of the 
local population. This area represents 36 percent of the total territory of the Republic of Macedonia. The 
area shaded yellow represents territory where Albanians constitute approximately 50 percent of the local 
population is “open for discussion” and may represent a possible third federal unit.  
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Appendix C: MANU Proposal for the Partition of the  
Republic of Macedonia (May 2001)  
 
 
 
Map published in a Macedonian language newspaper.  
Source: Dnevnik (2001). 
 
 
Map published in an Albanian language newspaper. 
Source: Fatki (2001). 
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Appendix D: Equitable Representation of Ethnic Communities  
in 15 Selected Municipal Administrations 
 
Name of 
Municipality 
No. of Pop 
/ Staff 
Mac. 
% 
Alb.  
% 
Turkish 
% 
Roma 
% 
Vlach 
% 
Serb. 
% 
Boš.  
% 
Other 
% 
Brvenica 15,855 37.5 61.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 
2006 12 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 16 37.5 62.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Čair 64,823 24.1 57.0 6.9 4.8 0.1 1.0 4.6 1.5 
2006 36 55.6 38.9 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 58 29.3 67.2 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Časka 7,673 57.3 35.2 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 
2006 11 100.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 22 86.4 9.1 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dolneni 13,568 35.9 26.7 19.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 17.5 0.6 
2006 8 62.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 16 56.3 6.3 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 
Gostivar 81,042 19.6 66.7 9.9 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2006 57 22.8 71.9 1.8 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 73 17.8 76.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Jegunovce 10,790 55.3 43.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 
2006 11 90.9 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 17 88.2 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kičevo 30,138 53.6 30.5 8.1 5.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.9 
2006 61 88.5 8.2 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 89 83.1 11.2 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kruševo 9,684 62.8 21.3 3.3 0.0 10.5 0.4 1.4 0.3 
2006 20 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 22 81.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kumanovo 105,484 60.4 25.9 0.3 4.0 0.1 8.6 0.0 0.6 
2006 76 - - - - - - - - 
2010 118 80.5 11.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Mavrovo  
& Rostuša 
8,618 50.5 17.2 31.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 
2006 11 72.7 9.1 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 
2010 15 53.3 0.0 26.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Petrovec 8,255 51.4 22.9 0.9 1.6 0.0 5.0 17.5 0.7 
2006 10 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 21 90.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 
Sopište 5,656 60.2 34.3 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.5 
2006 18 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 
2010 30 86.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 
Struga 63,376 32.1 56.9 5.7 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 3.8 
2006 76 61.8 26.3 1.3 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 6.6 
2010 95 41.0 47.4 3.2 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 
Vrapčište 25,399 4.1 83.1 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
2006 6 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 34 8.8 82.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Zelenikovo 4,077 61.9 29.6 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.1 4.7 0.5 
2006 8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2010 8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sources: MCIC 2006, 2010; ADI 2010. 
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Appendix E: Membership Data for Municipal 
Committees for Inter-Community Relations
9 
 
 
Municipality 
 
Required 
by Law? 
 
No. of 
Members 
No. of 
Female 
Members 
No. of 
Municipal 
Councillors  
All 
Communities 
Represented?
10
 
Equal 
Representation 
of Communities? 
Brvenica Yes 6 0  No: S = 0.49% Yes 
Butel Yes      
Čair
11
 Yes 4 1  No: R = 4.76% Yes 
Čaška Yes 5 1  No: A =35.23%,  
T = 5.1% 
 
Čucer 
Sandevo 
Yes      
Debar
12
 Yes 5 0  Yes Yes 
Dolneni Yes      
Jegunovce Yes 5 1 5 - all Yes No – 3M, 2A 
Kičevo Yes      
Kruševo Yes 5 0  No: V = 10.53% Yes 
Kumanovo Yes 12 2 0 - none Yes Yes 
Mavrovo and 
Roštusa 
Yes      
Petrovec Yes      
Sopište Yes      
Struga
13
 Yes 8 0  Yes Yes 
Šuto Orizari Yes 5 0    
Tetovo
14
 Yes 5 0  Yes Yes 
Vraneštica Yes      
Vrapcište Yes      
Zelenikovo Yes      
Bogovinje No 3 1 3 No: T = 4.09% No –all Albanian 
Dojran No 5 1 5 - all No: R = 1.05%  
(A=only 0.47%) 
No – 2A, 1M,  
1S, 1T 
Drugovo No 3 1 1 No: A = 4.77%  No – 2T 
Gevgelija No 5 2 0 Yes Yes 
Gostivar
15
 No 4 0  Yes Yes 
Kratovo No 5 1 5 - all No: S = 0.23% 
(T=only 0.08%) 
No – 3M, 1T, 
1R 
Lipkovo No 5 0 2 No: S = 1.7% No – 3A, 2M 
Lozovo No 7 1 2 Yes No – 2T 
Oslomej No 5 0 4 Yes No – 4A, 1M 
Saraj No 3 0 3 - all No: M = 3.9%,  
B = 3.2% 
No – all 
Albanian 
Staro 
Nagoricane 
No 5 1 2 Yes No – 4M, 1S 
Valandovo No 6 2 6 - all No: R = 6.27% Yes 
Source: ZELS 2010a. 
                                                          
9
 This data was collected directly from municipalities by ZELS in September 2010. 
10
 The following abbreviations apply to the different nationalities: Albanian - A, Bošniak - B,  
Macedonian -  M, Roma - R, Serbian - S, Turkish - T, Vlach - V. 
11
 Source: Foundation Metamorphosis and Common Values 2011, 26. 
12
 Source: Foundation Metamorphosis and Common Values 2011, 25. 
13
 Information available at Municipality of Struga’s website: www.struga.gov.mk/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=76&Itemid=117&lang=sq [Accessed: 07/04/10]. 
14
 Source: Foundation Metamorphosis and Common Values 2011, 26. 
15
 Source: Foundation Metamorphosis and Common Values 2011, 26. 
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Appendix F: Municipality Council Members in 30 Mono- and Multi-ethnic 
Municipalities, According to Gender and Ethnicity, 2009 
 
 
 
Municipality 
Total No. 
of Council 
Members 
Female 
Council 
Members 
 
Alb. 
 
Mac. 
 
Boš. 
 
Rom. 
 
Turk. 
 
Female  
(%) 
 
Urban 
/ Rural 
Aračinovo 15 5 5     33.3 Rural 
Bevoro 15 5  5    33.3 Urban 
Bogovinje  19 6 6     31.6 Rural 
Brvenica 15 5 3 2    33.3 Rural 
Butel 19 5 1 4    26.3 Urban 
Čair 27 6 4 1 1   22.2 Urban 
Centar Župa16 11 1  1    9.1 Rural 
Debar  15 3 3     20.0 Urban 
Debarca 10 4  4    40.0 Rural 
Dolneni 15 2  1 1   13.3 Rural 
Gostivar 31 8 4 2   2 25.8 Urban 
Kičevo 19 4  4    21.1 Urban 
Kisela Voda 23 10  10    43.5 Urban 
Kumanovo 33 7 1 6    21.2 Urban 
Lipkovo 19 4 4     21.1 Rural 
Oslomej 15 4 4     26.7 Rural 
Mavrovo and 
Rostuše  
11 2  2    18.2 Rural 
Mogila 11 2      18.2 Rural 
Saraj  19 
 
6 6     31.5 Rural 
Skopje 45 13 3 9  1  28.8 Urban 
Struga  27 7 3 3 1   25.9 Urban 
Studeničani 15 1 1     6.6 Rural 
Šuto Orizari 19 3 1   2  15.8 Urban 
Tearce 19 5 2 3    26.3 Rural 
Tetovo 31 9 6 3    29.0 Urban 
Vevčani 8 3  3    37.5 Rural 
Vrapčište 19 4 3    1 21.1 Rural 
Zajas 15 5 5     33.3 Rural 
Želino 19 4 4     21.1 Rural 
Sources: MCIC 2010; UNDP 2010b, 16.   
 
                                                          
16
 The proportion of female councillors in the shaded municipalities falls below 20 percent. 
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Appendix G: Recruitment of Civil Servants in All Municipal 
Administrations between 2006 and 2010, according to Gender17 
 
Name of 
Municipality 
Urban / 
Rural  
No. of Staff 
2006-2010 
Female 
(No.) 
Female 
(%) 
Male   
(No.) 
Male  
(%) 
Staff 
Increase  
(%) 
Women's 
Increase 
(%) 
Aerodrom Urban 
26 15 57.7 11 42.3 
169.2 173.3 
70 41 58.6 29 41.4 
Aračinovo Urban 
10 3 30.0 7 70.0 
-30.0 -33.3 
7 2 28.6 5 71.4 
Berovo Urban 
37 10 27.0 27 73.0 
13.5 20.0 
42 12 28.6 30 71.4 
Bitola Urban 
103 40 38.8 63 61.2 
22.3 25.0 
126 50 39.7 76 60.3 
Bogdanci Urban 
13 9 69.2 4 30.8 
0.0 0.0 
13 9 69.2 4 30.8 
Bogovinje Rural 
31 5 16.1 26 83.9 
9.7 40.0 
34 7 20.6 27 79.4 
Bosilovo Rural 
7 3 42.9 4 57.1 
114.3 33.3 
15 4 26.7 11 73.3 
Butel Urban 
12 7 58.3 2 16.7 
258.3 185.7 
43 20 46.5 23 53.5 
Brvenica Rural 
12 6 50.0 6 50.0 
33.3 16.7 
16 7 43.8 9 56.3 
Čaška Rural 
11 6 54.5 5 45.5 
100.0 66.7 
22 10 45.5 12 54.5 
Centar Urban 
53 34 64.2 19 35.8 
15.1 23.5 
61 42 68.9 19 31.1 
Centar Župa Rural 
7 1 14.3 6 85.7 
42.9 0.0 
10 1 10.0 9 90.0 
Cesinovo- 
Oblesovo 
Rural 
13 6 46.2 7 53.8 
7.7 0.0 
14 6 42.9 8 57.1 
Čučer-
Sandevo 
Rural 
18 9 50.0 9 50.0 
27.8 44.4 
23 13 56.5 10 43.5 
Čair Urban 
36 13 36.1 23 63.9 
61.1 38.5 
58 18 31.0 40 69.0 
Debarca Rural 
10 5 50.0 5 50.0 
20.0 20.0 
12 6 50.0 6 50.0 
Delcevo Urban 
38 11 28.9 27 71.1 
7.9 90.9 
41 21 51.2 20 48.8 
Demir Kapija Urban 
10 5 50.0 5 50.0 
20.0 20.0 
12 6 50.0 6 50.0 
Demir Hisar Urban 
29 13 44.8 16 55.2 
20.7 23.1 
35 16 45.7 19 54.3 
                                                          
17
 Complete data was unavailable in the following 13 municipalities: City of Skopje, Debar, Dolneni, Gjorce 
Petrov, Gostivar, Ilinden, Kriva Palanka, Struga, Tetovo, Veles, Vinica, Zajas, and Zelino. Employee data 
for 2006 is displayed in the shaded rows. Data for 2010 is below. 
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Name of 
Municipality 
Urban / 
Rural  
No. of Staff 
2006-2010 
Female 
(No.) 
Female 
(%) 
Male   
(No.) 
Male       
(%) 
Staff 
Increase
 (%) 
Women's 
Increase 
(%) 
Dojran Urban 
8 4 50.0 4 50.0 
62.5 25.0 
13 5 38.5 8 61.5 
Drugovo Rural 
7 4 57.1 3 42.9 
42.9 75.0 
10 7 70.0 3 30.0 
Gazi Baba Urban 
44 19 43.2 25 56.8 
54.5 89.5 
68 36 52.9 32 47.1 
Gevgelija Urban 
58 23 39.7 35 60.3 
22.4 39.1 
71 32 45.1 39 54.9 
Gradsko Rural 
12 6 50.0 6 50.0 
-25.0 -16.7 
9 5 55.6 4 44.4 
Jegunovce Rural 
11 6 54.5 5 45.5 
54.5 16.7 
17 7 41.2 10 58.8 
Karbinci Rural 
6 2 33.3 4 66.7 
50.0 200.0 
9 6 66.7 3 33.3 
Karpoš Urban 
62 41 66.1 21 33.9 
77.4 46.3 
110 60 54.5 50 45.5 
Kavadarci Urban 
57 27 47.4 30 52.6 
-14.0 14.8 
49 31 63.3 18 36.7 
Kičevo Urban 
61 30 49.2 31 50.8 
45.9 16.7 
89 35 39.3 54 60.7 
Kisela Voda Urban 
38 18 47.4 20 52.6 
126.3 166.7 
86 48 55.8 38 44.2 
Kocani Urban 
48 20 41.7 28 58.3 
39.6 30.0 
67 26 38.8 41 61.2 
Konce Rural 
4 1 25.0 3 75.0 
125.0 200.0 
9 3 33.3 6 66.7 
Kratovo Urban 
16 7 43.8 9 56.3 
18.8 28.6 
19 9 47.4 10 52.6 
Krivogastani Rural 
4 3 75.0 1 25.0 
175.0 100.0 
11 6 54.5 5 45.5 
Kumanovo Urban 
76 47 61.8 29 38.2 
55.3 -34.0 
118 31 26.3 87 73.7 
Kruševo Urban 
20 12 60.0 8 40.0 
10.0 8.3 
22 13 59.1 9 40.9 
Lipkovo Rural 
36 10 27.8 26 72.2 
-5.6 -40.0 
34 6 17.6 28 82.4 
Lozovo Rural 
6 2 33.3 4 66.7 
33.3 50.0 
8 3 37.5 5 62.5 
Makedonska 
Kamenica 
Urban 
10 3 30.0 7 70.0 
120.0 100.0 
22 6 27.3 16 72.7 
Makedonski 
Brod 
Urban 
18 8 44.4 10 55.6 
72.2 125.0 
31 18 58.1 13 41.9 
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Name of 
Municipality 
Urban / 
Rural  
No. of Staff 
2006-2010 
Female 
(No.) 
Female 
(%) 
Male   
(No.) 
Male       
(%) 
Staff 
Increase  
(%) 
Women's 
Increase 
(%) 
Mavrovo and 
Rostuša 
Rural 
11 5 45.5 6 54.5 
36.4 -20.0 
15 4 26.7 11 73.3 
Mogila Rural 
9 3 33.3 6 66.7 
11.1 66.7 
10 5 50.0 5 50.0 
Negotino Urban 
29 7 24.1 22 75.9 
-13.8 0.0 
25 7 28.0 17 68.0 
Novaci Rural 
10 3 30.0 7 70.0 
40.0 66.7 
14 5 35.7 9 64.3 
Novo Selo Rural 
9 5 55.6 4 44.4 
188.9 80.0 
26 9 34.6 17 65.4 
Ohrid Urban 
75 42 56.0 43 57.3 
73.3 31.0 
130 55 42.3 75 57.7 
Oslomej Rural 
9 1 11.1 8 88.9 
44.4 100.0 
13 2 15.4 11 84.6 
Pehcevo Urban 
7 3 42.9 4 57.1 
28.6 0.0 
9 3 33.3 6 66.7 
Petrovec Rural 
10 4 40.0 6 60.0 
110.0 125.0 
21 9 42.9 12 57.1 
Plasnica Rural 
7 0 0.0 7 100.
0 28.6 200.0 9 2 22.2 7 77.8 
Prilep Urban 
113 35 31.0 78 69.0 
-25.7 22.9 
84 43 51.2 41 48.8 
Probistip Urban 
20 14 70.0 6 30.0 
135.0 28.6 
47 18 38.3 29 61.7 
Radoviš Urban 
38 15 39.5 23 60.5 
7.9 33.3 
41 20 48.8 21 51.2 
Rankovce Rural 
6 4 66.7 2 33.3 
133.3 125.0 
14 9 64.3 5 35.7 
Resen Urban 
47 16 34.0 41 87.2 
36.2 31.3 
64 21 32.8 43 67.2 
Rosoman Rural 
5 1 20.0 4 80.0 
20.0 0.0 
6 1 16.7 5 83.3 
Saraj Rural 
27 7 25.9 20 74.1 
25.9 0.0 
34 7 20.6 27 79.4 
Sopiste Rural 
18 7 38.9 11 61.1 
66.7 157.1 
30 18 60.0 12 40.0 
Staro 
Nagoricane 
Rural 
11 4 36.4 7 63.6 
72.7 75.0 
19 7 36.8 12 63.2 
Strumica Urban 
80 33 41.3 47 58.8 
67.5 42.4 
134 47 35.1 87 64.9 
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Name of 
Municipality 
Urban / 
Rural  
No. of 
Staff 
2006-2010 
Female 
(No.) 
Female 
(%) 
Male   
(No.) 
Male       
(%) 
Staff 
Increase
 (%) 
Women's 
Increase 
(%) 
Studeničani Rural 
10 2 20.0 8 80.0 
-20.0 50.0 
8 3 37.5 5 62.5 
Sveti Nikole Urban 
32 15 46.9 17 53.1 
65.6 6.7 
53 16 30.2 37 69.8 
Štip Urban 
68 24 35.3 44 64.7 
39.7 29.2 
95 31 32.6 64 67.4 
Šuto Orizari Urban 
24 9 37.5 15 62.5 
0.0 0.0 
24 9 37.5 15 62.5 
Tearce Rural 
18 2 11.1 16 88.9 
5.6 0.0 
19 2 10.5 17 89.5 
Valandovo Urban 
25 12 48.0 3 12.0 
-4.0 0.0 
24 12 50.0 12 50.0 
Vasilevo Rural 
8 3 37.5 5 62.5 
187.5 266.7 
23 11 47.8 12 52.2 
Vevčani Rural 
6 2 33.3 4 66.7 
16.7 150.0 
7 5 71.4 2 28.6 
Vraneštica Rural 
6 2 33.3 4 66.7 
100.0 50.0 
12 3 25.0 8 66.7 
Vrapčište Rural 
27 5 18.5 22 81.5 
25.9 0.0 
34 5 14.7 29 85.3 
Zelenikovo Rural 
8 3 37.5 5 62.5 
0.0 0.0 
8 3 37.5 5 62.5 
Zrnovci Rural 
6 1 16.7 5 83.3 
33.3 200.0 
8 3 37.5 5 62.5 
Sources: MCIC 2006, 2010; ADI 201. 
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Appendix H: Number of Schools (including Branches) and Class Sections, 
According to Language of Instruction (Regular Primary and  
Lower Secondary Schools) 
 
 
Year 
 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
 No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
Macedonian 
 
764 6,578 759 6,506 748 6,986 740 6,968 
Albanian 
 
280 3,087 284 3,105 286 3,449 288 3,453 
Turkish 
 
57 272 57 274 60 353 61 318 
Serbian 
 
11 37 10 35 8 35 8 36 
Total 
 
1,012 9,974 1,010 9,920 1,005 10,823 1,000 10,775 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
2007/08 2008/2009 2009/10 20010/11 
 No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
Macedonian 
 
737 6,927 734 6,924 729 6,812 731 6,773 
Albanian 
 
289 3,431 287 3,440 289 3,426 288 3,403 
Turkish 
 
60 321 60 318 62 348 62 352 
Serbian 
 
8 34 7 31 7 36 7 39 
Total 
 
997 10,713 991 10,713 990 10,622 990 10,567 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
 
 310 
Appendix I: Number of Schools (including Branches) and Class Sections,  
According to Language of Instruction (Regular Upper Secondary Schools) 
 
 
Year 
 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
 No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
Macedonian 
 
89 2,441 90 2,445 - - 93 2,418 
Albanian 
 
23 521 27 609 - - 29 696 
Turkish 
 
5 25 8 26 - - 8 41 
English 
 
6 45 6 54 - - 7 64 
Total
18
 
 
96 3,032 100 3,134 - - 104 3,219 
 
 
Year 
 
2007/08 2008/2009 2009/10 20010/11 
 No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
No. of 
Schools 
Class 
Sections 
Macedonian 
 
96 2,401 99 2,394 99 2,422 101 2,395 
Albanian 
 
32 722 33 781 35 853 34 912 
Turkish 
 
9 48 10 55 10 59 10 61 
English 
 
7 66 7 65 5 64 7 73 
Total 
 
107 3,237 110 3,295 110 3,398 114 3,441 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
 
Appendix J: Proportion of Serbian Students Learning in their Mother 
Tongue (Regular Primary and Lower Secondary Schools) 
 
 
Year No. of 
Students 
No. of Students Learning 
in Mother Tongue 
Students Learning 
in Mother Tongue 
2004/05 
 
2,335 174 7.45 
2005/06 
 
- - - 
2006/07 
 
2,242 193 8.61 
2007/08 
 
2,076 177 8.53 
2008/09 
 
1,943 177 9.11 
2009/10 
 
1,871 153 8.18 
2010/11 1,733 145 8.37 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
 
 
                                                          
18
 The cumulative totals of both primary and secondary schools do not match the values included in the 
‘total’ column since some schools are bi or trilingual. 
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Appendix K: Regular and Lower Secondary Schools  
According to the Number of Students 
 
 
No. of Schools 
 
No. of 
Students 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Up to 20 
 
300 310 - 278 292 302 301 311 
21 – 50 
 
171 167 - 177 173 166 178 173 
Total no.  
of schools 
1,012 1,010 - 1,000 997 991 990 990 
Sources: SSO 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010a; 2011; 2012b. 
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Appendix L: Representativeness of 60 Primary School Board Members, 
According to the Ethnic Profile of Students19 
 
 Ethnic Profile Mac Alb Turk Roma Vlach Serb Boš Other Total Rep? 
1 School population 295 15 10 518 - - - - 843  
 Board members 7 - - 2 - - - - 9 No 
2 School population 297 332 9 5 5 5 5 42 695  
 Board members 6 3 - - - - - - 9 No 
3 School population 37 717 6 8 - 1 87 6 862  
 Board members 3 5 - - - - - - 8 No 
4 School population 3 340 80 91 - - 6 5 525  
 Board members 1 4 2 1 - - 1  9 Yes 
5 School population 146 136 7 585 - 5 60 12 951  
 Board members 6 2 - 1 - - - - 9 No 
6 School population 182 - - 3 - 32 - - 217  
 Board members 6 3 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
7 School population 40 599 89 172 - - - 236 1136  
 Board members 1 8 - - - - - - 9 No 
8 School population - 517 - 84 - - - - 601  
 Board members - 8 - 1 - - - - 9 Yes 
9 School population 567 - 4 79 - - - - 650  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
10 School population 193 7 41 14 - 22 - - 284  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
11 School population 746 47 4 144 3 17 19 4 984  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
12 School population 352 134 - 7 - 2 - - 495  
 Board members 7 2 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
13 School population 723 7 12 2 - 24 49 2 819  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 Yes 
14 School population 228 114 - 3 - 6 - 2 353  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
15 School population 369 164 - 95 - - 5 2 635  
 Board members 7 1 - - - - - - 8 No 
16 School population 172 10 22 47 - 1 57 2 311  
 Board members 8 - - - - 1 - - 9 No 
17 School population 465 - - 208 - 4 - - 677  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
18 School population 484 673 52 330 - 1 - 2 1542  
 Board members 3 5 - 1 - - - - 9 Yes 
19 School population 597 412 - 55 - - - - 1092  
 Board members 5 4 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
20 School population - 1287 143 - - - - - 1430  
 Board members - 9 - - - - - - 9 No 
                                                          
19
 I have underlined the instances where I consider a particular ethnic community is under-represented on 
the School Board. 
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 Ethnic Profile Mac Alb Turk Roma Vlach Serb Boš Other Total Rep? 
21 School population 28 39 - - - - - - 419  
 Board members 8 1 - - - - - - 9 No 
22 School population 239 14 8 41 - - 43 - 345  
 Board members 8 - - - - - - 1 9 No 
23 School population 336 - - 64 - 24 - - 424  
 Board members 5 - - - - 2 - 2 9 No 
24 School population 988 74 - 6 - 12 - - 1080  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
25 School population 280 9 - 5 - 31 - - 350  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
26 School population 123 197 - - - - - - 323  
 Board members 6 3 - - - - - - 9 No 
27 School population 220 - 61 - 3 - - - 384  
 Board members 7 - 1 - 1 - - - 9 Yes 
28 School population 340 - - 1 - 5 - 7 353  
 Board members 7 - - - - 2 - - 9 Yes 
29 School population 180 704 237 380 - - - - 1501  
 Board members 1 6 - 2 - - - - 9 No 
30 School population 518 - 34 1 - - - - 553  
 Board members 8 - 1 - - - - - 9 Yes 
31 School population 458 - - 5 5 2 - - 470  
 Board members 8 - - - 1 - - - 9 Yes 
32 School population 412 - - 1 1 - - 5 419  
 Board members 8 - - - - - - - 8 Yes 
33 School population 628 - 6 83 2 - - - 719  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
34 School population 636 - 6 57 3 - - 1 703  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 Yes 
35 School population 217 - 70 - - - - - 287  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
36 School population 686 - - 66 - - - - 752  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
37 School population 656 - - 3 - 94 - - 753  
 Board members 6 - - - - 3 - - 9 Yes 
38 School population 439 89 - 35 - 59 - - 622  
 Board members 7 1 - - - 1 - - 9 No 
39 School population 29 22 - 9 - - - 2 62  
 Board members 5 4 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
40 School population 175 - 35 - - - - - 211  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
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 Ethnic Profile Mac Alb Turk Roma Vlach Serb Bos Other Total Rep? 
41 School population 654 8 16 122 - 13 - 13 826  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
42 School population 403 300 200 17 - - - 238 1158  
 Board members 2 3 3 - - - - - 9 No 
43 School population 30 113 4 - - - 160 - 307  
 Board members 1 6 - - - - 2 - 9 No 
44 School population 432 215 - 16 - 43 50 1 757  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
45 School population 65 17 - - - - - - 82  
 Board members 8 1 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
46 School population 51 79 - - - - - - 130  
 Board members 4 5 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
47 School population 93 - - - - 9 - - 102  
 Board members 7 - - - - 2 - - 9 Yes 
48 School population 455 3 25 229 13 1 - - 726  
 Board members 8 - - 1 - - - - 9 No 
49 School population 699 - 4 36 38 - - 5 752  
 Board members 7 - - - 2 - - - 9 Yes 
50 School population 439 710 56 73 3 2 - 24 1307  
 Board members 4 4 1 - - - - - 9 Yes 
51 School population 237 22 - - - - - - 259  
 Board members 7 1 - - - - - - 8 Yes 
52 School population 15 268 - - - - - - 283  
 Board members 1 8 - - - - - - 9 Yes 
53 School population 140 239 25 15 - - - - 419  
 Board members 3 3 3 - - - - - 9 Yes 
54 School population 244 38 - 44 - 5 - 7 338  
 Board members 7 2 - - - - - - 9 No 
55 School population 619 938 26 30 - - - - 1613  
 Board members 3 5 1 - - - - - 9 Yes 
56 School population 350 175 1 110 - - 2 - 638  
 Board members 7 2 - - - - - - 9 No 
57 School population 394 - 29 2 - 9 - 3 437  
 Board members 7 - 1 - - 1 - - 9 Yes 
58 School population 191 - 37 - - 48 - - 276  
 Board members 8 - 1 - - - - - 9 Yes 
59 School population 271 13 37 158 - 4 2 - 485  
 Board members 8 - 1 - - - - - 9 No 
60 School population 475 - 28 168 - - - 1 672  
 Board members 9 - - - - - - - 9 No 
Source: USAID 2011. 
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Appendix M: Capital Expenditures for Education,  
According to Municipality (2006 - 2009) 
 
 
No. Municipality 2006 2007 2008 2009 Funding Trend? 
1 Aračinovo 0.00
20
 0.00 0.00 18.82 Yes 
2 Berovo 5.05 26.51 15.13 64.97 Yes 
3 Bogdanci 0.00 2.34 103.24 282.60 Yes 
4 Bogovinje 0.00 28.82 60.23 77.50 Yes 
5 Bosilovo 0.00 0.00 11.09 27.82 Yes 
6 Brvenica  0.00 263.87 46.72 44.66 No 
7 Vasilevo 0.00 10.13 65.93 22.28 No 
8 Vevčani 0.00
21
 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 
9 Veles  16.87 77.38 90.20 158.55 Yes 
10 Vinica  11.01 11.50 5.28 19.06 Yes 
11 Vrapchishte 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.17 Yes 
12 Gevgelija 2.50 15.77 78.05 259.84 Yes 
13 Gostivar 62.51 88.53 29.86 1.29 No 
14 Debar  0.00 10.93 0.00 186.54 Yes 
15 Delchevo 14.19 17.89 10.41 33.44 Yes 
16 Demir Kapija 0.00 0.00 0.00 67.64 Yes 
17 Demir Hisar 0.00 2.09 0.00 26.73 Yes 
18 Dojran 0.00 16.68 15.03 300.17 Yes 
19 Dolneni 0.00 26.31 32.80 14.56 No 
20 Drugovo 0.00 47.23 45.45 36.64 No 
21 Zajas 0.00 8.34 149.31 0.00 No 
22 Kavadarci 25.40 22.77 129.83 141.54 Yes 
23 Karbinci 0.00 18.10 2.70 467.82 Yes 
24 Kičevo 9.93 0.30 0.00 115.07 Yes 
25 Konče 0.00 0.00 180.86 329.36 Yes 
26 Kocani 18.14 17.87 65.11 167.53 Yes 
27 Kriva Palanka 4.70 5.95 25.45 171.48 Yes 
28 Krivogastani 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 
29 Kruševo 7.29 10.31 21.92 63.45 Yes 
 
                                                          
20
 The shaded values represent a year where the municipality was run by a political party in opposition 
centrally. 
21
 A shaded figure represents a year where the municipality was run by an independent candidate. 
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No. Municipality 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Funding Trend? 
30 Lipkovo  0.00 0.00 0.00 43.99 Yes 
31 Lozovo 0.00 0.00 13.26 9.24 No 
32 
Mavrovo and 
Rostuše 
0.00 14.19 56.86 103.18 Yes 
33 
Makedonski 
Brod 
0.00 10.77 147.79 109.38 No 
34 
Makedonska 
Kamenica 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 No 
35 Negotino 3.35 15.51 47.04 52.68 No 
36 Oslomej  0.00 0.00 0.00 221.55 Yes 
37 Petrovec 14.47 11.07 159.04 191.86 Yes 
38 Probishtip 0.00 0.00 4.82 5.82 No 
39 Resen 0.00 0.00 27.78 25.43 No 
40 Rosoman 0.00 0.00 77.61 427.82 Yes 
41 
Staro 
Nagoričane 
0.00 0.00 0.00 81.53 Yes 
42 Sopište 0.00 283.82 195.86 1062.51 Yes 
43 Struga  25.30 32.24 27.61 54.80 Yes 
44 Studeničani 0.00 45.78 75.03 8.98 No 
45 Tearce  1.93 2.10 21.89 65.42 Yes 
46 Tetovo 31.78 140.11 233.15 199.10 Yes 
47 Centar Župa 4.75 112.99 197.81 138.55 Yes 
48 Čaška  0.00 0.00 10.44 20.68 Yes 
49 
Češinovo- 
Obleševo 
0.00 0.00 10.79 20.26 Yes 
50 Stip 13.57 15.77 16.06 44.26 Yes 
51 Gjorge Petrov  0.00 22.87 43.45 14.41 No 
52 Saraj 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.73 No 
53 Čair 0.35 0.60 0.58 118.88 Yes 
54 City of Skopje 25.32 33.88 48.97 33.45 No 
  Source: Ministry of Finance 2010. 
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Appendix N: Gross Domestic Product per Capita,  
According to Region (in MKD) 
 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
National 
Average 
116,657 114 916 120 768 127 478 134 050 
East  89,423 80,494 83,871 90,883 96,389 
Northeast  75,580 61,948 65,105 72,078 69,694 
Pelagonia  131,898 135,129 150,913 160,807 153,624 
Polog  57,701 51,563 55,029 66,174 64,377 
Skopje  180,300 183,497 188,570 192,782 213,453 
Southeast 99,128 95,993 100,269 112,626 119,194 
Southwest 93,072 86,462 93,420 86,479 95,209 
Vardar  104,226 114,900 118,014 132,670 131,528 
 
 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
National 
Average 
144 857 156 874 178 605 201 147 200 293 
East  105,128 115,672 134,114 173,815 170,486 
Northeast  73,260 82,837 92,566 122,014 104,775 
Pelagonia  151,544 154,671 174,589 208,990 219,635 
Polog  71,119 76,968 84,913 95,277 93,966 
Skopje  235,479 254,010 294,884 314,531 312,040 
Southeast 136,708 141,360 162,758 168,211 189,566 
Southwest 97,861 106,970 115,083 150,771 140,262 
Vardar  141,505 170,187 184,937 196,028 194,092 
  Source: SSO Online Database 2012a.  
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Appendix O: Map of the Republic of Macedonia’s Planning Regions 
  
Source: SSO 2010b. 
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Appendix P: The Result of Territorial Reorganisation in 1996 and 2004 
 
Planning 
Region 
32 
Municipalities 
in 1991 
123 Municipalities  
from 1996 
84 Municipalities  
from 2004 
East  
Berovo 
Berovo Berovo 
Pehcevo Pehcevo 
Vinica 
Vinica 
Vinica 
Blatec   (2,024) 
Delcevo 
Delcevo Delcevo 
Makedonska Kamenica Makedonska Kamenica 
Kocani 
Kocani 
Kocani 
Orizari   (4,410) 
Zrnovci Zrnovci
22
   (3,264) 
Cesinovo 
Cesinovo- Oblesevo 
Oblesevo  (5,076) 
Probistip 
Probistip 
Probistip 
Zletovo   (3,428) 
Sveti Nikole 
Sveti Nikole Sveti Nikole 
Lozovo Lozovo
23
   (2,858) 
Stip 
Stip Stip 
Karbinci Karbinci
24
   (4,012) 
Northeast  
Kratovo Kratovo Kratovo 
Kriva Palanka 
Kriva Palanka Kriva Palanka 
Rankovce Rankovce
25
   (4,144) 
Kumanovo 
Kumanovo  
Kumanovo Klecevce   (1,609) 
Orasac   (1,252) 
Lipkovo Lipkovo 
Staro Nagoricane 
Staro Nagoricane
26
   
(4,840) 
Makedonski 
Brod 
Makedonski Brod  
Makedonski Brod 
Samokov   (1,553) 
Plasnica Plasnica
27
   (4,545) 
Ohrid 
Ohrid  
Ohrid 
Kosel   (1,370) 
Belcista 
Debarca 
Meseista   (2,587) 
Struga 
Struga 
Struga 
Delogozdi   (7,884) 
Labunista   (8,935) 
Lukovo Velesta   (1,509) 
Vevčani Vevčani
28
   (2,433) 
     Source: SEC 1996.
                                                          
22
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
23
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
24
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
25
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
26
 Macedonian majority with 20 percent local Serbian population. 
27
 Turkish majority. 
28
 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor; Macedonian majority surrounded by Albanian-majority municipalities. 
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Planning 
Region 
32 Municipalities 
in 1991 
123 Municipalities 
from 1996 
84 Municipalities 
from 2004 
Pelagonia 
Bitola 
Bitola 
Bitola 
Bistrica   (5,050) 
Capari   (1,426)   
Kukurecani   (2,511) 
Mogila 
Mogila 
Dobrusevo   (2,175) 
Novaci 
Novaci
29
   (3,549) Bac   (755) 
Staravina   (320) 
Demir Hisar 
Demir Hisar 
Demir Hisar 
Sopotnica   (2,332) 
Kruševo 
Kruševo 
Kruševo 
Zitose   (2,128)  
Prilep 
Prilep 
Prilep Topolcani   (2,923) 
Vitoliste   (494)  
Dolneni 
Dolneni 
Krivogastani   (6,019) 
Resen Resen Resen 
Polog  
Gostivar 
Gostivar 
Gostivar 
Cegrane   (12,346) 
Vrutok   (5,999) 
Dolna Banjica   (9,467) 
Srbinovo   (3,709) 
Mavrovi Anovi  
Mavrovo-Rostuša Rostuša   (9,451) 
Vrapčište  
Vrapčište Negotino – Polosko 
(16,865) 
Tetovo 
Tetovo 
Tetovo Dzepciste   (7,963) 
Sipkovica   (7,854) 
Tearce Tearce 
Bogovinje 
Bogovinje 
Kamenjane   (14,468) 
Brvenica    Brvenica 
Jegunovce 
Jegunovce 
Vratnica   (3,563) 
Želino Želino 
                                                          
29
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
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Planning 
Region 
32 Municipalities 
in 1991 
123 Municipalities 
from 1996 
84 Municipalities 
from 2004 
Skopje  
Gazi Baba 
Gazi Baba Gazi Baba 
Aračinovo Aračinovo 
Ilinden Ilinden 
Petrovec Petrovec 
Karpos 
Karpos Karpos 
Gjorce Petrov Gjorce Petrov 
Saraj  
Saraj 
Kondovo   (11,155) 
Kisela Voda 
Kisela Voda Kisela Voda 
Zelenikovo Zelenikovo
30
   (4,077) 
Sopiste Sopiste 
Studeničani Studeničani 
Centar Centar Centar 
Čair 
Čair Čair 
Čučer-Sandevo Čučer-Sandevo 
Šuto Orizari Šuto Orizari 
Southeast  
Valandovo Valandovo Valandovo 
Gevgelija 
Gevgelija 
Gevgelija 
Miravci   (2,631) 
Bogdanci Bogdanci 
Star Dojran Dojran
31
   (3,426) 
Radovis 
Radovis 
Radovis 
Podares   (3,747) 
Konce Konce
32
   (3,536) 
Strumica 
Strumica 
Strumica Kuklis   (4,449) 
Murtino   (6,544) 
Vasilevo    Vasilevo 
Bosilovo Bosilovo 
Novo Selo Novo Selo 
Southwest 
Debar 
Debar Debar 
Centar Župa Centar Župa 
Kičevo 
Kičevo  Kičevo
33
 
Drugovo   (3,249) Drugovo
34
   (3,249) 
Oslomej   (10,438) Oslomej   (10,438) 
Vraneštica   (1,322) Vraneštica
35
   (1,322) 
Zajas   (11,605) Zajas   (11,605) 
                                                          
30
 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor with 30 percent local Albanian population. 
31
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
32
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
33
 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor with 30 percent local Albanian population. 
34
 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
35
 Macedonian majority with 20% Turks. 
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Planning 
Region 
32 Municipalities 
in 1991 
123 Municipalities 
from 1996 
84 Municipalities 
from 2004 
Vardar 
Veles 
Veles  Veles 
Gradsko Gradsko
36
   (3,760) 
Čaška  
Čaška Bogomila   (1,252)  
Izvor   (1,049) 
Kavadarci 
Kavadarci 
Kavadarci 
Konopiste   (350)  
Rosoman Rosoman
37
   (4,141) 
Negotino 
Negotino Negotino 
Demir Kapija Demir Kapija
38
   (4,545) 
    
                                                          
36
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
37
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority. 
38
 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
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Appendix Q: Characteristics of the 16 Municipalities with Populations 
Below 5,000 
 
  
Name of 
Municipality 
Population 
(2002 
Census) 
Characteristics 
1 Demir Kapija 4,545 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
2 Dojran 3,426 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
3 Drugovo *
39
 3,249 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor; Macedonian majority 
4 Gradsko 3,760 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
5 Karbinci 4,012 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
6 Konce 3,536 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority  
7 Losovo 2,858 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
8 Novaci 3,549 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
9 Plasnica 4,545 Turkish majority 
10 Rankovce 4,144 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
11 Staro Nagoricane 4,840 Macedonian majority with 20% Serbs 
12 Vevčani * 2,433 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor; Macedonian majority 
13 Vraneštica * 1,322 Macedonian majority with 20% Turks 
14 Zelenikovo 4,077 VMRO-DPMNE Mayor; 30% Albanians 
15 Zrnovci 3,264 SDSM Mayor; Macedonian majority 
Source: SEC 1996. 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 Earlier proposals for the territorial reorganisation did not include the three VMRO-DPMNE led 
municipalities marked with an asterix symbol (Drugovo, Vevčani and Vraneštica). 
 324 
Appendix R: Basic Features of the Planning Regions 
 
Region 
Area  
(km
2
) 
Regional 
Population 
(2006) 
Regional 
Ethnic 
Balance 
(2002) 
Pop. 
Density 
(km
2
) 
No. of 
Muns 
No. of 
Rural 
Muns 
No. of 
Settlements 
Proportion 
of Urban 
Population 
(2002) 
Rep. of 
Macedonia  
25,713  2,040,228  
Mac: 64%  
Alb: 25% 
Others: 
11% 
82  84  41  1767  56.7%  
East 3,537  180,938  
Mac: 93%  
Others:7% 
 
51  11  3  217  66.3%  
Northeast  2,310  173,982  
Mac: 59% 
Alb: 31% 
Others:10% 
75  6  3  192  56.6%  
Pelagonia  4,717  236,088  
Mac: 89%  
Alb: 4% 
Others: 7% 
 
50  9  4  343  67.6%  
Polog  2,416  310,178  
Mac: 19%  
Alb: 73% 
Others: 8% 
 
126  9  7  184  29.2%  
Southeast 2,739  171,972  
Mac: 90%  
Others: 
10% 
 
63  10  5  188  45.3%  
Southwest   3,340  222,385  
Mac: 49%  
Alb: 38% 
Others: 
13%  
 
66  13  8  286  36.1%  
Skopje  1,812  590,455  
Mac: 64%  
Alb: 23% 
Others: 
13% 
 
319  17  7  142  71.8%  
Vardar  4,042  154,230  
Mac: 88%  
Alb: 4% 
Others: 8% 
 
38  9  4  215  68.7%  
Sources: MoLSG 2009, 6; SSO 2005. 
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Appendix S: VAT Revenue, According to Region (in million MKD) 
 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
East  13,681 12,328 12,436 14,217 15,150 
Northeast 10,778 8,873 9,133 10,702 10,443 
Pelagonia 26,880 27,532 29,244 32,815 31,472 
Polog 14,602 13,148 13,620 17,367 17,087 
Skopje 86,120 88,252 88,546 96,093 107,662 
Southeast 14,378 13,966 13,966 16,595 17,707 
Southwest 17,388 16,211 16,832 16,479 18,292 
Vardar 13,515 14,916 14,816 17,583 17,548 
Total 197,342 195,226 198,592 221,852 235,361 
 
 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
East  16,254 18,069 20,803 27,201 26,814 
Northeast 10,851 12,443 13,842 18,461 15,991 
Pelagonia 30,556 31,526 35,313 42,620 45,008 
Polog 18,715 20,612 22,716 25,858 25,757 
Skopje 11,853 129,487 150,310 162,869 163,477 
Southeast 20,039 20,988 24,065 25,171 28,592 
Southwest 18,567 20,538 21,961 29,077 27,210 
Vardar 18,617 22,661 24,468 26,192 26,097 
Total 251,452 276,324 313,478 357,450 358,945 
          Source: SSO Online Database 2012a. 
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Appendix T: Approved and Planned Central Budget Funds  
for Underdeveloped Economic Regions (1994-2007) 
 
Year 
Approved in the 
Budget (MKD) 
1% of GDP Prescribed 
in the Law (MKD) 
Proportion of 
Approved Funds 
1994 418,000,000 1,464,090,000 28.55% 
1995 700,000,000 1,695,210,000 41.29% 
1996 750,000,000 1,764,440,000 42.51% 
1997 500,000,000 1,860,180,000 26.88% 
1998 520,000,000 1,949,790,000 26.68% 
1999 470,000,000 2,090,100,000 22.49% 
2000 758,000,000 2,363,890,000 32.08% 
2001 560,000,000 2,338,410,000 23.95% 
2002 850,000,000 2,388,900,000 35.58% 
2003 238,000,000 2,388,900,000 9.96% 
2004 221,132,000 2,652,570,000 8.33% 
2005 205,132,000 2,866,260,000 7.15% 
2006 166,000,000 3,076,290,000 5.4% 
2007 184,000,000 3,326,090,000 5.53% 
Total: 6,541,364,000 20,303,910,000 22.6% 
    Source: OSCE 2011, 51. 
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Appendix U: Area Plan of the Urban Renewal Programme  
“Skopje 2014” (May 2012) 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
 
 
S   Statues 
 
A    Statue of Alexander  
      the Great  
 
P    Statue of King     
      Phillip II of Macedon 
 
H    Five star Marriott  
       hotel 
 
 
 
 
1    Monumental  
      marble arch 
 
2    Old National  
      Theatre  
 
3    Museum of  
      Macedonian  
      Struggle for  
      Sovereignty and  
      Independence  
     “Museum of VMRO 
      and Museum of  
      Victims of  
      Communist Regime” 
 
 
 
 
 
4    Museum to the Victims of the Holocaust  
 
5    Constitutional Court, State Archive, and Archaeological Museum 
 
6    Telecommunications Agency 
 
7    Financial Police and Colonnade ‘Independent Macedonia’ 
 
8    Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
9    Macedonian Philharmonic  
      Orchestra 
 
10  Skenderbeu Square 
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